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A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 


:th^X^o. 


A  FIRST  BOOK 

IN 

METAPHYSICS 


BY 

WALTER  T.  MARVIN 

COLLEGIATE  CHURCH  PROFESSOR  OF  LOGIC  AND  MENTAL 
PHILOSOPHY  IN  RUTGERS  COLLEGE 


Nrm  fork 

THE  MACMILLAN   COMPANY 

1920 

All  rights  ruened 


^^^a^ 


COFYUOHT,  191 2,  BT  STREET  AND  SlOTH 
COPYWGHT,    191 2, 

By  the  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
Set  up  and  electiotyped.    Published  October,  igza. 


TO 
A.  H.  M. 


-  ^ 

»• 


K 


PREFACE 

This  book  is  planned  to  be  a  student's  first  book  in 
philosophy,  though  the  course  which  it  outlines  may 
either  precede  or  follow  a  course  in  the  history  of  philos- 
ophy. In  writing  the  book  I  have  had  in  mind  to  fulfil 
the  following  three  purposes:  First,  I  wished  the  book 
to  be  simple,  clear  and  definite,  and  as  brief  as  pos- 
sible in  order  that  the  student  using  it  might  devote  by 
far  the  larger  part  of  his  time  to  further  reading.  That 
is,  the  book  should  form  a  system  of  closely  connected 
topics,  an  outline  to  be  fiUed  in  by  extensive  outside 
reading  and  an  outline  to  keep  this  reading  from  becom- 
ing hopelessly  confusing.  This  reading  should  be  selected 
from  current  philosophical  literature  and  especially  from 
those  philosophical  classics  which  are  intelligible  to  the 
beginner. 

Secondly,  I  wished  to  write,  not  an  outline  of  the  his- 
torical development  of  the  problems  of  metaphysics, 
nor  a  long  discussion  regarding  the  definition  and  divi- 
sion of  philosophy,  nor  again  an  account  of  rival  philo- 
sophical schools  and  their  theories,  but  a  book  in 
metaphysics,  a  book  representing  consistently  one  con- 
temporary philosophical  tendency.  This  forced  the  book 
to  be  partisan,  but  I  believe  that  the  beginner  demands, 
and  has  the  right  to  demand,  a  modern  philosophical 
creed.    Later  he  may  have  to  outgrow  this  creed,  but 

vH 


Vm  PREFACE 

in  the  meantime  he  insists  upon  being  a  partisan  and 
takes  little  interest  in  being  led  through  a  philosophical 
museum.  Accordingly,  following  my  own  philosophical 
convictions,  I  have  tried  to  formulate  briefly  and  rigor- 
ously that  t5^e  of  neo-reahsm  which  is  a  return  at  least 
to  the  spirit,  though  not  always  to  the  letter,  of  Plato 
and  of  Aristotle. 

Lastly,  I  wished  to  adapt  the  book  especially  to  the 
Oxford  or  preceptorial  method  of  instruction.  Accord- 
ing to  this  method,  the  text-book  and  the  lectures  in 
class  should  serve  to  give  a  general  view  of  the  subject 
but  should  play  a  far  less  important  part  than  the  stu- 
dent^s  independent  reading  and  study.  The  results  of 
this  reading  and  study  should  be  expressed  in  a  weekly, 
or  better  fortnightly,  essay  submitted  to  the  preceptor 
and  afterward  discussed  with  him  in  an  informal  con- 
ference held  preferably  in  his  private  study  and  attended 
by  not  more  than  three  or  four  students.  This  enables 
the  teacher  to  deal  with  his  students  as  individuals  and 
to  vary  greatly  the  amount  and  kind  of  reading  he  as- 
signs to  each.  Some  will  do  not  only  more  difficult 
reading  than  others  but  three  or  four  times  the  amount 
of  reading. 

Besides  being  adapted  especially  to  the  use  of  under- 
graduate students  in  philosophy,  the  book  is,  if  I  mistake 
not,  adapted  also  to  the  use  of  graduate  students  as  an 
outline  of  a  course  of  reading  in  metaphysics. 

A  few  words  should  be  added  regarding  the  reading  I 
have  selected  to  which  to  refer  the  student.  One  has 
to  select  from  writings  which  are  easily  available  and, 
unfortunately,  as  far  as  possible  only  from  those  in  the 


PREFACE  IX 

English  tongue.  Hence,  it  is  often  a  matter  of  good 
fortune  to  find  articles  or  chapters  which  fit  precisely 
the  subject  of  study  and  which  are  suitable  for  the  be- 
ginner. However,  this  responsibility  will  be  shared 
with  me  by  every  instructor  who  uses  the  book,  for  not 
only  can  he  add  to  or  select  from  the  list  of  readings 
which  I  give  but  he  can  do  what  of  course  the  book  itself 
can  not  do,  keep  selecting  from  new  articles  and  books 
as  they  appear.  My  chief  regret  is  that  many  of  the 
great  classics,  especially  the  logical  and  metaphysical 
writings  of  Aristotle,  are  not  intelligible  to  the  be^nner 
and  therefore  have  had  to  be  either  omitted  or  assigned 
only  for  advanced  reading, 

Walter  T.  Marvin. 
Greensboro,  Vermont, 
August  ij  igi2. 


CONTENTS 

PART  I.    INTRODUCTORY 

Chapter  I.    Different  Views  Regarding  the  Nature  of 
Philosophy 3 

I.  Introduction.  2.  The  belief  that  philosophy  is  a  matter 
of  feeling  and  appreciative  insight.  3.  The  belief  that  philos- 
ophy is  a  science.   4.  The  standpoint  of  the  present  book. 

Chapter  II.    The  DEEiNrnoN'  of  Philosophy  and  of 

Metaphysics 12 

I.  The  difficulty  of  defining  philosophy.  2.  The  cause  of 
this  difficulty.  3.  Popular  philosophy.  4.  The  definition  of 
philosophy.  5.  Metaphysics  defined.  6.  The  program  of 
this  book. 

PART  n.    THE  NATURE  OF  SCIENCE 

Chapter  HI.    The  Nature  of  That  Which  is  Known  ...    25 

I.  The  nature  of  information.  2.  The  nature  of  truth. 
3.  The  nature  of  propositions.  4.  The  knowledge  of  proposi- 
tions. 5.  The  ascertainment  of  truth.  6.  The  natxure  of  ex- 
planation.   7.  The  world.    8.  Existence. 

Chapter  IV.    Everyman's  Theory  of  Reality  42 

I.  Introduction.  2.  The  world  as  perceived.  3.  The  world 
of  common  sense.   4.  Appearance  and  reality. 

Chapter  V.    The  Nature  of  Science 53 

I.  The  nature  of  science.  2.  Faith.  3.  Two  ultimate  types 
of  fact.   4.  The  definition  of  science. 

zi 


301  CONTENTS 

Chapter  VI.    The  Progress  of  Sctence 62 

I.  The  progress  of  science.  2.  The  place  of  metaphysics  in 
science. 

PART  III.    PROBLEMS  OF  GENERAL  METAPHYSICS 

Chapter  VII.    RoMANTiasM  and  Logic 75 

I.  The  problem.  2.  Can  what  we  perceive  be  analyzed  into 
terms  and  relations?    3.  Can  what  we  perceive  be  explained? 

4.  Can  what  we  perceive  be  fully  explained? 

Chapter  VIII.    Logical  Monism  and  Logical  Pluralism    86 

I.  The  problem.  2.  The  significance  of  the  problem. 
3.  Arguments  for  monism.    4.  Argiunents  for  pluralism. 

Chapter  IX.    The  Criterion  of  Truth 96 

I.  The  problem.  2.  Consequences  of  the  two  rival  theories 
regarding  the  ultimate  test  of  truth.  3.  Argiunents  against 
the  coherence  theory.  4.  Progress  in  perception.  5.  Em- 
piricism vs.  Rationalism. 

Chapter  X.    Nominalism  vs.  Platonic  Realism 106 

I.  The  problem.  2.  Existence  and  subsistence.  3.  A  de- 
fense of  Platonic  realism.    4.  Conclusion. 

Chapter  XI.    Causation 115 

I.  Introduction.  2.  Causation  reducible  to  implication. 
3.  The   different    types   of   causes.     4.  Causal   pluralism. 

5.  Chance,  or  spontaneity.    6.  Conclusion. 

Chapter  XII.    Temporalism  and  Evolution 128 

I.  Two  problems.    2.  Temporalism.   3.  Evolution. 

Chapter  XIII.    The  Logical  Strata  of  Reality 136 

I.  Introduction.    2.  Logical  continuity  and  discontinuity 


CONTENTS  Xm 

in  reality.  3.  The  logical  strata  of  reality.  4.  The  logical  de- 
pendence of  the  sciences  upon  one  another.  5.  The  passage 
from  simplicity  to  complexity  in  evolution.   6.  Conclusion. 

ChAPTEK  XIV.      SUPERNATURALISM 150 

I.  Introduction.  2.  Supematuralism.  3.  Origin  of  super- 
naturalism.  4.  The  issue  between  naturalism  and  super- 
naturalism. 

Appendix:  Theology  as  a  Metaphysics i6o 

I.  Introduction.  2.  The  ontological  argiunent  for  God's 
existence.  3.  The  cosmological  argument  for  God's  exist- 
ence. 4.  The  teleological  argument  for  God's  existence. 
5.  The  natmre  of  creation.  6.  The  relation  between  God  and 
the  world. 

Chapter  XV.    The  Substance  Hypothesis 169 

I.  Introduction.  2.  A  more  rigorous  formulation  of  the 
substance  hypothesis.  3.  Criticism  of  the  substance  hypothe- 
sis. 

Appendix:  The  Metaphysics  of  Substance 180 

I.  Introduction.  2.  The  kinds  of  substance.  3.  Pluralism 
and  monism.  4.  The  relation  between  the  substances.  5.  The 
problem  of  change. 

Chapter  XVI.    Idealism 186 

I.  Introduction.  2.  The  idealistic  hypothesis.  3.  The  evi- 
dence offered  in  support  of  idealism.  4.  The  refutation  of  the 
idealistic  hypothesis. 

Appendix:  Idealistic  Hypotheses 196 

I.  Introduction.  2.  Representative  realism  and  phenom- 
enalism.   3.  Subjective  and  objective  idealism. 


XIV  CONTENTS 

Chapter  XVn.    Dogmatism  vs.  CRiTiasM 201 

I.  Introduction.  2.  Criticism.  3.  The  issue  between  crit- 
icism and  dogmatism.  4.  The  refutation  of  criticism. 
5.  Conclusion. 

Appendix:  The  Metaphysics  of  Criticism 211 

I.  Introduction.  2.  A  classification  of  epistemological 
theories.   3.  The  metaphysics  of  these  theories. 


PART  IV.    PROBLEMS  OF  SPECIAL  METAPHYSICS 

Chapter  XVIII.    The  Logical 221 

I.  Introduction.  2.  The  subject  matter  of  formal  logic. 
3.  Logic  and  existence. 

Chapter  XIX.    The  Mathematical 227 

I.  The  nature  of  mathematics.  2.  Mathematics  deducible 
from  formal  logic.  3.  Mathematics  as  a  non-existential 
science.  4.  Some  mathematical  results  of  great  philosophical 
importance. 

Chapter  XX.    The  Physical 236 

1.  Introduction.  2.  The  definition  of  the  physical.  3.  Me- 
chanics and  energetics.  4.  The  relation  between  physical 
theory  and  physical  existence. 

Chapter  XXI.    Life 248 

I.  Introduction.  2.  Mechanism  and  vitalism.  3.  Bio- 
logical atomism. 

Chapter  XXTE.    The  Mental 256 

I.  Introduction.  2.  The  subject  matter  of  psychology. 
3.  The  nature  of  consciousness.  4.  The  relation  between 
mind  and  body.    5.  The  soul. 


A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 
CHAPTER  I 

DIFFEKENT  VIEWS  REGARDING  THE  NATURE  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

I.  Introduction. — In  this  chapter  we  are  to  reason 
about  philosophy,  not  to  study  philosophy  itself.  We 
are  forced  to  do  this  in  beginning  an  elementary  book  in 
philosophy  because  radically  different  opinions  exist 
among  philosophers  themselves  as  to  what  philosophy  is, 
that  is,  as  to  its  proper  subject-matter  and  as  to  the  valid 
methods  of  philosophical  research.  Some  thinkers  be- 
lieve that  philosophy  is  a  science  and  that  it  should  be 
discovered  and  reasoned  out  by  methods  which  are 
distinctly  scientific;  whereas  other  thinkers  regard  it  as 
fundamentally  unlike  science.  Either  they  beUeve  that 
it  is  an  imaginative  or  esthetic  insight,  as  is  poetry  or 
painting,  or  they  believe  that  it  is  a  different  sort  of 
intellectual  procedure  from  the  research  which  gives  us 
the  special  sciences. 

To  understand  these  different  opinions  regarding  the 
nature  of  philosophy  without  taking  sides  in  the  issue 
itself  forces  us  to  study  them  from  the  point  of  view  of 
psychology.  In  so  doing,  we  shall  see  that  the  differences 
involved  result  from  differences  in  the  mental  Ufe  of  the 
various  philosophers.  Philosophers  are  men  of  markedly 
unlike  temperament.    For  some  the  scientific  interest  is 

3 


4  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

dominant,  for  some  the  religious  interest,  for  others  the 
moral,  and  for  still  others  the  esthetic  interests  are  su- 
preme. The  philosopher  with  the  scientific  temperament 
is  not  always  troubled  if  philosophy  fails  to  furnish  him  a 
religion;  whereas  the  philosopher  with  strong  religious 
temperament  may  have  as  his  sole  interest  in  philosophy 
the  insight  it  can  give  him  into  the  world  as  the  environ- 
ment of  man's  spiritual  life  and  as  the  means  of  fulfilling 
his  spiritual  aspirations.  Similarly  the  man  with  pro- 
nounced artistic  temperament  may  seek  in  philosophy 
only  the  means  of  satisfying  his  esthetic  desires  regarding 
the  world;  and  finally  the  man  whose  mental  bias  is 
wholly  moral  may  narrow  his  philosophical  interest  to 
the  one  problem,  the  world  as  the  scene  in  which  man 
fights  for  the  good  and  wins  the  victory  over  his  baser 
nature. 

Philosophers  are  men  not  only  of  unlike  tempera- 
ments but  also  with  different  experiences,  men  possessing 
different  sorts  of  knowledge,  men  who  react  differently  to 
the  abstract  arguments  and  results  of  the  special  sciences. 
One  man's  experience  may  be  narrow  and  provincial, 
another's  extensive  and  even  world  wide.  One  may  be 
trained  in  the  exact  sciences,  another  may  be  chiefly  a 
psychologist,  sociologist  or  anthropologist.  One  may  be 
a  student  of  theory,  the  other  may  be  a  man  of  action. 
One  may  be  interested  in  the  abstract  sciences,  may  be 
impressed  with  the  exactitude  of  mathematical  and  ex- 
perimental research;  the  other  may  dislike  such  study 
but  love  the  concrete  world  of  nature  and  of  life  with 
its  wealth  of  detail  and  with  its  unfailing  variety. 

It  would  take  us  far  beyond  the  purpose  of  this  chapter 


VIEWS  REGARDING  THE  NATURE  OF  PHILOSOPHY       5 

to  trace  out  the  results  of  all  these  mental  factors  in  the 
history  of  philosophy.  It  fulfils  the  pur]f)ose  to  empha- 
size two  general  types  of  belief  regarding  the  nature  of 
philosophy,  the  belief  that  philosophy  is  a  matter  of  feeling 
or  esthetic  insight  and  the  belief  that  it  is  a  science. 

2.  The  belief  that  philosophy  is  a  matter  of  feeling  and 
appreciative  insight. — If  philosophy  is  a  matter  of  esthetic 
insight,  philosophy  cannot  be  called  either  true  or  false, 
it  cannot  be  demonstrated  or  given  a  rigorous  verifica- 
tion. Rather  it  will  be  Hke  the  styles  and  customs  in 
literature  or  art.  Now  this  philosophy,  now  that,  will 
be  widely  received  and  welcomed  by  different  peoples 
and  different  ages.  There  will  be  as  many  philosophies 
as  there  are  different  temperaments  and  different  types 
of  human  experience.  There  will  be  mysticism  with 
its  distrust  of  reason.  There  wiU  be  naturaHsm  with  its 
distrust  of  rehgion.  There  will  be  obscurantism  and 
there  will  be  radicalism,  there  will  be  allegiance  with 
ecclesiasticism  and  again  bitter  hostility  to  the  church, 
there  will  be  optimism  and  pessimism,  there  wiU  be 
stoicism  with  its  single-hearted  devotion  to  the  moral 
law,  and  there  will  be  rationaUsm  with  its  emphasis  upon 
the  universal  reign  of  order.  Under  such  conditions  it 
is  utterly  idle  to  expect  men  to  agree  philosophically  or 
to  endeavor  to  bring  about  a  consensus  of  opinion  regard- 
ing the  solution  of  fundamental  philosophical  problems. 
In  short,  the  world  cannot  be  understood,  it  cannot  be 
made  the  subject  of  theory,  it  can  only  be  felt  and 
lived. 

However,  the  philosopher  himself  who  holds  these 
views  regarding  philosophy  is  very  often  an  advocate  of 


6  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

a  distinct  philosophical  theory,  and  perhaps  we  can  best 
express  the  difference  between  him  and  other  philosophers 
by  calling  him  a  perceiver  and  them  thinkers.  The  per- 
ceiver  loves  the  concrete,  and  distrusts  the  abstract.  To 
know  the  world  you  must  be  part  of  it,  live  it,  drink 
deeply  of  the  cup  of  life,  in  short  you  must  perceive  the 
world.  The  world  cannot  be  known  in  terms  of  the 
abstract  sciences,  in  terms  of  logic.  The  world  is  not  a 
logical  puzzle.  It  is  rather  a  Hving,  growing,  evolving 
concrete  object,  of  an  infinite  variety  which  completely 
baffles  abstract  thought  and  system.  This  type  of  philos- 
opher is  usually  called  a  romanticist.  He  refuses  to  be 
held  down  to  precise  and  rigorous  logic.  He  needs  and 
demands  poetic  license. 

J.  The  belief  that  philosophy  is  a  science. — Opposed  to 
romanticism  is  the  belief  that  philosophy  is  a  science. 
If  philosophy  is  a  science  then  not  only  is  it  true  or  false 
but  it  can  be  demonstrated.  Philosophers  may  disagree 
as  to  what  the  words  true  and  false  mean  and  as  to  the 
limits  to  which  philosophical  research  can  attain;  but 
in  any  case  there  is  agreement  that  the  philosopher  as  a 
seeker  after  truth  is  called  upon  to  verify  his  assertions. 
The  differences  in  belief  among  philosophers  are  not  due 
to  any  cause  which  makes  a  consensus  of  opinion  impos- 
sible, rather  they  are  due  to  the  difficulty  of  the  problems, 
to  the  imperfect  insight  of  the  student  or  to  the  errors  of 
his  training.  These  differences  between  philosophers 
will  in  time  gradually  disappear  as  further  knowledge 
and  insight,  further  mutual  understanding  and  discus- 
sion, make  the  problems  and  their  solutions  thoroughly 
explicit. 


VIEWS  REGARDING  THE  NATURE  OF  PHILOSOPHY       ^ 

In  general,  however,  there  is  a  radical  difference  of 
opinion  within  this  philosophical  group  itself  regarding 
what  science  is  and  therefore  regarding  the  nature  of 
philosophy.  To  one,  science  seems  to  be  a  mere  instru- 
ment invented  by  man,  by  means  of  which  he  can  adjust 
himself  to  environment  and  satisfy  his  needs.  To  this 
philosopher,  truth  is  not  something  absolute,  fixed,  or 
invariable.  It  is  but  another  name  for  perfect  adjust- 
ment. To  the  other  philosopher  truth  is  absolute  and 
invariable.  Science  is  the  discovery  of  something  en- 
tirely independent  of  man,  and  of  his  struggle  for  exist- 
ence and  happiness.  As  a  consequence  of  this  difference, 
philosophy  seems  to  the  former  thinker  to  be  solely  a 
study  of  man,  of  his  history  and  of  the  processes  by 
which  he  has  become  in  part  master  of  his  environment. 
But  to  the  latter  thinker  philosophy  is  a  science  of  the 
world,  a  world  not  made  by  man,  a  world  whose  general 
nature  is  fixed  and  determined  regardless  of  human 
history.  The  former  philosophers  are  nowadays  called 
pragmatists  or  subjectivists  and  the  latter  might  be 
called  objectivists  or  intellectualists.  But  these  names 
are  quite  ambiguous,  and  they  should  be  used  therefore 
with  utmost  caution. 

The  objectivist  party,  or  better,  the  scientific  party  in 
the  narrow  sense,  is  again  divided  into  two  distinct  groups 
or  types.  Let  us  for  convenience  call  them  the  monists 
and  the  pluralists,  though  again  these  names  are  thor- 
oughly ambiguous.  The  monist  starts  with  the  con- 
viction that  the  goal  of  science  is  to  understand  the  world 
as  a  unity.  Any  knowledge  of  things  that  leaves  them 
independent  and  not  unified  brands  itself  ipso  facto 


8  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

as  incomplete  and  imperfect.  The  ultimate  and  sole 
problem  of  science  for  the  monist  then  is  to  understand 
how  the  many  things  of  the  world,  how  the  infinite 
variety  and  change  found  in  the  world,  all  constitute 
one  system  or  whole.  This  philosopher  is  compelled  to 
build  up  such  an  imderstanding  not  by  starting  with 
the  many  and  various  objects  and  events  of  nature  but 
by  starting  with  certain  axioms  or  a  priori  convictions 
regarding  the  world  and  deducing  his  theory  of  reality 
largely  therefrom.  He  cannot  really  use  the  knowledge 
put  at  his  disposal  by  the  special  sciences,  because  it 
is  never  complete  enough  for  his  purpose.  He  must  get 
some  infallible  and  universal  truths  by  direct  means.  In 
short,  he  is  what  is  called  an  absolutist  and  his  method 
is  a  priori  and  deductive.  As  a  consequence,  under  his 
leadership  philosophy  becomes  quite  divorced  from  the 
rest  of  science.  It  is  of  Httle,  if  of  any,  help  to  the  special 
sciences  as  they  are  of  little  assistance  to  it.  Moreover, 
the  doctrine  is  entertained  that  the  special  sciences  are 
less  certain,  less  valid,  than  philosophy,  that  they  are 
only  relative  or  imperfect  truth,  whereas  philosophy 
is  absolute  or  perfect  truth. 

This  divorce  from  science  seems  to  the  pluralistic 
opponent  not  only  unfortunate  but  disastrous  for 
philosophy.  Thoroughly  as  he  may  agree  with  the 
monist  that  we  are  to  seek  to  unify  our  knowledge,  to 
search  for  the  interconnection  between  things,  never- 
theless he  is  convinced  that  the  monist's  method  leads 
directly  and  inevitably  back  to  romanticism  and  mysti- 
cism. It  may  indeed  be  that  the  world  is  a  unity  but 
there  are  no  sound  methods  of  research  known  to  man 


VIEWS  REGARDING  THE  NATURE  OF  PHILOSOPHY       9 

other  than  those  used  and  developed  in  the  special 
sciences.  We  must  be  content  to  go  slowly;  we  must 
be  content  to  wait  for  the  results  of  science,  to  accept 
probabilities  and  to  live  by  them;  we  must  be  satisfied 
with  an  imperfect  incomplete  knowledge.  The  most 
certain  body  of  knowledge  is  science,  especially  the  exact 
sciences;  and  the  philosopher  can  ignore  this  only  at  his 
great  peril.  Thus  the  pluralist  is  in  close  S3rmpathy  with 
science.  His  methods  are  the  methods  of  science,  his 
information  starts  from  science.  He  believes  that  the 
philosophical  problems  must  be  kept  open  as  scientific 
problems  are  kept  open.  There  is  no  short  cut  to  the 
goal.  There  is  no  infallible  judge  to  tell  us  when  our 
work  is  done  and  the  race  completely  won.  There  are 
only  the  individual  daily  triumphs  to  assure  us  that  we 
are  making  progress. 

4.  The  standpoint  of  the  present  book. — The  author 
confesses  that  he  belongs  to  the  last  party,  the  pluralists, 
but  he  confesses  at  the  same  time  his  fear  of  all  partisan- 
ship. No  doubt  the  world's  work  gets  done  by  strong 
partisans,  but  strong  partisans  are  seldom  wholly  right  in 
what  they  deny.  The  philosopher  especially  needs  to  dis- 
trust his  own  party  enthusiasm  even  though  he  needs  also 
to  cherish  it  in  the  interest  of  progress.  The  chances  are 
that  in  the  long  run  we  shall  need  all  the  help^  the  sug- 
gestion, and  the  insight  the  great  philosophers  of  every 
party  and  creed  have  given  the  world.  The  chances  are 
that  one  man's  eyesight  is  better  in  one  environment 
than  is  another  man's,  that  our  differences  are  thus  in 
part  due  to  the  greater  emphasis  different  facts  receive. 
The  field  of  perception  is  far  broader  than  the  field  of 


lO  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

precise  and  verifiable  knowledge;  and  this  means  that 
the  pluralist  should  be  most  tolerant  toward  the  views 
of  other  philosophers  and  of  leaders  in  religion,  art, 
literature  and  Hfe,  for  though  their  views  may  not  be 
scientific  they  may  contain  the  raw  material  of  science. 
We  must  not  forget  the  history  of  science  itself.  Science 
is  of  humble  parentage,  for  it  grew  out  of  vague  insights, 
analogies,  and  obscure  feelings.  Yet  though  the  field  of 
vague  perception  is  broader  than  that  of  precise  percep- 
tion, this  does  not  indicate  a  permanent  state  of  affairs. 
It  indicates  rather  the  need  of  growth  and  the  likelihood 
of  growth. 

However,  let  this  be  as  it  may,  even  should  the  plural- 
ist be  wrong  in  what  he  denies,  surely  he  cannot  be  wrong 
in  what  he  affirms.  There  is,  undeniably,  a  philosophy 
of  science  or  a  scientific  philosophy.  Though  this  may 
have  limits  which  will  forever  prevent  it  from  fulfil- 
ling the  philosopher's  highest  aspiration  for  knowledge; 
still  it  is  a  body  of  valid  knowledge  having  a  right  to  a 
place  in  the  hierarchy  of  the  sciences.  In  short,  the 
pluralistic  metaphysics  must  be  given  a  place  some- 
where in  the  philosophy  of  all  thoughtful  men. 

Of  course  my  own  conviction  remains  that  the  plural- 
ist is  right  also  in  what  he  denies,  that  he  is  right  in 
maintaining  that  the  sole  path  of  progress  open  to 
philosophy  is  the  scientific  highway.  No  matter  how 
helpful  side  excursions  may  be  in  telling  us  of  the  coun- 
try beyond,  such  pathways  end  in  swamps  and  jimgles. 
To  drop  figures  of  speech,  philosophy  should  be  brought 
into  closest  relation  to  science  and  should  be  the  genuine 
result  of  man's  entire  scientific  achievement.    Of  course 


VIEWS  REGARDING  THE  NATURE  OF  PHILOSOPHY      II 

it  must  be  the  result  also  of  man's  religious,  moral  and 
esthetic  insight.  But  even  as  such  it  must  still  remain 
rigorously  scientific.  Perhaps  I  can  indicate  to  the 
student  of  the  history  of  philosophy  my  point  in  no 
better  way  than  to  urge  that  the  modern  philosopher 
would  do  well  to  take  as  his  ideal  the  greatest  of  ancient 
philosophers,  if  not  the  greatest  of  all  philosophers, 
Aristotle. 

For  further  study  read: 

Woodbridge,  The  Enterprise  of  Learning,  Columbia  University 
Quarterly,  June,  191 2; 

Santayana,  The  Life  of  Reason,  I,  1-32; 

James,  Pragmatism,  Lect.  I; 

James,  The  Will  to  Believe,  Essay  "The  Sentiment  of  Rational- 
ity;" 

James,  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  Lect.  I,  "The  Types  of  Philo- 
sophic Thinking;" 

Boodin,  Truth  and  Reality,  3-14; 

Perry,  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,  Chap.  II,  "Scientific 
and  Religious  Motives  in  Philosophy;" 

The  New  Realism,  New  York,  191 2,  Introduction; 

Sheflfer,  Ineffable  Philosophies,  /.  of  Phil.,  Psychol.,  etc.,  1909, 
6,  123. 

For  more  extensive  study  read: 
Stein,  Philosophische  Stromungen  der  Gegenwart; 
Perry,  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies. 


CHAPTER  n 

THE  DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  AND  OF  METAPHYSICS 

1.  The  difficulty  of  defining  philosophy. — This  book  is 
intended  to  acquaint  the  student  with  an  important 
branch  of  philosophy  called  metaphysics,  by  reveahng 
its  chief  problems  and  by  expounding  certain  solutions 
of  these  problems  which  philosophers  have  ofifered. 
Unfortunately,  a  difficulty  confronts  us  at  the  very 
start,  for,  as  we  have  seen,  men  disagree  as  to  what  is 
meant  by  the  words  philosophy  and  metaphysics,  and 
it  is  not  easy  to  make  their  precise  meaning  apparent. 
As  a  consequence,  many  of  the  first  pages  must  be 
devoted  to  the  preliminary  work  of  learning  what  we  are 
to  study,  when  it  would  seem  so  much  more  direct  to 
begin  at  once  with  the  main  subject-matter.  Yet  in 
fact  we  shall  be  beginning  with  the  main  subject-matter; 
for  to  understand  precisely  what  the  words  philosophy 
and  metaphysics  mean,  is  to  solve  some  important  philo- 
sophical problems  and  therefore  to  be  already  well  started 
in  the  subject. 

2.  The  cause  of  this  difficulty. — ^The  cause  of  this 
difficulty  in  defining  philosophy  is  twofold.  First,  the 
things,  or  entities,  which  the  philosopher  studies,  are 
highly  abstract;  and  the  truths  which  he  seeks  to  dis- 
cover are  highly  general.  Now  it  is  easy  to  point  out 
animals  or  rocks  or  stars,  and  to  say,  "These  are  what 
we  are  to  study,"  for  these  things  are  concrete  and  are 

13 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  AND   OF  METAPHYSICS      1 3 

readily  perceived;  whereas  things  which  can  be  seen  only 
by  the  educated  or  discriminating  eye,  like  the  things 
denoted  by  the  S3Tnbols  and  formulae  of  the  abstract 
sciences,  for  example,  of  mathematics,  cannot  be  per- 
ceived until  we  have  been  technically  trained.  Again, 
it  is  easy  to  make  clear  even  to  a  child  the  particular 
truth,  "This  fire  is  hot  and  will  burn;"  but  it  is  most 
difficult  to  make  clear  the  general  truth,  "All  forms  of 
combustion  are  instances  of  oxydation."  Hence  philoso- 
phy, the  most  abstract  and  the  most  general  of  all  the 
sciences,  studies  things  and  problems  which  usually 
quite  escape  our  notice  and  which  can  be  revealed  only 
to  the  thoughtful  and  discriminating  mind.  On  this 
account,  too,  philosophy  is  one  of  the  latest  subjects 
which  we  should  study  and  one  in  whose  pursuit  we  can 
profitably  employ  all  that  we  have  ever  learned. 

A  second  cause  of  difficulty  is  the  difference  of  opinion 
among  philosophers  regarding  the  nature  of  their  science. 
To  the  beginner  this  disagreement  cannot  fail  to  be  con- 
fusing and  incomprehensible;  but,  as  every  other  fact, 
it  too  is  really  full  of  meaning  if  only  we  examine  it  with 
insight.  It  means  that  all  the  world  grows  slowly  in 
matters  philosophical,  and  that  men  are  more  liable  to 
be  old  fashioned  in  their  philosophical  opinions  than  in 
their  other  beliefs.  Again,  it  means  that  men  are  Uable 
to  be  one-sided,  narrow-minded,  or  prejudiced  when  it 
comes  to  taking  a  profound  and  a  broad  view  of  the 
world  and  of  their  life  in  the  world;  for  our  particular 
and  special  interests  are  attended  to  so  much  more  fre- 
quently and  seem  so  much  more  important,  that  our 
judgment  is  already  biased  when  we  come  to  the  problems 


14  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

which  are  world  wide.  Let  us  then  comfort  ourselves 
that  the  very  dilQ&culty  of  defining  philosophy  but  shows 
how  great  is  our  need  to  study  philosophy.  We  need 
to  study  it  in  order  to  become  intellectually  mature, 
in  order  to  become  modem,  broad-minded,  wide-awake, 
and  alive  to  all  the  fundamental  interests  of  mankind. 

J.  Popular  philosophy. — The  easiest  means  of  gaining 
a  clear  idea  of  the  nature  of  philosophy  is  to  notice  that 
every  normal  person  is  already  something  of  a  philosopher 
and  then  to  consider  the  problems  and  opinions  which 
make  him  a  philosopher.  One  of  these  opinions  is, 
Everything  has  a  cause.  The  child  asks  over  and  over 
again.  Why  this?  why  that?  who  made  this?  who  did 
that?  Again,  children  often  ask,  Who  made  the  world? 
How  big  is  the  world?  How  old  is  the  world?  From  which 
it  appears  that  even  to  them  the  world  stretches  on  into 
distant  space  and  time,  yet  constitutes  a  totality,  and 
as  a  totality,  calls  for  explanation.  Further,  the  bright 
child  soon  outgrows  its  belief  in  fairies  and  magic.  This 
indicates  how  quickly  we  become  at  least  dimly  aware 
that  order  and  uniformity  reign  everywhere.  It  is 
remarkable  too  how  early  we  begin  to  distinguish  the 
subjective  from  the  objective,  or  the  mental  from  the 
externally  real.  Dreams  soon  seem  unreal  or  rather 
subjective,  our  thoughts  and  feelings  are  soon  discovered 
to  be  peculiarly  our  own,  and  in  general  we  begin  to 
make  the  great  division  between  things  mental  and  things 
non-mental,  between  minds  and  material  things.  Many 
other  important  general  divisions  are  made  by  all  men: 
between  the  living  and  the  lifeless,  between  things  that 
endure  and  things  that  quickly  perish  or  vanish,  be- 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  AND  OF  METAPHYSICS      1 5 

tween  things  and  their  qualities,  between  growth  and 
decay,  between  characteristics  true  of  a  few  things  and 
those  true  of  ahnost  everything,  between  good  deeds  and 
bad  deeds,  between  beautiful  things  and  ugly  things. 
Let  us  formulate  as  problems  this  philosophy  of  all 
civilized  men. 
;^  (i)  Had  the  world  a  beginning  in  time,  will  it  ever 
come  to  an  end?  Has  it  a  beginning  in  space?  Is 
there  but  one  world  or  are  there  many  worlds?  Has  the 
world  a  creator  or  is  it  self-existent?  (2)  What  are 
space  and  time?  (3)  Has  everything  a  cause,  or  do  some 
things  come  into  existence  without  a  cause?  (4)  Must 
a  cause  produce  just  the  effect  that  it  does,  or  are  there 
free  causes,  for  example,  our  wills,  whose  doings  are 
absolutely  unpredictable?  What  is  fate?  Is  everything 
fated?  Is  there  such  a  thing  as  chance,  luck,  or  magic? 
(5)  What  are  laws  of  nature,  and  in  what  sense  do 
things  obey  these  laws?  (6)  What  is  a  thing?  What  is 
a  quality?  (7)  Are  there  things  which  never  arise  or 
pass  away,  that  are  eternal?  (8)  What  features,  aspects 
or  attributes  of  the  things  in  the  world  about  us  are 
eternal?  Or  is  nothing  eternal  or  changeless?  (9)  What 
are  change,  growth  and  decay?  (10)  What  is  the  differ- 
ence between  minds  and  things  that  are  not  minds? 
How  does  our  mind  inhabit  the  body,  and  determine  its 
conduct?  How  does  our  body  influence  the  mind?  Is 
there  such  a  thing  as  the  soul?  Is  it  immortal?  (11) 
What  is  life?  Is  the  living  radically  different  from  the 
lifeless?  (12)  What  makes  one  deed  good  and  another 
bad?  (13)  What  is  it  in  one  thing  that  makes  it  beautiful 
and  in  another  that  makes  it  ugly;  in  other  words,  what 


l6  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

is  the  nature  of  beauty?  (14)  Is  there  a  God?  How  can 
we  know  that  there  is?  How  are  we  to  picture  or  to 
conceive  Him?  What  is  His  relation  to  the  world?  (15) 
Can  we  be  absolutely  certain  about  anything  we  know? 
Or  is  all  knowledge  at  best  probability?  What  parts 
of  our  knowledge  come  nearest  to  certainty  or  are  certain? 
What  is  truth?  (16)  Why  are  we  so  confident  about  the 
propositions  of  arithmetic  and  geometry  and  so  little 
confident  about  many  other  things,  such  as  to-morrow's 
weather?  These  problems  are  philosophical.  What 
then  is  the  nature  of  philosophy? 

-  4.  The  definition  of  philosophy. — (i)  Philosophy  points 
out  the  notions  which  turn  up  so  often  in  our  thinking 
and  which  seem  indispensable  to  our  thinking,  for  ex- 
ample, cause,  thing,  space  and  time,  good,  knowledge, 
true.  (2)  Philosophy  endeavors  to  define  these  notions 
with  utmost  precision.  (3)  Philosophy  tries  to  ascertain 
the  fundamental  truths  regarding  the  world  and  the 
things  and  events  which  constitute  it.  By  a  fundamental 
truth  I  mean  a  truth  that  seems  to  be  an  indispensable 
part  of  our  way  of  thinking.  Thus  we  seek  the  cause 
of  this  or  that  event  and  thereby  presuppose  that  events 
must  have  a  cause;  we  try  to  discover  what  happened 
millions  of  years  ago,  thereby  presupposing  that  there 
was  such  a  time;  we  investigate  the  origin  of  things  and 
thereby  presuppose  that  all  or  most  things  have  an  ori- 
gin; we  say  that  we  are  certain  about  some  matters  and 
doubtful  about  others,  and  thereby  presuppose  that  parts 
of  our  knowledge  are  better  founded  than  other  parts,  and 
that  some  parts  are  surely  true.  (4)  Philosophy  en- 
deavors to  answer  the  most  general  questions  we  can  ask 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  AND  OF  METAPHYSICS      l^ 

regarding  the  world  and  the  things  within  it.  Is  there 
only  one  world?  Did  the  world  have  a  beginning  in 
time?  Are  there  things  which  are  eternal  or  changeless 
such  as  the  ultimate  parts  of  matter?  Is  all  nature  under 
the  universal  reign  of  law,  or  is  there  truly  such  a  thing 
as  chance? 

>  These  four  points  regarding  philosophy  may  be  brought 
together  under  two  headings  provided  we  understand 
the  meaning  of  three  very  useful  terms,  "logically  funda- 
mental," "indefinable"  and  "indemonstrable."  By 
"logically  fundamental"  is  meant  whatever  must  he  true 
in  order  that  other  things  can  be  true,  or  whatever  must 
be  understood  in  order  that  other  things  can  be  under- 
stood. Thus  if  the  sum  of  the  angles  of  a  plane  triangle 
equals  two  right  angles,  it  must  be  true  that  the  whole 
equals  the  sum  of  its  parts.  If  there  can  be  a  perpetual 
motion  machine,  it  must  be  true  that  friction  can  be 
totally  eliminated.  That  is,  whatever  is  an  indispensable 
premise  of  any  conclusion  is  logically  more  nearly  funda- 
mental; and  if  so,  some  truths  must  be  genuinely  funda- 
mental. If  C  must  be  true  that  D  may  be  true  and  if  B 
must  be  true  that  C  may  be  true,  evidently  we  shall  come 
in  time  to  a  beginning,  a  proposition  which  must  be  true 
that  others  may  be  truebut  which  we  cannot  demonstrate. 
Such  a  proposition  is  an  "indemonstrable."  In  short, 
an  indemonstrable  is  a  proposition  which  is  genuinely  a 
first  premise.  Some  of  the  laws  of  logic  must  be  indemon- 
strables  for  we  use  them  in  proving  and  should  have  to 
use  them  as  premises  in  order  to  prove  them  true.  Again, 
to  understand  what  a  triangle  is  we  must  understand 
what  a  plane  figure  is;  to  understand  what  coal  is,  we 


l8  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

must  understand  what  carbon  is;  to  understand  what 
theft  is,  we  must  understand  what  property  is.  In  short, 
one  notion  is  logically  fundamental  to  another  provided 
it  is  indispensable  in  defining  that  other.  If  C  enables 
us  to  define  D,  and  B  is  required  to  define  C  and  A  to 
define  B;  we  must  come  sooner  or  later  to  the  end  of 
the  Une  where  we  cannot  define  without  "a  circle  in  the 
definition."  If  A  is  the  ultimate,  not  only  is  it  logically 
fundamental  to  B,  C,  and  D,  but  it  is  an  "indefinable." 
We  are  now  ready  for  the  briefer  statement  of  the  nature 
of  philosophy,  (i)  Philosophy  seeks  the  logically  funda- 
mental, that  is,  the  indefinables  and  the  indemonstrables 
of  all  our  knowledge.  (2)  Philosophy  endeavors  to  formu- 
late the  highest  generalizations  warranted  by  the  sum  total 
of  information  man  possesses. 

In  seeking  the  former,  philosophy  may  be  called  The 
Study  of  the  Logical  Foundations  of  Knowledge.  In  en- 
deavoring to  do  the  latter,  it  may  be  called  The  Unifica- 
tion of  Knowledge.  This  last  name  is  quite  appropriate 
because  as  man  discovers  laws  of  higher  and  higher 
generality,  the  sciences  tend  to  merge  into  one  another 
and  to  raise  even  the  question  whether  or  not  all  sciences 
are  not  really  parts  of  one  universal  science.  If  they  are 
one  science,  that  science  is  philosophy.  For  example, 
every  student  of  zoology  and  botany  knows  that  many 
truths  hold  of  all  forms  of  life  and  that  this  large  body  of 
information  regarding  all  life  is  a  sort  of  tnmk  science 
of  which  botany  and  zoology  are  branches.  Some  call 
it  biology.  Again,  every  student  of  chemistry  and  physics 
knows  that  many  truths  are  common  to  both  sciences; 
and  the  question  has  often  been  raised,  may  not  chemis- 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  AND  OF  METAPHYSICS      1 9 

try  some  day  in  the  distant  future  be  explicitly  a  branch 
of  physics?  Indeed  there  are  hardly  any  two  sciences 
which  have  not  many  truths  in  common,  that  do  not 
turn  out  to  have  more  and  more  in  common  as  our  knowl- 
edge increases,  and  that  do  not  thereby  suggest  one  tree 
of  knowledge  of  which  all  sciences  are  branches.  We 
have  now  our  definition  of  philosophy,  (i)  Philosophy 
is  the  science  of  the  logical  foundations  of  all  knowledge. 
It  is  the  First  (logically)  Science.  (2)  Again,  Philosophy 
is  the  highest  generalizations  which  scientific  research 
thus  far  warrants  or  suggests.  It  consists  of  the  great 
imifying  truths  and  as  such  is,  The  Science  of  Sciences. 
5.  Metaphysics  defined. — I  have  said  that  within 
philosophy  this  book  will  be  confined  to  a  part  called 
metaphysics.  What  is  metaphysics?  We  can  now  find 
the  answer  quickly  and  easily.  Philosophy,  as  just  de- 
fined, has  to  do  with  all  knowledge.  Metaphysics  has 
to  do  with  only  a  part  of  knowledge.  Philosophy  includes 
not  merely  the  knowledge  revealed  in  mathematics, 
chemistry  and  biology  but  also  the  study  of  the  good, 
the  beautiful,  and  anything  else  that  can  be  called  true. 
Briefly  put,  man  endeavors  to  know  not  only  what  is, 
but  what  ought  to  be;  not  only  what  exists,  has  existed, 
or  will  exist,  but  what  ought  to  exist  and  what  is  in  any 
way  truly  desirable.  More  briefly  still,  we  seek  to  know 
the  Real  and  the  Ideal.  Sometimes  we  limit  the  word 
science  to  denote  the  former  study.  In  any  case  meta- 
physics is  the  philosophy  of  the  real;  and  other  divisions, 
such  as  ethics  and  esthetics,  constitute  the  philosophy 
of  the  ideal.  Hence  we  may  defiine  metaphysics  as 
follows,  remembering  of  course  our  definition  of  philoso- 


20  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

phy:  Metaphysics  is  (i)  the  study  of  the  logical  founda- 
tions of  science,  or  of  the  real;  (2)  the  theory  of  reality, 
or  the  highest  generalizations  regarding  the  real  warranted 
by  our  present  knowledge.  As  the  former  it  is  the  First 
Science  (science  used  in  the  narrow  sense  or  the  study  of 
the  real).  As  the  latter,  it  is  The  Theory  of  ReaUty. 
6.  The  program  of  this  hook. — ^Within  metaphysics 
we  shall  confine  our  study  to  the  former,  the  logical 
foundations  of  man's  knowledge  of  the  real  world.  Ac- 
cordingly, we  shall  have  to  seek  the  fundamental  notions 
in  terms  of  which  man  is  and  has  been  endeavoring  to 
interpret  reality.  When  found,  we  should  try  either  to 
define  these  notions  rigorously  or  to  admit  that  they 
remain  still  undefined.  Again,  we  shall  have  to  seek  the 
fundamental  premises  upon  which  the  scientific  con- 
victions of  the  present  and  of  past  ages  rest  logically, 
especially  those  ultimate  premises,  the  indemonstrables. 
But  to  do  even  this  fully  and  rigorously  would  be  a  vast 
and  a  most  difficult  enterprise  and  would  far  outstrip 
the  ambitions  and  purposes  of  an  elementary  book. 
Consequently  we  shall  seek  not  a  detailed  and  exhaustive 
knowledge  of  this  field  of  metaphysics  but  only  a  bird's- 
eye  view,  a  general  outlook,  enough  to  make  us  feel 
acquainted  and  somewhat  at  home.  Our  study  will  be 
divided  into  three  parts.  The  first  part  will  be  intro- 
ductory leading  to  the  answer  of  the  question.  What  do 
we  mean  by  the  words  science,  reality,  and  universe? 
The  second  part  will  introduce  the  student  to  certain 
fundamental  metaphysical  hypotheses.  Some  of  these 
will  have  been  deliberately  avoided  in  the  first  part  and 
others  will  have  been  intentionally  ruled  out  as  false 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  AND  OF  METAPHYSICS      21 

by  the  very  definitions  which  the  first  part  formulates. 
This  part  will  acquaint  the  student  also  with  the  founda- 
tions of  man's  older  theory  of  reality,  which  I  entitle, 
The  Substance  Hypothesis,  and  with  a  more  recent 
theory  of  reality,  a  theory  widely  entertained  by  the 
thinkers  of  the  past  two  hundred  years,  The  Idealistic 
Hyp>othesis.  The  last  part  will  give  a  brief  sketch  of 
some  of  the  more  prominent  metaphysical  hypotheses 
found  within  the  special  sciences. 

For  further  study  read: 
Paulsen,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  1-50; 
Butler,  N,  M.  Philosophy; 
Windelband,  History  of  Philosophy,  1-8; 
Woodbridge,  Metaphysics  (in  Lectures  on  Science,  Philosophy 

and  Art,  Columbia  University  Press) ; 
Sidgwick,  Philosophy,  Its  Scope  and  Relations,  1-75,  76-121. 

For  more  extensive  study  read: 
Sidgwick,  Philosophy,  Its  Scope  and  Relations. 


PART  II 
THE  NATURE  OF  SCIENCE 


In  this  part  I  shall  define  a  number  of  fundamental 
terms  and  point  out  several  indefinables.  These  terms 
are: — Information,  Term,  Relation,  Truth,  Implication, 
Proposition,  Postulate,  Fact,  Theory,  Explanation, 
Existence,  World,  Science,  Faith,  Value.  This  list  of 
words  soimds  at  first  formidable:  but  it  will  prove  to  be 
a  very  important  list;  for  to  see  clearly  what  these  words 
mean  is  to  gain  a  profound  insight  into  our  knowledge 
of  things  and  is  to  secure  far  greater  rigor  and  definiteness 
in  our  thinking.  Hence,  though  these  words  sound 
uninteresting,  a  careful  study  of  them  will  more  than 
repay  us  for  the  time  and  labor  required. 


CHAPTER  m 

THE  NATURE  OF  THAT  WHICH  IS  KNOWN 

I.  The  nature  of  information. — ^What,  precisely,  is 
information?  "  Whatever  we  know. "  But  what  do  we 
know,  or  better,  what  as  such  is  knowable?  How  does 
the  presence  of  information  differ  directly  from  the  ab- 
sence of  information?  The  answer  is:  Whenever  we 
know,  we  are  aware  of  some  relation  between  one  entity 
and  another.  Thus  I  know  that  this  is  the  sixteenth 
day  of  October,  that  is,  I  am  aware  of  a  relation  between 
to-day  and  the  other  days  in  the  system  we  call  the 
calendar.  I  notice  that  Mr.  E.  is  on  my  right  hand  and 
Mr.  F.  on  my  left  hand  and  that  Mr.  G.  stands  behind 
them.  In  all  these  cases  evidently  I  know  relations  be- 
tween things.  Further,  we  know  that  whales  are  mam- 
mals, that  the  anopheles  mosquito  is  a  carrier  of  the 
malaria  parasite,  that  Napoleon  was  a  Corsican,  in 
other  words,  that  one  class  of  objects  is  included  in 
another  class  of  objects  or  that  one  object  is  a  member 
of  a  given  class.  Here,  likewise,  we  know  relations 
between  terms.  We  know  also  that  things  are  related 
as  cause  and  effect.  For  example,  we  learn  that  the 
wind  causes  the  waves,  that  the  volume  and  pressure 
of  a  gas  are  functions  of  one  another.  Again,  all  sorts 
of  comparisons  of  one  object  with  another  by  means  of 
some  standard  of  measurement  lead  to  information, 
such  as,  A  is  more  beautiful  than  B,  C  is  hotter  than  D, 

25 


26  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

F  is  heavier  than  G,  L  is  longer  than  M,  Mr.  R.  is  older, 
richer  and  wiser  than  Mr.  S.  Finally,  mathematics  gives 
us  most  explicitly  information  regarding  certain  rela- 
tions between  terms,  thus  (a+b)2  =  a^+2ab+b^ 

There  are  cases  where  this  relationship  between  terms 
is  not  so  apparent,  such  cases  as:  this  flag  is  red;  the  dog 
runs;  the  house  is  building;  the  load  is  carried;  the  comet 
was  seen;  the  race  was  run;  the  jar  was  broken.  But  in 
these  and  similar  instances  analysis  reveals  either  a  com- 
plex of  relations  and  several  terms  or  some  conventional 
and  fairly  definite  type  of  relation,  as,  for  example,  the 
relation  between  a  thing  and  its  quality,  between  a 
thing  and  its  acts,  or  again  the  relation  between  a  thing 
and  changes  in  its  quality  or  in  some  of  its  relations 
brought  about  by  an  outside  agent.  In  most  of  these 
cases  a  fairly  simple  statement  verbally  may  convey  a 
most  complex  bit  of  information:  as,  the  building  was 
torn  down;  the  machine  was  put  together;  the  child 
is  growing.  Of  course,  precisely  what  our  words  mean 
to  us  and  to  our  audience  will  depend  largely  upon  what 
we  and  they  know  about  the  matter  involved.  The 
important  point  is,  however,  that  if  that  information 
is  carefully  analyzed,  it  will  be  found  to  be  made  up 
of  bits  of  information  and  these  bits  of  information  will 
in  their  turn  prove  to  be  relations  between  terms.  Hence 
the  information  in  my  mind  "my  house  is  building"  is 
probably  equivalent  to  a  long  list  of  simpler  bits  of  in- 
formation, such  as  "the  bricks  and  other  pieces  of  ma- 
terial are  being  placed  in  this,  that  and  the  other  special 
relation  to  one  another,"  "the  hands,  arms,  and  legs  of 
the  artisans  go  through  certain  motions  with  certain 


THE  NATURE  OF  THAT  WHICH  IS  KNOWN  27 

mechanical  effects,"  "many  conversations  take  place 
between  me  and  the  builder  and  architect,"  and  so  on 
indefinitely.  In  any  case  all  information  will  prove 
to  be  simple  or  complex  systems  of  terms  in  relation. 

It  may  seem  to  the  reader  that  information  might 
sometimes  be  merely  terms,  as  when  I  see  merely  a 
bright  light,  or  hear  merely  a  strange  noise,  or  behold 
merely  some  thing  quite  new  to  me.  But  to  see  a  thing 
is  not  to  know  a  thing.  A  baby  may  see  a  watch  and 
know  nothing.  You  and  I  see  it  and  know  it  to  be  a 
complicated  mechanism.  The  child  merely  gets  certain 
sensations  of  color  and  sound,  possibly  without  any 
awareness  of  relationship  whatsoever.  Of  course,  merely 
to  notice  "the  colored  object  connected  with  ticking" 
would  be  to  know  something  but  it  would  be  a  perception 
of  relation.  Prof.  James  expressed  this  p)oint  well  in  his 
distinction  between  "acquaintance  with"  and  "knowl- 
edge about."  A  brute  may  be  acquainted  with  things, 
that  is,  may  get  sensations  from  them,  but  know  nothing 
about  them.  Such  must  be  the  state  of  affairs  as  the  cat 
"hears"  the  conversation  in  the  home,  or  the  dog 
"watches"  us  write  a  letter.  In  short,  if  aU  awareness 
of  relation  is  lacking,  whatever  we  may  rightly  be  said 
to  have,  we  cannot  be  said  to  have  information. 

2.  The  nature  of  truth. — There  is  a  further  character- 
istic essential  to  information: — it  must  he  tru^  or  false. 
Indeed,  it  is  the  only  thing  in  all  the  world  which  is  one 
or  the  other,  and  conversely  whatever  is  either  true  or 
false  must  be  information.  Hence,  if  a  man  tells  us  he 
knows  something,  he  means  at  least  that  he  believes 
something  to  be  a  truth.    Here  we  introduce  a  word, 


28  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

and  a  very  important  word,  without  having  defined  it; 
for,  what  is  truth?  ^  Unfortunately  this  seems  to  be 
a  question  which  it  is  impossible  to  answer.  As  has  been 
stated,  some  notions  are  so  nearly  ultimate  that  when 
you  try  to  define  them  you  find  that  you  have  no  notions 
more  nearly  fundamental  by  means  of  which  the  de- 
fining can  be  done.  In  this  case  you  will,  if  you  proceed, 
run  into  what  logic  calls  a  circular  definition,  for  you 
will  use  notion  x  to  define  y  and  then  when  you  define  x, 
you  will  have  to  do  so  in  terms  of  y.  Thus  in  the  forego- 
ing section  we  did  not  define  "term"  or  "relation."  A 
term  is  that  which  can  stand  in  a  relation,  and  a  relation 
is  that  which  can  hold  between  terms;  but  this  is  not  a 
definition,  for  each  notion  presupposes  the  other.  So  too, 
I  believe  that  an  examination  of  any  definition  of  truth 
will  reveal  that  the  notion  defined  is  presupposed  in  the 
definition.  Of  course,  the  fact  that  these  terms  are 
indefinable  does  not  prevent  our  recognizing  a  truth  or 
a  relation  when  we  find  one;  for,  if  it  did,  not  only  would 
the  notion  be  useless  but  we  should  not  have  it  at  all. 
J.  The  nature  of  propositions. — Though  we  cannot 

*  The  word  truth  is  ambiguous.  It  is  used  here  as  a  property  of  propo- 
sitions, as  in  the  statement,  "it  is  true  that  the  earth  revolves  on  its 
axis."  It  is  often  used  as  a  property  of  our  beliefs,  thoughts  or  judg- 
ments. They  are  true  when  that  which  we  think  or  assert  is  true  (in  the 
first  sense).  Those  who  use  the  word  true  in  this  second  sense,  use  the 
words  real  or  fact  as  the  equivalent  of  true  in  the  first  sense.  But  as  it  is 
awkward  to  say  "a  real  proposition"  instead  of  "a  true  proposition" 
and  as  true  so  used  must  be  one  of  the  fundamental  notions  of  logic,  I 
prefer  to  use  the  word  correct  or  some  equivalent  for  true  in  the  second 
sense.  The  words  fact  and  real  will  be  defined  later.  I  use  them  in  a 
different  sense  from  that  just  mentioned.  Truth  in  the  second  sense 
can  be  defined. 


THE  NATURE  OF  THAT  WHICH  IS  KNOWN  29 

define  truth,  we  can  point  out  one  remarkable  character- 
istic possessed  by  all  truths  and  falsehoods:  they  never 
stand  alone.  Always  if  one  thing  is  true,  another  must 
be  true  or  false;  or,  if  one  thing  is  false,  some  other  must 
be  true.  This  characteristic  is  called  implication.  It 
is  an  ultimate  relation  obtaining  between  truths  and 
falsehoods,  and  is  usually  regarded  as  indefinable.  Some 
define  it  by  tajdng  the  notion  "either-or"  as  indefinable 
and  by  using  this  notion  as  a  basis  of  definition.  In  that 
case  (a  piece  of  information)  x  implies  (another  piece 
of  information)  y  when  either  y  is  true  or  x  is  false.  For 
example,  if  it  is  true  that  B  is  the  son  of  A,  it  must  be 
true  that  A  is  a  parent  of  B.  In  other  words,  if  it  is  not 
true  that  A  is  a  parent  of  B,  it  cannot  be  true  that  B  is 
the  son  of  A.  Either  A  is  a  parent  of  B  or  B  is  not  a  son  of 
A.  Notice  moreover  that  it  may  be  true  that  A  is  a  parent 
of  B  but  false  that  B  is  a  son  of  A,  for  B  may  be  a  daugh- 
ter. In  short,  X  implies  Y  means: — if  X  is  true,  so  is  Y; 
and  if  Y  is  false,  so  is  X;  but  X  may  be  false  and  Y  still 
be  true.  All  this  is  summed  up  in  the  words,  "if  X,  then 
Y." 

All  cases  of  argument,  or  demonstration,  are  illustra- 
tions of  how  one  truth  or  falsehood  "leads  on"  to  others; 
and  therefore  every  book  in  mathematics  or  any  other  science 
is  made  up  almost  entirely  of  statements  that  one  thing 
implies  another.  For  example,  if  two  sides  of  a  triangle 
are  equal,  their  opposite  angles  are  equal.  If  the  volume 
of  a  gas  decreases,  its  pressure  will  increase.  If  a  body 
moves  in  empty  space,  it  will  move  in  a  straight  line 
with  uniform  velocity. 

If  the  nature  of  implication  is  clear  to  us,  we  are  ready 


3©  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

to  define  another  technical  term.  Whatever  implies  or  is 
implied  is  a  proposition;  which  in  turn  means  that  we 
know  already  many  things  about  propositions.  If  propo- 
sitions imply  one  another  they  must  be  either  truths  or 
falsities.  Moreover,  if  they  are  truths  or  falsities  they 
must  be  information  and  if  they  are  information  they 
must  consist  of  relationships  between  terms.  In  other 
words,  propositions  are  units  or  bits  of  information,  and 
as  such  they  are  made  up  of  relations  between  terms, 
they  are  either  true  or  false,  and  they  imply  one  another. 

(Sections  1-3)  For  further  study  read: 
Read,  The  Metaphysics  of  Nature,  2d  ed.,  Chap.  XIII,  Pt.  I; 
Moore,  G.  E.    The  Nature  of  Judgment,  Mind,  1899,  8. 

For  advanced  study  read: 
Russell,  Principles  of  Mathematics,  Chap.  EQ; 
Erdmann,  Logik,  2**  Aufl.,  Bd.  I,  55-258; 
Sigwart,  Logic,  Pt.  I,  23-235. 

4.  The  knowledge  of  propositions. — From  the  fore- 
going definition  of  the  term  proposition  it  follows  that 
whenever  a  man  says,  he  knows  a  proposition,  it  is  proper 
for  us  to  ask  him  three  questions:  first.  What  precisely 
is  the  relationship  between  terms,  that  is,  the  proposi- 
tion which  you  have  before  your  mind?  secondly.  Is  it 
true  or  is  it  false?  thirdly.  What  does  it  imply?  If  he  can 
answer  correctly  these  three  questions,  he  does  indeed 
know  that  proposition.  However,  as  is  evident,  he 
might  be  able  to  answer  the  first  two  without  being  able 
to  answer  the  last;  and  again,  he  might  be  able  to  answer 
the  first  and  the  third  but  not  the  second;  and  finally 
unless  he  is  able  to  answer  the  first  he  cannot  answer 
either  of  the  other  two,  for  he  does  not  know  even  what 


THE  NATUBE  OF  THAT  WHICH  IS  KNOWN  3 1 

he  is  talking  about.  Let  me  illustrate.  If  a  patient 
says  to  me,  his  physician,  "My  wound  is  painful,"  it 
might  be  that  before  I  can  decide  whether  his  assertion 
is  true  or  false  and  before  I  can  ascertain  what  it  implies, 
I  shall  have  to  learn  precisely  what  it  means.  Now  this 
particular  illustration  is  chosen  because  psychologists  find 
that  individuals  very  often  disagree  as  to  what  is  and 
what  is  not  painful  and  because  this  disagreement  can 
hardly  be  due  to  a  man's  inability  to  observe  his  own 
feelings.  They  find  rather  that  few  men  mean  by  the 
word  "pain"  precisely  the  same  feeling.  Could  we 
fimd,  however,  some  means  by  which  all  men  and  our 
patient  in  particular  would  agree  upon  a  standard  feeling, 
called  pain,  then  each  could  very  quickly  decide  whether 
his  present  feeling  is  painful  or  not.  Let  us  assume  that 
we  have  been  able  to  do  this.  There  would  still  remain 
the  question.  Is  our  patient  telling  the  truth  or  is  he 
endeavoring  to  deceive  us?  Let  us  assume  first  that 
this  second  difficulty  also  has  been  met,  and  that  our 
patient  is  telling  the  truth.  There  will  still  remain  a 
third  question.  What  does  this  truth  imply?  Does  it 
imply  that  blood  poisoning  is  begiiming  or  something 
else?  Evidently  we  may  not  know.  This  is  a  case  when 
we  may  know  the  proposition  to  be  true  without  know- 
ing what  it  implies.  In  contrast  to  this  let  us  assume  that 
we  do  not  know  the  patient  to  be  truthful.  Then  we 
should  know  the  meaning  of  the  proposition  and  we 
might  know  also  regarding  its  significance  or  what  it 
would  imply  if  true;  but  we  should  be  in  doubt  as  to  the 
truthfulness  of  the  man's  statement,  for  we  might  suspect 
him  to  be  a  coward  or  a  malingerer.    In  this  case  we 


32  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

know  the  proposition  and  what  it  implies  without  know- 
ing whether  it  is  true  or  false. 

Granting  the  pertinency  of  these  questions,  how 
shall  we  answer  them?  (i)  How  do  we  know  a  proposi- 
tion? (2)  How  do  we  ascertain  whether  it  is  true  or 
false?  (3)  How  do  we  learn  what  it  implies?  The  first 
question  we  shall  answer  briefly  at  once;  the  answer  to 
the  others  we  must  postpone.  Ultimately  we  reveal 
the  propositions  we  are  asserting  only  by  pointing  out 
what  we  mean  or  acting  out  what  we  mean;  but  where 
others  are  already  familiar  with  most  of  our  thoughts 
and  beliefs,  we  can  point  out  indirectly  either  by  descrip- 
tion or  by  definition.  To  a  baby  we  point  out  a  cow  or  a 
horse  and  so  the  child  learns  the  meaning  of  these  words. 
To  a  zoologist  we  describe  a  new  species  and  he  under- 
stands. To  a  mathematician  we  offer  a  rigorous  defini- 
tion of  a  curve  heretofore  unknown  to  him  and  he  may  be 
able  at  once  to  deduce  many  of  its  further  properties. 
But  neither  the  zoologist  nor  the  mathematician  could 
understand  us  unless  much  information  were  already 
common  to  him  and  to  us.  Thus  to  know  a  proposition, 
means  to  be  able  to  point  out  its  terms  and  their  relation, 
to  be  able  to  describe  them  or  to  be  able  to  define  them; 
and,  as  we  have  seen,  we  might  be  able  to  do  all  this  and 
not  yet  know  whether  the  proposition  is  true  or  false. 

5.  The  ascertainment  of  truth. — How  do  we  ascertain 
whether  a  proposition  is  true  or  false?  Three  methods 
are  actually  employed  although  one  is  only  a  necessary 
makeshift,  (i)  Firstwe  may  simply  guess  at  its  truth  or  ac- 
cept it  tentatively.  Indeed  this  is  what  we  have  to  do 
most  of  the  time.   Fortunately  for  us,  however,  our  guess 


THE  NATURE  OF  THAT  WHICH  IS  KNOWN  33 

is  seldom  wholly  blind;  for  often  though  we  do  not  know  a 
proposition  to  be  true,  we  do  know  it  to  have  some 
chances  of  being  true.  Thus  whether  a  tossed  coin  will 
fall  heads  or  tails  we  cannot  foretell  with  certainty;  but 
should  we  have  to  guess,  we  know  we  have  one  chance 
in  two  of  being  correct.  So  throughout  life  we  can  seldom 
know  from  the  beginning  the  final  outcome  of  our  enter- 
prises; but  as  we  cannot  wait  we  have  to  act  in  the  way 
which  seems  most  likely  to  be  successful,  which  means, 
we  have  to  make  the  field  of  pure  guess,  or  venture  as 
small  as  our  knowledge  permits.  We  insure  our  lives 
though  we  may  lose  money  in  so  doing.  We  choose  a 
calling  though  we  may  afterward  prove  unfitted.  We 
breathe  the  air  of  our  streets  though  it  may  contain  the 
germs  which  will  kill  us.  In  short,  nothing  risked,  noth- 
ing accomplished;  and  this  is  true  not  merely  of  practical 
affairs  but  also  of  the  sciences.  All  scientists  have  their 
working  hypotheses;  and  every  science  is  based  in  part 
upon  unproved  assumptions,  or  as  we  shall  henceforth 
call  them,  postulates.  The  future  alone  can  tell  whether 
or  not  our  present  theories  are  true;  for,  as  history  shows, 
many  things  confidently  believed  in  by  people  in  bygone 
centuries  were  really  false  and  some  things  we  have 
to  call  mere  superstitions.  How  will  our  convictions 
appear  to  men  centuries  from  now?  Well,  it  is  not  our 
business  either  to  ask  this  question  or  to  be  concerned 
about  the  matter,  but  to  forge  ahead  fearlessly  as  best 
we  can. 

(2)  The  second  method  by  which  we  ascertain  the 
truth  or  falsity  of  a  proposition  is  to  infer  it  from  other 
propositions  which  we  know  or  believe  to  be  true.    That  is, 


34  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

we  get  our  information  by  reasoning.  The  most  wonder- 
ful and  perfect  example  of  the  successful  employment 
of  this  method  is  the  science  of  mathematics.  In  our 
elementary  geometry  we  started  with  a  few  propositions 
which  we  assumed  and  then  we  deduced  proposition  after 
proposition  until  we  acquired  an  extensive  body  of  in- 
formation. However,  mathematics  is  by  no  means  the 
only  place  where  we  reason;  for  some  reasoning  is  to 
be  found  in  almost  all  our  intellectual  processes.  Indeed 
most  psychologists  believe  that  this  ability  to  reason  or 
to  infer  is  a  trait  which  quite  marks  off  the  human  in- 
tellect from  the  mind  of  even  the  highest  brutes;  and  all 
must  agree  that  man's  intellectual  achievements  would 
have  been  impossible  had  his  learning  remained  solely 
of  the  trial  and  error  type. 

But  our  rationality  has  one  serious  shortcoming. 
To  reason  is  to  infer  conclusions  from  premises,  to  de- 
rive the  truth  of  one  proposition  from  the  assumed  truth 
of  another.  How  then  do  we  know  that  our  premises 
themselves  are  true?  Did  we  get  them  too  by  reasoning? 
If  so,  this  only  pushes  our  question  back  to  the  premises 
of  an  earlier  inference,  it  does  not  give  an  ultimate  proof. 
If  to  reason  is  then  but  to  guess  and  afterward  to  infer 
from  the  proposition  guessed,  wherein  does  it  give  us  a 
genuine  hold  on  truth?  The  answer  is,  if  these  two  were 
our  only  methods,  we  could  not  know  the  truth  of  any 
proposition.  We  might  guess  rightly  and  do  so  often; 
but  we  should  never  know  when  we  had  or  even  when  we 
had  not.  We  should  be  like  the  lowest  forms  of  life  which 
adapt  themselves  often  most  successfully  to  the  objects 
and  forces  of  nature  surrounding  them  and  acting  upon 


THE  NATURE  OF  THAT  WHICH  IS  KNOWN  35 

them,  but  which  cannot  know,  as  we  know,  either 
falsity  or  truth. 

(3)  The  first  and  second  methods  of  ascertaining  truth 
leave  a  gap  which  is  filled  by  the  third  method.  Not  only 
do  we  guess  at  truth,  not  only  do  we  infer  truth  but  also 
we  perceive  truth.  For  example,  if  we  guess  heads  or  tails 
when  a  coin  is  tossed  we  soon  perceive  whether  or  not  we 
are  right.  If  a  man  has  a  device  for  accomplishing  some 
end,  he  can  put  it  to  the  test  and  perceive  if  it  will  work. 
If  a  scientist  has  a  theory,  he  can  deduce  some  of  its  con- 
sequences and  put  them  to  a  crucial  test  in  his  laboratory 
and  perceive  if  his  theory  is  false.  Thus  day  by  day  we 
are  putting  our  beliefs  and  plans  to  the  test  of  perception. 
If  they  agree  with  what  we  perceive  or  if  they  work,  we 
are  confirmed  in  our  intellectual  venture.  If  they  do  not 
agree  with  what  we  perceive  or  if  we  perceive  that  they 
do  not  work,  we  tend  to  discard  them  and  should  discard 
them  for  new  beliefs  and  new  plans.  Perception  then 
gives  us  our  ultimate  warrant.  It  tells  us  when  we  are 
right  and  when  we  are  wrong.  It  tells  us  that  some 
things  are  thus  and  that  other  things  are  not.  In  short, 
it  tells  us  all  that  we  know  to  be  true. 

This  enables  us  to  give  a  technical  meaning  to  a 
familiar  word.  Henceforth  we  shall  always  mean  by  the 
word  fact,  a  perceived  truth.  Fact  then  is  opposed  to 
theory,  for  theory  is  always  either  a  guess,  or  an  inference 
in  part  from  guesses.  Facts  are  as  such  true.  Theories 
on  the  other  hand  are  sometimes  true,  sometimes  false. 
This  is  what  we  mean  when  we  say  a  theory  should  con- 
form to  the  facts  and  if  it  does  not,  the  theory  must  give 
place  to  another. 


36  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

(Sections  4  and  5)  For  further  study  read: 

Mill,  Logic,  Bk.  Ill,  Chap.  VII;  Bk.  IV,  Chap.  I; 

Venn,  Empirical  Logic,  Chaps.  I,  XIV,  XXI; 

Tyndall,  Fragments  of  Science,  "The  Scientific  Use  of  the 
Imagination;" 

Clififord,  Lectures  and  Essays,  "On  the  Aims  and  Achieve- 
ments of  Scientific  Thought;" 

Mach,  Popular  Scientific  Lectures,  "On  the  Part  Played  by 
Accident  in  Invention  and  Discovery;" 

Aikins,  Principles  of  Logic,  Chaps.  XXXIII-XXXVI; 

Marvin,  Introduction  to  Systematic  Philosophy,  349-373,  412- 

419; 
Hobhouse,  Theory  of  Knowledge,  15-59; 
Russell,  The  Problems  of  Philosophy,  Chaps.  V  and  VI,  Xm 

and  XIV; 
Stout,  Immediacy,  Mediacy  and  Coherence,  Mind,  1908,  77. 

For  more  extensive  study  read: 
Locke,   Essay   Concerning  Human   Understanding,   Bk.   IV, 

Chaps.  I-VI; 
Russell,  The  Problems  of  Philosophy; 
Schmidt,  Critique  of  Cognition  and  its  Principles,  /.  of  Philos., 

Psychol.,  etc.,  1909,  6; 
Jevons,  Principles  of  Science,  Bk.  IV; 
Sigwart,  Logic,  Pt.  II,  295-325;  and  Pt.  III. 

For  advanced  study  read: 
Hobhouse,  Theory  of  Knowledge. 

6.  The  nature  of  explanation. — This  in  turn  enables 
us  to  define  precisely  another  familiar  word,  namely, 
explanation.  What  do  we  do  when  we  explain?  We 
discover  a  premise  or  set  of  premises  from  which  a  given 
fact  or  facts  follow,  or  can  he  deduced.  For  example,  I 
hear  a  strange  noise  on  the  hearth,  and  after  listening 
attentively  I  decide  it  is  made  by  a  cricket.  That  is, 
"if  a  cricket  is  on  the  hearth,  it  would  follow  that  we 


THE  NATURE  OF  THAT  WHICH  IS  KNOWN  37 

should  hear  such  a  sound."  The  noise  is  my  fact;  that 
a  cricket  is  on  the  hearth,  is  the  premise  I  have  assumed 
to  account  for,  or  to  explain,  this  fact.  If  this  fact  follows 
from  my  premise  and  from  no  other  premise  which  I 
may  have  overlooked,  then  no  doubt  I  have  discovered 
the  correct  explanation.  As  another  example  we  might 
take  the  undulatory  theory  of  light.  No  one  has  actually 
seen  the  ether  or  its  undulations.  These  undulations 
then  are  not  a  fact  but  a  theory,  and  as  a  theory  their 
whole  significance  is  that  they  agree  with  other  theories 
which  we  hold  and  that  their  assumption  gives  us  prem- 
ises from  which  the  facts  of  light  can  be  deduced.  The 
same  is  true  even  of  the  proposition,  the  earth  is  a  sphere. 
Nobody  has  seen  this  sphere;  yet  since  so  very  many 
facts  can  be  deduced  from  the  assumption  and  since  no 
known  fact  disagrees  with  it,  he  who  would  question  it 
to-day,  would  be  considered  insane.  Still  it  is  only  an 
explanation;  and  there  is  no  other  reason  to  regard  it 
as  true,  except  that  it  does  explain. 

For  further  study  read: 
MiU,  Logic,  Bk.  Ill,  Chaps.  XI-XIV; 
Hobhouse,  Theory  of  Knowledge,  442-474; 
Joseph,  Introduction  to  Logic,  Chap.  XXIII. 
Nunn,  On  Causal  Explanation,  Proc.  Aristotd.  Soc,  1906-7,  7. 

For  more  extensive  study  read: 
Russell,  The  Problems  of  Philosophy; 

Smith,  Norman,  Studies  in  the  Cartesian  Philosophy,  Chap.  II; 
Descartes,  Discourse  on  Method; 
Descartes,  Regulx  ad  Directionem  Ingenii. 

For  advanced  study  read: 
Nunn,  Aim  and  Achievements  of  Scientific  Method. 


$8  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

7.  The  world. — Having  learned  to  distinguish  between 
facts,  or  what  we  perceive,  and  their  explanation,  we 
can  define  the  term,  world.  The  word  "world"  or  ''uni- 
verse" is  the  name  for  the  true  and  complete  explanation  of 
all  facts.  As  an  illustration,  let  us  assume  that  the  so- 
lar system,  as  studied  in  astronomy,  is  the  whole  world. 
Now  the  solar  system  is  the  theory  which  astronomy 
offers  in  explanation  of  a  multitude  of  facts  or  perceived 
truths.  These  truths  include  the  rising  and  setting  of  the 
sun,  moon,  and  stars,  the  succession  of  day  and  night, 
summer  and  winter,  the  elevation  of  the  sun  in  the 
heavens,  the  erratic  motion  of  the  planets,  the  phases  of 
the  moon,  the  echpses  of  both  sun  and  moon,  as  well  as 
countless  other  facts.  Notice  that  "the  solar  system"  is 
indeed  a  theory,  or  explanation.  Nobody  ever  perceived 
the  earth  revolve,  or  the  planets  go  about  the  sun  in  their 
orbits,  or  even  the  earth  itself  as  a  sphere.  The  only  war- 
rant for  believing  these  propositions  is  that  they  explain  so 
well  what  we  do  perceive.  We  do  perceive  the  sunset,  the 
phases  of  the  moon,  and  so  these  are  not  theory  but  fact; 
but  the  solar  system  is  not  only  a  theory,  a  theory  with  a 
history,  but  one  among  other  conceivable  or  rival  the- 
ories. Before  1600  A.  d.  men  believed  in  a  very  different 
theory,  which  made  the  earth  the  immovable  centre 
of  the  universe  with  the  sun  revolving  about  it;  and  if 
now  we  have  full  confidence  in  our  present  heliocentric 
theory,  this  is  simply  because  all  rival  theories  have 
proved  false,  inadequate,  or  inconvenient,  and  because 
this  theory  agrees  with  all  perceptual  tests  to  date. 
Notice,  moreover,  that  our  complete  confidence  in  this 
theory  expresses  itself  in  the  assertion  that  the  solar 


TEE  NATURE  OF  THAT  WHICH  IS  KNOWN  39 

system  exists.  Yet,  since  nobody  has  ever  perceived  "  the 
solar  system,"  this  assertion,  analyzed  logically,  is  no 
more  than  the  assertion  "the  solar  system"  explains  and 
alone  explains  what  we  perceive. 

If  the  perceived  did  not  raise  problems  or  call  for 
explanation,  if  we  could  accept  it  not  only  as  it  is  given 
but  as  all  that  is  true ;  then  we  should  have  no  world.  We 
should  live,  as  do  the  lowest  brutes,  from  moment  to 
moment,  reacting  blindly  now  to  this  sensation  and  now 
to  that;  but  we  should  never  assert  existence.  But  the 
perceived  does  raise  problems  in  our  minds;  and  so  man, 
from  childhood  to  the  grave,  from  prehistoric  days  to 
the  present,  has  been  seeking  and  discovering  their 
solution.  As  he  does  so,  the  world  as  conceived  by  him 
keeps  growing  and  changing,  and  must  continue  to  do 
so  until  the  true  and  full  explanation  is  found  of  all  that 
he  perceives.  Of  this  perfect  explanation  most  people 
believe  we  have  already  a  part;  but  how  much  there  re- 
mains to  add  and  how  many  truths  remain  to  be  per- 
ceived, is  a  question  no  one  can  answer.  However  we 
can  define  the  world.  The  universe,  or  world  is  a  theory. 
It  is  a  theory  in  answer  to  questions  which  in  their 
origin  are  always  regarding  the  perceptual.  To  repeat, 
it  is  the  complete  explanation  of  all  fact. 

The  word  "all"  must  be  emphasized.  The  world  is 
the  complete  explanation  of  all  facts.  All  facts  include 
not  only  those  man  has  perceived  or  does  perceive, 
but  will  perceive,  or  can  perceive,  or  should  perceive. 
They  include  all  perceivable  truth.  Again,  they  include 
not  merely  the  truths  our  eyes  perceive  in  the  field  or 
laboratory  or  through  the  telescope,  but  also  the  truths 


40  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

that  the  moralist,  the  artist,  the  religious  perceive.  They 
include,  then,  all  facts  whose  explanation  we  seek  from 
science  in  the  very  broadest  sense  of  this  word. 

8.  Existence. — Finally,  in  defining  the  term  "world" 
we  have  at  the  same  time  been  defining  the  term  "to 
exist."  Whatever  belongs  to  the  world,  or  is  a  part  or 
aspect  of  the  world,  exists.  Otherwise  expressed,  what- 
ever explains  or  in  part  explains  any  fact  and  is  consistent 
with  all  other  facts  and  their  explanation,  is  rightly 
said  to  exist.  Thus,  hearing  many  unfamiliar  noises 
at  night,  the  superstitious  man  may  say,  "A  ghost  is 
moving  about  the  house."  This  is  his  explanation  of  a 
perceived  truth,  the  noises;  and  accordingly  he  asserts 
the  ghost's  existence.  But  should  he  inform  himself  of 
further  perceivable  truth,  there  is  little  doubt  that  he 
would  reject  his  old  hypothesis  and  entertain  a  quite 
dififerent  one.  However,  what  is  true  of  the  superstitious 
is  in  part  true  of  all  men.  In  the  light  of  our  knowledge 
or  the  darkness  of  our  ignorance  we  explain  what  we 
perceive  and  then  assert  existence.  In  so  doing  we  are 
presupposing  some  world  hypothesis  or  another,  perhaps 
a  crude  and  primitive  one  or  perhaps  one  of  a  modern 
and  an  enlightened  adult.  Moreover,  we  fit  the  thing 
which  we  assert  to  exist  somehow  into  this  world  concep- 
tion and  into  the  system  of  other  existents  in  which 
we  believe.  As  long  as  we  feel  satisfied  with  the  result 
we  do  not  question  the  thing's  existence;  but  should  the 
clash  be  too  severe  for  our  intellectual  conscience  we 
have  to  give  up  either  the  old  or  the  new  and  offer  our- 
selves some  other  hypothesis.  Thus  the  highway  of 
man's   intellectual   progress   from   savagedom   to   the 


THE  NATURE  OF  THAT  WHICH  IS  KNOWN  4 1 

civilization  of  to-day  is  lined  on  both  sides  with  discarded 
"existents."  They  perished  because  the  logical  load 
they  were  carrying  was  too  much  for  them  or  because 
stronger  carriers  were  found  to  take  their  place.  There- 
fore, whenever  we  say  anything  exists  we  are  merely 
offering  our  present  explanation  of  some  fact  or  other. 

(Sections  7  and  8)  For  further  study  read: 
Marvin,  The  Existential  Proposition,  /.  of  Philos.,  Psychol.,  etc., 

191 1,  8; 
Hume,  Enquiry  concerning  Human  Understanding,  Sect.  IV. 


CHAPTER  IV 

Everyman's  theory  of  reality 

I.  Introduction. — The  "world"  or  "universe"  has 
been  defined  as  "the  true  and  complete  explanation  of 
what  we  perceive."  This  definition  is  our  most  important 
result  thus  far.  Through  it  we  learn  that  the  world  as 
thought  or  conceived  by  each  man  depends  upon  two 
things: — first,  upon  what  he  has  perceived;  secondly, 
upon  his  success  in  explaining  what  he  has  perceived. 
As  men  dififer  greatly  in  both  these  respects,  they  differ 
also  in  the  way  in  which  they  think  or  conceive  the 
world.  The  world  of  the  child  is  far  different  from  the 
world  of  the  adult,  and  the  world  of  the  savage  or  of  the 
peasant  is  markedly  unlike  that  of  the  scientist.  More- 
over, men  differ  in  their  way  of  conceiving  the  world  not 
only  as  individuals  but  also  as  social  groups  and  as 
members  of  this  or  that  historical  period.  The  world 
as  conceived  by  the  oriental  is  different  from  the  world 
as  conceived  by  the  man  of  western  Europe.  The  world 
of  modern  science  is  extremely  unlike  the  world  of  even 
the  most  learned  men  of  the  thirteenth  century. 

Great  as  are  these  differences  and  great  as  may  be  the 
differences  in  the  future  which  the  advance  of  knowledge 
may  bring  about,  still  all  ages  and  all  individuals  have 
been  engaged  upon  a  common  task  and  all  have  contrib- 
uted something  to  its  fulfillment.  Our  ways  of  conceiv- 
ing the  world  may  be  different,  and  the  facts  known  to  us 

42 


EVERYMAN'S  THEORY  OF  REALITY  43 

may  be  different;  still  one  common  problem  faces  us  all: 
What  is  the  true  and  complete  explanation  of  that  which 
is  perceived?  Moreover,  different  as  are  our  worlds,  all 
men  have  some  results  in  common;  for  the  lowest  savage 
and  the  normal  child  are  not  so  foreign  to  civilized  man's 
ways  of  thinking  that  he  cannot  communicate  with  them. 
In  other  words,  his  world  is  not  a  separate  world  from 
theirs.  Not  only  has  the  world  as  conceived  by  the 
modern  scientist  and  philosopher  grown  out  of  the  world 
as  conceived  by  the  child  and  by  the  ancient;  but  it  has 
remained  in  parts  virtually  unchanged.  Indeed,  logi- 
cally behind  or  beneath  science  stands  the  world  of 
everyman,  the  world  of  the  learned  and  of  the  ignorant, 
the  world  of  the  ancient  and  of  the  modern.  We  might 
call  it  the  world  of  common  sense. 

The  purpose  of  this  chapter  wiU  be  to  show  that  this 
world  of  everyman,  or  of  common  sense,  is  already  an 
elaborate  and  complicated  explanation  of  what  we  per- 
ceive, and  that  it  should  never  be  confused  by  the  meta- 
physician with  the  perceived. 

2.  The  world  as  perceived. — The  ordinary  adult  is  an 
old  fogy  biased  and  set  in  his  ways  of  explaining  and 
perceiving  facts.  The  cause  of  this  bias  is  that  he  has 
become  habituated  to  the  explanations  of  these  facts 
which  have  been  taught  him  from  childhood  and  that  he 
fuses  the  facts  and  the  explanations  so  thoroughly  that 
he  seldom  distinguishes  between  them.  But  as  students 
of  metaphysics  we  must  now  do  so. 

First,  let  us  imagine  ourselves  on  the  platform  of 
a  railway  station  watching  an  approaching  train.  As 
we  look  at  the  locomotive,  it  keeps  getting  bigger  and 


44  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

bigger  slowly  at  first,  then  more  and  more  rapidly  as  it 
draws  near.  As  adults  we  say,  the  locomotive  has  not 
changed  in  size  but  a  mile  away  was  really  as  large  as 
here  twenty  feet  away;  yet  perception  says,  it  grew 
larger  and  larger.  We  board  the  train  and  it  is  soon  under 
way.  We  look  through  the  windows.  Objects  are  flying 
by,  those  "near  us"  very  rapidly,  those  "farther  away" 
less  rapidly.  Looking  through  the  rear  window  of  the 
last  car,  we  see  that  the  rails  in  the  distance  meet  at  a 
point  and  form  the  two  sides  of  an  extremely  elongated 
triangle.  Near  by,  the  sides  of  this  triangle  are  rapidly 
receding  and  at  the  same  time  moving  rapidly  together. 
Finally  we  notice  that  the  "distant"  objects,  men, 
animals,  trees,  houses,  mountains,  are  small;  the  "near 
ones  "  much  larger.  All  this  is  what  perception  says;  but 
common  sense  gives  a  very  different  account. 

Secondly,  let  us  imagine  ourselves  walking  along  a 
dty  street.  As  we  look  down  the  street  the  buildings 
are  in  "perspective,"  the  street  grows  narrower  in  the 
distance  as  did  the  rails,  the  lines  of  windows  and  roofs 
descend  and  meet  the  distant  horizon.  As  we  pass  a 
building,  if  we  watch  sharply,  we  shall  see  that  it  is 
changing  its  shape.  As  we  look  at  this  or  that  person 
approaching,  we  shall  see  him  not  only  increasing  in 
size,  but  also  changing  in  many  other  respects.  His 
clothing  increases  in  detail.  The  details  of  its  coloring 
and  its  shape,  of  its  pattern  and  its  parts  grow,  literally 
spring  into  existence.  Likewise  his  face  takes  on  features 
and  expression.  To  make  a  long  story  short,  let  us  recall 
the  following  few  out  of  many  familiar  yet  remarkable 
percepts.    A  "straight"  stick  partly  immersed  in  water 


EVERYMAN  S  THEORY  OF  REALITY  45 

looks  bent.  Sometimes  "tepid"  water  feels  to  one 
hand  hot,  to  the  other  cold.  The  crater  of  an  extracted 
tooth  is  much  bigger  according  to  the  testimony  of 
the  tip  of  the  tongue  than  it  is  according  to  that  of 
the  end  of  the  finger.  A  warm  radiator  is  warmer  when 
felt  by  the  back  of  the  hand  than  when  felt  by  the  palm. 

To  make  clearer  this  picture  of  things  as  perceived 
let  us  add  to  the  list  some  things  which  we  do  not  per- 
ceive. No  one  ever  saw  the  earth,  that  is,  the  planet, 
but  only  parts  of  its  surface.  No  one  ever  perceived 
the  earth  turn  on  its  axis.  No  one  ever  saw  a  thousand 
miles  of  railroad,  even  if  he  has  tramped  twenty  thousand 
on  that  highway.  We  are  told  that  the  sun  is  90,000,000 
miles  away,  but  when  you  look  at  the  sun  you  do  not 
seem  to  see  between  you  and  it  a  space  of  that  diameter. 
Similarly  in  the  case  of  time,  we  never  perceive  as  long  a 
span  as  five  minutes,  and  a  year  is  as  truly  an  impossible 
percept  as  is  infinite  space.  Finally,  to  come  nearer  to 
what  we  do  perceive,  no  one  ever  saw  Westminster 
Abbey  or  his  own  house.  You  have  seen  the  west  side  of 
your  house,  but  when  you  were  looking  at  this  you  did 
not  see  the  east  side.  Again,  if  your  house  has  many 
rooms  and  two  or  more  stories,  you  have  seen  now  this 
room  and  now  that,  but  the  "house,"  that  is,  all  the 
rooms,  windows,  doors,  walls,  front,  side  and  rear  eleva- 
tions: all  these  and  all  in  their  correct  geometrical  and 
metrical  relations  one  to  another,  you  have  never  seen. 
It  is  evident  too  that  a  man  has  never  perceived  his  own 
body,  that  is,  the  body  as  fully  described  in  the  ponder- 
ous volumes  on  human  anatomy. 

But  enough  said.   It  is  evident  that  the  world,  or  man!- 


46  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

fold,  perceived  by  you  and  me  is  very  different  from  the 
world  we  ordinarily  think  about.  The  perceived  world 
is  spatially  a  small  world.  It  is  a  world  of  a  moment. 
In  it  men,  houses  and  locomotives  change  their  shape, 
size,  and  color.  Walk  across  the  room  and  your  table 
changes  its  shape  and  size  and  probably  color!  Hold 
your  hand  close  to  your  eyes  and  the  hand  becomes  as 
big  as  the  room! 

For  further  study  read: 

Santayana,  Life  of  Reason,  I,  35-291; 

Berkeley,  Essay  Towards  a  New  Theory  of  Vision; 

Clififord,  Lectures  and  Essays,  "The  Philosophy  of  the  Pure 

Sciences,"  I,  Statement  of  the  Question; 
Pearson,  Grammar  of  Science,  Chap.  VI. 

J.  The  world  of  common  sense. — In  contrast  to  this 
perceived  world  consider  the  world  as  ordinarily  con- 
ceived, the  world  of  common  sense.  In  this  world  objects 
are  stationary  and  do  not  fly  by  the  windows  of  the 
moving  train.  The  rails  are  parallel  and  motionless. 
The  men  and  trees  and  houses  at  a  distance  are  no 
smaller  than  those  near  by.  The  size  of  the  locomotive  is 
constant  and  does  not  alter  as  the  locomotive  approaches. 
The  straight  stick  immersed  in  the  water  remains  straight. 
Houses  do  not  alter  their  shape  as  we  pass,  for  their  shape 
is  constant.  The  street  and  houses  are  not  in  perspective. 
Their  lines  are  parallel.  The  crater  of  the  extracted 
tooth  does  not  change  its  size  nor  the  radiator  its  heat 
under  the  conditions  aforegiven.  Though  we  may  not 
perceive  "the  house,"  what  we  do  perceive  is  part  of 
a  real  house  of  such  and  such  dimensions,  parts,  number 
of  rooms,  and  materials.    And  of  course  a  man's  hand 


EVERYMAN  S  THEORY  OF  REALITY  47 

is  never  as  big  as  the  room,  and  the  furniture  does  not 
alter  its  shape,  size  and  color  as  we  walk  up  and  down  the 
room. 

Now,  every  student  of  psychology  knows  that  this 
world  of  common  sense  is  not  known  by  the  very  young 
child.  To  it,  a  distant  man  or  house  is  small;  the  moon 
does  race  through  the  clouds;  the  sun  does  rise  and  set. 
As  for  the  earth  being  a  globe  and  revolving  on  its  axis, 
that  is  a  fantastic,  incomprehensible  way  in  which  grown 
people  talk.  It  requires  years  of  training  for  the  child 
to  learn  the  truths  of  common  sense;  and  this  shows 
that  the  world  as  believed  in  by  common  sense  or  as 
thought  of  in  daily  life,  instead  of  being  a  perceived 
world,  is  a  most  elaborate  and  wonderful  world  hypothesis. 
It  is  not  perceived  but  conceived;  and  the  way  in  which 
we  adults  conceive  it  has  not  only  grown  but  has  grown 
continuously  from  babyhood  to  our  present  state.  Of 
course  it  has  developed  under  the  control  of  our  percepts. 
It  has  grown  out  of  our  percepts.  It  has  been  constantly 
tested  and  corrected  by  our  percepts.  Yet  it  is  not  the 
world  we  actually  perceive,  and  in  many  respects  it  is 
radically  different  from  what  we  do  perceive.  The  two 
worlds,  or  systems  of  terms  and  relations,  are  not  only 
different  in  character  but  are  numerically  different. 
They  cannot  be  logically  identified,  though  they  are 
connected  logically  and  most  intimately.  To  sum  up: 
The  world  of  common  sense  is  man's  first  great  world 
hypothesis;  it  is  not  a  world  of  perceived  fact,  rather  it  is  a 
THEORY,  no  matter  how  well  established  a  theory. 

Out  of  this  theory,  which  we  call  the  world  of  common 
sense,  science  has  grown;  and  though  science  has  gradu- 


48  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

ally  reconstructed  it,  science  never  totally  rejects  it,  and 
seldom  ceases  to  be  logically  dependent  upon  it.  As  a 
consequence,  the  metaphysics  of  common  sense  is  im- 
portant not  only  in  and  by  itself,  but  also  for  its  in- 
fluence upon  science  and  because  of  its  presence  within 
science.  Indeed,  where  science  has  outgrown  the  meta- 
physics of  common  sense,  it  has  done  so  very  gradually 
and  often  not  thoroughly.  All  of  this  will  become  appar- 
ent as  we  proceed. 

For  further  study  read: 
Russell,  The  Problems  of  Philosophy,  Chaps.  I  and  II. 

For  advanced  study  read: 
Nunn,  Aim  and  Achievements  of  Scientific  Method,  Chaps.  I 
andn. 

4.  Appearance  and  reality. — The  study  of  the  rela- 
tion of  the  world  as  perceived  to  the  world  of  common 
sense  introduces  us  to  one  of  the  most  vexed  questions 
in  metaphysics.  This  question  is,  what  is  the  place  in 
reality  occupied  by  the  world  of  perception?  A  later 
chapter  will  give  part  of  the  answer  to  this  question,  but 
the  fundamental  point  at  issue  may  be  taken  up  at  once. 
If  to  explain  my  perceptions  of  my  desk  I  assert  a  rec- 
tangular desk  of  a  standard  size,  if  to  explain  my  per- 
ceptions of  the  oncoming  locomotive  I  assert  a  locomo- 
tive of  constant  size;  what  relation  obtains  between  the 
observed  facts  and  the  theoretical  entity,  do  both  belong 
to  reality?  Most  metaphysicians  reply,  "the  many 
unlike  and  changing  data  of  perception  are  not  real  but 
are  appearance,  whereas  the  standard  object  in  whose 
existence  we  come  to  believe  is  the  genuinely  real." 


Everyman's  theory  of  reality      49 

That  is,  the  oncoming  locomotive  which  I  see  is  not  real. 
The  real  locomotive  is  constant  in  size.  Thus  the  relation 
between  the  two  is  said  to  be  that  of  a  reality  and  of 
its  appearance.  The  objection  to  this  answer  is  that  it  is 
false  to  the  data  in  question  and  that  it  clears  up  no  dif- 
ficulties. 

As  we  have  found,  the  relation  between  the  world 
as  perceived  and  the  world  as  conceived  is  that  of  fact 
and  its  explanation.  Moreover,  that  is  all  there  is  to  the 
problem.  The  conceived  rectangular  changeless  desk  is 
a  theory,  and  the  only  reason  for  asserting  its  existence 
is  that  it  explains  the  desk  I  do  perceive.  With  it  as  a 
premise  I  am  able  to  infer  many  of  the  properties  of  the 
desk  I  perceive  and  I  am  able  to  do  this  far  more  readily 
than  did  I  use  any  particular  percept  as  my  premise.  I 
can  give  instructions  to  a  cabinet  maker  to  make  me 
another  desk  much  more  easily  and  intelligibly  if  I 
present  him  with  rectangular  plans  than  if  I  give  him  a 
photograph  of  the  desk.  A  similar  truth  holds  of  the  plans 
of  a  house  given  to  the  builder.  In  short,  theory  is  a  far 
better  guide  to  conduct  than  are  photographs  or  isolated 
percepts.  All  this,  however,  does  not  make  the  concept- 
ual desk  real  and  the  perceived  desk  mere  appearance. 
Both  are  real. 

It  will  here  be  objected,  "A  desk  cannot  change  in 
size  and  shape  and  at  the  same  time  be  constant.  Do 
you  mean  that  there  are  two  real  desks  and  not  merely 
two  but  a  himdred,  for  as  you  go  about  the  room  you 
could  easily  get  a  hundred  different  photographs  of 
your  desk?"  This  question  reveals  much  confusion  in 
the  mind  of  the  questioner.    There  is  not  one  desk  in 


5©  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

the  sense  that  several  diflferent  photographs  are  identical 
or  dupUcate  pictures.  If  a  man  has  several  different 
photographs  taken  of  himself  in  quite  different  positions 
evidently  they  are  not  the  same  picture.  If  they  were, 
why  should  he  not  be  satisfied  with  one?  In  this  sense 
there  are  indeed  thousands  of  desks  in  my  study,  and  you 
and  I  are  thousands  of  different  individuals.  But  this  is 
not  what  we  mean  when  we  say  all  are  one  desk  or  all  are 
one  man.  We  mean  that  the  various  data  are  parts  or 
members  of  one  system  intimately  and  logically  related. 
So  much  so  that  the  system  stands  quite  distinct  from 
other  systems  and  forms  what  we  call  a  thing. 

That  a  thing  should  have  many  different  properties 
in  its  different  relations  to  the  world  about  it,  should  not 
take  us  by  surprise.  A  bag  of  coffee  on  the  earth  may 
weigh  a  pound  and  on  the  moon  but  a  small  fraction  of  a 
pound.  A  bell  in  the  air  may  have  a  sound  and  in  a 
vacuum  no  sound.  So  a  desk  in  one  set  of  relations,  the 
relations  in  which  I  perceive  it,  may  be  markedly  different 
from  the  desk  in  the  relations  in  which  you  perceive  it 
and  from  the  desk  as  we  both  conceive  it.  We  should  not 
call  the  bag  of  coffee  and  the  bell  two  bags  and  two  bells 
but  one  bag  and  one  bell;  and  there  is  no  more  reason  for 
calling  the  desk  conceived  and  the  desk  perceived  two 
desks. 

Similar  arguments  might  be  made  regarding  all  other 
cases  where  the  object  of  theory  and  the  object  of  per- 
ception differ.  The  heat  of  the  fire,  the  color  of  the 
ocean,  the  sound  of  a  whistle  are  different  as  our  point  of 
perception  is  different;  whereas  the  theoretical  object 
may  have  constant  properties.    The  confusion  here  as 


Everyman's  theory  of  reality  51 

in  the  foregoing  cases  all  comes  from  not  understanding 
the  true  relation  between  the  perceived  and  the  conceived 
and  the  sense  in  which  the  two  are  the  same  object. 
To  repeat:  the  relation  is  a  logical  relation  which  brings 
them  into  an  identical  logical  system.  The  relation  is 
not  literal  identity  which  of  course  leads  to  the  absurdity 
felt  by  the  puzzled  metaphysician.  The  conceptual 
is  a  premise  from  which  together  with  other  premises 
(in  many  cases  the  particular  spatial  relations)  the  per- 
ceived object  can  be  deduced.  From  such  premises,  for 
example,  an  artist  could  deduce  a  ship  as  perceived  from 
a  given  distance  and  at  a  given  angle  and  paint  the  picture 
of  this  object.  From  his  plans  and  other  premises  an 
architect  can  deduce  many  of  the  aspects  of  a  building 
and  foretell  their  harmony  and  beauty. 

Thus  the  relation  between  the  conceived  object  and  the 
perceived  object  is  not  that  between  a  real  object  and  its 
appearances  but  that  between  a  premise  and  a  conclusion. 
In  practical  affairs  the  conceived  object  is  a  more  useful 
guide  to  our  conduct  and  to  the  conduct  of  those  whom  we 
instruct.  This,  and  this  chiefly,  leads  so  many  to  regard 
it  as  the  more  genuinely  real.  Again,  the  world  is  so  much 
simpler  if  we  think  of  objects  only  as  we  conceive  them, 
if  we  ignore  the  many  and  varying  aspects  of  the  per- 
ceived. This  too  impels  us  to  sacrifice  truth  to  conven- 
ience. Habit  completes  the  work  and  soon  we  cannot 
beheve  what  we  perceive.  Moreover,  there  is  no  con- 
tradiction in  maintaining  the  reahty  of  both  the  per- 
ceived and  the  conceived.  There  is  no  contradiction  in 
saying  that  the  changing  locomotive  is  also  constant,  as 
there  is  none  in  saying  that  two  photographs  taken  of 


52  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

a  man  from  diflferent  positions  are  pictures  of  the  same 
man.  There  is  no  contradiction,  because  the  same  thing 
can  have  radically  different  properties  in  different  re- 
lations.^ 

For  further  study  read: 
Moore,  Nature  and  Reality  of  Objects  of  Perception,  Proc. 

Aristotel.  Soc,  1905-6,  6; 
Stout,  Primary  and  Secondary  Qualities,  Proc.  Aristotel.  Soc, 

1903-4,  4; 
Nunn,  Are  Secondary  Qualities  Independent  of  Perception? 

Proc.  Aristotel.  Soc,  1909-10, 10. 

For  more  extensive  study: 
Cf.  references.  Chapter  XVI. 

^  These  relations  are  often  complicated  and  puzzling;  and  this  some- 
times leads  us  into  errors,  especially  the  errors  called  illusions.  But 
these  errors  do  not  lie  in  the  perceived  entity  but  in  the  assertion  of  the 
wrong  theory,  or  conceived  entity. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  NATDKE  OF  SCIENCE 

I.  The  nature  of  science. — We  are  now  prepared  to 
state  precisely  the  nature  of  science.  Science  is  the  ex- 
plicit and  demonstrated  explanation  oj  all  facts.  That  is, 
the  business  of  scientific  research  is  to  explain  all  facts, 
to  make  this  explanation  logically  explicit,  and  to  dem- 
onstrate rigorously  its  truth.  But  science  thus  defined 
is  evidently  an  ideal;  for  to  demonstrate  any  theory  re- 
quires not  only  sufficient  premises  but  also  knowledge 
of  the  truth  of  these  premises.  Indeed  such  a  demonstra- 
tion is  a  task  that  has  nowhere  been  accomplished,  ex- 
cept perhaps  in  formal  logic  and  in  mathematics.  Still, 
our  definition  is  justified;  for  as  our  sciences  progress 
they  draw  nearer  to  this  ideal.  In  all  their  stages,  the 
sciences  diflFerentiate  themselves  from  the  knowledge  and 
opinions  of  daily  life,  from  the  opinions  of  the  ignorant 
and  of  the  careless,  of  the  child  and  of  the  savage,  pre- 
cisely in  these  respects,  a  rigorous  demonstration  is  ex- 
plicitly sought  and  methods  are  employed  which  tend 
to  eliminate  all  unproved  or  imwarranted  premises. 
Our  ordinary  knowledge  and  opinions  are  dependent  to 
a  great  degree  upon  our  instincts,  our  emotions,  our  tra- 
ditions, our  habits,  and  many  another  unconscious  prej- 
udice; whereas  in  science  the  struggle  is  to  make  every- 
thing logically  explicit,  to  eliminate  prejudice  of  all  sorts, 
to  distinguish  between  the  certain  and  the  probable, 

53 


54  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

and   between   the   probable   and   the  mere  tentative 
guess. 

However,  science  arises  out  of  the  humbler  form  of 
knowledge,  and  the  psychological  laws  which  govern  the 
growth  of  the  two  are  fundamentally  the  same.  As  trial 
and  accidental  success  sometimes  enable  an  animal  to 
escape  from  a  trap  or  to  acquire  a  valuable  habit,  so 
also  in  the  realm  of  science  does  the  constant  experiment- 
ing— as  we  invent  and  think  out  our  theories  and  as  we 
test  these  theories  in  nature  and  in  the  laboratory — en- 
able us  to  discover  and  to  demonstrate.  In  short,  the 
tentative  trial  is  never  wholly  lacking  even  in  the  ad- 
vanced stages  of  a  science  and  demonstration  is  never 
totally  lacking  in  the  ordinary  beginnings  of  knowledge. 
So  science  and  common  sense  are  not  opposites,  rather 
they  are  different  stages  of  the  same  process. 

For  further  study  read: 
Santayana,  Life  of  Reason,  V,  Reason  in  Science; 
Thomson,  J.  A.,  Introduction  to  Science,  Chaps.  I-IV; 
Pearson,  Grammar  of  Science,  Chap.  I. 

For  advanced  study  read: 
Aristotle,  Posterior  Analytics; 
Jevons,  The  Principles  of  Science. 

2.  Faith. — The  true  logical  opposite  of  science  is  not 
a  lower  or  less  thorough  knowledge;  it  is  rather  an  ex- 
plicit disobedience  of  the  maxim  that  whatever  is  as- 
serted as  true,  should  be  perceived  or  demonstrated.  In 
other  words,  science  is  the  opposite  of  unfounded  asser- 
tion, and  let  us  call  unfounded  assertion  faith  or  belief. 
To  believe,  is  not  merely  to  entertain  a  proposition  ten- 
tatively while  we  wait  for  evidence  or  while  we  put  our 


THE  NATURE  OF  SCIENCE  55 

assertion  to  the  test  of  experiment,  nor  is  it  to  assert  a 
proposition  as  probable  because  it  will,  if  true,  explain 
certain  facts,  nor  is  it  to  deduce  a  proposition  from 
theories  we  know  to  be  true.  On  the  contrary,  to  be- 
lieve or  to  have  faith  is  to  assert  that  which  lacks  proof. 
It  is  unfounded  conviction. 

Faith  can  be  utterly  lawless,  believing  even  what  is 
known  to  be  false  or  denying  what  is  known  to  be  true; 
but  faith  is  not  necessarily  lawless.  Faith  is  lawless  if 
the  proposition  believed  might  have  been  proved  or  dis- 
proved. In  order  not  to  be  lawless,  faith  must  be  a  be- 
lief in  a  proposition  which  for  the  time  being  lies  beyond 
our  means  of  verification.  Moreover,  since  we  can  ignore 
altogether  such  propositions,  confining  our  assertion  to 
those  propositions  for  which  we  have  proof;  faith,  in  order 
not  to  be  lawless,  must  be  a  duty,  an  obUgation,  and  not 
a  mere  impulse  or  act  of  indolence.  In  short,  it  must  be 
shown  to  be  genuinely  valuable  and  more  valuable  than 
its  opposite,  the  refusal  to  believe.  Finally,  what  is  not 
possible  for  us  to  demonstrate  to-day  may  be  possible 
to-morrow  or  the  next  day;  therefore,  to  have  a  right  to 
believe,  we  must  know  either  that  we  shall  never  be  able 
to  prove  what  we  believe  or  that  we  are  justified  in  not 
waiting  until  we  are  able.  - 

In  other  words,  faith  is  lawful  if  the  proposition  be- 
lieved does  not  disagree  with  any  other  proposition  which 
we  know,  if  the  proposition  believed  is  not  within  our  power 
to  prove,  and  finally,  if  the  belief  is  truly  valuable  and  more 
valuable  than  its  opposite,  the  refusal  to  believe,  or  the 
merely  tentative  assumption. 

This  principle  raises  two  important  and  interesting 


56  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

questions.  First  to  what  extent  are  the  convictions  of 
the  cultured  man  of  to-day  a  matter  of  faith?  Secondly, 
to  what  extent  does  this  faith  conform  to  the  principle 
above  given?  Does  man  live  by  faith  and  is  he  jus- 
tified in  so  doing?  Every  deed  in  daily  life  involves  us  in 
acts  of  faith,  as  does  every  application  of  science.  This 
is  so  for  two  reasons.  First,  even  when  the  deed  is  gov- 
erned by  the  fullest  knowledge  we  can  command,  this 
knowledge  is  always  either  inadequate  or  partly  unveri- 
fied. We  calculate  with  greatest  accuracy  and  with  all 
but  certainty  the  time  of  the  rising  of  to-morrow's  sun  or 
the  date  of  an  eclipse;  yet  our  astronomical  theories 
upon  which  we  base  our  calculations  fall  short  of  being 
completely  proved.  Hence  even  though  we  should  be 
regarded  insane,  did  we  refuse  to  act  upon  this  infor- 
mation, we  are  in  so  doing  going  beyond  what  we  know 
to  be  true.  If  this  is  so  in  such  a  case,  to  how  much 
greater  extent  do  we  go  beyond  knowledge  when  we 
decide  upon  a  political  measure  or  a  life's  career?  More- 
over, even  when  we  make  allowance  for  this  lack  of  com- 
plete proof  and  act  not  upon  the  truth  but  upon  the 
probability  of  our  information,  we  are  still  acting  upon 
faith;  for  the  premises  upon  which  the  probability  of 
any  proposition  is  reckoned,  always  fall  short  of  absolute 
certainty.  When  I  toss  a  coin  there  are  even  chances 
of  head  or  tail  falling  uppermost  provided  the  position  of 
the  centre  of  gravity  does  not  favor  either  side.  But  this 
last  I  may  not  know.  Or  if  I  do,  by  what  means  did  I 
ascertain  it?  Were  these  means  quite  conclusive?  So 
we  may  proceed  to  question  indefinitely;  and  we  shall 
always  find  that  somewhere  in  the  test  we  have  to  make 


THE  NATURE  OF  SCIENCE  57 

a  start  and  so  run  the  risk  of  making  a  false  assumption. 
Secondly,  every  deed  of  daily  life  involves  faith,  because 
it  is  never  completely  tentative,  it  is  always  conclusive. 
We  can  never  undo  our  deeds.  If  only  we  might  take 
back  our  acts  then  we  might  use  only  tentatively  the 
various  theories  or  plans  which  we  entertain;  but  we 
cannot.  After  the  speculator  in  stocks  has  lost  his  for- 
tune he  cannot  take  his  decision  back  and  thereby  re- 
cover the  money  and  start  over  again.  When  we  act, 
whatever  may  in  our  sight  be  the  ultimate  warrant  for 
our  action,  that  is  absolutely  asserted.  Of  course,  if  our 
act  is  blind,  it  asserts  nothing  and  is  morally  not  our 
act  at  all;  but  when  we  act  conscientiously  and  know- 
ingly, we  always  act  on  the  basis  of  some  conviction. 
This  is  true  all  the  way  from  the  answers  to  such  ques- 
tions as.  Shall  I  take  my  umbrella?  Shall  I  walk  or 
ride?  to  the  solutions  of  life's  most  serious  problems, 
Shall  I  be  a  Christian?  Shall  I  volunteer  for  the  war? 
Shall  I,  as  juryman,  decide  that  this  man  is  to  go  to  the 
scaffold?  Shall  I  accept  the  physician's  advice  and  un- 
dergo a  dangerous  operation?  No  doubt  there  is  much  in 
such  answers  that  is  tentative  and  so  not  asserted,  but 
there  is  always  something  that  is  asserted  even  if  it  be 
only  the  proposition,  "I  ought  not  to  think  over  the 
matter  any  longer  but  to  decide  at  once." 

To  go  farther  into  this  subject  would  lead  us  into 
ethics  and  the  philosophy  of  religion.  We  have  been 
led  into  it  so  far  only  in  order  to  point  out  the  difference 
between  actual  life  with  its  absolute  decisions  and  science 
with  its  tentative  assumptions.  In  the  life  of  conduct 
we  are  compelled  to  decide,  to  assert,  to  believe.    In 


58  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

the  life  of  speculation,  of  theory,  and  of  scientific  re- 
search we  are  called  upon  to  assert  nothing  for  which  we 
lack  proof.  Everything  may  be  questioned,  everything 
may  be  tentatively  assumed,  until  complete  proof  is 
forthcoming.  Thus  theory  is  thoroughly  radical.  It 
may  rob  us  of  our  strongest  convictions  and  offer  us 
nothing  in  their  place.  It  may  question  our  fondest 
hopes,  and  promise  us  nothing  in  return.  For  this  we 
should  not  condemn  it;  for  its  work  can  be  done  in  no 
other  way,  and  if  it  compels  us  to  outgrow  our  older  be- 
liefs, still,  through  its  help,  we  in  time  reach  nobler  and 
more  enlightened  convictions.  So  far  we  may  conclude, 
it  is  the  business  of  science,  to  question  old  hypotheses, 
to  invent  new  hypotheses,  to  test  all  hypotheses,  and  to 
demonstrate  whatever  it  asserts. 

For  further  study  read: 
Paulsen,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  313-335; 
Clifford,  Lectures  and  Essays,  "The  Ethics  of  Belief;" 
James,  Will  to  Believe,  Essays  "The  Will  to  Believe,"  and  "Is 

Life  Worth  Living;" 
James,  Some  Problems  of  Philosophy,  Appendix; 
Russell,  Philosophical  Essays,  87-126; 
Perry,  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,  Chap.  I; 
Bradley,  Faith,  Phil.  Review,  191 1,  20,  165. 

J.  Two  ultimate  types  of  fact. — The  word  science  is 
conveniently  used  in  a  still  narrower  sense  than  that 
described  in  section  i.  This  narrower  sense  is  revealed 
by  pointing  out  that  besides  faith  science  has  another 
logical  opposite.  Science  does  not  assert  valttes;  whereas 
our  moral  and  esthetic  convictions  do.  What  are  values? 
If  we  examine  any  man's  beHefs,  we  shall  find  that  some 


THE  NATURE  OF   SCIENCE  59 

of  them  assert  what  we  may  call  "cold-blooded  truth," 
that  is,  truth  which  is  thoroughly  disinterested,  whereas 
in  other  instances  we  shall  notice  evidence  of  personal 
interest,  of  approval  or  disapproval,  of  love  or  hate,  of 
delight  or  sorrow,  of  praise  or  blame,  of  respect  or  indig- 
nation, of  worship  or  disdain,  of  trust  or  dread.  These 
latter  propositions  are  values,  and  may  be  illustrated  as 
follows:  "He  is  a  better  man;"  "You  ought  to  go  to 
work;"  "That  deed  is  evil;"  "This  sunset  is  beautiful;" 
"His  cause  is  noble;"  "God  is  holy  and  He  should  be 
worshipped."  Such  propositions  as  a  group  differ  in 
some  one  respect  from  the  following:  "Two  plus  two 
is  four;"  "Water  is  composed  of  oxygen  and  hydrogen;" 
"The  election  was  held  yesterday;"  "Heat  caused  the 
rail  to  expand;"  "It  is  a  mile  from  here  tp  Oxford." 
These  latter  in  no  way  indicate  either  our  approval  or 
disapproval,  our  admiration  or  disdain  or  any  other  type 
of  valuation.  No  matter  how  properly  and  worthily  we 
might  wish  them  to  be  false,  they  are  true;  and  we  have 
to  reconcile  ourselves  to  this  truth,  even  though  it  crush 
our  fondest  hopes.  Indeed  this  is  the  lesson  man  has 
to  learn,  hard  as  it  is  to  learn;  for  science  in  this  narrower 
sense  has  in  its  progress  found  old  and  dear  beliefs  false. 
It  has  compelled  man,  often  against  his  will,  to  change 
his  old  manner  of  life  and  adjust  himself  to  a  very  dif- 
ferent conception  of  the  world,  of  man,  of  his  origin  and 
destiny,  of  his  place  in  the  universe,  and  of  the  natural 
laws  that  control  his  welfare.  In  short,  science  in  this 
narrower  sense  is  "cold-blooded"  or  free  from  judgment 
of  value.  On  the  other  hand,  let  this  statement  not 
lead  us  to  underestimate  the  validity  of  our  judgments 


6o  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

of  value.  They  too  should  become  and  may  become 
thoroughly  scientific  in  the  broader  sense,  that  is,  they 
too  are  either  true  or  false,  they  too  are  based  on 
fact,  or  perceived  truth,  they  too  require  to  be  demon- 
strated. 

For  further  study  read: 
Marvin,  Introduction  to  Systematic  Philosophy,  438-448; 
Russell,  Philosophical  Essays,  1-58; 
Perry,  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,  Chap.  XIV. 

For  advanced  study  read: 
Urban,  Valuation:  Its  Nature  and  Laws; 
Considt   for  further  references  art.   "Worth"  in  Baldwin's 
Dictionary  of  Philosophy  and  Psychology. 

4.  The  definition  of  science. — We  have  now  all  the 
data  at  hand  from  which  to  formulate  a  complete  defi- 
nition of  science  in  the  narrow  sense.  First,  science, 
like  other  types  of  information,  consists  of  an  array  of 
propositions  but  differs  from  all  other  types  in  that  it 
forms  an  expUcit  and  a  demonstrated  system.  It  is 
knowledge  and  not  faith.  Secondly,  science  differs  from 
other  systems  of  propositions  in  being  an  explanation 
of  facts.  It  is  not  an  isolated  proposition,  such  as  the 
assertion,  "Two  plus  two  equals  four;"  rather  it  is  the 
assertion,  "Two  plus  two  equals  four,  explains  or  ac- 
counts for  some  other  truth."  Thirdly,  science  is  con- 
fined in  its  explanation  to  propositions  which  assert 
non- values:  for  example,  science  explains  what  exists 
and  why  it  exists  but  does  not  ascertain  what  is  valuable 
or  why  it  has  a  value.  More  rigorously  expressed, 
science  does  not  explain  the  facts  called  values,  nor  does 
it  assume  premises  which  assert  values.     Hence  our 


THE  NATURE  OF  SCIENCE  6l 

complete  definition:  (a)  Science  in  the  narrow  sense  is 
the  explicit  and  demonstrated  explanation  of  all  facts  that 
are  non-values;  (b)  Science  in  the  broad  sense  is  the 
explicit  and  demonstrated  explanation  of  all  perceived 
triUh. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  PROGRESS  OF  SCIENCE 

I.  The  progress  of  science. — Science,  as  defined  in 
the  previous  chapter,  is  an  ideal.  It  is  what  we  hope 
to  know  and  strive  to  know  and  what,  in  succeeding 
generations  of  men,  we  have  come  nearer  to  knowing; 
whereas  what  we  actually  know  is  only  science  in  the 
making.  However,  it  is  convenient  to  call  this  imper- 
fect knowledge  science;  but  in  so  doing  we  must  not 
confuse  it  with  the  ideal,  or  say  of  the  one  what  is  true 
only  of  the  other.  On  the  one  hand,  science,  the  ideal, 
does  not  grow.  By  definition  it  is  final  and  perfect,  and 
having  no  growth,  has  no  history.  It  has  been  always 
and  will  be  always  what  it  is,  the  complete  explanation 
of  fact.  On  the  other  hand,  science  as  we  possess  it, 
does  grow,  does  have  a  history,  does  make  progress. 
We  speak  of  the  history  of  chemistry,  of  physics  or  of 
astronomy.  We  call  chemistry  a  young  science,  a  sci- 
ence of  the  last  one  hundred  and  fifty  years.  We  say 
that  the  explorers  of  the  fifteenth  century  revolution- 
ized geography,  and  that  the  investigators  of  the  follow- 
ing century  revolutionized  astronomy  and  physics. 

The  truth,  that  science  grows  or  makes  progress, 
forces  us  to  ask:  What  constitutes  this  progress?  How 
does  science  change  as  it  grows?  How  can  one  tell  a 
maturer  from  a  less  mature  science?  Or  put  the  ques- 
tion thus:  You  and  I  were  once  children  and  possessed 

62 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  SCIENCE  63 

a  child's  knowledge;  now  we  are  adults  and  have  a  far 
better  knowledge.  Wherein  is  our  present  knowledge 
superior  to  that  of  childhood?  In  the  first  place  we  know 
more  than  we  did  in  childhood,  and  this  must  mean  that 
we  know  more  truths.  From  this  we  may  infer  that 
science  also  grows  by  the  discovery  of  truths.  Let  us 
call  this  aspect  of  its  growth,  growth  by  adding  infor- 
mation. 

In  the  second  place  we  know  better  than  we  did  as 
children  because  our  present  information  is  more  inter- 
connected. We  have  learned  that  this  and  that  propo- 
sition implies  or  is  implied  by  this  or  that  other  propo- 
sition. As  children  we  know  many  a  truth  without 
knowing  why  it  is  true.  For  example,  we  know  that  tele- 
phone and  electric  bells  ring,  that  water  freezes,  that 
wood  burns;  but  we  do  not  know  why  these  things  happen. 
Similarly  the  ancients  knew  that  the  moon  has  phases, 
that  both  Sim  and  moon  undergo  edipse,  that  the 
planets  have  a  di£Ferent  path  through  the  heavens  from 
that  of  the  other  stars,  that  the  altitude  of  the  sun  in 
winter  is  less  than  it  is  in  summer;  but  they  did  not 
know  why  these  things  are  so. 

As  science  progressed  it  was  discovered  why  these 
propositions  known  to  the  ancients  are  true.  In  the 
days  of  Galileo  Europe  learned  that  the  sun,  not  the 
earth,  is  at  the  centre  of  the  solar  system,  that  the 
earth  revolves  on  its  axis  and  that  it  and  the  other 
planets  revolve  about  the  sun.  This  theory  accounted 
for  the  facts  then  known  and  other  facts  soon  discov- 
ered, such  as,  that  the  planets  go  through  phases  as 
does  the  moon.     Thus  many  facts  became  logically 


64  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

connected  which  before  seemed  quite  isolated.  But 
other  facts  remained  still  unexplained  and  logically  un- 
connected. Why  the  ocean  tides?  Why  the  velocity, 
the  path  about  the  sun  and  the  distance  from  the  sun, 
of  each  planet?  Why  the  various  perturbations  in 
these  planetary  orbits?  One  proposition  discovered 
by  Sir  Isaac  Newton  explains  in  part  all  these  truths, 
and  connects  logically  such  seemingly  isolated  truths 
as  the  falling  of  an  apple,  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the 
tide,  the  length  of  the  year,  the  shape  of  the  earth's 
orbit,  and  the  origin,  the  age,  and  the  destiny  of  the 
solar  system  itself.  And  the  end  is  not  yet;  for  if  the 
day  ever  comes  when  the  physicist  can  explain  gravi- 
tation, we  shall  probably  be  able  not  only  to  account  for 
many  things  we  now  know  to  be  true  but  also  to  connect 
logically  truths  which  now  seem  completely  isolated. 
Thus  as  science  progresses  propositions  are  discovered 
each  of  which  in  part  explains  a  large  number  of  other 
propositions  and  thereby  connects  these  many  truths 
logically.  Such  propositions  are  spoken  of  usually  as 
generalizations.  In  short,  as  knowledge  grows  it  be- 
comes unified,  it  becomes  general  knowledge.  Thus  far 
we  have  seen  two  respects  in  which  sdence  progresses, 
first  our  information  increases  in  extent,  and  second  in 
logical  connection,  or  generality. 

In  the  third  and  last  place,  science  progresses  by  gain- 
ing in  logical  rigor.  This  means  two  things:  first,  the 
discovery  of  the  ultimate  or  more  nearly  ultimate  terms 
and  relations  of  our  sciences  and  through  them  the  pre- 
cise definition  of  the  other  terms  and  relations;  secondly, 
the  discovery  of  the  ultimate  or  more  nearly  ultimate 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  SCIENCE  6$ 

premises  presupposed  in  our  sciences  and  thereby  the  re- 
formulation of  these  sciences  to  a  greater  and  greater  ex- 
tent as  thoroughly  deductive  systems.  In  short,  science 
becomes  logically  more  explicit.  As  a  man  becomes  wiser 
and  more  thoughtful,  he  tries  to  use  his  words  with 
greater  precision.  He  does  not  say  linen  when  he  should 
say  cotton,  brass  when  he  should  say  bronze,  dirt  when 
he  should  say  clay,  curve  when  he  should  say  parabola. 
Again,  he  becomes  more  widely  acquainted  with  the 
principles  which  guide  him  in  his  decisions  and  the  prem- 
ises which  are  presupposed  in  his  opinions.  If  he  holds 
to  a  certain  political  policy,  he  knows  whether  or  not 
it  is  a  mere  dogma  or  a  well-founded  conviction.  If 
he  has  certain  strong  artistic  Ukes  and  dislikes,  he  may 
see  and  acknowledge  that  they  are  idiosyncrasies  and 
are  blind.  Finally,  if  some  of  his  opinions  clash  or  are 
quite  inconsistent  he  may  notice  this  and  give  up  one 
or  the  other.  In  short,  he  has  become  more  self-critical, 
more  consistent,  more  profound  in  his  thoughts  and 
more  open  minded.  Evidently  every  normal  adult  in  a 
civilized  land  has  made  some  progress  in  these  respects 
since  the  days  of  his  childhood. 

The  same  truth  holds  of  the  progress  of  science 
through  the  centuries.  In  the  various  sciences  greater 
logical  rigor  is  evident  everywhere,  except  where  it  has 
been  delayed  by  the  rapid  accumulation  of  new  infor- 
mation; and  in  the  exact  sciences  especially  terms  and 
relations  are  defined  with  greater  care  and  often  with 
remarkable  accuracy.  Nowhere  is  this  so  wonderfully 
the  case  as  in  mathematics. 

In  the  other  respects  also  the  sciences  progress  notice- 


66  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

ably.  As  long  ago  as  Euclid  the  geometrician  endeav- 
ored to  teach  his  propositions  as  explicit  deductions 
from  precisely  formulated  premises.  In  our  own  age, 
however,  the  mathematician  has  far  outstripped  his  pred- 
ecessors in  the  rigor  of  his  deductions,  in  the  reduction 
of  the  number  of  premises  required  and  in  their  explicit 
formulation;  until  to-day  mathematics  is  the  intellectual 
wonder  of  the  world,  the  most  perfect  of  the  sciences, 
the  body  of  knowledge  which  most  nearly  fulfils  the 
conditions  of  the  ideal  science.  Moreover,  what  has 
been  possible  in  mathematics  does  not  appear  impossible 
for  the  other  sciences.  True  its  realization  seems  indef- 
initely far  in  the  future,  but  we  are  fully  aware  that 
physics  and  chemistry  and  biology  are  nearer  this  ideal 
of  logical  rigor  than  they  were.  Much  of  physics  can 
be  put  in  a  thoroughly  deductive  form  as  can  also  parts 
of  chemistry;  and  perhaps  we  are  to-day  on  the  verge 
of  discovering  premises  from  which  the  periodic  law  and 
many  of  the  phenomena  of  chemicaJ  affinity  may  be 
rigorously  deduced.  Now  all  such  progress  brings  with 
it  not  only  a  more  nearly  deductive  formulation  of  our 
knowledge  but  what  is  especially  pertinent,  a  knowledge 
of  the  gaps  in  the  argument,  a  greater  awareness  of  what 
are  mere  working  hypotheses  or  postulates,  an  insight 
into  the  inconsistencies  of  our  theories  and  the  merits 
of  rival  hypotheses.  Our  science  to-day  is  less  dogmatic, 
more  cautious,  more  open  minded,  and  more  critical. 

Thus  we  get  a  third  respect,  which  with  the  two  pre- 
ceding gives  us  the  following  three  elements  that  consti- 
tute the  progress  of  science.  First,  there  is  the  increase 
in  knowledge  and  the  mere  multiplication  of  facts  and  of 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  SCIENCE  6j 

other  truths  requiring  to  be  explained.  Second,  there 
is  the  increase  in  generalization,  in  the  number  of  truths 
which  are  explained  and  thereby  logically  connected, 
in  the  unification  of  knowledge.  Third,  there  is  the  in- 
crease in  logical  rigor.  The  terms  and  relations  are  de- 
fined with  greater  precision  and  with  the  employment  of 
fewer  ultimate  notions.  The  logical  gaps  are  more  ap- 
parent. The  premises  are  explicitly  assumed  and  re- 
duced to  a  minimum  and  the  formulation  of  the  science 
approaches  nearer  the  ideal  of  the  explicit  and  rigorous 
deductive  argument. 

2.  The  place  of  metaphysics  in  science. — If  now  we  re- 
call what  was  said  in  the  second  chapter,  we  shall  see  that 
the  second  and  third  respects  in  which  the  scientist  en- 
deavors to  advance  knowledge  is  precisely  what  we 
mean  by  philosophy.  Indeed  we  could  here  substitute 
for  the  expression  "Science  progresses,"  the  sentence, 
"Science  becomes  more  philosophical;"  for  philosophy 
is  not  so  much  a  name  of  a  certain  body  of  information 
as  an  aspect  of  our  knowledge  in  general  as  it  progresses 
from  a  more  primitive  to  a  maturer  stage.  In  other 
words,  one  science  is  more  philosophical  than  another, 
not  because  it  studies  numbers,  or  matter,  or  protoplasm 
and  the  other  does  not,  but  because  it  has  reached  a 
higher  stage  of  development  than  has  the  other.  The 
philosopher  has  no  extra  source  of  information  or  outside 
field  for  research  beyond  that  in  the  possession  of  the 
mathematician,  the  biologist,  the  sodal  scientist,  the 
artist,  the  teacher  of  reHgion.  Rather  he  has  precisely 
what  they  have,  but  his  special  interests  are  confined  to 
two  aspects  of  their  information;  first,  the  generaliza- 


68  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

tions  to  which  it  leads,  its  unification,  and  secondly,  its 
logical  rigor  and  cogency. 

The  second  chapter  told  us  also  that  metaphysics  as  a 
branch  or  discipline  of  philosophy  is  a  study  whose  field 
is  confined  to  that  of  science  in  the  narrow  sense,  in  other 
words,  to  the  problems  of  reality.  As  such  it  is  therefore 
that  aspect  of  scientific  growth  which  consists,  first,  in 
formulating  the  highest  generalizations  warranted  by 
man's  existential  knowledge,  and,  secondly,  in  organiz- 
ing this  knowledge  into  a  logically  rigorous  and  explicit 
system  of  information.  In  other  words,  every  scientist 
who  is  endeavoring  to  reach  higher  generalizations  re- 
garding the  existent  world,  be  he  astronomer,  physicist, 
biologist,  psychologist,  or  any  other  student  of  the  real,  is 
ipso  facto  a  metaphysician.  So  too  is  every  student  who 
seeks  to  discover  and  to  define  the  fundamental  terms 
and  relations  of  his  science  and  to  make  explicit  the  ulti- 
mate premises  upon  which  his  science  logically  rests: 
in  short,  every  student  who  is  seeking  the  logical  founda- 
tions of  the  sciences. 

Here  it  is  highly  to  be  desired  that  we  should  notice 
that  philosophy  and  metaphysics  are  not  matters  of 
merely  academic  pursuit  and  interest.  They  constitute 
an  aspect  of  man's  intellectual  history  the  world  over. 
Indeed,  they  form  a  chapter  in  the  history  of  civiliza- 
tion itself.  As  man  has  progressed  he  has  sought  to 
imify,  to  generalize,  what  he  knows  or  believes;  he  has 
striven  to  see  more  clearly  what  logically  underlies  his 
opinions  and  convictions.  As  he  has  done  so,  he  has  made 
not  only  great  discoveries,  discoveries  that  completely 
revolutionize  his  picture  of  the  world  about  him  and 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  SCIENCE  69 

within  him,  but  also  great  changes  in  his  manner  of 
reacting  to  that  world.  Thus  the  whole  intellectual 
history  of  man  from  savagedom  to  modem  Europe  is 
not  merely  an  accumulation  of  bits  of  information  and 
correction  of  individual  errors,  but  also  a  gradual  trans- 
formation of  the  whole  outlook  upon  reality  from  a  nar- 
row and  superficial  to  a  broader  and  profounder  vision. 
It  has  been  not  only  an  increase  in  knowledge  but  a 
philosophical  growth  within  knowledge.  Thus  in  study- 
ing philosophy  we  are  gaining  an  insight  into  himaan 
history,  human  nature  and  human  life  as  truly  as  we  are 
when  we  study  man's  political,  social,  and  economic  cus- 
toms and  institutions;  for  the  philosophical  convictions  of 
men  to-day,  from  those  of  the  ablest  scientist  to  those  of 
the  humblest  peasant,  are  one  and  all  the  gradual  out- 
come of  centuries  upon  centuries  of  human  experience 
and  thought.  Therefore  to  think  of  philosophy  as  some- 
thing solely  in  books,  or  in  the  minds  of  a  few  bookworms 
or  dreamers  would  be  to  make  as  great  an  error  as  to 
think  in  the  same  way  of  economic,  social  and  political 
policies  and  customs. 

Again,  it  is  important  that  we  should  notice  that  our 
philosophical  knowledge  not  only  has  evolved  but  shows 
all  the  usual  marks  of  evolution.  That  is,  precisely  as 
different  peoples  and  different  geographical  sections,  and 
different  strata  of  any  nation's  population  reveal  different 
stages  of  economic  and  social  development  and  pre- 
cisely as  you  will  see  in  them  side  by  side  with  the  new 
vestiges  of  the  old  and  even  of  the  very  ancient;  so  also 
will  you  fiind  a  similar  state  of  affairs  in  philosophy.  The 
primitive  and  barbaric  can  be  found  side  by  side  with  the 


70  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

most  enlightened.  As  you  can  find  to-day  in  the  slums 
of  New  York  medical  practices  of  centuries  ago,  that  you 
thought  long  obsolete  in  civilized  communities;  so  too 
can  you  find  even  in  the  learned,  philosophical  opinions 
that  were  held  and  refuted  ages  ago.  Again,  as  the  ex- 
pression of  to-day,  "The  sun  rises  or  the  sun  sets,"  points 
back  to  a  time  when  the  earth  was  literally  believed  to 
be  stationary  and  to  be  the  centre  of  the  universe,  so  too 
do  our  ordinary  notions,  for  example,  of  force,  of  causa- 
tion and  causal  law,  point  back  to  the  primitive  days 
when  men  believed  most  objects  and  events  in  nature  the 
abode  of  spirits  and  demi-gods. 

Finally,  it  should  be  noticed  that  as  science  evolves 
so  also  must  its  philosophy.  As  the  special  theories  of 
science  often  prove  false  to  fact,  inadequate,  or  too 
simple  for  the  complexity  of  fact;  so  also  do  its  funda- 
mental notions  and  assumptions  and  its  higher  generali- 
zations. Science  outgrows  its  philosophy,  and  a  new 
philosophy  has  to  be  gradually  formulated  to  take  its 
place.  This  process  of  changing  from  the  old  to  the  new 
is  usually,  however,  a  slow  one;  for  men  are  more  con- 
servative in  their  philosophical  convictions  than  they  are 
in  their  belief  in  this  or  that  particular  fact;  and  often 
they  accept  facts  which  explicitly  contradict  philosophi- 
cal opinions  still  held  tenaciously.  Hence  we  should 
learn  at  the  beginning  of  philosophical  study  that  the 
epochs  of  science  mean  also  epochs  in  metaphysics,  that 
the  great  discoveries  in  science  in  the  past  have  brought 
with  them  radical  changes  in  metaphysics  and  that  the 
same  fate  is  no  doubt  in  store  also  for  the  metaphysical 
theories  of  oiu:  own  day.    In  its  way  then  the  attempt 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  SCIENCE  7 1 

to  formulate  a  metaphysics  for  all  time  is  as  absurd  and 
disastrous  as  would  be  the  attempt  to  force  upon  a 
nation  a  constitution  and  a  code  of  laws  which  could 
never  be  amended  or  revised. 

For  further  study  read  books  on  the  history  op  philosophy 

AND  of  science,  ESPECIALLY: 

Windelband,  History  of  Philosophy; 
Hoffding,  History  of  Modem  Philosophy; 
Merz,  A  History  of  European  Thought  in  the  Nineteenth 
Century. 

On  the  msTORY  of  science  read  especially  books  on  the  his- 
tory of  astronomy,  mathematics  and  physics: 
Ball,  History  of  Mathematics; 
Cajori,  A  History  of  Elementary  Mathematics; 
Mach,  Science  of  Mechanics; 
Cf .  also  references  at  the  ends  of  Chapters  XIX-XXII. 


PART  III 
PROBLEMS   OF   GENERAL  METAPHYSICS 


In  the  foregoing  part  we  have  pointed  out  certain  fun- 
damental aspects  of  that  which  we  know,  we  have  defined 
certain  fundamental  terms,  and  we  have  studied  the 
nature  of  common  sense  and  of  science.  In  so  doing  we 
have  taken  for  granted  a  number  of  propositions  whose 
truth  is  seriously  disputed.  These  propositions  we  must 
now  examine,  for  upon  their  truth  or  falsity  depends 
our  entire  conception  of  the  world.  Perhaps  the  most 
convenient  method  by  which  to  keep  our  new  problems 
in  mind  is  to  think  of  them  centering  about  our  conclu- 
sion, "the  world  is  the  true  and  complete  explanation  of 
what  we  perceive. "  Philosophers  differ  as  to  what  we  per- 
ceive, as  to  how  far  it  can  be  explained,  and  as  to  the  fun- 
damental notions  and  postulates,  in  other  words,  as  to  the 
nature  of  explanation  itself.  We  shall  study  the  re- 
sulting issues  in  what  seems  to  me  their  most  appropriate 
order,  and  each  will  be  defined  as  we  come  to  it;  but, 
note  well,  the  one  problem  which  remains  the  central 
thought  throughout  is  the  validity  of  the  results  already 
reached. 


CHAPTER  VII 

ROMANTICISM  AND  LOGIC 

1.  The  problem. — ^The  preceding  chapters  have  set 
forth  the  hypothesis  that  the  world  is  the  complete  ex- 
planation of  what  we  perceive  and  is  a  system  of  terms 
in  relation.  Against  this  hypothesis  the  following  ob- 
jections have  been  raised  by  one  philosopher  or  another: 
(a)  What  we  perceive  cannot  itself  be  analyzed  into 
terms  and  relations,  (b)  The  perceived  can  be  only 
perceived,  it  can  in  no  way  be  explained,  (c)  Or,  if 
the  perceived  can  be  explained  in  some  of  its  aspects, 
it  cannot  be  explained  completely.  These  doctrines  may 
be  called  romanticism  a,nd  the  opposed  doctrines  such 
as  those  of  the  preceding  chapters  may  be  named  in 
contrast  intellecttuilism. 

2.  Can  what  we  perceive  he  analyzed  into  terms  and  re- 
lations? (a)  The  negative  answer. — The  basis  of  both  the 
extreme  and  the  moderate  romanticism  is  the  proposition, 
the  perceptual  is  unanalyzable  and  is  not  composed  of  terms 
and  relations.  As  you  look  at  a  basin  of  water  what  you 
see  is  not  a  thousand  drops  of  water  but  one  unbroken 
total,  or  unity,  the  water.  A  river  is  one  flowing  stream, 
not  millions  of  buckets  of  water  packed  together  Uke 
sardines  in  a  box.  As  you  listen  to  a  melody  what  you 
hear  is  not  a  series  of  tones  but  a  flowing  imity  of  soimd, 
complex  to  be  sure  but  none  the  less  undivided.  If  you 
are  angry  what  you  feel  is  not  a  compound,  a  sum  made 

75 


76  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

up  of  feelings  of  clenched  fist,  scowling  forehead,  flushed 
face,  and  so  on.  Anger  is  just  anger,  and  though  complex, 
it  is  one  unanalyzable  feeling.  A  landscape  too,  as  seen 
by  us,  is  of  course  quite  complex,  but  there  is  a  unity 
to  it  which  would  be  quite  lost  did  we  analyze  it  into  so 
many  mountain  tops,  so  many  trees,  so  many  rocks,  so 
much  green  grass,  so  many  head  of  cattle.  It  is  not 
these  patched  together,  it  is  a  total  whose  unity  is  more 
than  the  sum  of  the  so-called  parts.  Again  the  feeling 
of  a  succession  of  events,  a  train  dashing  by,  a  horse 
running,  a  waterfall,  the  wind,  the  throb  of  a  toothache, 
the  flow  of  our  life  from  moment  to  moment,  or  any 
other  case  of  change  and  of  duration  is  not  made  up  of 
bits  or  stages,  each  a  stationary  changeless  state.  Time 
is  not  now,  now,  now,  now,  or  the  successive  ticks  of 
the  clock,  but  is  an  unbroken  unanalyzable  flow.  Motion 
too  is  not  here,  then  here,  then  here,  then  here;  rather 
it  has  no  stages.  It  is  not  made  up  of  rests,  one  in  each 
point  of  the  line  of  travel.  Not  only  does  it  flow  on,  but 
it  flows  evenly  and  without  break.  Therefore  to  analyze 
it  and  to  regard  it  as  the  sum  of  positions  in  different 
moments  is  to  ignore  or  to  destroy  its  most  prominent 
characteristic.  A  broken  egg  or  a  broken  vase,  no  matter 
how  expert  the  man  who  mends  it,  is  never  again  the 
original  unbroken  object.  The  totality  forms  a  unity, 
precisely  as  a  human  body  full  of  hfe,  energy,  action, 
is  not  a  mere  aggregate  of  bones,  muscles,  blood  and 
other  parts. 

(b)  The  affirmative  answer. — ^The  doctrine  thus  out- 
lined is  guilty  of  one  or  more  of  the  following  implied 
errors:    (i)  To  analyze  what  we  perceive  does  not  mean 


ROMANTiaSM  AND  LOGIC  77 

to  take  what  we  perceive  to  pieces.  When  I  analyze 
the  motion  of  a  ball  tossed  in  the  air,  or  of  a  running 
horse,  I  do  not  stop  the  ball  or  the  horse  each  instant  to 
get  a  series  of  photographs  as  it  were.  When  I  analyze 
the  American  flag  into  white  stars  in  a  blue  field  at  one 
comer  surrounded  on  two  sides  by  thirteen  red  and  white 
stripes  in  succession,  I  do  not  tear  the  flag  to  pieces. 
When  I  analyze  an  animal's  body  into  its  constituents, 
head,  trunk,  legs,  tail,  I  do  not  butcher  the  animal,  I 
simply  find  in  the  total  complex,  the  unity,  such  and  such 
constituents,  thus  and  thus  related.  A  flying  projectile 
does  go  through  a  path,  the  shape  of  that  path  is  a  parabola, 
the  projectile  is  in  different  places  at  different  times,  it  is 
there  before  it  is  here.  This  I  see  or  find  without  touching 
the  ball,  stopping  the  ball,  or  doing  anything  but  looking 
sharply. 

(2)  That  a  thing,  an  event,  or  in  general,  any  com- 
plexity, has  not  yet  been  analyzed,  in  no  way  proves 
that  it  is  unanalyzable.  Unanalyzed  is  not  the  equivalent 
of  unanalyzable.  It  is  evident  that  some  things  are  more 
easily  analyzed  than  others,  that  some  things  have  been 
analyzed  even  by  children  and  others  have  not  been  even 
by  the  most  skillful  laboratory  methods.  On  the  one 
hand,  a  child  can  see  in  the  American  flag  its  geometrical 
form  and  structure  and  the  arrangement  of  the  colors. 
On  the  other  hand  introspective  psychologists  may  be 
far  from  agreement  as  to  the  makeup  of  our  thoughts, 
and  sensory  experiences.  However,  the  important  point 
is  that  many  things  which  in  days  gone  by  have  com- 
pletely bafiBed  analysis  have  in  later  days  been  analyzed. 
Analysis  requires  education.     Moreover,  analysis  is  al- 


78  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

ways  a  genuine  discovery,  and,  as  any  other  form  of 
discovery,  has  to  wait  for  the  discoverer.  It  has  to  wait 
as  truly  as  America  had  to  wait  for  Columbus.  The 
child  has  to  learn  to  see  the  parts  of  a  bird,  or  the  geomet- 
rical relations  between  the  parts  of  an  ellipse.  Mankind 
had  to  wait  for  a  Helmholtz  to  point  out  the  constituents 
of  a  given  note  of  a  violin,  piano,  horn,  or  of  the  human 
voice,  and  to  show  what  these  notes  have  in  common, 
and  wherein  they  differ.  Now  that  we  have  been  taught, 
the  discriminating  ear  can  easily  apprehend  what  no 
man  one  hundred  years  ago  noticed,  the  constitution  of 
sounds.  Thus  the  absence  of  analysis  is  never  a  proof 
that  the  unanalyzed  is  unanalyzable.  Neither  is  it, 
of  course,  proof  of  the  opposite.  But  inasmuch  as 
one  thing  after  another  has  revealed  its  constitution  (as 
perceived)  to  the  sharper  insight  of  the  discoverer  and 
the  trained  observer;  it  is  certainly  better  to  entertain  the 
working  hj^othesis  that  all  complex  objects  of  percep- 
tion, which  as  yet  remain  unanalyzed,  can  be  analyzed. 
There  is  from  the  nature  of  the  case  no  positive  evidence 
against  analysis.  In  other  words,  when  anyone  main- 
tains that  some  perceived  object  is  a  complex  unanaly- 
zable unity  the  utmost  that  he  is  justified  in  maintain- 
ing is  that  it  is  a  complex  unanalyzed  unity. 

In  short,  the  intellectualist  teaches  in  opposition  to 
romanticism:  (a)  that  to  analyze  what  we  perceive  is 
not  to  destroy  it,  or  to  alter  it,  but  is  to  find  and  to  dis- 
cover in  the  genuine  and  literal  senses  of  those  words; 
(b)  that  though  analysis  is  a  slow  process  of  discovery 
requiring  true  genius,  yet  an  immense  amount  of  success- 
ful analysis  is  already  to  man's  credit;  (c)  that  the  fact, 


ROMANnaSU  AND  LOGIC  79 

that  any  perceived  object  or  event  has  not  yet  been 
analyzed,  is  no  proof  that  it  will  not  be  or  cannot  be; 
(d)  that  analysis  must  proceed  until  the  genuinely  simple 
(or  non-complex)  is  discovered;  (e)  finally  that  we  can 
never  be  sure  of  having  reached  the  truly  simple  even 
where  the  object  perceived  seems  simple  and  we  can  be 
confident  of  not  having  reached  the  truly  simple  as  long 
as  the  object  remains  complex.  The  safer  working 
hypothesis  is,  there  are  no  complex  unities. 

J.  Can  what  we  perceive  he  explained?  {a)  The  nega- 
tive answer. — The  romanticist  beHeves  that  the  methods 
by  which  the  scientist  explains,  fail  in  a  second  respect. 
Explanation  singles  out  certain  aspects  of  the  perceived 
world  and  endeavors  to  interpret,  or  describe  the  other 
aspects  by  means  of  these,  or  it  even  attempts  to  reduce 
these  other  aspects  to  the  ones  singled  out.  As  a  result, 
explanation  reduces  the  world  to  one  of  its  countless 
asi)ects,  not  because  this  aspect  is  in  itself  important  but 
because  it  is  convenient,  though  all  these  various  as- 
pects are  not  only  totally  different  but  are  ultimate  and 
irreducible.  The  two  most  prominent  aspects  of  things 
which  are  used  as  a  basis  of  explanation,  the  romanticist 
claims,  are  the  spatial  and  the  static.  That  is,  in  ex- 
plaining we  spatialize  things  or  aspects  of  things  which 
in  no  way  are  spatial,  we  treat  as  static,  changeless  or 
permanent  what  is  really  dynamic,  changing  and  de- 
veloping. To  make  this  clear  we  must  study  instances. 
If  we  wish  to  measure  the  rising  temperature  of  a  room 
we  do  so  by  measuring  the  length  of  a  column  of  mercury 
(the  thermometer),  let  us  say,  every  thirty  seconds. 
But  the  real  heat  of  the  room  is  not  the  length  of  this 


Bo  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

column;  therefore  we  have  substituted  for  this  real  heat 
a  very  different  object,  a  scale  on  a  thermometer,  a  geo- 
metrical entity  and  one  easily  measured.  The  real  heat, 
the  heat  that  we  directly  perceive,  does  not  increase  in 
the  sense  of  becoming  longer  or  shorter.  Thus  it  has  been 
ignored  and  its  place  in  our  thought  has  been  given  to 
another,  the  thermometer.  Now  the  romanticist  admits 
that  what  we  have  done  is  far  more  convenient  and  useful. 
He  says,  for  practical  purposes  judge  of  the  heat  of  a 
room  by  the  thermometer  rather  than  by  direct  per- 
ception; but  he  protests,  when  we  go  beyond  the  practical 
and  assert  that  our  method  actually  measures  the  heat. 
Again,  consider  the  way  in  which  we  spatialize  sound. 
We  call  one  note  higher  or  lower  than  another,  but  this 
is  only  a  figure  of  speech,  for  notes  are  not  Uterally  higher 
or  lower  in  the  sense  that  the  steeple  is  higher  than  the 
church  or  the  valley  is  lower  than  the  mountain.  Further 
when  we  explain  sound  we  do  so  by  the  theory  of  air 
waves.  To  each  note  we  assign  waves  of  a  certain  con- 
figuration and  length.  But  sound  as  actually  perceived 
has  none  of  these  spatial  characteristics.  In  terms  of 
vibrations  one  note  may  be  256  and  another  512  waves 
per  second,  but  as  heard  one  note  is  not  twice  the  other 
in  any  literal  or  numerical  sense.  Finally,  take  the  case 
of  time:  we  measure  it  usually  by  the  distance  traveled 
by  the  sim  or  the  hands  of  a  clock.  But  time  is  not  dis- 
tance. We  can  feel  or  perceive  time  and  as  felt  it  is  not 
the  change  of  spatial  position  of  any  thing.  It  is  just 
time.  Yet  when  the  scientist  thinks  of  it  he  usually 
thinks  of  it  in  terms  of  space  and  he  usually  draws  a 
Mne  to  represent  it. 


ROMANTICISM  AND  LOGIC  8l 

Notice  too  that  when  we  spatialize  we  really  make 
things  static,  for  space  itself  is  changeless,  and  also  the 
occupation  of  space  (no  matter  for  how  short  a  time)  is 
changeless.  Hence  changes  of  any  sort,  such  as  motion, 
growth,  expansion,  increase,  flow,  the  passage  of  time, 
when  represented  or  symbolized  in  terms  of  space,  are 
described  in  terms  of  the  changeless,  the  static,  the  per- 
manent, in  short,  in  terms  that  behe  them.  If  you  repre- 
sent time  as  a  line  you  ignore  its  very  nature,  for  a  line 
is  "all  there  at  once,"  is  "changeless;"  whereas  time 
is  an  "on  flowing,"  "a  passing,"  is  much  like  the  crest  of 
an  onrushing  wave.  In  short,  wherever  in  science  the 
romanticist  directs  his  attention,  he  finds  over  and  over 
again  this  same  or  similar  falsifying  of  the  perceived  by 
measuring  it  or  by  reducing  it  to  terms  that  are  spatial 
and  static. 

Thus  he  draws  the  conclusion:  However  valuable 
science  may  be  as  an  instrument  to  guide  our  conduct, 
it  does  not  reveal  the  true  nature  of  the  real.  Moreover, 
this  fault  of  science  is  irremediable,  for  to  explain  is  of 
necessity  to  spatialize  and  make  static.  Hence  the  real 
cannot  be  explained;  it  can  only  be  perceived,  felt,  or 
Uved.  In  other  words,  the  poet  is  far  nearer  revealing  to 
us  the  genuinely  real,  for  he  feels  it  and  does  not  try  to 
explain  it.  His  insight  is  not  an  explanation  which  dis- 
torts and  falsifies  but*  an  intuition  which  appreciates  and 
enjoys. 

(b)  The  affirmative  answer. — This  doctrine  of  the 
romanticist  the  inteUectuaUst  finds  both  false  and  ab- 
surd. It  is  absurd,  because  it  leads  to  extreme  obscur- 
antism by  rejecting  science  as  untrue  and  to  utter  license 


82  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

by  removing  all  workable  tests  of  truth  and  falsity.  It 
is  false,  because  the  romanticist  misstates  the  true  nature 
of  explanation.  True  explanation  never  identifies  the 
spatial  with  the  non-spatial,  or  the  dynamic  with  the 
static.  Moreover,  a  large  number  of  terms  in  science 
which  if  pictured  would  no  doubt  be  pictured  as  spatial, 
are  themselves  entirely  non-spatial.  Finally  and  chiefly, 
the  romanticist  forgets  that  explanation  includes  not 
only  terms  but  also  relations.  Let  us  illustrate  these 
three  points.  The  scale  of  a  thermometer  is  of  course 
not  itself  heat  and  no  scientist,  who  is  rigorous  in  his 
thinking,  would  identify  the  two  or  identify  time  and  a 
line,  or  anything  else  with  the  spatial  unless  actual 
analysis  reveals  that  it  is  spatial.  Secondly,  because 
the  spatial  aspects  of  things  are  more  easUy  perceived 
and  because  spatial  words  or  symbols  are  often  the  most 
convenient,  this  in  no  way  shows  that  what  the  scientist 
means  by  his  words  and  thoughts  is  spatial.  If  he  rep- 
resents time  by  a  line,  he  does  not  mean  that  time  is  a 
line;  or  if  he  represents  velocity  and  acceleration  by  lines 
he  does  not  assert  that  either  is  a  line.  If  his  terms  are 
fixed  by  definition  and  so  logically  static,  this  does  not 
prevent  them  from  being  entities  which  are  dynamic, 
changing,  or  anything  else.  In  any  case,  let  us  not  con- 
fuse this  logical  fixedness  of  terms,  which  alone  makes 
them  definable,  with  the  static  of  physics.  Thirdly,  when 
the  scientist  analyzes  change,  time,  motion,  acceleration 
and  other  such  terms  he  may  actually  find  in  them  certain 
static  features,  or  he  may  actually  find  that  they  are 
certain  static  terms  related  to  one  another  in  certain  ways. 
In  the  latter  case  especially  it  would  be  falsifying  the 


ROMANTiaSM  AND  LOGIC  83 

real,  did  we  notice  only  these  static  terms  and  forget  to 
mention  the  relations  between  them  which  are  as  truly 
parts  of  the  entity  analyzed  as  are  the  elementary  terms. 
For  example,  if  we  analyze  time  into  terms  (called 
"instants")  related  to  one  another  in  certain  ways 
(called,  let  us  say,  "before"  and  "after"),  this  means, 
we  actually  find  this  to  be  the  constitution  of  time  and 
we  find  these  relations  there  as  truly  as  we  do  the  in- 
stants. Did  we  leave  these  relations  out,  of  course,  the 
analysis  would  falsify  by  ignoring  an  essential  aspect  of 
real  time.  So  too  if  we  analyze  motion  into  a  relation 
between  points  of  space  and  instants  of  time,  the  re- 
sult is  of  course  logically  static;  but  the  entity  analyzed 
is  not  physically  static,  for  it  is  motion  itself.  If  we 
ignore  this  relation  between  the  points  of  space  and  the 
instants  of  time,  then  indeed  we  have  on  our  hands 
nothing  but  static  and  changeless  entities,  the  points  of 
space  and  the  instants  of  time.  For  example,  a  point 
defined  in  geometry  is  an  absolute  static;  three  o'clock 
at  such  and  such  a  place  on  the  afternoon  of  such  and 
such  a  day  is  for  all  ages  a  fixed  instant  of  time. 

But  the  intellectualist  can  bring  the  argument  even 
closer  home.  If  explanation  really  falsified,  how  could 
it  be  even  of  practical  value?  How  can  the  astronomer 
predict  to  a  moment  the  time  of  an  eclipse,  how  can 
the  physicist  give  us  the  electric  motor  and  the  wireless 
telegraph,  or  how  can  any  other  scientist  give  us  the 
marvelous  inventions  of  modern  days,  imless  he  has  a 
true  knowledge  of  the  real?  The  romantic  hypothesis 
makes  his  deed  utterly  miraculous.  In  general,  as  we 
have  seen  in  an  earlier  chapter,  the  very  test  of  ezplana- 


84  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

tion  is  perception.  Then  how  can  it  be  that  scientific 
explanation,  which  standi  this  test,  is  a  mere  practical 
device,  belying  perception?  The  only  explanation  of  the 
romanticist's  behef  seems  to  be  that  he  looks  upon  ex- 
planation itself  as  a  literal  description  of  what  we  per- 
ceive; whereas  to  explain,  we  learned  in  an  earlier  chapter, 
is  to  deduce  from  premises,  and  there  is  no  question  but 
that  the  scientist  deduces  from  his  theories  what  we 
perceive.  In  short,  the  romanticist  seems  to  misunder- 
stand both  analysis  and  explanation. 

4.  Can  what  we  perceive  be  fully  explained? — Some 
romanticists  might  admit  all  that  has  been  thus  far 
urged  in  defense  of  science,  but  maintain  that  though  we 
can  explain  in  part  what  we  perceive,  we  cannot  do  so 
fully.  This  objection  may  mean  several  things,  (a) 
It  may  mean  that  the  world  is  infinitely  complex  and  that 
the  work  of  explaining  it  fully  is  like  counting  from  one, 
two,  three,  four,  up  to  infinity,  which  counting,  of  course, 
can  never  be  completed.  The  world  may  be  infinitely 
complex;  but,  if  so,  this  does  not  tell  against  explanation 
as  such.  Explanation  as  far  as  it  goes  is  a  valid  knowl- 
edge of  reality;  as  far  as  it  goes,  it  fuUy  explains:  and 
the  only  cure  for  our  ignorance  is  more  explanation.  In 
short,  the  trouble  is  not  with  explanation  as  such,  but 
with  the  ignorance  of  which  the  finite  mind  must  always 
be  guilty,  (b)  The  objection  may  mean  that  each  part 
or  element  of  the  world  is  infinitely  complex  and  therefore 
can  never  be  fully  explained.  As  a  consequence  nothing 
which  exists  is  fully  known,  or  fully  analyzed  and  never 
can  be.  If  this  be  true,  the  same  reply  is  again  pertinent. 
It  may  be  that  every  grain  of  sand  is  itself  a  little  world, 


ROMANTICISM  AND  LOGIC  85 

precisely  as  complex  as  the  universe  of  which  it  seems  to 
be  so  insignificant  a  part.  Then  indeed  man  will  never 
know  any  object  fully;  yet  here  too  the  cure  of  ignorance 
is  not  poetry  or  feeling  but  more  explanation.  If  we 
cannot  know  fully  the  grain  of  sand  we  can  know  many 
of  its  aspects,  its  terms  and  its  relations,  (c)  Finally, 
the  objection  may  mean  that  though  some  things  can 
be  analyzed  and  explained,  others  cannot;  or  again,  that 
though  some  aspects  of  things  can  be  analyzed  and 
explained,  other  aspects  are  inexplicable.  Against  this 
objection  the  original  reply  is  valid.  All  such  cases  of 
"complex  unities"  prove  merely  that  as  yet  we  have 
not  been  able  to  analyze.  They  do  not  prove  the  im- 
possibility of  analysis.  Thus  examined  in  all  its  forms, 
however  valuable  romanticism  may  be  in  pointing  out 
the  richness,  variety  and  complexity  of  the  world,  roman- 
ticism is  in  error  in  undervaluing  explanation  and  sub- 
stituting feeUng  for  knowledge. 

For  further  study  read: 

James,  Pluralistic  Universe,  Lect.  V,  VI  and  VII; 

James,  Some  Problems  of  Philosophy,  Chap.  V; 

The  New  Realism,   Spaulding,  A  Defense  of  Analysis,  and 
Holt,  The  Place  of  Illusory  Experience  in  a  Realistic  World, 
308-355- 
For  more  extenstve  study: 

Bergson,  Time  and  Free  Will; 

James,  Some  Problems  of  Philosophy; 

Perry,  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies. 


CHAPTER  Vni 

LOGICAL  MONISM  AND  LOGICAL  PLURALISM 

I.  The  problem. — There  is  a  third  position,  a  position 
between  romanticism  with  its  doctrine  that  the  real  is 
a  flowing  complex  unity,  unanalyzable  and  inexplicable, 
and  the  intellectualism  of  the  preceding  chapters.  This 
position  is  said  to  be  intellectuaUstic  but  often  it  more 
resembles  romanticism.  It  is  called  logical  monism  and 
the  opposed  intellectualism  is  named  logical  pluralism. 

The  issue  between  them  is  whether  or  not  the  fol- 
lowing postulate  of  formal  logic  is  true  of  reality:  terms 
in  relation  are  not  constituted  by  their  relation;  but 
each  term  is  what  it  is  independently  both  of  its  re- 
lations and  of  the  terms  to  which  it  is  related.  This 
postulate  may  be  more  precisely  "expressed"  by  saying 
that  (a)  relatedness  does  not  imply  any  corresponding 
complexity  in  the  relata  (things  related);  (b)  any  given 
entity  is  a  constituent  of  many  different  complexes.  To 
illustrate: 

(a)  If  z;  is  related  by  RHo  x,  by  R^  to  y,  by  R^  to  z  {vR% 
vR^y,  vRh),  this  does  not  imply  that  v  is  complex,  for  v 
may  be  quite  simple.  The  apex  of  a  given  triangle 
may  be  also  the  apex  of  an  infinite  number  of  other 
triangles,  and  the  centre  of  a  like  number  of  circles, 
without  being  in  any  way  complex,  for  it  remains  the 
simple  entity  called  a  point.  In  those  cases  where  v  is 
complex,  the  relations  in  which  it  stands  do  not  imply 

.86 


LOGICAL  MONISM  AND  LOGICAL  PLURALISM  87 

any  corresponding  complexity.  Take  a  straight  line, 
which  of  course  is  complex.  As  the  radius  of  a  circle, 
the  side  of  a  square,  the  altitude  of  a  triangle,  it  is  the 
identical  line  in  the  three  relations.  No  inspection  of 
its  properties  would  force  us  in  any  way  to  alter  its  defi- 
nition as  we  pass  in  thought  from  the  one  relationship 
to  the  other.  Consider  another  case.  A  man  is  a  father, 
an  uncle,  a  brother,  a  cousin,  a  son,  a  grandson,  as  he 
stands  in  different  relations  to  different  people.  These  re- 
lations do  not  imply  a  corresponding  complexity  in  the 
man  himself.  Moreover,  a  new  relationship  might  be 
formed  by  the  birth  of  a  son  to  his  cousin  without  alter- 
ing the  man. 

(b)  Again,  in  all  these  cases  the  same  term  is  not 
only  identical  in  its  different  relations,  but  it  may  be 
a  constituent  of  many  different  complexes.  The  one 
and  the  same  point  may  be  a  point  on  many  lines.  The 
one  and  the  same  man  may  be  a  member  of  half  a  dozen 
dubs.  The  very  same  vowel  may  be  a  part  of  a  thousand 
different  words.  The  very  same  proposition  may  be 
asserted  in  a  hundred  different  books. 

2.  The  significance  of  the  problem. — This  postulate, 
asserted  by  pluralism  and  denied  by  monism,  is  fre- 
quently called  "the  external  theory  of  relations."  It  is 
of  great  importance,  for  as  it  is  asserted  or  denied 
there  follows  a  radically  different  conception  of  the  world. 
If  the  postulate  is  true,  the  world  is  the  totaUty,  sum,  or 
aggregate  of  its  members,  and  the  extent  to  which  each 
of  these  members  is  logically  independent  of  the  others 
can  be  ascertained  only  by  empirical  research.  If  the 
postulate  is  false,  the  world  is  a  complex  unity.    Noth- 


88  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

ing  is  logically  independent  of  any  thing  else.  Each 
constituent  of  the  world  is  what  it  is  because  of  all  the 
other  members.  If  the  postulate  is  true,  there  are  ul- 
timately simple  entities  and  therefore  changeless  entities. 
If  the  postulate  is  false,  "simple  terms  could  have  no 
relations,  and  therefore  could  not  enter  into  complexes; 
hence  every  term  would  have  to  be  strictly  infinitely 
complex."  That  is,  as  relatedness  would  then  imply 
complexity,  the  fact  that  a  point  is  the  apex  of  an  in- 
finitude of  triangles  would  imply  that  the  poiut  is  it- 
self infinitely  complex,  and  as  everything  stands  in  some 
sort  of  relation  to  all  other  things,  everything  must  be 
infinitely  complex.  Indeed  there  would  be  no  simple 
terms. 

If  pluralism  is  true,  the  world  is  made  up  of  many 
things  which  are  distinct  and  logically  independent;  per- 
haps of  infinitely  many.  We  do  not  know  that  it  might 
not  have  been  quite  different  in  many  of  its  relations 
and  terms  from  what  it  is  and  yet  have  been  quite  the 
same  as  regards  its  other  terms  and  their  relations.  For 
example,  there  may  be  parts  or  elements  of  the  world 
which  would  in  no  way  be  different  if  Caesar  had  not 
crossed  the  Rubicon,  or  indeed  even  if  there  were  no 
such  relation  between  the  particles  of  matter  as  that  ex- 
pressed in  the  law  of  gravitation.  Even  if  the  sun  did 
not  attract  the  earth,  the  physical  world  might  still 
remain  a  world  in  which  the  Euclidean  geometry  is  true. 
Even  if  water  could  not  become  hard  and  stone  like,  the 
laws  of  mechanics  might  still  be  true.  Of  course  no  one 
will  deny  that  in  other  respects  the  changes  in  the  phys- 
ical world  would  have  had  to  be  enormous. 


LOGICAL  MONISM  AND  LOGICAL  PLURALISM  89 

If  monism  is  true,  the  world  is  an  organic  unity.  An 
object  is  said  to  be  an  organic  unity  when  each  part  is 
what  it  is  because  of  the  other  parts,  when  the  whole  is 
what  it  is  because  of  the  parts  and  the  parts  what  they 
are  because  of  the  whole.  The  living  organisms  suggest 
such  imities.  Biology  regards  such  a  creature  as  a  mer- 
maid as  impossible.  Man's  body  could  not  have  a  fish's 
tail.  The  one  part  of  the  body  indicates  what  the  other 
parts  must  be.  The  hand,  the  foot,  the  heart,  the  lungs, 
the  brain,  belong  together  and  had  the  form  of  one  of 
them  been  markedly  different,  it  seems  highly  probable 
that  the  form  of  the  others  would  also  have  been  quite 
other  than  they  are.  A  favorite  example  is  that  a  pa- 
leontologist discovering  one  tooth  or  bone  of  an  unknown 
animal  might  be  able  to  reconstruct  in  drawings  its 
outward  form  and  internal  organs. 

Finally  there  remain  two  further  and  very  important 
differences  betw';:en  pluralism  and  monism.  First,  if 
pluralism  is  true,  logical  analysis  is  possible,  whereas 
it  is  not  possible  if  monism  is  true.  Not  only  would  an- 
alysis never  arrive  at  a  genuinely  simple  term,  but  it 
could  never  even  mention  the  real  constituents  of  any 
complex,  for  each  of  these  constituents  would  be  itself 
constituted  by  the  complex.  If  the  complex  is  abed,  we 
might  not  call  a  a  constituent,  for  a  apart  from  or  out 
of  relation  with  the  bed  would  not  be  the  a  of  the  com- 
plex. If  the  complex  were  a  triangle  we  could  not  truly 
analyze  it  into  the  constituent  sides,  angles,  and  their 
relations.  If  the  complex  were  a  musical  melody  we 
could  not  truly  define  the  notes  and  their  relations  of 
which  it  is  constituted.     In  common  then  with  the  ro- 


90  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

mantidst  the  monist  regards  all  rigorous  analysis  as  a  fal- 
sification. 

Secondly,  if  pluralism  is  true  it  is  possible  to  study 
and  to  understand  one  part  or  aspect  of  the  world  and 
reach  correct  conclusions  though  we  be  quite  ignorant 
of  most  other  parts  or  aspects.  We  can  isolate  our  prob- 
lems and  solve  them  one  at  a  time.  We  can  learn  one 
truth  and  later  learn  a  second  truth  without  revising 
the  earlier  information.  Thus  mathematics  does  not 
have  to  wait  until  physiology  or  meteorology  become 
almost  perfect  sciences.  Thus  in  general  one  science 
can,  without  serious  fear  of  error,  be  far  in  advance  of 
this  or  that  other  science;  and  some  problems  can  get 
their  true  and  final  solution  regardless  of  whether  or  not 
many  others  ever  get  solved. 

But  if  the  monist  is  in  the  right,  none  of  this  is  true. 
We  can  never  know  the  truth  about  anything  until  we 
know  the  truth  about  everything.  We  cannot  isolate 
problems  and  solve  them,  for  their  true  solution  must 
take  into  accotmt  the  entire  universe.  Hence  the  sci- 
ences that  appear  to  be  independent  one  of  another 
really  are  not.  Strictly  speaking,  we  cannot  add  to  our 
knowledge  anywhere,  for  to  do  so  means  to  alter  it  every- 
where, in  other  words,  to  transform  it.  For  example  the 
monist  might  say:  see  how  completely  the  discovery  of 
the  shape  of  the  earth  and  of  its  position  and  motion  in 
the  solar  system  revolutionized  Europe's  whole  world  hy- 
pothesis a  few  centuries  ago.  Behold  how  great  a  change 
in  our  behefs  has  been  wrought  by  Darwinism.  In  short, 
history  shows  ever3rwhere  how  wide-reaching  in  its  ef- 
fects is  the  change  of  some  crucial  belief;  and  if  this 


LOGICAL  MONISM  AND  LOGICAL  PLURALISM  9 1 

wide-reaching  effect  does  not  take  place  when  other  be- 
liefs change,  this  is  simply  due  to  the  inertia  of  human 
thought  and  insight.  To  conclude,  the  contrast  between 
the  two  positions  is  clear:  the  pluralist  teaches  that 
our  information  grows  by  addition,  new  information  can 
be  added  to  old  information;  the  monist  on  the  other 
hand  asserts  that  our  information  grows  organically, 
new  information  transforms  all  our  old  information. 

J.  Arguments  for  monism. — (a)  The  monist  claims 
that  the  postulate  presupposed  in  all  science  is,  "the 
world  is  a  unity. "  Unless  the  world  is  a  unity,  it  is  simply 
an  aggregate  of  more  or  less  disconnected  worlds  and 
some  of  them  may  be  absolutely  unknowable  even  to  a 
perfect  intellect  inhabiting  other  systems.  Unless  the 
world  is  a  unity,  the  sciences  must  remain  more  or  less 
disconnected  and  it  can  never  be  understood  why  they 
are  true  as  a  group.  Ultimately  we  shall  have  to  be  con- 
tent to  know  this  is  true  and  that  is  true  but  never 
why  both  this  and  that  are  true  together.  Only  then 
in  case  all  truths  are  parts  of  one  truth  and  can  be  under- 
stood as  such  will  the  world  total  be  intelligible.  Now 
whatever  postulate  makes  the  world  either  unknowable 
or  unintelligible  cannot  be  consistently  entertained  by 
science.  The  plurahstic  hypothesis  does  so,  therefore 
it  must  be  rejected. 

(b)  As  our  knowledge  grows  things  have  been  found  to 
he  more  and  more  interconnected. — ^The  civiHzed  man 
feels  that  the  world  of  the  savage  is  chaotic  because  his 
own  world  in  contrast  seems  interconnected  and  uni- 
fied. For  example,  the  law  of  gravitation  connects  an 
untold  number  of  events  that  to  the  uneducated  seem 


92  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

far  apart  and  quite  independent.  To-day  light,  heat, 
electricity  and  magnetism  seem  closely  related  energies. 
The  doctrine  of  evolution  has  made  the  forms  of  animal 
and  plant  life,  the  institutions,  customs,  languages  and 
arts  of  different  peoples  all  seem  but  different  chapters 
in  one  connected  story  of  earthly  life.  In  short,  in- 
creased knowledge  reveals  increased  interconnection 
and  complete  knowledge  would  reveal  complete  inter- 
connection. 

(c)  A  sttcdy  of  the  growth  of  knowledge  in  the  individ- 
ual and  in  the  race  shows  that  knowledge  grows  not  by 
addition  alone  but  by  transformation  or  evolution. — The 
child  may  use  the  same  words  as  the  man,  but  he  does 
not  mean  by  them  the  same  things  as  the  man.  This  is 
true  even  of  the  simplest  statements,  "That  is  a  cow;" 
"Two  and  two  are  four."  Our  whole  method  of  apperceiv- 
ing  changes,  and  therefore  it  is  impossible  to  retain  any 
of  our  childhood's  views,  attitudes  or  judgments,  or  even 
what  childhood  seems  already  to  know  well.  The  same 
difference  is  apparent  when  we  contrast  the  world  of  the 
modern  western  European  with  that  of  the  medieval 
European,  or  of  the  Oriental,  or  of  the  savage.  Even 
the  most  trivial  matters  of  daily  life  which  every  one 
seems  to  know  well,  are  differently  conceived  and  imder- 
stood  by  different  peoples.  Thus  if  growth  in  knowledge 
alters  our  whole  way  of  apperceiving,  a  higher  knowledge 
than  ours  would  find  all  that  we  believe  never  quite  true 
but  only  relatively  true,  only  on  the  way  toward  truth; 
and  finally  a  highest  or  perfect  knowledge  alone  would 
know  any  thing  as  it  truly  is.  Now  all  this  indicates  that 
the  object  of  knowledge  as  well  as  knowing  is  an  organic 


LOGICAL  MONISM  AND  LOGICAL  PLURALISM  93 

unity.  If  it  were  an  aggregate  of  independent  objects 
we  could  know  it  part  by  part,  and  as  we  added  to  our 
knowledge  we  should  not  have  to  revise  all  our  earlier 
information.  But  we  cannot  know  it  part  by  part ;  there- 
fore the  world  which  forms  the  object  of  knowledge  can- 
not be  an  aggregate. 

4.  Arguments  for  pluralism,  (a)  Monism  reduces  to  skep- 
ticism and  even  to  absurdity. — It  teaches  that  we  cannot 
truly  know  any  thing  until  we  know  everything.  For 
example,  we  cannot  truly  know  that  two  plus  two  equals 
four  until  we  learn  the  name  of  the  prisoner  who  wore 
the  iron  mask.  Even  monism  itself  cannot  be  known  by 
the  monist  to  be  true;  rather  it  cannot  be  quite  true  for 
did  the  monist  know  more,  he  would,  here  as  elsewhere, 
alter  his  doctrine.  In  short,  nothing  that  we  beheve 
is  quite  true. 

(b)  The  m^st  important  method  of  scientific  research 
is  to  isolate  problems. — Monism  denies  that  this  can  be 
done.  But  as  a  matter  of  fact  science  does  isolate  prob- 
lems and  has  been  most  successful  in  ascertaining  thereby 
truths  which  the  monist  accepts  as  readUy  as  any  man. 

(c)  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  sciences  do  progress  at  dif- 
ferent rates. — Certainly  mathematics  is  far  in  advance 
of  meteorology.  This  fact  cannot  be  explained  unless 
the  truths  of  mathematics  are  logically  independent 
of  the  generahzations  of  meteorology.  Of  course  dis- 
covery in  one  field  does  often  lead  to  discovery  in  another 
field.  But  the  fact  that  one  discovery  is  connected 
with  another  discovery,  does  not  prove  that  the  things 
discovered  are  logically  connected.  The  sum  of  the 
angles  of  a  plane  triangle  do  not  equal  two  right  angles 


94  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

because  Caesar  crossed  the  Rubicon;  yet  it  might  happen 
in  some  child's  life  that  the  learning  of  one  truth  was 
connected  with  the  learning  of  the  other. 

(d)  The  extent  to  which  and  the  respects  in  which  the 
world  is  a  unity  cannot  he  assumed  at  the  outset  of  scientific 
research. — Only  by  a  study  of  facts  can  we  get  this  in- 
formation. It  is  true  that  events  and  things  in  remote 
parts  of  the  known  world  have  turned  out  to  be  inter- 
related in  ways  undreamed  of  by  the  wise  men  of  five 
hundred  years  ago.  But  this  interconnection  is  not  of  the 
sort  monism  teaches.    It  is  logical  or  causal,  not  organic. 

(e)  It  is  true  that  pluralism  implies  that  we  cannot 
unify  knowledge  if  to  do  so  means  to  make  all  truths 
one  truths  hut  this  is  not  what  science  m^ans  by  uni- 
fication.— To  unify  means  to  find  more  and  more  gen- 
eral truths,  means  to  find  interrelations,  means  to  make 
science  more  and  more  deductive.  Now  all  of  this 
contradicts  neither  the  externality  of  relations  nor  our 
formal  logic  which  presupposes  this  externality. 

(f)  The  extent  to  which  the  growth  of  human  knowl- 
edge in  the  individual  and  in  the  race  is  organic,  is  indeed 
an  important  problem  for  psychology  to  solve;  hut  the  mat- 
ter is  not  relevant  to  the  present  issite. — The  question  is, 
not  how  does  man's  knowledge  grow,  but  how  are  things 
in  nature  and  everywhere  else  logically  interrelated? 
The  way  in  which  our  knowledge  has  grown  has  nothing 
to  do  with  the  logical  relation  of  mathematics  and  chem- 
istry. 

In  general,  formal  logic  and  science  postulate  and  pre- 
suppose the  external  theory  of  relations.  Of  course,  as  is 
true  of  any  other  postulate,  this  too  is  subject  to  correc- 


LOGICAL  MONISM  AND  LOGICAL  PLURALISM  95 

tion  by  fact;  but  where  as  yet  are  the  conjflicting  facts,  or 
where  as  yet  are  the  errors  to  which  this  postulate  has 
led?  Moreover,  those  who  believe  the  organic  theory  to 
be  true,  do  not,  and  as  far  as  we  know  cannot,  adopt  it  in 
science.  The  whole  enterprise  of  science  and  of  logic  de- 
pends upon  the  contradictory  of  the  organic  theory,  and 
the  very  monists  who  defend  this  theory  use  logic  in 
their  reasoning.  There  may  be  some  escape  from  the 
absurdity  of  this  position  but  no  monist  seems  as  yet  to 
have  made  it  apparent. 

For  further  study  read: 
Russell,  The  Basis  of  Realism,  /.  of  Philos.,  Psychol.,  etc., 

191 I,  8; 
Russell,  Philosophical  Essays,  150-169; 
James,  Pluralistic  Universe,  Lects.  II  and  III; 
James,  Some  Problems  of  Philosophy,  Chaps.  VII  and  VIII; 
Bradley,  several  articles  in  recent  volvmies  of  Mind; 
Stout,  Alleged  Self-Contradictions  in  the  Concept  of  Relation, 

Proc.  Aristotel.  Soc,  1901-2,  2. 

For  more  extensive  study  read: 
Joachim,  The  Natxire  of  Truth. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  CRITERION  OF  TRUTH 

I.  The  problem. — Closely  connected  with  the  issue 
between  logical  monism  and  pluralism  is  the  question 
whether  or  not  logical  consistency  is  the  sole  ultimate 
test  of  truth.  Indeed  all  monists  do  and  must  hold  to 
the  view  that  consistency  or  coherence  is  such  a  test; 
whereas  the  pluralists  are  divided  on  this   question. 

Formal  logic  teaches  that  of  two  contradictory  propo- 
sitions one  must  be  true  and  the  other  false.  **A  is  B," 
and,  "A  is  not  B,"  cannot  both  be  true.  Hence  when- 
ever contradiction  is  found  in  our  information  we  know 
at  once  there  must  be  error  somewhere.  From  this  prin- 
ciple is  inferred  not  only  that  truth  is  free  from  contra- 
diction but  that  any  body  of  knowledge  which  is  free 
from  contradiction  is  so  far  true.  In  short,  truth  can 
be  defined,  for  truth  is  logical  coherence.  Moreover, 
logical  coherence  is  the  sole  test  of  truth. 

Opponents  of  this  theory  admit  that  logical  consist- 
ency is  indeed  a  very  important  test  of  truth  but  deny 
that  it  is  either  the  sole  test  of  truth  or  an  ultimate  test. 
They  maintain  that  the  sole  ultimate  test  of  truth  is  per- 
ception. A  perceived  truth  is  self-warranted  and  needs 
no  further  support.  Through  perception  we  may  ascer- 
tain other  important  tests  of  truth  such  as  the  principles 
of  logic  and  even  some  of  the  postulates  and  deductions 

96 


THE   CRITERION  OF  TRUTH  97 

of  science.  For  example,  not  only  is  logical  consistency 
an  excellent  test  of  truth,  but  so  too  is  arithmetic  when 
used  to  refute  a  man's  bad  reasoning.  Indeed  any  per- 
ceived truth  may  be  a  test  of  another  proposition  whose 
truth  is  not  perceived  but  inferred. 

2.  Conseqiiences  of  the  two  theories  regarding  the  tdti- 
ntate  test  of  truth. — If  the  coherence  theory  be  correct, 
there  are  no  self-evident  truths  except  the  principle  of  con- 
tradiction itself,  which,  inconsistently,  has  to  be  admitted 
to  be  self-evident.  The  only  method  by  means  of  which 
we  can  learn  of  the  greater  truthfulness  of  the  adult's 
knowledge  as  compared  with  that  of  childhood  or  of  mod- 
em science  as  compared  with  that  of  medieval  Europe 
is  internal  coherence.  The  knowledge  of  the  adult  ex- 
cels that  of  childhood  and  the  information  of  modern 
science  excels  that  of  medieval  science  in  two  respects. 
Such  knowledge  is  less  fragmentary  and  more  extensive, 
and  freer  from  contradiction  or  inconsistency.  '-As  we 
grow  in  knowledge,  we  know  more,  there  are  fewer 
gaps  between  different  parts  of  our  knowledge,  and  the 
whole  logically  hangs  together  to  a  greater  degree.  More- 
over, any  part  or  field  of  knowledge  may  be  superior  in 
coherence  to  other  parts,  and  this  explains  why  we  re- 
gard such  a  field  as  nearly  or  even  as  quite  certain.  But 
besides  these  reasons  there  is  none  for  regarding  one 
proposition  or  portion  of  knowledge  as  better  founded 
than  others.  Indeed  we  cannot  be  sure  that  any  prop- 
osition is  true;  because  it  is  not  enough  that  it  should 
be  consistent  with  what  we  already  know,  but  it  must  be 
consistent  with  all  truth;  and  of  course  we  lack  com- 
plete knowledge.    In  short,  no  one  except  the  possessor 


98  A  FIRST  BOOK  EST  METAPHYSICS 

of  all  truth  can  know  whether  or  not  any  given  prop- 
osition fits  in  harmoniously  with  all  the  rest  and  is  there- 
fore true.^ 

If  the  perception  theory  is  held,  it  is  not  in  any  way 
denied  that  logical  coherence  is  a  most  important,  some- 
times the  most  important,  test  of  truth,  but  it  is  af- 
firmed that  our  knowledge  of  many  propositions  and 
subjects  has  a  degree  of  certainty  out  of  all  proportion 
to  what  this  knowledge  would  have  were  coherence  the 
sole  criterion,  and  it  is  even  afl&rmed  that  some  parts 
of  our  knowledge  are  certainties  or  virtual  certainties. 
Perception  tells  us  many  things  directly.  We  actually 
learn  truths  by  looking,  observing,  examining  and  think- 
ing, quite  apart  from  any  question  of  logical  relations 
to  other  truths.  I  can  see  that  no  lamp  is  standing  on 
my  table.  I  can  see  that  one  man  is  taller  than  another. 
I  can  perceive  that  the  American  flag  is  made  up  of  thir- 
teen red  and  white  stripes  with  a  field  of  blue  in  one  cor- 
ner in  which  are  many  white  stars. 

How  far  we  can  perceive  is  indeed  a  difficult  question 
to  answer  because  there  is  no  clear  cut  boundary  line 
between  what  is  almost  perceivable  and  what  is  just 
perceivable.  Moreover,  we  differ  man  from  man  in  our 
various  abilities  to  perceive.  One  man  has  great  math- 
ematical insight,  another  artistic,  another  musical,  and 

^Notice  how  admirably  this  supports  logical  monism;  for, 
strictly,  there  are  no  truths,  there  is  but  the  one  all  inclusive 
and  coherent  truth.  What  man  possesses  is  only  relatively  true, 
it  is  true  as  far  as  it  is  consistent  and  complete.  Never  can  we 
say  of  the  result  of  any  science,  such  as  mathematics,  that  it  is 
absolutely  true. 


THE  CRITERION  OF  TRUTH  99 

another  mechanical.  Then  again,  as  the  opponents  of 
the  perception  theory  rightly  point  out,  no  actual  per- 
ception is  unaccompanied  by  inferences  and  it  is  very 
difl&cult  to  decide  precisely  where  perception  leaves  off 
and  inference  begins.  For  example,  when  I  perceive 
that  A  is  taller  than  B,  am  I  not  guilty  of  some  inference? 
Am  I  not  assuming  that  they  are  both  equally  distant, 
and  that  I  am  not  deceived  in  many  possible  ways? 
Any  one  who  has  watched  professional  sleight  of  hand 
performances  knows  only  too  well  how  fallible  we  can 
be  in  believing  we  do  see  or  in  ignoring  what  we  should 
see. 

Finally  there  is  the  important  question,  can  we  per- 
ceive universals  and  truths  regarding  universals?  Do 
we  perceive  that  two  plus  two  equals  four,  that  things 
equal  to  the  same  thing  are  equal  to  each  other,  that  if 
class  a  is  included  in  class  h  and  class  h  is  included  in 
class  c  then  class  a  is  included  in  class  c?  Some  maintain 
that  though  such  truths  are  very  close  to  the  perceiv- 
able and  have  a  large  measure  of  perceptual  warrant, 
they  are  more  general  than  truths  we  can  perceive. 
Others  who  hold  the  perception  theory  think  that  these 
and  many  other  axiomatic  truths  which  form  the  founda- 
tions of  logic  and  mathematics  are  fully  perceived  and 
therefore  infallible  intuitions.  In  any  case,  those  who 
accept  perception  as  an  ultimate  test  of  knowledge 
point  out  that  such  truths  have  a  more  nearly  complete 
warrant  than  if  coherence  were  their  sole  test;  and  that 
this  warrant  must  come  largely  from  perception. 

3.  Arguments  against  the  coherence  theory. — ^This  theory 
of  the  nature  of  truth  is  wrong  in  making  coherence  the 


lOO  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

sole  test  of  truth  for  the  following  reasons:  (a)  It  has  it- 
self to  admit  one  truth  which  is  true  not  because  of  co- 
herence with  other  truths,  that  is,  it  has  to  admit  as  self- 
evident  the  logical  principle  of  consistency,  (b)  Some 
parts  of  our  knowledge  are  more  easily  discovered 
and  indeed  were  discovered  long  before  other  parts 
both  by  us  as  individuals  and  by  man  in  the  course 
of  history,  for  example,  matters  of  ordinary  perception, 
and  the  simplest  truths  of  logic  and  mathematics  and 
many  simple  generalizations.  It  is  inexpUcable  why  one 
truth  should  be  more  easily  discoverable  than  another 
unless  we  do  actually  perceive  truths,  (c)  Moreover, 
these  truths  are  not  only  easily  discovered  but  they  are 
the  most  nearly  certain  truths  according  to  universal 
consent.  Of  them  we  can  indeed  say  that  they  are  held 
semper,  uhiqiie  et  ah  omnibus.  But  why  this  should  be 
so  if  the  only  test  of  their  truth  is  that  they  are  consistent 
with  all  else  which  we  know,  is  hard  to  comprehend.  So 
many  truths  which  no  one  doubts  and  which  are  widely 
tested  by  their  coherence  still  seem  to  us  only  highest 
probabilities  and  not  certainties.  Compare,  for  example, 
"the  sun  will  rise  to-morrow,"  with  the  percept,  "there 
is  no  lamp  on  the  table;"  "a  stone  thrown  into  the  air 
will  fall"  with  "yellow  is  brighter  than  blue;"  "all  men 
die"  with  "there  are  precisely  six  combinations  of  three 
things  taken  two  at  a  time. "  For  ages  some  truths  have 
been  held  to  be  necessary  while  all  others  have  been 
called  contingent;  and  this  must  point  to  a  difference 
which  indicates  some  original  and  direct  access  to  truth, 
(d)  Two  sciences  stand  out  sui  generis,  logic  and  math- 
ematics.   They  are  held  to  be  infallible  or  infallible  for 


THE  CRITERION  OF  TRUTH  lOI 

the  greater  part,  or,  if  you  prefer,  all  but  infallible.  How 
can  this  be  when  weU-established  sciences  such  as  physics 
and  chemistry  make  no  such  pretences?  The  perception 
theory  can  make  reply  but  what  can  the  coherence 
theory  answer?  (e)  In  general,  it  is  evident  that  we 
learn  through  perception;  and  if  we  learn,  what  is  there 
to  learn  except  the  truth  of  propositions?  Every  in- 
stance of  exploration,  geographical,  geological,  biological 
or  of  any  sort,  every  instance  of  experimental  research 
in  the  physical,  chemical,  or  any  other  laboratory,  every 
percept  from  the  cradle  to  the  grave,  is  either  revealing 
truth,  making  us  know  more  than  we  did  before,  or  is 
testing  what  we  already  know  by  correcting  or  by  sup- 
porting our  working  hypotheses.  If  such  observation 
and  experimentation  have  any  influence  upon  our  knowl- 
edge whatsoever,  and  influence  every  man  admits  that 
they  have,  what  in  the  whole  world  of  logic  can  be 
their  influence  unless  it  be  that  aforementioned?  The 
only  ways  in  which  knowledge  can  be  influenced  are  by 
increasing  it,  by  correcting  it,  or  by  verifying  it;  and 
each  of  these  ways  imphes  that  some  as  yet  unknown 
truth  is  revealed.  Hence  if  perception  has  any  influence, 
it  has  this  influence  because  it  reveals  truth,  (f)  Finally, 
if  there  is  any  other  test  of  truth  besides  perception,  any 
axiomatic  rules,  such  as  the  principles  of  logic,  these 
must  be  themselves  either  postulates  or  working  hypoth- 
eses or  else  perceived  truths.  In  short,  perception  is 
not  only  a  test  of  truth;  it  is  also  the  sole  ultimate  test 
of  truth. 

4.  Progress   in   perception. — That   perception   is   an 
ultimate  source  of  truth  does  not  imply  that  all  men 


I02  A  PmST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

are  equal  in  their  powers  to  perceive  or  that  man's  abil- 
ity to  perceive  does  not  grow.  Evidently  the  opposites 
of  both  these  propositions  are  true.  In  the  first  place, 
the  expert  mathematician  perceives  with  ease  the  truth 
of  propositions  which  the  idiot  can  never  perceive  or 
even  understand.  The  musical  can  perceive  harmonies 
and  discords  to  which  the  non-musical  seem  completely 
deaf.  The  person  with  normal  vision  sees  outlines  and 
objects  under  conditions  where  the  shortsighted  person 
would  be  quite  unable  to  see  more  than  a  blur  of  colors. 
In  the  second  place,  students  of  mathematics  are  con- 
scious of  growing  insight  as  they  progress  in  their  subject; 
the  musically  trained  perceive  what  is  unheard  by  the 
musically  ignorant;  and  in  general,  adults  perceive  far 
more  than  they  were  capable  of  perceiving  when  children. 
Thus,  though  the  doctrine  that  perception  is  an  ulti- 
mate source  of  truth,  is  a  most  democratic  doctrine, 
giving  each  man,  as  a  perceiver,  a  right  to  be  heard  and 
a  right  to  judge  for  himself;  stiU  it  is  also  an  aristocratic 
doctrine,  for  it  admits  that  the  genius  and  the  expert 
have  a  right  to  be  heard  and  a  right  to  judge  where  others 
have  not  this  right. 

5.  Empiricism  vs.  Rationalism. — In  deciding  that  per- 
ception is  the  ultimate  test  of  truth  we  are  prepared 
to  take  sides  in  one  of  the  oldest  philosophical  issues, 
namely,  that  between  empiricism  and  rationaUsm.  We 
have  already  raised  this  issue,  but  let  us  now  study 
briefly  certain  of  its  further  aspects.  In  general,  the 
problem  involved  is  that  of  the  source  and  certainty  of 
man's  knowledge,  but  the  problem  is  analyzable  into 
several  distinct  questions.  On  the  one  hand,  empiricism 


THE  CRITERION  OF  TRUTH  103 

asserts  that  sense  perception  is  our  sole  ultimate  means 
of  acquiring  information  and  that  consequently  we  can- 
not know  more  regarding  the  world  than  sense  perception 
makes  possible.  On  the  other  hand,  rationaUsm  asserts 
that  besides  sense  perception  we  have  another  and  surer 
means  of  gaining  knowledge,  our  thought  or  rational 
insight,  and  that  consequently  we  can  know  more  than 
sense  perception  reveals  and  can  know  it  with  certainty. 
To  the  rationahst  even  from  most  ancient  times  mathe- 
matics has  seemed  the  proof  of  his  dogma.  Here  it  is 
urged  we  have  not  only  knowledge  far  beyond  what 
sense  perception  reveals  but  knowledge  which  is  in- 
faUible.  To  the  empiricist  all  science,  mathematics 
included,  is  but  a  generalization  from  man's  particular 
experiences  and  is  at  best  only  of  higher  or  lower  proba- 
bility. Such  is  the  first  question  at  issue  between  the 
two  schools.  This  question  I  have  already  answered 
in  favor  of  rationalism. 

A  second  question  arises  immediately.  If  sense  is 
our  sole  ultimate  source  of  truth  we  can  of  course  know 
no  more  regarding  existence  than  sense  perception  re- 
veals and  implies.  If  however  we  can  perceive  universal 
truths,  the  hope  is  at  once  raised  that  we  can  know 
far  more  regarding  the  world  and  can  know  this  infallibly. 
Perhaps  we  can  perceive  enough  to  know  the  general 
nature  of  the  universe  and  possibly  anticipate  the  most 
general  results  of  inductive  science.  Perhaps  too  science 
can  be  deductive  to  a  far  greater  extent  than  is  at 
first  apparent.  Thus  the  second  question  may  be  worded : 
How  far  can  we  perceive  universal  truths  and  how  far 
is  our  knowledge  of  existence  infallible?    The  former 


I04  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

part  of  the  question  must  be  left  somewhat  open;  but 
in  general  the  strongest  evidence  goes  to  show  that  all 
attempts  to  deduce  a  theory  of  reahty  from  so-called 
axioms  or  perceived  universal  truths  has  met  with  failure 
and  will  continue  to  do  so.  Again  and  again,  what 
was  taken  to  be  an  existential  axiom  has  turned  out  to 
be  not  only  a  guess  but  a  false  hypothesis.  So  true  is  this, 
that  modem  science  is  thoroughly  suspicious  of  any 
deductive  existential  theory.  In  general,  then,  we  must 
decide  that  if  we  perceive  universal  truths;  these  are 
restricted  to  the  principles  of  logic  and  mathematics  and 
to  such  propositions  as  all  reds  are  different  from  all 
blues,  yellow  is  brighter  than  blue,  pleasure  is  more 
desirable  than  pain.  Such  propositions  quite  by  them- 
selves give  us  little  insight  into  the  nature  of  the  world 
total  and  certainly  by  themselves  do  not  enable  us  to 
prove  deductively  a  comprehensive  theory  of  reality. 
Here  empiricism  is  in  the  right. 

In  general,  then,  how  far  is  our  knowledge  infallible? 
The  answer  to  this  question  depends  upon  whether  or 
not  we  do  perceive  universals.  If  we  do,  as  I  believe,  per- 
ceive universals  then  such  sciences  as  logic  and  mathe- 
matics may  indeed  be  infallible.  But  if  the  principles 
of  logic  and  mathematics  are  only  generalizations  from 
what  we  perceive,  then  the  possibility  is  open  that  errors 
may  obtain  anywhere  in  these  sciences.  However,  all 
propositions  except  what  we  actually  perceive  or  deduce 
from  what  we  perceive  are  tentative,  that  is,  are  hypoth- 
eses. They  are  not  certainties.  They  are  subject  to 
correction  by  what  we  do  perceive,  and  to-morrow's 
research  may  prove  them  false.    Thus  all  information 


THE  CRITERION  OF  TRUTH  I05 

as  far  as  it  is  not  perceived  or  deduced  from  what  we 
perceive  is  got  by  the  experimental,  or  trial  and  error 
method.  This  means  that  our  whole  world  conception 
and  the  results  of  the  sciences  are  only  working  hypoth- 
eses. Some  of  them  are  indeed  far  less  venturesome 
than  are  others,  come  nearer  to  being  verified  than  do 
others;  but  all  involve  guess.  Yet  they  are  not  a  mere 
guess,  they  are  and  have  been  subject  to  correction 
by  an  infallible  test,  the  information  revealed  to  us  in 
perception,  or  the  factual.  Facts  we  do  know;  and  this 
knowledge  is  gradually  extending  the  remainder  of  our 
knowledge,  and  is  constantly  eliminating  its  errors. 

For  further  study  read: 
Russell,  Philosophical  Essays,  150-185; 
Russell,  Problems  of  Philosophy; 
Hiune,  Enquiry  concerning  Human  Understanding,  Sects.  II- 

VII; 
Hume,  Treatise,  Of  the  Understanding,  Pts.  I  and  IH; 
MiU,  Logic,  Bk.  II,  Chaps.  III-VII; 
Hobhouse,  Theory  of  Knowledge,  483-516; 
Read,  C,  The  Metaphysics  of  Natvure,  Chaps.  III-VI. 

For  more  EXTENsrvne  stxtoy  read: 
Joachim,  Nature  of  Truth. 


CHAPTER  X 

NOMINALISM  VS.  PLATONIC  REALISM 

1.  The  problem. — In  an  earlier  chapter  we  defined 
existence  as  the  true  explanation  of  what  we  perceive, 
that  is,  as  a  theory  which  truly  explains  facts;  and  in 
succeeding  chapters  we  enquired  into  the  sujficiency  and 
validity  of  theory  in  general.  Now  we  are  to  enquire 
whether  or  not  we  have  done  rightly  in  defining  existence 
so  broadly,  for  we  have  made  it  almost  synonymous  with 
true  theory.  Two  questions  are  involved.  First,  is  not 
truth  more  inclusive  than  existence?  Second,  do  uni- 
versal exist? 

2.  Existence  and  subsistence. — ^The  first  question  may 
be  restated  thus:  Is  there  not  information  which  is  true 
but  which  does  not  assert  itself  as  an  explanation  of 
facts,  in  other  words,  which  is  not  existential?  For  ex- 
ample, the  mathematician  can  demonstrate  for  us  a  non- 
Euclidian  geometry  as  well  as  the  Euclidian  geometry 
which  we  learned  in  the  elementary  school.  He  can  in- 
struct us  in  the  geometry  of  a  four  or  n  dimensional  space 
as  well  as  in  the  three  dimensional  geometry  which  we 
ordinarily  believe  to  be  the  geometry  of  the  space  we 
perceive.  Again,  the  mathematician  can  tell  us  truth- 
fully much  about  perfect  machines,  or  perpetual  motion 
machines,  although  such  machines  may  nowhere  exist. 

io6 


NOMINALISM  VS.  PLATONIC  REALISM  I07 

In  general,  logic  and  mathematics,  including  mechanics, 
can  inform  us,  and  inform  us  truly,  regarding  what  is 
logically  possible,  although  this  information  may  not 
be  true  of  the  existent  world.  Hence,  we  must  keep  truth 
quite  distinct  from  existence,  and  point  out  once  more 
that  the  realm  of  truth  is  more  extensive,  including 
within  it  the  realm  of  existence.  The  name  given  this 
larger  realm  is  "subsistence"  as  opposed  to  "existence." 
Perpetual  motion  machines  subsist,  they  do  not  exist. 
A  four  dimensional  space  may  not  exist,  but  it  certainly 
subsists.  AU  this  is  so,  because  any  true  proposition, 
or  any  entity  or  object  concerning  which  we  can  assert 
a  true  proposition,  is  certainly  not  a  mere  nothing.  As 
a  genuine  object  of  thought,  it  is,  has  being  or  subsists; 
and  that  it  does  not  exist  must  not  be  urged  against  its 
having  a  place  in  science.  We  may  then  give  the  follow- 
ing answer  to  the  first  question:  The  realm  of  subsistence 
is  a  more  extensive  realm  within  which  is  the  realm  of  the 
existent;  in  other  words,  the  existent  world  is  only  one  out 
of  many  logically  possible  worlds. 

The  second  question  raised  regarding  our  definition 
of  existence  is:  Should  our  definition  be  narrowed  not 
only  by  excluding  from  existence  all  mere  subsistents,  but 
also  by  excluding  aU  universals?  In  short,  do  universals 
exist  or  only  subsist?  This  question  regarding  the  exist- 
ence of  universals  is  a  very  old  one  and  is  one  concerning 
which  even  now  there  is  not  consensus  of  opinion  among 
philosophers.  Those  who  answer  that  only  particulars 
exist,  are  called  nominalists.  Some  nominalists  claim 
even  that  the  subsistent  is  merely  words.  Hence  the 
name,  nominalist,  from  the  Latin  nomina.    Those  who 


Io8  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

maintain  that  the  universal  does  exist  have  been  called 
realists.  Universalia  realia  sunt.  It  is  better  to  call 
them  after  the  first  great  realist,  Platonic  realists.  We 
have  decided  against  the  extreme  nominalism  which 
asserts  that  the  subsistent  is  merely  "convention"  or 
"talk."  The  more  moderate  nominahsm,  however, 
raises  an  issue  which  we  cannot  dismiss  so  briefly  and 
dogmatically.  To  this  issue  between  nominalism  and 
Platonic  realism  let  us  now  proceed. 

For  further  study  read: 
Russell,  Problems  of  Philosophy,  127-157; 
Russell,  On  the  Relations  of  Universals  and  Particulars,  Proc. 

Aristotel.  Soc,  1911-12; 
Russell,  Principles  of  Mathematics,  449; 
Berkeley,  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  Introduction,  and 

Sects.  101-116; 
Hume,  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  Bk.  I,  Pt.  I,  Sect.  VII,  Of 

Abstract  Ideas; 
Mill,  Examination  of  Sir  Wm.  Hamilton's  Philosophy,  Chap. 

XVII,  The  Doctrine  of  Concepts,  or  General  Notions; 
Perry,  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,  Chap.  X. 

5.  A  defense  of  Platonic  realism. — In  discussing  this 
issue  I  shall  try,  as  far  as  I  can,  to  reconcile  the  two 
doctrines,  (a)  The  nominalist  is  correct  in  combating 
the  extreme  realism  which  has,  probably  wrongly,  been 
ascribed  to  Plato.  The  entities  and  the  propositions 
of  logic  and  mathematics,  the  generalizations  of  nat- 
ural science,  such  as  the  law  of  gravitation,  do  not 
exist  in  the  same  way  as  does  St.  Paul's  Cathedral,  the 
Amazon  river,  or  the  planet  Jupiter.  The  laws  of  nature, 
that  is,  the  universal  propositions  by  means  of  which  we 
explain  facts  are  not  entities  that  we  can  meet  on  the 


NOMINALISM  VS.  PLATONIC  REALISM  109 

street  and  with  which  we  can  shake  hands.  They  do  not 
exist  in  any  place  or  at  a  statable  time.  They  are  eternal, 
that  is,  timeless.  They  are  spaceless,  that  is,  they  cannot 
be  located. 

(b)  Yet  it  would  be  equally  erroneous  to  go  to  the 
other  extreme  and  to  maintain  as  a  nominalist  that  only 
things  which  have  a  duration  and  occupy  space,  exist. 
For  how  about  time  and  space  themselves  and  how  about 
many  of  the  relations  between  things?  Surely  we  per- 
ceive relations  as  truly  and  readily  as  we  do  the  things  be- 
tween which  they  obtain,  and  many  of  them  are  not  lo- 
cated in  time  or  space.  For  example,  I  can  perceive  order, 
the  order  of  the  fingers  on  my  right  hand  and  its  difference 
from  the  order  of  the  fingers  on  my  left  hand.  I  can  per- 
ceive the  relations  between  the  colors,  between  musical 
notes,  between  weights,  between  odors.  Such  relations 
as  these  last  are  not  temporal  or  spatial.  Then  too,  many 
of  the  relations  which  we  perceive  are  elementary  fea- 
tures of  space  itself  and  as  such  should  be  said  to  con- 
stitute space  rather  than  to  be  located  in  space.  In 
short,  it  would  be  idle  to  maintain  that  relations  are  non- 
existent; and  once  we  admit  that  relations  exist,  we  are 
a  long  way  toward  reaUsm. 

Of  course  it  will  be  objected  that  admitting  the  exist- 
ence of  relations  is  admitting  only  that  the  particular  rela- 
tions exist,  the  relations  actually  perceived  holding  be- 
tween the  particular  entities.  But  let  us  see  if  further 
considerations  do  not  force  us  to  admit  that  universal  re- 
lations exist.  We  can  perceive  the  hkeness  between  twins. 
But  once  we  admit  this,  can  we  deny  that  the  zoologist 
sees  the  likeness  between  lions,  tigers,  panthers,  wild  cats, 


no  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

leopards,  lynxes,  which  he  calls  " Cat"  (Felis)?  This  like- 
ness certainly  exists.  Moreover,  it  is  not  the  particular 
likeness  between  one  tiger  and  one  leopard  and  between 
one  leopard  and  one  lynx  and  so  on  through  the  list  taking 
the  millions  of  specimens  two  at  a  time.  The  Hkeness 
is  a  universal  likeness  between  cats  in  general.  The  nom- 
inalist will  hardly  object  to  the  biologist  saying,  "There 
exists  a  likeness  between  the  members  of  the  genus  Felis," 
or  to  his  attempting  to  explain  the  origin  of  this  like- 
ness.  Therefore,  some  universal  relations  exist.  ^ 

The  existence  of  laws  of  nature  has  been  called  in  ques- 
tion especially  by  two  prominent  Uving  nominahsts, 
Professors  Mach  and  Pearson.  According  to  these  philos- 
ophers, natural  laws  are  but  brief  descriptions  or  conven- 
tions whose  entire  significance  is  their  economy  for  our 
thought.  There  is  no  such  thing  in  nature  as  the  law  of 
gravitation.  There  are  only  falling  bodies,  and  the  law 
of  gravitation  merely  sums  up  for  us  in  one  exceedingly 
useful  statement  the  countless  instances  of  falling  by 
describing  certain  important  common  characteristics.  In 
short,  the  laws  of  nature  are  human  inventions,  human 
devices,  and  belong  as  Uttle  to  the  physical  world  as  does 
the  English  language  or  as  do  the  names  of  the  stars.  But 
such  a  doctrine  is  hardly  fair  to  the  truth,  for  it  does  not 

*  It  is  true,  this  problem  can  degenerate  into  a  question  about 
the  use  of  words;  and  we  must  be  careful  to  keep  it  from  doing 
so.  Existence  can  be  so  defined  that  relations  and  universals  are 
excluded;  and  if  it  is  a  desirable  usage  to  adopt  this  definition, 
the  realist  should  yield  at  once.  All  I  wish  to  maintain  is  that 
the  line  between  the  existent  and  the  non-existent  will  then  be  a 
very  narrow  one,  and  it  seems  to  me  a  thoroughly  arbitrary  one. 


NOMINALISM  VS.  PLATONIC  REALISM  III 

explain  how  these  mere  conventions  can  be  so  exceedingly 
useful  and  trustworthy  or  how  they  came  into  man's  pos- 
session. It  is  not  fair  to  say  that  Newton  invented  the 
law  of  gravitation;  rather  we  must  say  he  discovered  it. 
Moreover,  the  laws  which  science  teaches  are  either  true 
or  false  and,  by  this  we  mean,  that  they  do  explain  or 
fail  to  explain  facts.  The  law  of  gravitation  explains  facts 
for  in  part  through  it  we  can  deduce  a  host  of  familiar  ver- 
ifiable events.  Were  it  a  mere  convention,  such  powers 
would  be  no  less  than  miraculous.  Now  in  asserting  the  ex- 
istence of  this  law  all  that  a  critical  reahst  means  is  simply 
this:  the  law  is  a  genuine  discovery  and  does  explain  fact. 
Again,  according  to  these  philosophers,  perceivability 
is  the  sole  criterion  of  existence;  and  if  so,  both  laws  of 
nature  and  such  hypothetical  imperceptible  entities  of 
science  as  the  chemical  atoms,  the  electrons,  and  the 
ether,  cannot  be  said  to  exist.  But  it  is  hard  to  believe 
that  these  philosophers  see  the  full  implication  of  their 
doctrine.  In  an  earlier  chapter  we  have  seen  how  few 
things  are  really  perceivable.  Our  bodies,  our  houses,  our 
country,  have  never  been  perceived;  and  certain  it  is  that 
the  earth  and  its  rotation  have  not  been  perceived.  Do 
they  then  not  exist?  It  is  preposterous  to  make  the  limits 
of  human  perception  the  limits  of  existence !  Moreover, 
perception  is  a  treacherous  criterion  for  a  nominalist  to 
use  as  a  criterion  of  existence,  treacherous  because  it  may 
be  that  we  can  perceive  things  which  all  admit  merely 
subsist  and  things  that  are  decidedly  universal.  In  short, 
if  perceivability  is  the  criterion  of  existence  it  must  be 
both  limited  and  extended  to  fit  the  existential  beliefs  of 
the  nominalist  or  of  anyone  else. 


112  A  MRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

Hence  when  it  comes  to  the  question  whether  or  not 
such  imperceptible  entities  as  the  chemical  atoms  and 
the  ether  exist,  it  is  the  same  type  of  question  precisely 
as  the  question,  does  the  earth  exist?  It  is  a  question  as 
to  whether  or  not  these  entities  explain  certain  facts  and 
remain  consistent  with  all  other  facts.  That  they  are 
imperceptible  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  case,  except 
that  verification  may  be  more  difficult,  or  that  we  snail 
have  to  wait  longer  for  it. 

Finally,  two  further  matters  mislead  these  nominal- 
ists. First,  sometimes  more  than  one  law  is  discovered 
which  will  explain  equally  well  the  same  facts,  and  it 
seems  to  the  nominalist  impossible  that  reality  can  be 
thus  multiple.  Regarding  this  I  know  of  but  two  things 
to  be  said.  First  we  have  no  guarantee  that  further  re- 
search and  exploration  may  not  at  any  time  provide  a 
crucial  experiment  between  such  theories  or  even  prove 
both  theories  false:  and  we  have  no  absolute  guarantee 
that  existence  is  single  and  not  multiple.  Existence  as 
far  as  we  know  it  seems  to  be  single  but  it  may  be  that 
the  facts  about  us  belong  to  two  or  more  worlds.  That 
is,  there  may  be  two  theories  both  of  which  are  consistent 
with  all  facts  and  both  of  which  explain  certain  facts, 
and  there  may  be  no  crucial  test  between  them.  If  this 
should  be  the  case  anywhere,  what  possible  a  priori  proof 
have  we  that  both  systems  do  not  exist?  Of  course,  such 
is  not  our  working  hypothesis;  but  it  fails  to  be  our  work- 
ing hypothesis  not  because  we  know  it  to  be  false,  but 
because  crucial  experiments  have  so  often  decided  in 
favor  of  one  or  other  rival  theory. 

The  second  matter  which  misleads  the  nominalist,  is 


NOMINALISM  VS.   PLATONIC  REALISM  II3 

the  fact  that  scientific  theories  keep  coming  and  going. 
For  a  while  a  theory  is  widely  held  and  seems  to  explain 
the  known  facts;  later  newly  discovered  facts  make  it  ob- 
solete. This  leads  the  nominalist  to  ask,  Can  such  en- 
tities exist?  Of  course  not.  Later  discoveries  showed 
that  they  were  not  truly  laws  of  nature.  The  realist 
maintains  only  that  the  tme  laws  of  nature  exist.  "But 
how  are  we  to  ascertain  what  are  the  true  laws?"  Of 
course  only  by  methods  that  do  not  give  us  infallible 
results  and  hence  both  nominalist  and  realist  may  agree 
that  we  do  not  know  absolutely  any  given  theory  to  be  the 
truly  existent  law  of  nature.  "Why  then  not  admit  that 
the  so-called  laws  are  merely  human  ways  of  explaining?" 
Because  they  are  not  asserted  as  merely  human  conven- 
tions but  as  true  laws  of  nature  which  the  discoverer 
would  reject  if  any  crucial  experiment  decides  against 
them.  Notice,  moreover,  that  even  the  assertion  that 
this  or  that  particular  and  theoretically  perceivable 
event  exists  or  existed,  is  often  no  better  off,  as  far  as 
our  knowledge  is  concerned,  than  are  these  laws  of  nature. 
Thousands  of  particular  existential  propositions  are  en- 
tertained by  men  regarding  the  remote  past  which  can- 
not possibly  be  directly  verified.  They  might  have  been 
verified  by  perception  had  we  been  there;  but  now  they 
are  (for  human  knowledge)  only  theories  to  explain  facts 
we  do  perceive.  Such,  for  example,  are  the  various  as- 
sertions in  the  geological  history  of  remote  ages.  In 
short,  the  fact  that  we  cannot  absolutely  verify  the  ex- 
istential theories  of  science  does  not  imply  the  non- 
existence of  those  laws;  it  simply  indicates  the  tenta- 
tive character  of  human  knowledge. 


114  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

For  further  study  read: 
Russell,  Problems  of  Philosophy,  127-157; 
Sheldon,  The  Metaphysical  Status  of  Universals,  Philos.  Review, 

1905.  14; 
Pearson,  Grammar  of  Science,  Pt.  I,  Chap.  Ill,  The  Scientific 

Law,  also  Chaps.  VI  and  VIII; 
Mach,  Science  of  Mechanics,  481-494,  The  Economy  of  Science; 
Le  Roy,  Science  et  Philosophie,  Reo.  de  MUaph.  ei  de  Morale, 

1899,  7. 

For  more  extensive  study  read: 
Plato,  Republic,  esp.  Bks.  VI  and  VII; 
Plato,  Theaetetus; 
Plato,  Parmenides; 
Stewart,  Plato's  Doctrine  of  Ideas; 
Poincare,  The  Value  of  Science; 
Mach,  Analysis  of  Sensations. 

4.  Conclusion. — The  realm  of  subsistence  and  of  truth 
is  a  broader  realm  than  is  the  realm  of  existence.  The 
world  is  only  one  of,  it  may  be,  an  indefinite  number  of 
logically  possible  worlds.  This  realm  of  subsistence  is 
a  genuine  field  for  scientific  research  even  though  it  is 
true  that  existence  interests  us  far  more  than  what  might 
have  existed  and  that  we  study  the  subsistent  chiefly 
with  the  hope  of  gaining  further  knowledge  regarding 
the  existent.  The  laws  of  nature  and  other  universals 
and  again  the  hypothetical  entities  of  science  are  exis- 
tential. Their  logical  status  is  radically  different  from 
that  of  mere  conventions  or  practical  instruments.  They 
are  asserted  as  explanations  of  fact,  and  if  they  are  indeed 
such,  then  they  exist  as  truly  as  do  the  hypothetical  par- 
ticulars whose  existential  character  no  one  questions. 


CHAPTER  ;XI 

CAUSATION 

7.  Introduction. — The  problems  of  the  nature  of  ex- 
planation, and  of  the  status  and  perception  of  univer- 
sals,  lead  us  to  another  fundamental  problem.  Tenta- 
tively ejcpressed  this  problem  is,  how  can  we  leam  from 
one  part  of  the  world  truths  regarding  other  parts?  For 
example,  how  can  we  learn  from  what  is  happening  near 
us,  what  is  happening  far  away?  How  can  we  learn  from 
present  documents,  relics,  ruins,  and  fossils,  the  story 
of  past  ages?  Surely  each  particular  fact  is  merely 
witness  of  itself  and  tells  no  story  regarding  any  other 
fact;  for  did  it  we  should  never  be  at  a  loss  regarding 
the  distant,  the  past  and  the  future.  The  ignorant  and 
thoughtless  could  then  look  at  a  stratum  of  rock,  at  a 
fossil,  at  a  ruined  wall,  at  an  old  manuscript  or  inscrip- 
tion, at  a  footprint,  or  at  any  other  fact,  and  know  di- 
rectly the  past  to  which  it  is  related :  whereas  the  truth  is, 
the  fire  does  not  tell  the  babe  that  it  will  burn  and 
destroy;  nor  does  the  falling  barometer  tell  the  ignorant 
of  the  approaching  storm.  With  outside  information, 
however,  the  astronomer  observing  the  heavens  can 
foretell  the  coming  eclipse,  the  mariner  taking  the  tem- 
perature of  the  sea  water  can  sometimes  be  forewarned 
of  approaching  icebergs,  the  naturalist  coming  upon 
fossil  remains  can  decide  the  age  of  a  rocky  formation, 

115 


Il6  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

the  physician  watching  a  patient  can  assure  us  of  his 
recovery. 

We  have  to  have  outside  information.  But  what  in- 
formation? That  a  given  proposition  implies  this  or  that 
further  proposition.  In  other  words,  were  it  not  an  ulti- 
mate trait  of  reality  that  one  proposition  implies  further 
propositions  the  only  mind  that  could  discover  or  know 
any  truth  would  be  the  mind  by  which  the  truth  is 
actually  perceived.  But  it  is  a  fundamental  premise  of 
science,  and  a  part  of  every  theory  of  reality,  that  propo- 
sitions do  imply  one  another.  This  premise  is  ultimately 
what  we  mean  by  causation,  by  the  statement  that  the 
world  is  a  causal  system,  a  system  in  which  law  reigns. 
Yet  it  is  conceivable  that  truths  should  be  so  completely 
disconnected  that  they  would  not  imply  one  another, 
that  one  truth  would  not  indicate  any  other  truth.  If 
this  were  the  case,  truths  would  not  form  a  system  but 
chance  alone  would  reign;  for  after  all  we  mean  by  an 
event  due  to  chance  a  proposition  whose  truth  or  falsity 
is  not  deducible  from  other  known  propositions. 

The  problems  of  this  chapter  are  the  following:  (a) 
Is  causation  always  reducible  to  implication?  (b)  What 
are  the  different  types  of  causes?  (c)  Is  science  tending 
to  reduce  the  multitudinous  causes  to  one  cause,  that  is, 
is  the  world  the  product  of  one  cause  or  of  many  ultimate 
independent  causes?  (d)  Is  chance  as  well  as  causation 
present  in  the  world? 

2.  Causation  reducible  to  implication. — Perhaps  the 
oldest  conception  of  causation  held  by  man  is  one  de- 
rived from  two  types  of  experience.  The  jirst  t5^e  of 
experience  is  the  feeling  of  helplessness  in  overcoming 


CAUSATION  117 

or  resisting  the  obstacles  to  our  will.  We  are  carried  or 
pushed,  or  struck,  or  burned,  or  disappointed,  and  are 
unable,  in  spite  of  our  utmost  resistance,  to  prevent 
things  having  their  way  with  us.  The  second  type  of 
experience  is  our  feeling  of  ability  to  control  these  agents 
and  to  have  our  way.  We  can  move  them,  stop  them, 
push  them,  throw  them,  or  in  some  other  way  determine 
their  behavior.  These  two  types  of  experience  led  men 
at  first  to  picture  causation  in  terms  of  the  sensations 
and  feelings  which  form  so  noticeable  a  part  of  our 
efforts.  A  cause  is  an  "active,"  a  "striving,"  "strug- 
gling, ""compelling,"  even  "living"  and  "willing"  thing. 
It  has  "force"  or  "power"  by  which  it  "necessitates" 
the  outcome.  Indeed,  only  in  modern  times  has  it  become 
clear  that  this  is  not  causation  as  causation  should  be 
defined  in  science;  for  it  was  not  until  the  great  English 
philosopher  David  Hume  (1711-1776)  submitted  our 
notion  of  causation  to  a  rigorous  analysis  and  scrutiny 
that  the  irrelevance  of  this  animistic  causal  conception 
became  fully  apparent. 

Causes  do  not  reveal  to  us  a  striving,  a  power,  a  will, 
a  necessity,  or  anything  of  the  sort.  Rather  what  we 
observe  is  one  event  succeeded  by  another  event,  or  one 
thing  changing  as  another  thing  changes,  or  one  thing 
present  when  another  is  present.  For  example,  one 
billiard  ball  hits  another,  and  then  this  moves.  The 
temperature  rises  and  the  ice  melts.  We  oil  the  axle  and 
the  wheel  makes  more  and  quicker  revolutions  when 
given  the  same  push.  We  open  a  cock  and  the  water 
flows  from  the  tank.  We  close  a  wire  circuit  and  the 
electric  bell  rings.    Even  in  the  case  of  our  own  conduct 


Il8  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

the  feelings  of  efifort  and  power  are  not  always  present; 
and  where  they  are  present,  psychology  and  physiology 
show  that  they  accompany  rather  than  constitute  the 
cause.  Hence,  if  we  talk  of  the  "necessity"  of  the  effect 
following  the  cause,  or  if  we  ascribe  to  the  cause  a  * '  power  " 
or  "compulsion,"  these  words,  to  be  true  to  fact,  must 
take  on  a  different  meaning,  a  meaning  which  we  shall 
see  they  may  be  given  when  used  as  logical  notions. 
Necessity  must  mean  logical  necessity.  The  power  of 
the  cause  must  mean  logical  power.  But  what  is  logical 
necessity  and  what  is  logical  power?  Logical  power  be- 
tween one  proposition  and  another  can  be  only  another 
name  for  implication;  and  logical  necessity  can  only 
mean  that  one  proposition  is  logically  prior  to,  that  is, 
is  presupposed  by,  another.  In  other  words,  science  seeks 
logical  relations,  relations  by  which  from  one  proposi- 
tion it  can  infer  other  propositions,  and  these  are  the 
causal  relations.  How  much  more  may  be  existentially 
involved  when  one  event  is  caused  by  another  is  of 
course  not  only  a  legitimate  problem  but  one  which 
science  cannot  ignore.  Causation,  however,  is  a  far 
more  general  and  abstract  aspect  of  the  world  than,  and  is 
logically  independent  of,  any  animistic  or  similar  hy- 
pothesis. As  a  notion  in  science  it  is  that  relation  be- 
tween entities  or  between  the  relations  of  entities  which 
enables  us  to  know  one  when  we  know  the  other.  In 
short,  causation  is  implication. 

This  reduction  of  causation  to  implication  shows 
that  many  other  typical  features  of  the  causal  process 
are  irrelevant,  and  that  they  should  not  be  included  in 
its  definition,    (a)  We  usually  think  of  the  cause  as  a 


CAUSATION  119 

temporal  antecedent  to  the  effect  and  of  course  it  is 
often  such;  but  this  temporal  antecedence  is  not  essential 
to  causation.  Sometimes  cause  and  effect  are  contem- 
porary as  in  friction  impeding  motion.  In  mechanics, 
from  two  or  more  configurations  of  a  system  we  can  de- 
duce backward  as  well  as  forward  in  time  and  ascertain 
further  configurations.  In  this  case  there  seems  no  better 
reason  for  saying  that  the  cause  precedes  the  event  than 
for  saying  that  the  event  precedes  the  cause.  Thus, 
when  the  astronomer  observes  with  precision  a  few 
positions  of  a  comet  and  the  time  of  these  positions,  he 
can  calculate  the  path  through  which  the  comet  has  been 
travelling  as  readily  as  the  path  through  which  it  will 
travel,  (b)  Then  again,  in  some  cases  time  seems  alto- 
gether an  irrelevant  aspect.  Thus  the  property  of  an  ob- 
ject often  depends  upon  a  geometrical  property  and  con- 
versely this  second  upon  the  former.  For  example, 
the  shape  of  an  object  may  have  much  to  do  with  its 
behavior.  The  shape  of  a  tank  is  the  cause  of  its  holding 
more  water  than  another  tank  constructed  out  of  the 
same  amount  of  material.  The  angle  of  an  incUned 
plane  causes  the  greater  or  less  velocity  of  the  object 
rolling  down  it.  The  position  of  a  fulcrum  causes  a 
lever  to  work  successfully  whereas  another  position 
would  cause  it  to  fail.  The  shape  and  size  of  a  wheel  are 
as  truly  causes  as  is  the  horse  which  draws  the  cart.  The 
shape  of  the  path  of  a  comet  determines  whether  the  comet 
remains  in  our  solar  system  or  leaves  it  never  to  return. 

For  further  study  read: 
Hume,    An    Enquiry    Concerning    Human     Understanding, 
Sects.  n-VH;  or 


I20  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

Hume,  A  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  Bk.  I,  Part  HI; 

MiU,  Logic,  Bk.  Ill,  Chaps.  HI-V,  XXI  and  XXII; 

Venn,  The  Principles  of  Empirical  or  Inductive  Logic,  Chaps. 

II-V; 
Erdmann,  Content  and  Validity  of  the  Causal  Law,  Philos. 

Review,  1905,  14; 
Thilly,  Causation,  Philos.  Review,  1907,  16; 
Pearson,  Grammar  of  Science,  Vol.  I,  Chap.  IV,  Cause  and 

Effect,  and  Chap.  V,  Contingency  and  Correlation; 
Russell,  Principles  of  Mathematics,  Chap.  LV,  Causality; 
James,  Some  Problems  of  Philosophy,  Chaps.  XII  and  XLQ. 

J.  The  different  types  of  causes. — If  causation  is  re- 
ducible to  implication  then  the  only  causes  are  proposi- 
tions; and  the  question,  What  are  the  different  types  of 
causes?  reduces  to  the  question,  What  types  of  proposi- 
tion are  found  in  causal  implication?  Evidently  universal 
propositions  as  well  as  particular  propositions  are  found 
here.  Thus  there  are  two  major  types  of  causes,  universal 
causes  and  particular  causes.  The  universal  causes  in- 
clude what  are  familiarly  called  the  laws  of  nature.  The 
particular  causes  constitute  the  world  of  things  and 
events  in  time  and  space. 

These  particular  causes  form  the  logically  lowest  level 
of  the  universe.  Logically  above  them  are  levels  of 
universal  causes,  as  we  ascend  to  propositions  of  greater 
and  greater  generality.  From  laws  that  hold  of  very  com- 
plex particular  objects  such  as  society,  minds,  animals, 
we  ascend  to  laws  that  hold  of  all  Hfe,  from  these  to  laws 
that  hold  throughout  the  chemical  world,  from  these  to 
laws  that  hold  of  the  physical  world,  from  these  to  the 
mathematical  laws  and  from  these  to  logic.  In  this  way, 
the  scientist  has  always  striven  to  discover  more  and 


CAUSATION  121 

more  general  laws  from  which  he  can  deduce  the  less 
general  laws  already  known  or  under  which  he  can 
classify  them;  and  it  is  in  this  way  that  he  hopes  ulti- 
mately to  unify  all  that  we  know. 

This  hope  has  raised  two  philosophical  problems: 
First,  cannot  all  causal  laws  be  ultimately  brought 
under  one  universal  law?  Is  there  not  one  ultimate  law 
or  proposition  which  forms  the  head  of  the  hierarchy? 
Secondly,  cannot  all  the  less  general  laws  down  to  the 
particular  propositions  which  constitute  the  world  in 
time  and  space  be  deducible  from  this  one  highest  law? 
The  belief  that  this  can  be  done  may  be  called  Causal 
Monism,  and  the  contradictory  belief,  Causal  Pluralism. 

4.  Causal  pluralism. — Evidently  the  principles  of 
logic  form  the  head  of  the  hierarchy,  for  they  are  the 
most  general  laws.  To  infer  from  this,  however,  that 
logic  contains  all  the  logically  primitive  notions  and 
propositions  of  science,  would  be  the  grossest  of  errors. 
Each  existential  science  brings  in  new  terms  and  new 
relations  that  are  either  quite  indefinable  or  indefinable 
in  terms  of  pure  logic.  For  example,  in  terms  of  logical 
notions,  it  is  impossible  to  define  animal,  water,  red,  or 
most  of  the  terms  and  relations  found  in  the  special 
sciences.  Again,  each  existential  science  brings  into  the 
argument  new  propositions  that  cannot  be  deduced  from 
logic.  For  example,  the  law  of  the  inertia  of  matter, 
the  composition  of  water,  the  laws  of  living  matter, 
are  indubitably  beyond  such  deductions.  If  this  is 
true  of  the  more  general  propositions  and  notions  of 
physics,  chemistry,  and  biology,  how  much  more  evi- 
dently is  it  true  of  the  infinitude  of  particular  proposi- 


122  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

tions  which  form  the  logically  lowest  level!  These  par- 
ticular propositions  cannot  be  deduced  even  from  the 
less  general  propositions  which  stand  closest  to  them. 
For  example,  no  psychologist  could  deduce  the  biography 
of  a  man  from  general  psychology.  No  breeder  of 
animals  could  deduce  from  mendelism  all  the  traits 
found  in  a  given  litter.  No  physicist  could  deduce  from 
general  physics  whether  a  tossed  penny  will  fall  heads  or 
tails.  In  short,  the  particular  entity  seems  infinitely 
complex,  baffling  all  attempts  to  put  it  completely  under 
any  assignable  number  of  laws;  and  this  means  that 
each  particular  thing  and  event  is  itself  a  logical  ultimate, 
or  primitive. 

Let  me  illustrate  this  important  point.  From  physics 
I  may  know  the  general  path  of  a  projectile  leaving  the 
earth  at  a  given  angle  and  at  a  given  velocity.  But 
other  factors,  perhaps  countless  other  factors,  enter  to 
alter  this  path  in  any  actual  instance;  for  example,  the 
currents  and  changing  density  of  the  air  from  point  to 
point,  the  minute  immeasurable  variations  in  gravity 
at  different  points  on  the  earth's  surface,  the  changing 
shape,  surface  and  rotation  of  the  projectile  itself.  As  a 
second  illustration,  think  of  the  countless  factors  which 
enter  into  the  growth  of  a  man's  body  and  mind.  Every 
meal  he  eats,  every  act  he  performs,  every  experience 
he  meets,  each  has  some  influence.  As  a  further  illustra- 
tion, think  of  the  countless  factors  which  influence  the 
social  and  political  history  of  thousands  and  millions 
of  these  men.  So  numerous  are  the  factors  which  in- 
fluence each  entity  that  it  is  highly  probable  that  no 
two  men  have  ever  been  alike,  no  two  animals,  no  two 


CAUSATION  123 

plants,  or  no  two  grains  of  sand.  Indeed  may  we  not  go 
farther  and  ask,  are  there  even  two  atoms  of  oxygen 
alike,  or  any  two  particular  things  aUke?  Again  con- 
sider the  milikeness  of  events.  If  a  man  is  shooting  at  a 
target,  no  matter  how  many  shots  he  takes,  does  a  second 
bullet  ever  hit  quite  where  another  has?  Does  a  river 
ever  flow  two  moments  in  quite  the  same  channel?  To 
these  and  similar  questions  one  can  only  reply:  Where  we 
have  been  able  to  examine  or  to  measure  with  suflScient 
accuracy,  we  find  always  what  we  find  when  in  a  crowd 
we  look  at  different  faces,  no  two  alike. 

Thus  it  seems  that  general  laws  can  never  be  the 
complete  explanation  of  any  particular  thing  or  event 
in  the  world  about  us.  The  infinite  number  of  particular 
propositions  may  form  each  a  part  of  the  world's  explana- 
tion and  each  may  be  as  truly  ultimate  as  are  the  very 
principles  of  logic.  Hence  from  the  standpoint  of  causa- 
tion the  world  has  an  infinitude  of  ultimate  and  independ- 
ent causes.  They  are  ultimate  and  independent  because 
no  amount  of  knowledge  of  other  details  of  the  world 
would  furnish  us  enough  information  from  which  to 
deduce  this  total  nature.  Another  way  of  stating  this 
point  is  that  the  world  might  be  indefinitely  different 
from  what  it  is  in  these  particular  propositions  without 
requiring  any  change  in  the  general  propositions,  and 
the  less  general  propositions  might  be  different  without 
the  more  general  propositions  being  false.  Still  another 
way  of  saying  the  same  thing  is,  the  world  of  particulars 
is  only  one  out  of  (for  all  we  know  to  the  contrary)  an 
infinite  number  of  logically  possible  worlds. 

5.  Chance,  or  spontaneity. — The  world  cannot  be  ex- 


124  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

plained  solely  in  terms  of  general  causal  laws,  but  it  is 
rather  a  world  of  causal  law  and  of  particular  individuals. 
Expressed  from  the  standpoint  of  causation,  it  is  a  sys- 
tem in  which,  in  all  particular  objects  and  events,  chance 
is  present,  chance  meaning  any  feature  or  term  of  a  com- 
plex object  or  event  which  cannot  be  deduced  from  gen- 
eral propositions  or  laws.  We  can  foretell  that  a  penny 
will  fall  either  heads  or  tails,  but  from  what  we  know  be- 
forehand we  cannot  ascertain  which;  or  we  may  know  the 
average  of  a  class  or  species,  but  we  must  depend  upon 
actual  perception  to  ascertain  the  complete  nature  of 
each  individual  member  and  his  variations  from  the  cen- 
tral tendencies  of  the  group.  That  is  to  say,  each  par- 
ticular thing  or  event  contains  particular  propositions 
which  defy  deduction  and  which  therefore  are  logical 
ultimates;  and  such  propositions  have  to  be  learned  em- 
pirically by  examining  the  thing  or  event  itself.  All  of 
this  can  be  expressed  in  the  more  pictorial  though 
less  rigorous  language  of  biology.  A  cause,  or  an  action 
of  one  entity  upon  another,  is  a  stimulus.  The  stim- 
ulus accounts  for  the  reaction  only  to  a  very  small  extent, 
because  the  nature  of  the  individual  organism  itself  plays 
by  far  the  greater  role. 

(Sections  4  and  s)  For  further  study  read: 

Mm,  Logic,  Bk.  Ill,  Chap.  XIV; 

Peirce,  The  Doctrine  of  Necessity,  Monist,  1891-2,  2; 

Sheldon,  Chance,  /.  of  Philos.,  Psychol.,  etc.,  1912,  p. 

t 
For  more  extensive  study  read: 

Ward,  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  Pts.  I  and  II; 

Perry,  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,  Chap.  IV. 


CAUSATION  125 

6.  Conclusion. — Thus  the  study  of  causation  reveals 
to  us  a  picture  of  the  world  as  a  twofold  causal  system, 
on  the  one  hand  a  system  of  universal  causal  laws  and 
on  the  other  hand  a  world  of  ultimate  individuals  or  par- 
ticular complex  entities.  The  scientist  is  engaged  in  the 
discovery  of  the  universal  or  general  laws.  Starting  with 
more  general  laws  he  deduces  subsidiary  laws,  or  start- 
ing with  less  general  laws  he  generalizes  and  thereby  dis- 
covers the  logically  higher  laws.  By  this  twofold  method 
he  seeks  to  deduce  as  far  as  possible  the  individual  or  par- 
ticular existent  entity  or  event,  that  is,  the  particular 
propositions  which  constitute  its  nature.  The  hope  of 
carrying  this  process  farther  and  farther  is  ever  before 
him  and  raises  the  still  greater  hope  that  the  goal  is  at- 
tainable where  all  the  world  will  be  found  to  be  de- 
dudble  from  the  system  of  causal  laws,  or  from  the 
system  of  causal  laws  and  some  minimum  assumptions 
giving  the  particular  nature  of  the  existing  entities. 
His  ideal  then  is  a  monistic  causal  system,  and  rightly 
so,  for  only  research  itself  will  ever  tell  him  how  far 
the  world  is  a  world  of  universal  causal  law;  but  mean- 
while his  actual  experience  seems  to  be  indicating  that 
somewhere  there  is  a  limit  to  such  law. 

This  limit  may  be  conceived  in  two  ways.  First,  it 
may  be  simply  the  end  of  an  infinite  series  in  which  from 
higher  laws  he  proceeds  ad  infinitum  to  laws  of  less  gen- 
erality until  the  complex  nature  of  the  individual  at 
infiuoity  is  completely  dedudble.  If  this  conception  be 
correct,  his  present  and  future  failures  are  due  only  to 
the  impossibility  of  exhausting  an  infinite  series  induct- 
ively. Secondly,  the  limit  may  be  conceived  as  absolute 


126  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

and  probably  not  infinitely  distant,  where  part  of  the 
individual's  nature  has  to  be  accepted  as  peculiar  to  it 
and  as  logically  ultimate.  Though  no  conclusive  proof 
is  in  our  possession  as  to  which  of  these  two  conceptions 
is  the  correct  one,  the  evidence  which  we  have  all  points 
to  the  existence  everywhere  of  unique  individuals  whose 
particular  nature  is  logically  ultimate.  No  doubt  analy- 
sis can  carry  us  indefinitely  farther  than  we  have  gone 
if  only  we  discover  the  means;  but  wherever  we  do  suc- 
ceed in  analyzing  farther  the  causal  laws  at  work  in  the 
individual  entity  or  event,  it  is  only  to  find  again  at  a 
lower  logical  level  the  idiosyncrades  of  the  complex 
individual.  For  example,  it  looks  as  though  after  we 
have  analyzed  different  chemical  compounds  and  have 
found  in  them  the  same  chemical  elements,  we 
should  find  the  atoms  of  these  elements  unhke  one  an- 
other if  only  we  could  examine  them  as  we  can  examine 
individual  human  beings.  And  if  in  turn  we  could 
analyze  these  atoms  into  electrons,  it  would  only  be  to 
find  again  differing  individuals.  Of  course,  this  example 
is  mere  speculation,  but  it  is  commonplace  information 
that  wherever  we  are  able  to  study  individuals  minutely 
we  never  find  two  alike.  Hence  causal  pluralism  seems 
the  better  hypothesis. 

If  this  hypothesis  is  true,  then  there  is  a  goal  for  sdehce 
in  her  search  for  causal  law,  a  goal  where  the  individual 
is  taken  as  logically  ultimate  or  rather  where  we  analyze 
its  complex  nature  into  its  unique  particular  propositions, 
which  cannot  be  deduced  but  have  to  be  empirically 
discovered.  We  seem  to  know  an  indefinite  number  of 
such  particular  propositions  already,  the  "finger  prints  " 


CAUSATION  127 

of  individual  realties.  Tbey  form  the  class  of  particular 
perceived  propositions,  or  particular  facts,  as  opposed  to 
all  universals  perceived,  inferred  or  assumed,  and  as  op- 
posed to  all  particular  propositions  dedudble  from  these 
imiversals. 


CHAPTER  XII 

TEMPORALISM  AND  EVOLUTION 

I.  Two  problems. — In  explaining  fact  man  has  dis- 
covered a  causal  world-system  extending  through  time, 
past,  present  and  future.  For  example,  the  geologist  finds 
far  inland  the  deposits  made  at  the  mouth  of  a  river 
untold  ages  ago.  He  sees  to-day  other  rivers,  such  as 
the  Mississippi,  carrying  down  sediment  and  depositing 
it  in  the  ocean  and  thereby  gradually  building  mainland 
that  is  to  be  ages  from  now.  Similarly  everywhere  what 
has  existed  and  what  will  exist  are  logically  as  truly 
present  to  be  known  and  studied,  to  imply  and  to  be 
implied,  as  is  that  which  we  call  the  world  of  to-day. 
Therefore,  regarded  strictly  from  the  point  of  view  of 
formal  logic,  time  is  a  secondary  feature;  the  whole  world, 
past,  present  and  future,  is  given  as  one  eternal  or  log- 
ically present  system.  Yet  the  question  arises,  Is  not 
such  an  eternal,  or  timeless  world  but  one  aspect  of  a 
world  far  more  complex?  Is  not  time,  with  its  distinction 
of  past,  present  and  future,  not  only  a  genuine  aspect  of 
reality  but  a  fundamental  aspect?  The  doctrine  of 
those  who  reply,  "No,"  is  called  Eternalism;  and  the 
doctrine  of  those  who  find  in  time  a  fundamental  trait 
of  the  existent  is  named  Temporalism.  The  issue  be- 
tween temporalism  and  eternalism  is  our  first  problem. 

128 


TEMPORALISM  AND  EVOLUTION  I29 

To  this  problem  a  second  problem  is  intimately  re- 
lated. The  future  brings  with  it  not  only  particular 
objects  and  events  that  have  not  previously  existed  but 
also  objects  and  events  whose  nature  is  thoroughly  novel 
and  unique.  It  is  said  that  history  repeats  itself;  and 
of  course  in  some  respects  it  does;  but,  when  we  come  to 
particulars,  history  seems  never  to  repeat  itself,  for  the 
new  period  or  age  is  always  unique  and  novel.  So  too 
as  we  go  back  into  the  remote  history  of  the  human  and 
the  animal  races,  we  learn  from  biology  how  new  forms  of 
life  have  constantly  been  arising  on  this  earth:  and  might 
we  go  back  to  the  origin  of  life,  the  origin  of  the  more 
complicated  chemical  compounds,  the  origin  of  the  earth 
and  solar  system,  and  the  origin  of  the  chemical  elements 
themselves,  and  might  we  study  each  particular  thing, 
we  should  probably  find  everywhere  the  same  story, 
each  stage  of  the  world's  history  is  marked  by  the  arising 
of  the  new  and  the  unique. 

The  preceding  chapter  has  pointed  out  to  us  this 
aspect  of  the  world,  which  we  there  called  chance.  The 
universal  propositions  do  not  give  us  enough  information 
from  which  to  deduce  the  particular  existential  propo- 
sitions; and  a  collection  of  particular  existential  propo- 
sitions, for  example,  a  detailed  account  of  some  past 
epoch  in  the  earth's  history,  does  not  give  us  information 
from  which  another  similar  collection  of  particular  ex- 
istential propositions,  some  later  epoch,  can  be  deduced. 
A  rigorous  way  in  which  to  express  this  causal  pluralism 
is,  the  facts  are  constantly  revealing  particular  propo- 
sitions which  are  logically  ultimate  or  primitive.  Of 
course,  this  does  not  mean  that  every  particular  propo- 


130  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

sition  is  logically  fundamental,  but  that  the  logically 
new  is  to  be  found  in  all  facts.  If  now  we  think  of  this 
causal  pluralism  related  to  the  world  in  time,  we  shall 
see  that  some  particular  propositions  are  not  only  log- 
ically ultimate  but  that  these  fundamental  particulars 
are  related  to  each  instant  of  time,  such  that  each  in- 
stant has  its  logically  primitive  asp>ect.  Expressed  in 
other  words,  related  to  each  instant  of  time  there  are  par- 
ticular propositions  which  could  not  have  been  deduced 
from  the  past,  even  were  our  knowledge  of  the  past  and 
of  the  universal  propositions  complete.  The  deduction 
would  require  as  part  of  its  assumed  premises  these  very 
particular  propositions  which  are  in  question.  For  ex- 
ample, could  a  mind  of  superhuman  wisdom  have  seen 
and  have  studied  fully  this  earth  and  life  upon  it  back 
in  the  carboniferous  age,  he  could  not  have  deduced 
that  you  and  I  would  be  hving  here  to-day.  This  doc- 
trine that  each  stage  of  history  brings  with  it  logical 
ultimates,  may  be  called  the  doctrine  of  evolution,  or 
more  explicitly,  of  creative  evolution. 

In  opposition  to  this  doctrine  the  believer  in  causal 
monism  or  in  eternahsm  would  maintain  that  the  whole 
future  universe  can  be  deduced  from  a  complete  knowl- 
edge of  its  universals  and  of  a  few  of  its  stages.  As  the 
mathematician  can  deduce  all  the  values  of  a  variable 
from  an  equation  or  as  the  student  of  mechanics  can 
deduce  from  two  configurations  of  a  closed  mechanical 
system  all  its  past  and  future  configurations,  so  a  super- 
human intellect  with  full  insight  into  the  past  could  deduce 
the  future.  The  issue  between  the  believer  in  creative  ev- 
olution and  the  eternalist  constitutes  our  second  problem. 


TEMPORALISM  AND  EVOLUTION  131 

2.  Temporalism. — Both  issues  take  us  beyond  logic 
and  force  us  to  appeal  to  fact.  As  far  as  logic  is  con- 
cerned, time  could  be  an  eternal,  logically  present, 
dimension  of  the  world.  Indeed  time  is  such  a  dimension 
in  abstract  mechanics.  But  the  complex  facts  of  the 
concrete  existent  world  seem  decidedly  to  favor  temporal- 
ism. Our  actual  temporal  p)ercepts  lead  all  men  to  enter- 
tain the  temporalist  hypothesis,  at  least  in  matters  of 
daily  Ufe,  where  metaphysics  has  not  made  them  sophis- 
ticated. 

The  hypothesis  that  accords  with  the  facts  we  actually 
perceive,  includes  two  most  significant  and  fundamental 
elements,  (a)  The  temporal  order  of  events  is  absolutely 
asymmetrical.  That  is,  it  has  a  fixed  direction  which 
cannot  be  rever.sed.  In  space  an  object  can  move  from 
right  to  left  and  back  from  left  to  right;  but  in  time  we 
observe  facts  in  a  fixed  order  in  which  the  present  suc- 
ceeds the  past  and  the  future  succeeds  the  present. 

(b)  The  existential  status  of  the  present  is  funda- 
mentally different  from  both  the  past  and  the  future. 
The  past  tense  and  the  future  tense  of  the  verb  to  exist 
indicate  more  than  merely  different  points  in  an  asym- 
metrical time  series.  They  indicate  a  further  ultimate 
trait  of  observed  fact,  that  the  future  existent  is  inferred, 
whereas  the  present  existent  can  in  part  coincide  with 
fact.  For  example,  as  I  observe  the  facts  called  "the 
noise  of  the  wind  blowing"  I  interpret,  or  explain  this 
fact,  by  asserting  the  proposition  "the  wind  is  now 
blowing;"  and  though  I  may  beheve  that  the  wind  will 
continue  to  blow,  I  perceive  that  I  have  far  fuller  warrant 
for  the  proposition  "the  wind  is  now  blowing"  than  I 


132  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

have  for  the  proposition  "the  wind  will  blow."  Simi- 
larly, the  factual  evidence  for  the  proposition  "I  now 
exist"  is  far  fuller  than  for  the  proposition  "I  shall  be 
alive  ten  minutes  from  now."  Why?  Well,  this  also  is 
an  ultimate,  a  fact,  a  perceived  truth.  Notice  further 
that  it  is  more  than  an  uncertainty  regarding  the  future. 
It  is  an  actual  coincidence  in  part  of  fact  and  present 
existence.  I  never  perceive  to-morrow  but  I  do  perceive 
what  I  interpret  to  be  the  present. 

More  difficult  to  discover  than  the  status  of  the 
present  or  future  is  the  status  of  the  past.  Is  the  past 
ever  perceived  or  is  it  always  inferred?  Is  memory  ever 
perception  or  is  it  always  inference?  This  question  is  a 
difficult  one,  for  what  we  ordinarily  call  memory  is 
proverbially  falUble;  and  yet  at  times  our  memory  ap- 
proaches complete  certainty.  For  example,  immediately 
after  reading  the  previous  sentence,  are  you  not  certain 
that  you  did  read  it?  However,  the  past  soon  becomes  a 
matter  solely  of  inference,  and  it  is  always  so  where 
memory  leaves  us  ignorant.  Still,  the  past  has  existen- 
tiaUy  a  different  status  from  that  of  the  future.  Let  us 
suppose  that  a  man  is  totally  lacking  in  memory  and 
that  in  observing  the  facts  we  call  the  present  he  comes 
to  the  hypothesis  of  a  past  and  future  world  as  he  might 
to  an  absent  or  distant  present  world.  The  past  would 
be  fully  an  inferred,  not  a  perceived,  existent;  but  would 
it  not  belong  to  existence  in  a  radically  different  sense 
from  that  in  which  the  future  does?  That  is  to  say,  do 
not  the  discovery  of  America,  the  battle  of  Waterloo, 
belong  to  reality  in  a  way  in  which  our  death,  our  great- 
great-great-grandchildren,  the  extinction  of  the  human 


TEMPORALISM  AND  EVOLUTION  133 

race,  the  collision  of  earth  and  moon,  do  not?  This 
difference  can  be  expressed  by  saying,  the  past  has 
existed,  the  future  has  not  yet  existed.  But  to  what 
does  this  difference  ultimately  go  back?  Not  to  a  logical 
difference,  for  the  past  and  future  are  both  parts  of  one 
series,  and  logically  their  difference  is  solely  one  of  posi- 
tion. No,  the  difference  is  an  ultimate  matter  of  fact. 
The  past  has  been  a  present,  and  any  present  has  a  status^ 
or  can  have  a  status,  which  we  call  perceivable  existence. 

This  status  we  believe  to  be  due  not  merely  to  the 
limits  of  the  human  powers  of  perception,  but  due  to 
the  nature  of  the  real  itself.  We  do  not  perceive  the  future 
because  the  future  as  such  cannot  be  perceived.  Of  course, 
we  have  no  complete  proof  that  minds  do  not  exist  which 
can  perceive  the  future,  but  we  have  as  much  evidence 
for  this  as  we  have  for  most  hypotheses.  As  we  know 
fact,  the  future  is  not  and  never  has  been  fact.  That  is, 
as  far  as  we  know,  even  a  mind  of  far  higher  powers  of 
perception  than  ours  would  have  to  infer  the  future  and 
could  not  literally  observe  or  perceive  it.  Factually  the 
future  is  not  present  to  be  perceived.  Whereas  the  past 
might  be  perceived  by  a  memory  of  a  higher  power  than 
man's  and  in  part  is  (probably  or  at  least  possibly)  per- 
ceived even  by  man.  To  repeat,  that  the  future  "does 
not  yet  exist,"  is  not  due  to  the  limitation  or  the  imper- 
fection of  our  perception  but  to  the  nature  of  the  real. 

This  temporalism  is  forced  upon  us  by  fact  as  we 
know  it,  and  not  by  theory.  For  theory  the  future  is  as 
genuine  a  part  of  existence  as  is  the  present,  and  all 
time  is  logically  present.  That  is,  our  earlier  definition 
of  existence,  as  the  complete  explanation  of  fact,  still 


134  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

stands;  but  it  defines  existence  in  the  broadest  sense  of 
the  word;  for  it  includes  both  the  past  and  the  future 
tense  of  the  verb  to  exist.  Fact,  however,  compels  us 
to  give  the  present  and  past  a  different  existential  status 
from  that  which  we  give  the  future.  Ordinarily  we 
express  this  difference  by  saying  "the  future  does  not 
yet  exist;"  and  in  so  doing  we  give  the  word  exist  a 
narrower  meaning.  As  it  will  be  confusing  to  use  the 
word  exist  in  two  senses,  let  us  retain  the  original  defini- 
tion and  use  for  the  narrower  meaning  the  expression 
"  to  exist  as  fact. " 

The  temporalist's  conception  of  existence,  put  in  more 
concrete  and  pictorial  terms,  is  somewhat  as  follows: 
The  existent  actually  grows  or  buds.  It  is  like  an  on- 
moving  wave.  The  future  is  born  of  the  present  and 
past.  It  is  now  potential,  not  actual.  It  evolves  out 
of  the  present.  Evolution  is  an  ultimate  trait  of  exist- 
ence. 

For  further  study  read: 
Lovejoy,  The  Place  of  the  Time  Problem  in  Contemporary 
Philosophy,  J.  of  Philos.,  Psychol.,  etc.,  1910,  VII. 

For  more  extenstve  study  read: 
Bergson,  Time  and  Free  Will; 
Bergson,  Creative  Evolution. 

J.  Evolution. — The  world  is  a  growing  world,  not  only 
in  the  sense  of  temporalism  but  also  in  the  logical  sense 
aforegiven.  The  future  brings  with  it  not  only  that 
which  could  not  be  observed  but  also  that  which  could 
not  be  deduced,  and  therefore  that  which  could  not  be 
predicted,  or  previously  known.    The  entire  past  can, 


TEMPORALISM  AND  EVOLUTION  I35 

theoretically,  be  known  by  inference  and  by  memory; 
but  the  future  can  be  known  by  inference  only  in  part. 
Logically  there  is  no  reason  why  the  world  should  not 
be  a  continued  repetition  of  the  elements,  or  ultimate 
particulars,  which  make  up  the  past,  either  in  new  com- 
binations or  in  the  same  combinations,  as  the  one  play 
may  be  acted  at  a  theatre  on  many  successive  days. 
But,  as  far  as  we  know,  the  world  is  not  such.  New 
things,  new  events,  and  perhaps  even  new  elementary 
constituents  of  these  things  and  events,  are  potentially 
in  the  present.  This  fundamental  newness,  and  the 
resulting  impossibility  of  knowing  the  future  fully  may 
be  called  freedom  or  spontaneity,  or  better,  creative 
evolution.  Rigorously  defined,  creative  evolution  is  the 
truth  that  some  particular  existential  propositions  related 
to  future  instants  are  not  so  related  to  past  instants  and 
that  these  propositions  are  neither  deducible  from  uni- 
versal or  from  the  past,  nor  knowable  beforehand  in  any 
other  way.^ 

For  further  study  read: 
Woodbridge,  Evolution,  Philos.  Review,  1912,  2i. 

For  more  extensive  study  read: 
Bergson,  Creative  Evolution. 

1  To  some  readers  this  conclusion  may  seem  to  conflict  with  my  defini- 
tion of  the  world  as  the  complete  explanation  of  fact;  but  I  do  not  think 
that  it  does.  It  shows,  of  course,  that  the  world  is  to  a  certain  extent 
unknowable  at  the  present  time.  The  facts  force  us  to  infer  as  their 
complete  explanation  an  evolving  world;  since  they  require  for  their 
complete  explanation  ultimate  particular  propositions.  That  is,  the  at 
present  unknowable  part  of  the  world  is  assumed  by  us  to  be  an  evolving 
existent  because  only  this  general  assumption  explains  the  facts  we  do 
know. 


CHAPTER  Xm 

THE  LOGICAL  STRATA  OF  REALITY 

I.  Introdtiction. — In  the  preceding  chapter  we  studied 
the  general  notion  of  evolution,  finding  spontaneity  or 
creative  transformation  a  prominent  characteristic.  We 
have  now  to  study  a  further  characteristic  which  many 
scientists  would  single  out  as  the  most  prominent  feature 
of  evolution,  namely,  its  historical  continuity,  or,  more 
precisely,  its  logical  continuity.  It  will  be  recalled  that 
by  logical  continuity  is  meant  the  opposite  of  spontaneity. 
In  other  words,  the  logically  continuous  can  be  deduced 
from  the  historically  antecedent.  The  clearest  examples 
of  such  continuity  are  successive  configurations  of  purely 
mechanical  systems.  Thus  the  successive  positions  of 
the  planets  of  our  solar  system  can  be  deduced  from  the 
previous  configurations  of  this  system. 

If  we  emphasize  this  characteristic  of  evolution  we 
see  in  the  new  thing  or  event  the  logical  consequent  of 
its  antecedents  and  we  are  led  to  maintain  that  the  chief 
business  of  the  student  of  evolution  is  to  discover  in  each 
stage  of  history  the  sufl&cient  reason  for  the  following 
stage.  To  such  a  student  evolution  does  not  mean  the 
arising  of  the  new  but  the  continuation  of  the  old.  Let 
us  take  a  concrete  and  familiar  example.  The  evolution 
of  life  on  our  planet  will  mean  to  such  a  student  chiefly 
two  things:  first,  the  chemical-physical  continuity  of 

136 


THE  LOGICAL  STRATA  OF  REALITY       137 

the  living  creatures  with  the  inorganic  world  out  of 
which  life  is  believed  to  have  originally  sprung  and  out 
of  which  it  is  constantly  springing  through  the  absorption 
of  heat,  light,  water,  and  the  various  chemical  compounds 
forming  the  food  of  plant  and  of  animal;  second,  the  con- 
tinuity of  structure  between  the  offspring  and  the  parents.* 
According  to  the  first  meaning  which  evolution  has  to 
the  student  of  life,  the  living  creature  is  an  exceedingly 
complicated  chemical-physical  machine  to  be  explained 
by  means  of  the  laws  of  chemical  synthesis.  It  does  not 
present  anything  radically  new  which  would  take  the 
student  of  life  beyond  organic  chemistry  and  other 
branches  of  physical  science  in  order  to  explain;  for  the 
living  thing  is  continuous  with  the  inorganic  world  in 
the  same  fundamental  sense  as  is  a  crystal  or  any  com- 
plicated organic  chemical  compound.  In  short,  life 
could  be  deduced  from  chemistry  and  physics  if  those 
sciences  were  complete.  According  to  the  second  meaning 
which  evolution  has  to  the  student  of  life,  the  living  or- 
ganism is  but  the  result  of  a  new  combination  selected 
out  of  the  Mendelian  characters  of  his  ancestors.  It 
may  owe  the  color  of  its  fur  to  one  grandparent,  and  the 
shape  of  some  particular  member  to  another,  and  so  on 
through  the  total  list  of  its  unit  characters. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  it  is  preeminently  the  business 
of  science  to  discover  this  logical  continuity  in  the 
successive  stages  of  existence;  and  no  doubt  the  logical 
continuity  is  there  ready  to  be  discovered,  so  great  has 
been  the  success  of  science  in  the  past  in  discovering  in- 
stances of  this  continuity  in  almost  every  domain  of 
» C£.  Chapter  XXI. 


138  A  rntST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

reality.  But  this  very  success  can  easily  lead  the  scientist 
to  the  doubtful  conclusion  that  all  elements  of  existence 
are  logically  continuous  with  one  another  and  with  the 
past.  The  purpose  of  the  preceding  chapter  was  to  point 
out  and  to  emphasize  the  logical  discontinuity  of  the 
evolving  existent;  and  the  purpose  of  the  present  chapter 
is  to  point  out  the  relation  between  this  logically  dis- 
continuous and  the  logically  continuous  sought  for  and 
in  part  discovered  by  science. 

2.  Logical  continuity  and  discontinuity  in  reality. — It 
would  take  us  quite  beyond  general  metaphysics  and 
into  the  detailed  results  of  the  special  sciences  if  we 
sought  out  all  the  fields  and  levels  of  logical  continuity. 
Some  instances  of  continuity,  however,  are  both  promi- 
nent and  familiar,  and  it  will  fulfil  our  purpose  if  we 
keep  to  them.  Every  student  of  physics  is  aware  of  the 
wonderful  role  played  by  applied  mathematics  in  this 
science,  that  is  to  say,  the  remarkable  extent  to  which 
many  physical  theories  can  be  deduced  mathematically 
from  postulates.  This  is  true  not  only  in  the  narrow  field 
of  mechanics  which  is  strictly  only  a  branch  of  mathemat- 
ical science  but  also  in  the  fields  of  such  non-mechanical 
energies  as  light,  heat,  and  electricity.  Yet  even  in 
physics  where  logical  continuity  is  apparent,  discon- 
tinuity also  is  apparent;  for  the  hopes  entertained  by 
earlier  generations  of  making  all  of  physics  dedudble 
from  mechanics  seem  now  imgrounded.  But  even  if 
physical  science  could  be  reduced  to  mechanics,  this  would 
not  eliminate  the  presence  of  discontinuous  elements, 
rather  it  would  make  their  presence  more  evident.  The 
facts  which  the  physicist  studies  in  his  laboratory  and 


THE  LOGICAL  STRATA  OF  REALITY  1 39 

upon  which  all  his  theories  depend  for  their  verification 
are  radically  unlike  one  another  and  clearly  different 
from  the  terms  of  the  theories  by  which  he  explains  these 
facts.  For  example,  he  may  trace  a  logical  continuity 
between  undulations  in  the  ether  and  the  properties  of 
the  light  which  he  observes.  Yet  light  as  observed  is  not 
an  undulation;  it  is  just  light.  Heat  again,  the  heat  with 
which  he  is  actually  experimenting,  the  heat  phenomena 
by  which  he  actually  verifies  his  hypotheses  may  be 
logically  continuous  in  many  of  its  aspects  with  the 
mathematical  postulates  and  hypothetical  entities  which 
serve  to  explain  it;  but  on  the  other  hand  it  is  evidently 
unlike  them.  So  decidedly  is  this  the  case  that  even 
physicists  of  renown  differ  radically  regarding  the  exis- 
tential status  of  these  postulates  and  entities;  and  all 
would  admit  that  we  are  far  nearer  certainty  in  asserting 
the  existence  of  light  than  we  are  in  asserting  the  existence 
of  the  ether  or  of  undulations  in  the  ether;  and  again  that 
we  are  certain  of  the  existence  of  electricity,  whereas 
our  assertion  that  the  electrons  exist  is  at  best  only 
highly  probable. 

A  similar  situation  meets  us  in  chemistry.  Through 
the  atomic  and  molecular  hypothesis  and  through  the 
discovery  of  the  elements  we  can  trace  the  chemical 
continuity  between  substances  before  and  after  chemical 
reactions.  Yet  how  utterly  unlike  these  chemical  com- 
povmds  are!  One  may  be  a  high  explosive,  a  dangerous 
poison,  a  transparent  liquid,  a  red  powder,  a  highly 
volatile  oil,  or  a  substance  with  a  remarkable  list  of 
chemical  afl&nities  for  other  substances;  whereas  the 
other  may  have  quite  an  opposite  character.    Of  course, 


I40  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

the  extent  to  which  such  traits  may  some  day  reveal  far 
more  logical  continuity  is  to  be  learned  only  by  further 
research;  but  from  past  experience  it  is  probable  that 
with  an  increased  knowledge  of  continuity  we  shall 
still  have  the  discontinuous  facts  of  our  present  per- 
ception and  even  additional  ones  revealed  to  us  by  more 
delicate  experiments  and  instrumental  devices.^ 

A  similar  truth  is  found  when  we  examine  the  bio- 
logical and  the  psychological.  With  increasing  com- 
plexity of  parts  and  structure  the  animal  world  reveals 
widely  different  and  novel  characters.  Even  should  it 
some  day  be  possible  to  work  out  in  utmost  detaU,  let 
us  say  in  terms  of  the  inheritance  of  unit  characters 
through  a  continuous  germplasm,  the  continuity  of 
characters  from  generation  to  generation;  still  we  shall 
not  get  rid  of  spontaneity,  or  creative  evolution,  for 
each  of  these  unit  characters  has  its  date  of  first  appear- 
ance in  the  history  of  the  given  race.  In  such  cases,  no 
doubt,  the  origin  of  the  trait  may  be  in  part  chemically 
continuous  with  its  antecedents  whatever  they  may  have 
been,  but  to  show  this  would  only  bring  our  problem 
back  again  to  the  discontinuity  within  chemistry  and 
physics. 

In  the  case  of  consciousness  much  ingenuity  has  been 
at  work  to  get  rid  of  the  evident  discontinuity  in  the 
known  facts  of  the  origin  and  development  of  mental 
life.  And  however  correct  the  resulting  theories  may  be 
in  getting  rid  of  part  of  the  discontinuity,  the  remaining 
discontinuity  does  not  become  less  evident.  Some  the- 
ories would  ascribe  even  to  the  chemical  atom  and  nowa- 
*  Cf .  Chapter  XX. 


THE  LOGICAL  STRATA  OF  REALITY       I4I 

days  would  have  to  ascribe  to  the  electron  and  the  ether 
some  sort  of  consciousness;  whereas  facts  apart  from 
theory  suggest  that  consciousness  is  a  relatively  recent 
character  in  the  earth's  history.  Still,  whether  conscious- 
ness is  present  only  in  the  higher  animals  or  not,  every 
adherent  of  complete  continuity  faces  the  same  difficulty. 
Himian  consciousness  as  we  know  it,  did  not  always 
exist;  and  when  it  arose  there  was  a  genuine  creative, 
or  spontaneous  evolution,  no  matter  to  what  extent 
elements  of  continuity  can  be  pointed  out  between  the 
higher  and  the  lower,  the  recent  and  the  andent  mental 
Ufe. 

Of  course,  all  the  foregoing  arguments,  as  well  as  the 
arguments  in  the  preceding  chapters,  are  based  upon  facts 
as  we  now  know  them,  not  upon  facts  which  are  as  yet 
imrevealed  to  man.  The  objector  has  the  right  therefore 
to  question  them  and  to  reply,  "Further  knowledge  of 
facts  may  ultimately  eliminate  discontinuity."  That  is, 
he  has  the  right  to  do  so  if  he  is  merely  pointing  out  that 
science  in  general  is  a  tentative  search  for  information; 
but  he  has  not  the  right,  without  far  more  in  the  way  of 
fact  to  bring  to  his  support  than  he  now  begins  to  have, 
to  urge  us  to  adopt  the  metaphysics  of  complete  evolu- 
tionary continuity. 

Continuity,  however,  we  certainly  find,  even  though 
not  complete  continuity.  To  give  a  summary  account 
of  this  side  of  reality  is  but  to  tell  of  one  scientific  triumph 
after  another.  The  discoveries  of  recent  years  have 
brought  us  hope  that  we  shall  be  able  some  day  to  explain 
fully  the  periodic  law  in  chemistry,  and  every  year  is 
bringing  new  information  of  chemical  and  physical  con- 


142  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

tinuity  in  the  phenomena  of  life.  Thus  chemistry  and 
biology,  the  most  empirical  of  the  sciences,  promise  to 
become  in  part  deductive.  Indeed  in  every  field  of 
science  we  are  taught  not  only  that  facts  seem  more  and 
more  intimately  connected  but  also  that  they  are  re- 
vealing why  they  are  interconnected. 

J.  The  logical  strata  of  reality. — The  result  is  that  the 
world  appears  to  have  a  distinct  metaphysical  structure 
made  up  of  strata,  or  levels  each  of  which  is  logically 
continuous.  The  basic  stratum  is  the  logical  and  the 
mathematical,  for  nowhere  in  reality  do  we  get  beyond  the 
realm  of  logical  and  of  mathematical  law.  It  would  not 
even  be  an  exaggeration  to  say,  changing  the  figure  of 
speech,  that  reaUty  has  a  skeleton  made  up  of  the  terms 
and  relations  studied  in  logic  and  mathematical  science. 
On  this  account  it  is  the  ideal  of  science  to  reduce  every 
problem  that  can  be  so  reduced  to  a  mathematical  prob- 
lem. 

Above  the  mathematical  and  almost  as  extensive  as 
the  mathematical  is  the  level  of  the  physical.  It  may 
even  be  that  every  non-physical  part  of  the  existent 
world  has  its  physical  substructure.  Otherwise  and 
more  rigorously  expressed,  it  may  be  that  every  non- 
physical  aspect  of  existent  things  is  in  one  to  one  corre- 
spondence with  a  physical  aspect.  For  example,  we  are 
taught  that  the  different  colors  correspond  to  different 
undulations  of  the  ether,  that  each  sound  has  its  correlate 
in  terms  of  air  vibrations.  Further,  it  is  believed  that  all 
the  asp>ects  of  things  which  we  call  their  chemical  prop- 
erties have  likewise  physical  correlates,  namely  electrons 
and  their  properties.   So  too,  it  is  widely  believed  that  all 


THE  LOGICAL  STRATA  OF  REALITY  143 

physiological  phenomena  have  chemical-phjrsical  corre- 
lates and  finally  that  all  mental  phenomena  have  in 
their  turn  physiological  and  so  ultimately  physical  cor- 
relates, though  some  scientists  vigorously  dispute  this. 

Above  the  physical  stratum  lies  the  chemical  and- 
above  the  chemical  the  vital  and  above  the  vital  the 
mental.  Regarding  each  of  these  strata  the  same  ques- 
tion arises,  that  is,  how  far  is  there  a  one  to  one  correspond- 
ence between  the  terms  of  the  higher  stratum  and  the  terms 
of  the  stratum  immediately  below?  This  is  one  of  the 
most  important  problems  in  all  metaphysics.  In  general, 
the  working  hypothesis  of  science  is  and  has  been  that 
there  is  this  one  to  one  correspondence  between  the 
discontinuous  and  the  continuous;  but  whether  or  not 
the  hypothesis  is  true,  the  facts  alone  can  decide.  So 
far  the  facts  have  greatly  favored  the  hypothesis.  But 
it  is  an  open  question  whether  or  not  they  do  so  always. 

Further,  each  of  these  logical  strata  can  itself  be 
analyzed  into  substrata;  and  so  the  problem  of  the 
logical  levels  of  reality  is  a  very  complicated  one,  re- 
quiring for  its  careful  study  at  least  a  thorough  ele- 
mentary knowledge  of  the  sciences  to  whose  field  the 
strata  belong.  But  for  our  present  purpose  the  general 
picture  of  the  successive  logical  levels  is  sufficient. 

To  siun  up:  the  picture  of  reality  just  outlined  is 
logically  built  up  of  strata.  The  logical  and  mathemat- 
ical are  fundamental  and  universal.  The  physical  comes 
next  and  though  less  extensive  is  still  practically,  if  not 
quite,  universal.  Then  comes  the  chemical,  very  ex- 
tensive but  by  no  means  imiversal.  Next  comes  the 
biological,  extensive  but  vastly  less  extensive  than  the 


144  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

chemical.  Finally,  comes  the  mental  and  especially  the 
human  and  the  social,  far  less  extensive.  Thus  to  under- 
stand man  we  have  to  know  mathematics,  physics, 
chemistry,  biology,  psychology,  for  all  these  levels  are 
in  his  constitution;  whereas  to  understand  the  sun, 
whose  heat  and  hght  make  human  life  possible,  we  can 
quite  ignore  biology,  psychology,  and  all  that  is  pecu- 
liarly human  and  social. 

Similarly,  if  we  study  the  history  of  the  solar  system  we 
behold  these  same  logical  strata  in  an  historical  order. 
In  the  very  hottest  stars  it  may  be  true  that  many  of 
the  chemical  elements  known  on  earth  have  not  yet 
arisen;  and  so  it  may  be  that  if  the  sun  was  ever  a  far 
hotter  star  it  lacked  chemical  elements  it  now  possesses. 
At  any  rate  it  lacks  most  of  the  chemical  molecules 
we  know  on  the  earth.  These  molecules  must  have 
arisen  in  the  course  of  the  earth's  history  as  it  passed 
from  a  molten  condition  to  its  present  condition.  As 
we  go  back  in  our  research  to  the  earliest  geological  ages, 
all  traces  of  life  disappear  and  the  earth  seems  to  have 
been  constituted  solely  of  the  chemical  and  physical. 
Gradually  more  and  more  complicated  forms  of  life 
appeared  imtil  man  appeared  and  finally  after  man  there 
have  appeared  his  social  and  civilized  life  and  its  achieve- 
ments. 

4.  The  logical  dependence  of  the  sciences  upon  one 
another. — We  have  seen  that  the  various  sciences  are 
working  out  distinct  logical  levels,  or  strata  of  reality. 
These  strata  are  logically  prior  to  one  another  and  this 
accounts  for  the  evident  logical  independence  of  some 
parts  of  science  upon  other  parts.    In  general,  logic 


THE   LOGICAL  STRATA  OF  REALITY  1 45 

and  mathematics,  including  mechanics,  are  logically  prior 
to  ail  other  sciences.  Mechanics  is  independent  of 
chemistry,  but  chemistry  presupposes  mechanics.  Be- 
tween physics  and  chemistry  there  is  no  doubt  a  more 
complicated  relation;  but  parts  of  physics  are  logically 
prior  to  parts  of  chemistry.  Chemistry  and  physics  are 
logically  prior  to  biology,  and  biology  to  psychology.  A 
more  suggestive  way  of  expressing  this  is  to  say,  a  physic- 
ist must  be  a  mathematician,  though  a  man  can  be  an 
eminent  mathematician  and  be  ignorant  of  physics  and 
chemistry.  The  physiologist  must  be  a  student  of 
inorganic  chemistry,  but  the  inorganic  chemist  may  be 
ignorant  of  physiology.  So  finally  the  general  psycholo- 
gist must  be  a  student  of  biology,  but  many  a  student 
of  biology  may  succeed  in  his  science  without  knowledge 
of  psychology. 

5.  The  passage  from  simplicity  to  complexity  in  evo- 
lution,— Our  results  in  this  and  preceding  chapters  give 
us  the  information  needed  to  correct  the  popular  error 
that  in  evolution  the  total  existent  entity  passes  abso- 
lutely from  a  condition  of  simphcity  to  that  of  complex- 
ity. Such  a  statement  is  true  only  relatively.  In  certain 
respects  the  adult  man  is  more  complex  than  the  child, 
the  ox  is  more  complex  than  an  amoeba,  and  the  earth 
than  the  sun.  But  the  general  principle  of  discontinuity 
forbids  us  to  infer  without  further  evidence  that  such 
is  absolutely  the  case.  A  drop  of  water  appears  to  us 
far  less  complex  than  an  amoeba  solely  because  we  are 
thinking  in  terms  of  chemistry.  Chemically  it  is  far  less 
complex;  but  could  we  know  all  its  as  yet  unknown  discon- 
tinuous properties,  we  might  find  both  objects  infinitely 


146  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

complex.  Not  that  we  know  that  we  should  so  find  them, 
but  that  such  a  nature  is  suggested  by  the  entities  which 
we  can  study  in  detail.  For  example,  a  man  as  seen 
some  miles  away  is  a  mere  homogeneous,  black  speck; 
and  could  we  never  see  him  near  by,  we  might  think  him 
a  quite  simple  or  atomic  entity.  Again,  an  ovum,  rela- 
tively simple  to  our  highest  power  microscopes,  we  know 
to  be  a  most  complicated  chemical  and  physical  machine. 
Hence  what  might  even  an  electron  prove  to  be,  could 
we  examine  it  as  readily  as  we  do  an  ovum,  a  human 
body,  or  the  earth! 

Another  popular  error  too  should  be  corrected.  We 
often  think  of  the  universe  itself  evolving  and  passing 
from  a  simpler  to  a  more  complex  constitution;  but  this 
again  does  not  follow;  for  it  may  be  that  such  a  thought 
is  comparing  infinite  complexity  with  infinite  complexity. 
The  only  justifiable  point  that  can  be  made  is  that  the 
older  the  universe  becomes,  the  richer  in  history  it  be- 
comes also.  But  this  does  not  mean  that  the  universe 
grew  from  simple  chaos  as  the  ancients  believed,  or  that 
it  ever  will  pass  into  such  a  chaos.  We  shall  have  rather 
to  confess  our  ignorance  of  such  things,  claiming  only 
that  simplicity  in  one  respect  does  not  necessarily  mean 
simplicity  in  other  respects,  that  simplicity  in  the  log- 
ically continuous  does  not  mean  necessarily  absolute 
simplicity. 

Finally,  we  shall  have  to  confess  our  ignorance  as  to 
what  objects  best  represent  the  general  character  of  the 
imiverse.  On  the  one  hand  is  a  tendency  to  regard 
the  mechanically  simplest  as  the  best  representative 
and  so  to  picture  the  world  as  a  vast  machine.    On  the 


THE  LOGICAL  STRATA  OF  REALITY  147 

Other  hand  is  a  tendency  to  find  in  man  and  the  society 
of  men,  which  seem  to  us  the  most  complex  types  of 
existence,  the  most  enlightening  analogy  with  the  uni- 
verse. But  we  have  no  ground  for  either  analogy.  The 
evidence  is  lacking  which  would  enable  us  to  point  to  this 
or  that  thing  and  to  say  this  thing  is  the  goal  of  existence 
or  that  thing  is  absolutely  more  complex  than  this  thing, 
or  again  to  say  this  thing  is  more  thoroughly  represent- 
ative of  reality,  or  that  thing  is  negligible  in  our  account 
of  reality.  On  the  contrary  each  thing  is,  as  far  as  we 
know,  representative  of  reality,  each  thing  is  a  goal  of 
existence,  and  each  thing  may  be  in  its  total  nature  as 
complex  as  anything  else. 

All  this,  however,  must  not  be  misunderstood.  It 
does  not  mean  that  there  are  not  genuine  values  in 
reality  or  that  we  should  not  value  one  thing  more 
highly  than  another.  Nor  again  does  it  mean  that  things 
which  science  finds  simpler  or  more  complex  are  not 
truly  so  in  those  respects  which  are  imder  study  by  the 
scientist.  It  means  rather  that  a  world  which  has  its 
logical  strata  and  within  these  logical  strata  its  logical 
continuity,  has  also  probably  everywhere  its  logical 
discontinuity  and  possibly  everywhere  its  infinite  com- 
plexity. 

6.  Conclusion. — ^The  picture  of  reaUty  which  we  now 
have  before  us  may  be  described  thus:  Looked  at  from 
the  standpoint  of  logical  analysis,  reality  reveals  many 
distinct  logical  strata  which  give  its  parts  considerable 
logical  continuity  and  which  make  several  of  the  sciences 
logically  prior  to  one  another  and  so  make  them  form 
the  familiar  logical  hierarchy.   At  the  same  time,  logical 


148  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

discontinuity  between  these  strata  is  most  conspicuous. 
Though  science  is  constantly  discovering  further  or 
hidden  continuity  and  thereby  suggests  that  no  discon- 
tinuity is  ultimate,  yet  the  facts  as  we  perceive  them 
seem  to  discourage  forever  the  hope  that  discontinuity 
can  be  eliminated. 

From  this  same  point  of  view  reality  is  not  only  dis- 
continuous at  any  one  time,  but  it  is  discontinuous  also 
in  its  history.  The  new,  or  logically  discontinuous,  is 
constantly  arising;  and  it  would  seem  that  genuine 
creative  evolution  is  the  story  of  each  thing  that  exists, 
giving  a  picture  similar  to  that  given  by  the  growing 
and  living  organisms. 

Looked  at  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  simplicity  and 
complexity  of  structure,  that  is,  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  number  of  constituting  terms  and  relations,  reality 
suggests  indefinite  complexity.  Of  course,  further  facts 
alone  can  enable  us  to  ascertain  whether  or  not  all  known 
entities  are  complex;  yet  the  facts  already  observed  are 
revealing  to  us  more  and  more  complexity,  and  are  con- 
sequently suggesting  indefinite  complexity. 

Looked  at  from  the  several  standpoints  we  have  taken 
in  preceding  chapters,  reality  is  a  system  of  universal 
laws  and  particular  entities.  The  universal  laws  give  it 
its  causal  system;  but  the  existential  particular  entity 
always  portrays  properties  which  cannot  be  fully  deduced 
from  causal  law.  This  makes  the  interaction  between 
particular  entity  and  particular  entity  logically  discon- 
tinuous in  its  results.  In  short,  causation  and  evolution 
actually  produce;  they  bring  into  being  the  new.  Return- 
ing to  the  language  of  logic  we  may  then  conclude:  In 


THE  LOGICAL  STRATA  OF  REALITY       149 

pari  the  existent  is  logically  contintwus  and  lends  itself  to 
deduction  from  universals;  in  part,  perhaps  vastly  the 
greater  part,  the  existent  cannot  he  discovered  except  by 
actual  perception:  and  therefore  in  part  the  existent  can  he 
explained  hy  universals  and  in  part  it  can  he  explained  only 
in  terms  of  the  actual  particulars  revealed  to  perception. 
Thus  each  existential  entity  seems  both  a  creature  of  causal 
law  and  a  centre  of  spontaneous,  or  creative  evolution} 

1  The  student's  attention  should  be  called  to  an  important  hypothesis 
which  seems  to  contradict  the  results  we  have  here  reached  and  to  imply 
a  logical  continuity  throughout  existence.  This  hypothesis  can  be  best 
studied  in  the  essay  by  Holt,  in  "The  New  Realism,"  New  York,  191 2, 
and  in  the  apf>endices  by  Holt  and  Montague.  I  do  not  believe  myself 
that  Holt's  hypothesis  implies  a  world  of  complete  logical  continuity. 


CHAPTER  XIV 


SUPERNATURALISM 


1.  Introdtiction. — The  four  remaining  chapters  of  this 
part  will  be  given  to  a  brief  study  of  four  metaphysical 
hypotheses  which  during  centuries  past  have  played  most 
important  roles  in  European  thought.  These  hypotheses 
are  supernaturalism,  the  substance  hypothesis,  idealism, 
and  criticism.  Supernaturalism  teaches  that  beyond  the 
world  there  is  a  creator  and  sustainer  of  the  world,  God. 
The  substance  hypothesis  maintains  that  the  world  is 
constituted  ultimately  of  substances  and  that  all  existents 
are  either  substances  or  the  predicates  of  substances. 
Idealism  asserts  that  all  facts  are  mental  and  that  the 
universe  is  solely  the  experience  of  one  or  many  minds. 
Criticism  maintains  that  the  nature  of  knowledge  is 
fundamental  to  the  nature  of  reality.  Let  us  turn  im- 
mediately to  the  study  of  the  first. 

2.  Supernaturalism. — Supernaturalism  maintains  that 
the  facts  can  be  explained  only  in  part  by  the  world  of 
which  they  are  members  and  that  the  ultimate  explana- 
tion of  all  existence  lies  logically  outside  the  world  system. 
The  world  has  a  first  cause,  or  creator,  God;  and  this 
cause  is  not  itself  part  of  the  world.  God  transcends  the 
world.  He  is  beyond  the  world,  but  not  beyond  in  a 
spatial  sense  (although  the  latter  was  the  ancient  belief) ; 
because  space  itself  belongs  to  the  world  system.    He  is 

ISO 


SUPERNATURALISM  X5t 

beyond  the  world,  but  not  in  a  temporal  sense  (although 
the  latter  again  has  been  and  is  held  by  most  people) ;  for 
time  likewise  belongs  to  the  world  system.  In  other 
words,  God  does  not  create  and  rule  the  world  from  some 
far  away  point  in  space,  nor  did  He  create  the  world  at 
some  date  in  time.  Rather  we  have  to  say.  He  created 
both  space  and  time  themselves;  and  He  transcends  them 
both. 

Did  He  Hve  in  space  or  did  He  act  in  time,  we  should 
have  to  infer  that  He  is  part  of  the  world  and  possibly  a 
finite  part.  If  He  is  a  finite  part  of  the  world,  then  it 
would  be  no  longer  true  that  the  full  explanation  of  the 
existent  world  carries  us  logically  beyond  the  world.  The 
problem  of  His  existence  and  of  His  nature  is  no  longer 
metaphysical  or  logically  fundamental,  but  the  same  as 
many  another  special  problem  in  the  sciences.  It  would 
be  of  the  same  order  as  ascertaining  whether  this  or  that 
sidereal  body  exists  or  not,  or  as  ascertaining  the  origin 
and  nature  of  the  comets  or  the  origin  and  nature  of 
life.  In  short,  supematuralism  asserts  a  complement  to 
science,  a  second  system  of  knowledge,  a  theology,  which, 
it  believes,  reveals  to  us  the  fundamental  explanation  of 
all  existence. 

Opposed  to  supematuralism  stands  a  contradictory 
doctrine,  naturalism,  which  teaches  that  the  world  is 
ultimate  and  that  the  facts  are  fuUy  explicable  in  terms 
of  the  world.  If  there  be  a  God,  He  is  the  universe,  or  the 
substance  of  things,  or  thirdly  some  superhuman  finite 
being;  and  therefore  not  the  creator  of,  but  a  part  of  the 
world. 

In  the  history  of  European  thought  the  two  rival  tend- 


152  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

encies,  supernaturalism  and  naturalism,  have  competed 
with  one  another  from  the  days  of  the  Sixth  Century 
B.  C.  in  Greece  to  our  own  time;  and  it  is  this  intellectual 
strife  that  has  been  improperly  called  the  warfare  between 
religion  and  science.  In  general,  the  Greco-Roman  and 
the  medieval  thinkers  tended  to  be  supernaturaUsts,  and 
modern  scientists,  beginning  with  the  Renascence  and 
Reformation  (Fifteenth  and  Sixteenth  Centuries),  have 
tended  to  be  naturalists. 

For  further  study  read: 
Moore,  The  Christian  Doctrine  of  God,  in  Lux  Mundi,  edited 

by  Charles  Gore; 
Lodge,  The  Christian  Idea  of  God,  Hibhert  Journal,  1910-11,  g; 
Consult  for  further  literature,  art.   "Theism,"  Encyclopedia 

Brittanica,  nth  ed. 

J.  Origin  of  supernaturalism. — Originally  men  were 
both  naturahsts  and  supernaturaUsts,  or  more  precisely 
neither,  for  the  issue  had  not  been  raised.  Primitive 
tribes  and  the  ancient  civilized  peoples  explain  the  facts 
of  nature  after  the  analogy  of  human  conduct.  If  any 
object  or  event  is  of  man's  authorship  we  usually  enquire, 
Who  did  it?  What  purpose  had  he  in  doing  it?  How 
was  he  able  to  do  it?  And  when  these  questions  have 
been  answered  we  rest  satisfied,  because  for  our  ordinary 
needs  no  further  explanation  is  required.  The  naive  man 
of  all  ages  and  lands  not  only  finds  such  an  explanation 
of  human  conduct  final  but  also  feels  without  further 
questioning  that  everything  else  is  to  be  explained  in  this 
same  way.  Familiar  with  his  own  deeds,  his  motives  and 
his  powers  and  with  the  deeds,  motives  and  powers  of  his 
fellow  tribesman,  and  grossly  ignorant  of  aU  that  we  to- 


SUPERNATUEALISM  I53 

day  call  science,  how  natural  for  him  to  put  to  everything 
that  he  observes  attentively  or  that  arouses  his  emotions 
the  same  questions  he  would  ask  regarding  his  own  deeds. 
At  one  time  braving  a  storm,  at  another  basking  in  the 
sunlight;  at  one  time  threatened  with  drought  and  famine, 
at  another  bountifully  supplied  with  food  and  drink;  at 
one  time  facing  the  dangers  of  sickness,  of  wild  beasts,  or 
of  war,  at  another  time  being  free  from  these  calamities,  he 
asks:  Who  are  bringing  these  things  to  pass?  What  are 
their  motives?  What  can  we  do  to  keep  their  friendship, 
win  their  good  will,  or  avoid  their  hostility?  How  great 
and  awful  must  appear  to  him  the  powers  of  some  of  these 
agents!  Thus  in  time  nature  seems  peopled  with  gods 
and  demigods  who  constitute  a  realm  far  superior  to 
that  of  man  and  whose  life  and  environment,  compared 
with  his,  are  more  blessed  and  more  wonderful.  As  man's 
experience  and  insight  increase,  the  gods  seem  more  and 
more  unlike  him,  far  wiser  and  more  powerful,  far  more 
righteous  and  more  inscrutable.  Finally,  as  the  world 
seems  to  man  less  and  less  chaotic  and  more  unified,  so 
too  do  the  gods  seem  to  him  either  to  form  a  hierarchy 
with  a  supreme  god  at  its  head,  or  to  merge  into  one  uni- 
versal god.  Moreover,  while  man  is  growing  toward 
monotheism,  he  is  gaining  some  insight  into  the  natural 
causes  of  things;  and  as  a  result,  nature  itself  becomes  a 
realm  more  and  more  distinct  from  the  supernatural, 
until  the  two  realms  stand  over  against  one  another, 
sharply  contrasted.  It  is  with  this  final  stage  only,  that 
we  are  concerned,  where  one  God  alone  is  believed  to  ex- 
ist or  is  at  least  thought  to  be  supreme,  and  to  be  the 
ultimate  author  of  all  existence  and  of  all  moral  law  and 


154  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

religious  custom,  and  where  the  world  of  man  and  of  na- 
ture are  kept  distinct  from  God  their  creator.  At  this 
stage  supematuralism  tends  to  become  a  metaphysics, 
a  theology. 

4.  The  issue  between  naturalism  and  supematuralism. — 
In  an  issue  of  long  standing  it  is  probable  that  right  is  on 
both  sides  and  that  both  parties  can  be  reconciled.  If 
science  is  naturalistic,  it  is  so  for  valid  reasons;  and 
if  religion  is  supernaturalistic,  it  too  is  so  for  valid 
reasons.  The  business  of  science  is  to  explain  certain 
types  of  fact,  which  means,  to  find  their  logical  groimd.  I 
say  "certain  types  of  fact,"  for  some  facts  such  as  values 
we  have  excluded.  Moreover,  if  God  can  be  perceived, 
as  the  mystic  claims,  then  God  also  is  a  fact.  But  if  God 
be  fact,  He  is  not  studied  by  science  in  the  narrow  sense. 
The  facts  of  science  are  those  which  are  popularly  called 
"natural  facts;"  and  of  these  science  seeks,  as  was 
said,  the  logical  ground.  The  question,  then,  becomes 
solely,  why  do  these  logical  groimds  form  a  naturalism 
and  thereby  exclude  supematuralism  from  science?  The 
answer  is  apparent  from  the  results  of  earlier  chapters. 
The  logical  grounds  of  these  facts  do  not  lead  us  to  some 
one  cause  but  to  an  indefinite  nvunber  of  causes.  The 
only  possible  means  by  which  they  could  lead  to  one  cause 
would  be  by  there  being  some  one  proposition  from  which 
all  other  existential  propositions  can  be  deduced;  but 
there  is  no  such  proposition.  In  general,  the  result  of 
scientific  research  is  not  to  give  us  a  system  beyond  the 
■world,  but  to  give  us  the  world.  The  only  result  of  sci- 
.dice  which  resembles  the  supernatural  is  the  hierarchy  of 
universal  existential  propositions  leading  logically  from 


SUPERNATURALISM  1 55 

the  particular  to  the  most  general.  But,  as  far  as  we 
know,  these  most  general  propositions  are  many  in  num- 
ber, and  they  are  such  propositions  as  those  of  mathe- 
matics, as  the  law  of  gravitation,  and  other  highest 
generalizations  of  science.  They  are  neither  one  in  num- 
ber nor  are  they  supernatural. 

Further,  these  causes  or  grounds  of  fact  whether  par- 
ticular or  imiversal  are  logically  ultimate.  They  are 
first  causes.  To  demonstrate,  one  has  to  have  premises, 
and,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  first  or  primitive  prem- 
ises. Logic  can  never  free  us  from  this  necessity.  But 
supematuralism  at  times  seems  to  ask.  Why  are  these 
premises  true?  What  lies  logically  behind  them?  And 
of  course  science  can  only  reply,  "Nothing,  for  they,  or 
some  unknown  similar  propositions,  are  logically  primi- 
tive." Therefore,  God  is  not  the  logical  ground  ol  so  called 
natural  facts,  which  is  another  way  of  saying,  the  exis- 
tential propositions  constituting  the  world  are  a  complete 
logical  system  by  themselves  and  are  not  deducible  from 
the  propositions  of  theology.  But  that  science  is  and 
should  be  naturalistic  does  not  imply  that  supematural- 
ism is  false.  If  they  contradict  one  another  then  indeed 
one  or  the  other  is  false;  but  it  is  not  at  once  evident  that 
they  do  contradict;  for  we  know  that  much  is  true  which 
is  not  science  in  the  narrow  sense,  for  example,  morals 
and  art. 

Let  us  then  consider  briefly  where  supematuralism 
may  have  its  logical  beginning  independent  of  science, 
(a)  In  the  first  place  the  mystic  has  to  be  considered. 
The  mystic  claims  that  he  perceives  God  and  the  super- 
natural, and  therefore  claims  that  God  and  the  super- 


156  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

natural  are  facts.  Now  there  is  no  way  of  proving  the 
mystic  wrong  except  by  getting  facts  which  are  incon- 
sistent with  his  claims.  As  long  as  there  is  no  such  incon- 
sistency apparent,  science  should  not  say  one  word  in 
protest;  for  such  a  protest  would  be  as  blind  as  is  the 
belief  of  him  who  finds  only  marble  in  a  Greek  statue, 
or  only  air  vibrations  in  a  symphony  or  only  nonsense 
in  the  vision  of  the  poet.  If  the  mystic,  or  the  religiously 
minded,  does  indeed  perceive  God  and  the  supernatural, 
then  there  is  another  realm  besides  the  world,  a  realm 
of  a  different  logical  order,  and  the  naturalist  will  have 
to  make  room  for  supernaturalism.  It  is  true,  he  will  not 
have  to  do  so  by  ceasing  to  be  a  naturalist;  but  he  will 
have  to  formulate  his  naturahsm  in  such  a  way  that  it 
does  not  contradict  supernaturalism,  precisely  as  he  has 
to  in  order  not  to  contradict  morality  and  art. 

(b)  In  the  second  place,  the  ultimate  logical  basis  of 
our  explanation  of  the  world,  even  though  logically  ulti- 
mate, is  not  logically  necessary.  Expressed  more  simply, 
the  existent  world  is  not  the  only  logically  possible  world. 
As  far  as  logic  teaches  us  regarding  existence  there  are, 
or  conceivably  there  may  be,  an  infinite  number  of  worlds 
which  would  conform  to  the  principles  of  logic  as  truly 
as  does  the  actual  world.  We  can  go  farther:  the  actual 
world  is  not  the  only  mathematically  possible  world. 
There  might  be  a  world  of  four,  five,  or  n  spatial  dimen- 
sions. There  might  be  a  world  of  two  or  more  time  dimen- 
sions instead  of  the  one  dimension  which  real  time  seems 
to  have.  Finally  we  have  seen  that  the  world  contains 
or  appears  to  contain  everywhere  a  large  element  that  is 
chance,  that  simply  has  to  be  taken  as  logically  ultimate 


SUPERNATURALISM  1 5  7 

and  therefore  inexplicable.  In  short,  the  actual  world 
cannot  be  deduced  from  logic,  mathematics,  mechanics 
or  any  number  of  general  sciences.  Technically  expressed 
it  is  a  contingent,  not  a  necessary  world.  There  is  no 
scientifically  assignable  reason  why  it  should  not  have 
been  a  very  dijBferent  world.  The  most  the  naturalist 
can  say  regarding  such  matters  is,  "This  is  the  world  as 
I  find  it.  Where  the  world  is  inexplicable  there  for  me 
it  is  logically  ultimate,  for  logic  can  take  me  no  farther. 
Thus  my  office  is  to  explain  the  part  of  the  world  which 
is  not  logically  ultimate  in  terms  of  the  parts  which  are 
logically  ultimate." 

Can  the  supematuralist  do  more?  Strictly  speak- 
ing, No.  He  too  has  to  take  the  world  as  he  finds  it. 
He  too  cannot  deduce  the  logically  fundamental  from 
something  that  is  logically  more  fundamental,  for  the 
fundamental  is  ultimate  and  has  no  degrees  of  compar- 
ison. Yet  is  it  not  a  significant  truth  that  the  world  is 
contingent,  that  it  is  only  one  of  many  possible  worlds? 
Of  course  this  question  cannot  be  answered  rigorously 
by  the  supematuralist  until  he  defines  or  knows  precisely 
what  he  means  by  the  words,  "  having  significance." 
However,  all  the  naturalist  has  a  right  to  say  is  that  these 
words  must  not  mean  a  logical  deduction  of  the  world 
from  theology.  The  philosophers  of  past  ages  made  the 
attempt  again  and  again  and  failed  and  had  to  fail. 
Meanwhile  the  religious  mind  asks  and  persists  in  asking 
"why  the  world  which  exists?  "  It  persists  that  its  ques- 
tion is  a  genuine  one  and  that  religious  insight  can  dis- 
cover the  answer  or  that  to  religious  insight  the  answer 
can  be  revealed.    It  claims  to  perceive  fact,  and  I  see  no 


158  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

just  protest  which  naturalism  can  make  to  this  claim  pro- 
vided no  facts  are  found  which  contradict  the  claim. 

Finally,  the  supernaturalist  has  not  been  the  only  one 
to  make  mistakes.  If  the  supernaturaHst  has  held  opin- 
ions contradictory  to  verified  science,  an  equally  serious 
fault  can  be  charged  against  many  a  naturalist,  for  he 
has  often  been  blind  to  genuine  facts.  That  this  world 
is  a  world  in  which  men  perceive  moral  truths  and  ar- 
tistic truths,  in  which  they  do  struggle  for  the  ideal  and 
in  which  to  some  extent  they  are  able  to  realize  that 
ideal  is  indubitable  truth.  How  much  more  is  true  can  be 
learned  only  by  further  insight,  not  by  deductions  from 
our  present  blindness.  To  say  all  this  is  not  to  open  the 
gates  wide  to  every  form  of  obscurantism.  Rather  it  is 
to  maintain  that  the  world  as  conceived  by  science  is  and 
should  be  a  naturalistic  world,  even  though  it  admits 
that  the  actual  world  may  be  also  supematuralistic. 
It  provides  for  both  separately  and  conjointly  the  same 
ultimate  tests  of  validity,  logical  consistency  and  per- 
ceived truth.  Duty  compels  the  metaphysician  to  admit 
all  this,  for  metaphysics  to-day  is  naturalistic  and  should 
be  so;  and  especially  does  duty  bid  the  metaphysician 
to  admit  this,  before  he  proceeds  to  show  the  failure  of 
certain  older  metaphysical  doctrines  derived  from  the- 
ology and  urged  in  the  defense  of  the  supernatural. 

To  put  my  point  positively  and  definitely,  the  meta- 
physician finds  that  the  actual  status  quo  of  science  to-day 
is  naturalistic.  But  at  the  same  time  he  has  to  admit  in 
fairness  that  it  belongs  to  man's  religious  insight  and  to 
the  philosopher  of  religion  to  answer  the  two  further  ques- 
tions :   First,  does  man's  religion  postulate  a  supernatural 


SUPERNATURALISM  159 

world;  is  religion  essentially  supematuralistic?  Second, 
if  religion  is  supematuralistic,  how  can  this  belief  in  a 
supernatural  world  be  so  formulated  that  it  does  not  con- 
tradict the  naturalism  of  science?  These  two  questions 
constitute  the  fundamental  and  the  most  pressing  phil- 
osophical problems  which  to-day  face  the  theologian 
and  the  philosopher  of  religion.  If  these  thinkers  face 
them  fairly,  no  doubt  they  will  find  a  solution;  but  to 
attempt  to  solve  these  problems  by  first  demanding  of 
science  to  surrender  her  naturalism  is  to  ask  history  to 
move  backward.  Moreover,  both  the  theologian  and 
the  philosopher  of  religion  should  not  forget  that  nat- 
uralism itself  has  its  religion  and  moral  idealism;  and  that 
many  naturalists  claim  that  supematuralism  is  not 
essential  either  to  the  validity  of  the  ideal  or  to  man's 
enthusiasm  for  the  ideal.  To  repeat,  the  supematural- 
istic thinker  faces  a  twofold  task:  first,  to  show  the  ne- 
cessity of  supematuralism,  and  second,  to  reconcile  it 
with  the  naturalism  of  modern  science. 

For  fukther  study  read: 
Santayana,  Life  of  Reason,  HI,  Reason  in  Religion; 
Otto,  R.,  Naturalism  and  Religion,  1907; 
Ward,  J.,  The  Realm  of  Ends,  or  Pluralism  and  Theism; 
Wenley,  R.  M.,  Modem  Thought  and  the  Crisis  in  Belief; 
Balfour,  A.  J.,  The  Foundations  of  Belief. 

For  more  extensive  study  read: 
White,  A.  D.,  A  History  of  the  Warfare  of  Science  with  Theology 

in  Christendom; 
Boutroux,  E.,  Science  and  Religion  in  Contemporary  Philosophy; 
James,  Wm,,  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XIV 

THEOLOGY  AS  A  METAPHYSICS 

1.  Introduction. — An  appendix  is  devoted  to  this 
subject  because  of  the  very  great  role  theological  prob- 
lems have  played  in  the  history  of  metaphysical  theory; 
but  I  shall  endeavor  to  deal  with  these  problems  with 
utmost  brevity,  for  I  beheve  they  can  be  studied  to  much 
greater  advantage  in  a  book  on  the  history  of  philosophy 
than  in  a  textbook  on  metaphysics. 

Within  theology  three  major  metaphysical  problems 
have  emerged:  first,  the  proof  of  God's  existence; 
secondly,  the  nature  of  creation;  thirdly,  the  relation 
between  God  and  the  world.  The  historic  proofs  of  the 
existence  of  God  as  world  creator  are  also  three:  first, 
the  ontological  argument;  secondly,  the  cosmological 
argument;  and  thirdly,  the  teleological  argument. 

2.  The  ontological  argument  for  God's  existence. — 
Briefly  stated  the  ontological  argument  runs,  "from  the 
definition  of  God  we  may  infer  His  existence;"  and  the 
counter-argument  retorts,  "no  definition  proves  the  ex- 
istence of  the  term  defined,  for  facts  alone  can  verify  an 
existential  hypothesis."  To  take  up  the  various  forms 
of  the  ontological  argument  and  their  presuppositions 
would  compel  us  to  discuss  again  many  matters  which 
have  been  studied  under  other  headings.  There  is,  how- 
ever, this  common  form  and  presupposition  to  all  the 
arguments.   The  authors  endeavor  to  give  us  an  hypoth- 

i6o 


THEOLOGY  AS  A  METAPHYSICS  l6l 

esis  which  will  not  need  for  its  proof  the  crucial  tests 
which  all  other  existential  scientific  theories  require, 
that  is,  the  observation  of  facts  which  these  theories 
uniquely  explain.  The  method  of  avoiding  this  test  in 
the  ontological  argument  is  so  to  define  God  that  His 
existence  is  given  by  definition.  For  example:  God  is 
"the  most  real"  of  aU  things  and  must  therefore  exist; 
or  God  is  "the  most  perfect"  of  all  beings,  and  did  He 
not  exist  some  other  entity  which  possesses  the  attribute 
of  existence  lacking  in  Him,  would  be  more  perfect,  but 
this  contradicts  the  definition. 

Thus  the  definition  of  God  becomes  more  than  a  mere 
definition,  for  it  includes  not  only  a  definition  but  an 
hypothesis.  Even  though  the  hypothesis  were  true,  to 
make  it  part  of  the  definition  would  be  to  beg  the  ques- 
tion at  issue.  But  the  hypothesis  is  not  true.  The 
hypothesis  is  this,  "some  information  regarding  existence 
can  be  known  to  be  true  without  appealing  to  fact  as 
proof."  Notice  also  that  if  God's  existence  is  a  per- 
ceived truth,  this  objection  remains  valid.  To  know  by 
perception  that  God  exists  is  not  to  know  so  by  analyzing 
logically  the  term  God. 

It  may,  however,  be  maintained  that  the  foregoing 
misinterprets  the  ontological  argument.  It  may  be  said 
"the  ontological  argument  first  defines  God  and  then 
calls  upon  us  to  perceive  that  God  as  thus  defined  exists." 
Probably  this  has  been  the  intent  of  many  who  have 
supported  the  argument.  If  so,  the  question  becomes, 
is  the  definition  of  God  correct  as  a  definition,  and  is  the 
existence  of  God,  as  defined,  self-evident? 

It  is  difficult  to  answer  these  questions  briefly.     In 


l62  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

general  the  tendency  has  been  to  define  God  as  the  logi- 
cally fundamental,  but  this  is  to  make  Him  synonymous 
with  logic,  mathematics,  and  other  fundamental  truths 
of  science.  Or  the  definition  has  made  Him  the  highest 
or  most  universal  entity.  This  again  identifies  Him 
with  logical  principles.  Or  finally  the  definition  has 
made  Him  the  substance  of  the  world;  but  this  leads  to 
a  pure  naturalism  if  there  is  such  a  thing  as  the  substance 
of  the  world,  and  to  a  denial  of  His  existence  if  there  is 
not  such  a  thing. 

For  further  study  read: 
Anselm,  Proslogium,  esp.  Chap.  Ill; 
Descartes,  Discourse  on  Method,  or 
Descartes,  Meditations; 
Kant  (Watson's  Selections  from),  195-210; 
Lotze,  Microcosmus,  Bk.  IX,  Chaps.  IV  and  V; 
Russell,  Philosophy  of  Leibniz,  Chap.  XV. 

J.  The  cosmological  argument  for  God's  existence. — 
This  brings  us  to  the  cosmological  argument,  which  may 
be  stated  briefly  as  follows:  The  facts  we  observe 
daily  are  not  self-explicable  but  require  for  their  expla- 
nation that  fuller  account  of  things  which  the  sciences 
are  endeavoring  to  discover  and  to  formulate.  But  the 
world  of  science  in  turn  requires  an  explanation,  because 
it  is  not  a  logically  necessary  world  but  a  contingent 
world.  There  must  be  then  not  only  a  complete  but  also 
an  absolute  and  necessary  explanation  of  1:he  world.  By 
a  complete  explanation  is  meant  one  that  will  accoimt 
for  the  existent  in  each  and  every  aspect;  and  by  an 
absolute  and  necessary  explanation  is  to  be  understood 
one  that  does  not  itself  require  an  explanation.    £x- 


THEOLOGY  AS  A  METAPHYSICS  163 

pressed  in  terms  of  cause  and  effect,  there  must  be  a  com- 
plete and  absolute  cause  of  all  existence,  a  complete 
cause  to  account  for  each  phase  and  aspect  of  existence, 
and  an  absolute  cause  or  causa  sui  which  is  not  in  turn 
the  effect  of  some  further  cause.  To  this  should  be  added, 
we  are  not  to  think  of  this  ultimate  cause  as  that  which 
once  upon  a  time,  ages  ago,  brought  the  world  into  exist- 
ence, a  first  cause  in  the  sense  of  the  beginning  of  an 
historical  series.  Rather  we  are  to  think  of  it,  as  we 
think  of  the  law  of  gravitation,  the  eternal,  or  ever  present 
factor  by  means  of  which  we  explain  part  of  the  behavior 
of  the  solar  system  and  of  all  other  sidereal  systems. 
The  ultimate  cause  is  always  acting,  always  creating. 
Now  this  ultimate  cause  is,  by  definition,  God. 

The  subject  matter  of  this  argument  we  have  already 
studied.  The  ultimate  logical  explanation  of  existence 
is  the  array  of  logically  primitive  propositions  from  which 
existence  follows  logically.  We  have  seen  that  as  far  as 
we  know  this  array  of  propositions  may  be  even  infinite 
in  niunber.  It  is  true  that  the  world  is  not  a  logically 
necessary  world,  is,  in  other  words,  a  contingent  world; 
but  this  means  only  that  the  world  cannot  be  deduced 
from  the  principles  of  logic  and  of  science.  Even  if  it 
could  be  so  deduced,  that  would  not  prove  God's  exist- 
ence. In  short,  the  error  of  the  cosmological  argument 
is  twofold:  it  confuses  God  with  the  logical  ground  of 
the  world,  which  we  have  seen  He  is  not;  secondly,  it 
believes  that  the  nature  of  this  logical  ground  can  be 
easily  discovered  either  from  logic  or  from  a  few  general 
axioms.  Thus  the  God  of  the  cosmological  argument 
is  not  a  transcendent  cause,  a  supernatural  being.    He 


164  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

is  the  logically  universal  and  logically  primitive  aspect 
of  existence;  and  therefore  He  is  thoroughly  naturalistic. 
Indeed  the  history  of  philosophy  witnesses  over  and  over 
again  to  this  by  the  constant  tendency  to  drift  into 
naturalism  on  the  part  of  those  who  supported  the  cos- 
mological  argument  most  rigorously.  The  most  famous 
example  of  this  tendency  is  the  pantheistic  and  natural- 
istic philosopher  Spinoza. 

For  further  study  read: 
Anselm,  Monologium,  esp.  Chaps.  I-XXXVIII; 
Descartes,  loc.  cit.; 
Locke,  Essay   Concerning   Human  Understanding,    Bk.    IV, 

Chap.  X; 
Russell,  Philosophy  of  Leibniz,  loc.  cit.; 
Kant  (Watson),  210-218; 
Lotze,  loc.  cit.; 
Hume,  Enquiry  Concerning  Human  Understanding,  Sect.  XI. 

4.  The  teleological  argument  for  God's  existence. — ■ 
The  most  familiar  form  of  the  teleological  argument  is 
the  argument  from  evidences  of  design  or  purpose  in 
nature.  Consider  the  earth:  how  wonderfully  adapted 
it  is  to  be  the  home  of  life,  of  plant,  of  beast  and  of  man, 
and  finally  of  society  and  civiUzationl  Consider  the 
wonderful  adaptions  found  in  all  forms  of  life  to  feed  and 
protect  the  individual  and  to  bring  about  the  procreation 
and  preservation  of  the  species!  Surely  we  must  infer 
from  all  such  wonderful  adaptions  of  means  to  ends  the 
workmanship  of  an  infinite  intelligence  planning  what  He 
performs. 

The  errors  in  this  argument  are  many,  (a)  First  there 
is  the  question  of  fact.    Does  nature  reveal  the  plans  of 


THEOLOGY  AS  A  METAPHYSICS         16$ 

a  workman?  Life  is  created  but  it  is  also  ruthlessly 
destroyed.  Some  processes  of  nature  favor  life  and 
higher  adaptations;  other  processes  hamper  the  progress 
of  life  seriously  and  even  fatally,  (b)  Secondly,  even  if 
it  were  true  that  nature  reveals  the  plans  of  a  workman, 
this  would  not  prove  that  a  transcendent  or  supernatural 
God  exists  but  that  there  is  some  superhuman  natural 
agent  at  work  in  this  world,  a  mind  whose  intellect  far 
surpasses  man's  and  whose  means  of  carrying  out  his 
purposes  are  vastly  greater  than  man's.  In  short,  it 
would  prove  that  there  dwells  in  nature  one  or  more 
finite  gods,  related  to  us  somewhat  as  we  are  related  to 
the  lowest  forms  of  life,  (c)  Thirdly,  a  correct  teleology 
does  not  find  in  the  facts  appealed  to  in  the  teleological 
argument  the  plans  of  a  workman,  for  the  teleological 
aspect  of  nature  is  not  analogous  to  human  plans  and 
work.  Man's  plans  are  outside  of  the  things  he  manu- 
factures, are  forced  upon  them  by  his  will  from  without. 
Nature's  plans  are  immanent.  The  acorn  does  not  grow 
into  the  oak  as  lumber  grows  into  a  house,  or  clay  into  a 
statue.  Life  has  come  into  existence  on  this  earth  and 
has  progressed  as  it  has  by  way  of  evolution,  not  by  way 
of  manufacture.  All  this  indicates  that  if  the  teleological 
argument  is  to  be  accepted,  it  must  be  completely  trans- 
formed. The  upholder  of  this  argument  may  indeed  be 
right  in  finding  in  evolution  a  wonderful  and  most  signifi- 
cant aspect  of  reality,  but  he  is  wrong  in  making  it 
comparable  to  human  workmanship. 

For  further  study  read: 
Paulsen,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  145-180; 
Spinoza,  Ethics,  Pt.  I,  Appendix; 


l66  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

Kant  (Watson's  Selections  from),  218-222; 

Lotze,  loc.  cil.; 

Marvin,  Introduction  to  Systematic  Philosophy,  320-328. 

5.  The  nature  oj  creation. — ^By  the  problem  of  the 
nature  of  creation  we  mean  the  theological  and  scholastic 
problem,  whether  God's  intellect  or  His  will  is  funda- 
mental. The  metaphysical  importance  of  this  question 
is  the  radical  difference  between  the  world  conceptions 
which  have  arisen  from  the  different  answers.  If  the 
world  and  the  moral  law  follow  from  God's  intellect, 
then  the  world  is  conceived  purely  as  a  logical  system 
following  from  certain  general  axioms;  for  these  axioms, 
known  to  God,  determine  His  creation.  On  the  other 
hand  if  God's  will  is  supreme,  if  the  world  which  exists 
does  so  simply  because  God  has  chosen  it,  its  origin  is 
inscrutable.  That  is,  the  world  is  now  conceived  as  one 
out  of  many  logically  possible  worlds,  one  chosen  from 
them  by  a  method  defying  logical  explanation.  It  is 
conceived  as  a  world  where  an  inexplicable  agent  rules  as 
well  as  logic,  indeed  where  this  agent  has  even  decided 
that  logic  should  rule.  In  this  its  extreme  form,  the 
doctrine  that  God's  will,  not  his  intellect,  is  the  true  ori- 
gin of  the  world  and  of  the  moral  law  is  a  type  of  roman- 
ticism. In  a  more  moderate  form  it  is  another  way  of 
saying  that  chance  as  well  as  causation  are  required  to 
explain  the  existent. 

For  further  study  read: 
Lotze,  loc.  cit.; 
Consult  Histories  of  Philosophy  on  Thomas  Aquinas  and  Duns 

Scotus; 
Windelband,  History  of  Philosophy,  328-337. 


THEOLOGY  AS  A  METAPHYSICS         167 

6.  The  relation  between  God  and  the  world. — A  number 
of  technical  terms  are  used  to  express  the  different 
views  held  regarding  the  relation  between  God  and  the 
world.  Of  course  these  different  views  often  imply  also 
different  conceptions  of  God. 

Theism  is  the  doctrine  that  God  is  supernatural  and 
usually  also  that  God  is  personal.  His  relation  to  the 
world  is  conceived  as  ultimate,  such  that  all  things  and 
events  are  to  a  greater  or  less  extent  to  be  explained 
directly  as  issuing  from  God.  This  is  the  familiar  doctrine 
of  God's  providence. 

Deism  has  much  the  same  conception  of  God,  but 
denies  any  intimate  relation  between  God  and  the  par- 
ticular existent.  God  created  the  world;  and  whether 
or  not  this  creation  is  conceived  as  purely  timeless  or  as 
in  the  far  distant  past,  the  world,  apart  from  the  original 
act  of  creation,  is  independent  of  God.  As  a  clock- 
maker  might  manufacture  and  wind  a  clock  and  as  after- 
ward it  would  go  for  days  or  weeks  without  further 
attention  from  him,  so  God,  the  perfect  clockmaker, 
created  the  world  and  then  left  it  quite  capable  of  running 
itself.  The  only  sense  in  which  there  can  then  be  a 
divine  providence  is  that  all  parts  and  stages  of  the 
world  were  foreseen  and  predestined  by  God. 

Pantheism  denies  a  supernatural  God.  God  is  either 
the  world,  or  is  the  substance  of  the  world.  Nowadays 
this  doctrine  is  often  expressed  in  the  proposition,  God 
is  immanent  in  the  world.  The  pantheist  may  or  may  not 
hold  that  God  is  personal.  In  any  case  pantheism  is  a 
form  of  naturalism. 

The  finite  God.    Besides  the  foregoing  doctrines  of 


1 68  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

the  relation  between  God  and  the  world  there  is  the  doc- 
trine already  alluded  to,  that  God  is  a  part  of  the  world, 
that  He  is  of  a  far  higher  order  of  spiritual  being  than  man 
but  otherwise  analogous  to  man.  He,  as  man,  is  strug- 
gling in  a  world  which  limits  Him  and  thwarts  His  will. 
This  doctrine  too  is  a  naturalism. 

Atheism.  To  this  list  should  be  added  the  name 
atheism.  This  doctrine  is  a  naturalism,  denying  the 
existence  not  only  of  a  transcendent  God  but  also  of 
both  a  pantheistic  and  a  finite  God. 

For  the  study  of  Theism  read: 
Flint,  R.,  Theism,  N.  Y.,  1893; 
Lotze,  loc.  cit. 

For  the  study  of  Deism  consult: 
Histories  of  Philosophy  on  English  Deism. 
(Some  of  the  original  deistic  writings  are  especially  worth 
reading.) 

For  the  study  of  Pantheism  read: 

Paulsen,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  207-312; 

Spinoza,  Ethics,  Pt.  I; 

Flint,  R.,  Anti-theistic  Theories. 

For  the  study  of  the  theory  that  there  is  a  unite  God  kead: 
James,  Pluralistic  Universe,  Lect.  VIII. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE  SUBSTANCE  HYPOTHESIS 

I.  Introdtiction. — To  the  primitive  thinker  the  world 
is  literally  what  it  looks  to  be.  It  looks  to  be  made  up  of 
things,  trees,  rivers,  oceans,  rocks,  mountains,  animals, 
clouds,  fire,  souls  and  not  only  many  other  similar 
objects  but  also  objects  which  the  modern  adult  European 
would  hardly  call  things,  such  as  the  sky,  the  wind,  fog, 
and  darkness.  These  things  have  certain  striking  differ- 
ences. Some  of  them  are  more  or  less  permanent  though 
others  are  noticeably  transitory.  At  one  extreme  are 
rocks  and  mountains,  at  the  other  are  cloud  and  fire. 
Again,  many  objects  though  different  from  one  another 
in  some  respects  are  evidently  similar  in  other  respects, 
and  are  often  believed  to  be  but  variations  of  the  same 
fundamental  thing.  Then  too,  some  things  are  directly 
manufactured  out  of  other  things,  spears  and  boats 
from  trees,  pots  from  clay,  bronze  from  metallic  ores, 
and  bread  from  grain. 

As  a  matter  of  course,  at  the  birth  of  science  these 
facts  would  be  among  the  chief  ones  to  be  considered, 
and  far  less  noticeable  facts  would  be  either  partly  or 
totally  ignored.  Consequently  the  following  assumptions 
and  naive  theories  constitute  part  of  the  first  stage  in  the 
history  of  science.  Many  things  which  appear  to  be 
different  are  really  one  and  the  same  thing  in  different 

169 


1 7©  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

fonns.  Not  only  are  the  pot  and  the  clay,  or  the  seed 
and  the  plant  the  same  thing,  but  so  also  are  water  and 
ice,  earth  and  rock,  water  and  mist.  But  if  this  explains 
the  noticeably  common  characteristics,  may  not  also  the 
less  obvious  likenesses  between  things  be  explained 
after  the  same  manner?  If  ice  and  water  are  the  same 
thing,  may  not  water  and  rock  be  so  too?  Water  dries 
up  and  leaves  a  sediment;  water  (in  the  case  of  springs) 
comes  seemingly  directly  out  of  the  rock;  therefore  are 
not  water,  earth  and  rock  all  the  same  thing  in  different 
forms?  Again,  wind  and  fire  are  somewhat  alike  and 
related?  May  they  not  also  be  the  same  thing?  For 
similar  reasons  are  not  cloud  and  rain,  water  and  mist, 
sky  and  fire,  cloud  and  lightning,  and  thus  water  and 
lightning  (or  fire)  the  same  things  in  different  forms? 

In  short,  are  not  all  things  composed  of  a  few  funda- 
mental types  of  stuff,  or  possibly  of  the  same  ultimate 
thing  or  stuff?  Indeed  is  there  not  evidence  that  all 
things  give  rise  to  all  other  things  changing  directly  or 
indirectly  into  one  another,  the  cloud  into  fire  (lightning) 
and  into  rain,  the  rain  into  earth  and  rock,  the  rock  into 
water,  the  water  into  fog  and  mist,  the  mist  into  cloud, 
the  cloud  into  sky,  the  sky  into  light?  If  so,  which  of 
these  things  is  the  fundamental  thing  or  true  stuff?  The 
favorite  answers  at  first  were,  earth,  air,  fire  and  water, 
or  all  four  of  these.  In  time,  however,  further  informa- 
tion and  reflection  raised  the  final  question:  Are  not 
even  earth,  air,  fire,  water,  or  any  other  sensible  thing, 
but  forms  of  some  less  easily  observable,  or  even  imper- 
ceptible, stuff?  That  is,  are  not  all  the  things  which  we 
observe  but  the  qualities  or  states  of  a  true  thing,  or 


THE  SUBSTANC3:  HYPOTHESIS  I7I 

stuff,  behind  or  beneath  them;  are  they  not  but  forms  of 
matter? 

Further,  the  true  stuff  must  be  one  which  in  taking  on 
new  qualities  and  in  parting  with  old  qualities  never 
loses  its  original  characteristics.  Hence  it  came  to  be 
believed  that  there  are  two  types  of  qualities:  first,  those 
which  are  coming  and  going,  such  as  color  and  warmth; 
secondly,  those,  whatever  they  may  be  foimd  to  be,  which 
are  eternal  and  changeless.  These  latter  are  the  ultimate 
attributes  or  properties  of  the  stuff,  whereas  the  other 
qualities  are  accidental.  Thus  color,  heat,  weight, 
fluidity,  and  other  such  qualities,  were  thought  to  be 
mere  accidents  of  matter;  whereas  impenetrability, 
movability,  spatial  extension,  were  regarded  as  attri- 
butes. 

To  express  these  distinctions,  technical  words  came 
to  be  employed.  The  fundamental  stuff  is  the  substance 
(that  which  stands  under) ;  the  permanent  characteristics 
are  the  essence,  the  properties,  the  attributes  or  the 
primary  qualities;  and  the  changing  qualities,  the  acci- 
dents, the  modes,  or  the  secondary  qualities.  Another 
set  of  important  technical  words  came  from  formal 
logic.  As  we  speak  ordinarily  of  the  thing  and  its  quali- 
ties, logic  speaks  of  the  subject  and  its  predicates.  Hence 
the  substance,  or  true  thing,  was  called  the  true  subject, 
the  subject  that  is  itself  never  the  predicate  of  some  other 
subject;  and  the  two  sorts  of  qualities  were  called  the 
two  sorts  of  predicates,  the  essential  and  the  acci- 
dental. 

If  then  the  true  thing  is  not  any  one  of  the  perceptible 
things  in  the  world  about  us,  it  has  to  be  foimd  by  ab- 


172  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

stracting  in  thought  from  each  thing  the  accidental  or 
changing  qualities.  In  short,  substance  is  not  a  percept 
but  a  concept.  Hence  substance  cannot  be  seen  by  our 
bodily  eyes,  but  by  our  intellectual  insight,  by  our  reason. 
The  world  as  revealed  to  our  senses  is  more  or  less  de- 
ceptive, for  it  seems  to  contain  many  things  which  are 
not  truly  things;  and  these  things  have  qualities  that  are 
merely  accidental  and  that  hide  the  eternal  or  essential 
qualities.  Here  again  technical  words  came  to  be  used: 
The  world  as  revealed  to  sense,  the  world  of  accidents 
and  pseudo-things,  is  the  perceivable  or  phenomenal 
world  and  these  things  and  their  qualities  are  phenomena-^ 
whereas  the  true  things,  the  substance  revealed  by  the 
reason,  are  noumena  and  the  world  of  substance  is  the 
rational,  the  intelligible  or  the  noumenal  world. 

For  further  study  read: 
Burnet,  Early  Greek  Philosophy,  2d  ed. 

2.  A  more  rigorous  formulation  of  the  substance  hypoth- 
esis.— ^The  substance  h5Tf)othesis  can  be  stated  with 
greater  logical  rigor  and  indeed  must  be  so  stated  to  be 
thoroughly  understood.  This  hypothesis  reduces  to  a 
theory  regarding  the  nature  of  the  proposition.  In 
general,  there  are  two  theories  regarding  the  natiu-e  of 
propositions.  One  theory  is  that  which  Chapter  III 
has  formulated  and  defended:  Propositions  consist  of 
terms  in  relation.  The  other  theory  is  that  which  asserts : 
Propositions  are  made  up  of  two  terms  and  no  relation, 
one  of  these  terms  being  the  subject  and  the  other  the 
predicate.  For  example,  the  upholder  of  the  second 
theory  would  say,  the  proposition,  "the  flag  is  red,"  is 


THE   SUBSTANCE  HYPOTHESIS  I73 

not  a  relationship  between  flag  and  red  but  the  predicate 
redness  asserted  of  the  subject  flag.  In  fact,  precisely 
such  examples  as  this  must  have  given  rise  to  the  theory; 
for  it  may  be  that  logic  will  finally  decide  that  this  t3^e 
of  proposition  is  truly  a  subject-predicate  proposition. 
But  the  theory  has  evidently  neglected  other  and  familiar 
types  of  proposition  such  as,  A  is  richer  than  B;  A  is 
cause  of  B;  A  is  to  the  right  of  B;  A  equals  B.  It  seems 
preposterous  to  call  "richer  than  B,"  "cause  of  B,"  "to 
the  right  of  B, "  and  "equal  to  B, "  predicates  of  the  sub- 
jects symbolized  by  A;  for  B  is  not  a  predicate  of  A  but 
another  thing;  and  the  information  is  clearly  a  relation- 
ship between  two  distinct  entities. 

Now  it  seems  remarkable,  but  is  none  the  less  true, 
that  the  valid  conception  of  the  world  itself  depends 
upon  how  this  question  regarding  the  nature  of  proposi- 
tions should  be  answered.  What  does  the  world,  as  we 
know  it,  reveal  to  us?  What  is  the  information,  that  is, 
the  content  of  the  propositions  we  learn  as  we  study 
nature?  Is  it  made  up  of  subjects  and  their  predicates, 
or  is  it  made  up  of  relations  between  terms?  If  the 
former,  the  world  does  indeed  consist  only  of  things 
and  their  predicates,  that  is,  of  substances  and  their 
essential  and  accidental  qualities.  If  the  latter,  the 
world  does  not  consist  of  things  alone.  Rather  it  con- 
sists of  all  sorts  and  kinds  of  entities  which  can  stand 
in  relation,  not  merely  things  and  qualities,  but  also 
sizes  and  shapes,  configurations  and  numbers,  quantities 
and  intensities,  and  most  anything  else  you  can  mention. 
It  consists  of  all  these  entities  in  their  multitudinous 
relations. 


174  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

For  further  study  or  the  substance  hypothesis  read: 
Rickaby,   General  Metaphysics,  Bk.  I,   Chaps.  II-III,  and 

Bk.  II,  Chaps.  I-II; 
Lotze,  Metaphysics,  Bk.  I,  Chaps.  I-IV. 

For  advanced  study  read: 
Aristotle,  Metaphysics. 

5.  Criticism  of  the  substance  hypothesis,  (a)  As  a  ques- 
tion of  fact. — ^Whether  or  not  the  world  is  made  up  of 
substances  and  predicates  or  of  terms  and  their  relations, 
is,  before  all  else,  a  question  of  fact.  This  question  has 
presented  itself  in  a  number  of  forms,  (i)  If  we  analyze 
the  things  we  perceive  about  us,  for  example,  a  table,  ab- 
stracting from  them  their  qualities,  or  predicates,  do  we 
get  a  remainder,  the  thing  itself  or  the  substance?  Evi- 
dently not;  a  table  robbed  of  its  properties,  its  color,  its  hard- 
ness, its  weight,  its  chemical  properties  as  wood,  becomes 
nothing  at  all.  The  thing  is  the  sum  of  its  qualities  and 
properties  in  their  proper  relations,  it  is  not  some  sub- 
ject over  and  above  or  beneath  these  predicates,  at  least 
not  as  far  as  direct  sense  perception  shows.  (2)  Some 
objects  cannot  be  analyzed  into  substances  and  their  attri- 
butes even  with  the  utmost  ingenuity.  These  are  space  and 
time  and  the  spatial  and  temporal  relations  between  entities. 
If  we  look  upon  space  as  one  thing,  as  a  great  container, 
surely  the  things  within  it,  the  earth,  the  stones,  the 
animals,  are  not  attributes  of  space.  On  the  other  hand, 
if  we  hold  that  space  is  made  up  of  points,  evidently  the 
relations  of  these  points  to  one  another  is  quite  essential 
to  there  being  the  total  entity  space.  But  what  are  these 
relations  of  the  points  of  space  to  one  another;  does 
each  point  have  as  its  attributes  every  other  point  with 


THE  SUBSTANCE  HYPOTHESIS         175 

their  countless  relations  to  one  another  and  to  it?  In 
short,  whatever  space  and  time  are,  they  do  not,  as  far 
as  our  knowledge  goes,  fit  in  well  with  the  substance 
hypothesis.  Indeed,  this  truth  appears  often  to  have 
been  evident  to  those  who  hold  the  substance  hypoth- 
esis; for  many  of  these  philosophers  have  found  it  essen- 
tial to  their  theory  to  prove  that  space  and  time  are  not  real. 
Such  a  tendency,  resulting  merely  from  efforts  to  uphold 
a  theory,  is  the  rediictio  ad  absurdum  of  the  theory.  (3) 
In  general,  the  substance  hypothesis  appears  to  be  but 
a  vestige  of  primitive  thought  and  science.  Things  are 
more  evident  to  us  in  childhood  and  in  our  ignorance 
than  are  relations.  As  science  progresses,  however,  the 
relations  between  things  and  between  the  properties  of  things 
are  not  only  noticed  but  become  actually  the  chief  and  even 
the  sole  subject  matter  of  the  science.  For  example,  modern 
mathematics,  physics  and  chemistry  are  made  up  almost 
exclusively  of  propositions  not  regarding  things  or  the 
predicates  of  things  but  regarding  terms  and  their  re- 
lations. Moreover,  when  these  sciences  define  things, 
they  do  so  by  asserting  of  the  thing  not  some  predicate 
but  certain  unique  relations  to  other  things. 

(b)  As  a  question  of  logic. — So  overwhelming  has  been 
the  evidence  of  fact  against  the  substance  h3^othesis 
and  so  great  has  become  the  difficulty  of  explaining  na- 
ture in  terms  of  that  hypothesis  that  those  who  still 
uphold  it  have  resorted  to  the  old  distinction  between 
phenomena  and  reality.  Relations  only  appear  to  exist, 
they  are  not  real.  Relations  are  fundamentally  irrational 
and  self  contradictory;  and  it  must  be  all  a  mistake  when 
we  think  we  observe  them  in  the  world  about  us.    This, 


176  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

again,  is  but  the  reductio  ad  ahsurdum  of  the  theory;  for 
relations  between  things  are  as  truly  revealed  to  our  per- 
ception as  the  things  themselves.  Moreover,  if  relations 
are  unreal,  then  every  proposition  is  false,  for  each  propo- 
sition asserts  or  implies  relations;  and,  of  course,  the 
sciences,  including  even  logic  and  mathematics,  are  false, 
for  one  and  all  assert  relationships. 

In  general,  the  holder  of  the  substance  hypothesis  has 
endeavored  to  explain  the  facts  consistently  with  his 
theory  by  adopting  the  one  or  the  other  of  its  extreme 
forms,  monism  or  monadism.  Each,  however,  is  a  re- 
ductio ad  ahsurdum  of  the  theory,  (i)  To  get  rid  of  the 
necessity  of  accounting  for  the  relations  between  things 
and  for  the  changes  that  take  place  in  one  thing,  as  the 
relations  between  it  and  other  things  change,  the  monist 
denies  that  things  are  true  things,  asserting  that  they 
all  are  but  modes  or  states  of  one  infinite  substance. 
That  is,  there  is  one  substance  and  all  of  nature  with 
its  multitudinous  objects,  instead  of  being  a  system  of 
things,  is  nothing  but  predicates  of  the  one  infinite  sub- 
ject. All  things  are  what  they  are  and  change  as 
they  do,  not  because  of  their  own  nature  and  interre- 
lationship, but  because  they  are  modes  of  this  infinite 
substance.    To  this  theory  there  are  two  fatal  objections. 

First,  you  do  not  by  this  method  get  rid  of  one  single 
problem  that  faced  you  at  the  beginning.  The  count- 
less particular  problems  of  daily  life  and  of  science  remain 
imanswered;  for  example,  why  does  ice  melt  when  put 
near  the  fire?  The  only  answer  that  has  ever  been  given 
to  such  questions  remains  a  proposition  asserting  some 
sort  of  relationship  between  terms.    Secondly,  when  we 


THE  SUBSTANCE  HYPOTHESIS         177 

turn  our  attention  to  the  infinite  substance  of  which  all 
objects  are  but  modes,  we  find  we  have  but  a  high  ab- 
straction which  throws  no  light  whatsoever  upon  any- 
thing, even  upon  why  the  substance  itself  has  predicates, 
let  alone  why  it  has  the  predicates  it  does.  All  attempts 
to  make  it  illuminating  by  holding  in  addition  the  organic 
theory  of  relations  and  by  insisting  that  this  infinite 
substance  is  concrete  give  likewise  only  promises  and 
never  any  results.  There  is  not  one  specific  problem  of 
science  or  of  daily  hfe  which  has  been  solved  completely 
or  in  part  by  this  monistic  theory  of  substance. 

(2)  Secondly,  the  case  is  no  better  when  monadism  is 
the  extreme  adopted.  Monadism  admits  that  many  sub- 
stances exist  and  consistently  maintains  that  the  business 
of  a  substance  is  to  be  the  logical  ground  of  all  its  predi- 
cates. If  things  appear  to  get  their  predicates  through 
relations  to  other  things,  this  is  mere  appearance,  for 
true  substances  are  independent  of  one  another  and  there- 
fore cannot  interact.  Hence  the  world  which  appears  to 
be  made  up  of  many  interacting  things  is  really  made  up 
of  substances  which  are  each  independent  worlds.  Of 
course,  the  monadist  has  to  argue  away  the  existence  of 
space.  But  he  cannot  ignore  the  correspondence  re- 
vealed in  the  behavior  of  the  various  substances.  Mind 
and  body  seem  to  interact.  Two  colliding  billiard  balls 
seem  to  influence  one  another.  The  sun  seems  to  have 
something  to  do  with  the  orbit  of  the  earth.  The  only 
escape  left  the  monadist  is  either  the  preceding  monism  or 
occasionalism.  The  former  requires  him  to  give  up  his 
theory.  The  latter  reduces  it  to  absurdity,  by  asserting 
that  the  seeming  interaction  between  substances  is  either 


178  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

a  perpetual  miracle  perfonned  by  God  or  is  a  preestab- 
lished  harmony  foreordained  by  God  when  He  created  the 
world.  In  either  case  the  monads  are  no  longer  true  sub- 
stances, for  they  are  not  the  true  subjects  of  their  predi- 
cates, being  acted  upon  from  without  by  their  creator. 
In  short,  there  is  but  one  consistent  monadism,  a  mon- 
adism  that  is  atheistic  and  that  asserts  the  world  of 
science  and  of  daily  Ufe  to  be  completely  an  illusion. 

However,  the  most  serious  criticism  of  the  substance 
hypothesis  is  that  already  indicated.  The  hypothesis  ex- 
plains nothing.  Whatever  properties  we  ascribe  to  the 
substance  in  order  to  explain  its  predicates,  have  been 
previously  borrowed  by  us  from  those  very  predicates. 
And  if  we  refuse  to  borrow  in  this  way  we  are  still  worse 
oflF,  for  the  substance  then  is  the  barren  abstraction, 
"thing  in  general,"  from  whose  nature  anything  or 
everything  follows  with  equal  cogency  or  rather  without 
any  cogency  whatever.  For  example,  to  explain  by 
means  of  the  substance  hypothesis  why  fire  bums  amounts 
either  to  saying  that  fire  burns  because  it  is  fire,  or  to 
saying  that  fire  burns  because  it  is  the  nature  of  the  sub- 
stance of  fire  to  burn.  In  short,  the  substance  hypothesis 
is  like  a  treadmill  where  no  matter  how  laboriously  we 
hasten  onward  we  arrive  at  precisely  the  same  point  from 
which  we  started. 

For  further  study  read: 
Berkeley,  Dialogues  between  Hylas  and  Philonous,  Second 

Dialogue; 
Hume,  Treatise,  Of  the  Understanding,  Pt.  I,  Sect.  VI,  and  Pt. 

Ill,  Sects.  III-V; 
Russell,  Philosophy  of  Leibniz,  especially,  8-15,  Chaps.  IV,  X; 


THE  SUBSTANCE  HYPOTHESIS  1 79 

Rtissell,  Principles  of  Mathematics,  Chaps.  XXVI  and  LI; 

Bradley,  Appearance  and  Reality; 

Stout,  Alleged  Self-Contradictions  in  the  Concept  of  Relation, 

Froc.  Aristoiel.  Soc,  1901-2,  2; 
Royce,  World  and  the  Individual,  Supplementary  Essay. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XV 

THE  METAPHYSICS   OF  SUBSTANCE 

1.  Introduction. — The  substance  hypothesis  has  played 
so  important  a  part  in  the  history  of  philosophy  and  is 
still  so  widely  held  that  a  study  of  the  various  resulting 
theories  must  be  added  to  our  study  of  the  general  hy- 
pothesis. Within  the  substance  hypothesis  the  follow- 
ing major  problems  arise,  (a)  What  are  the  kinds  of 
substance?  (b)  Is  substance  many  or  one?  (c)  If  many, 
are  the  substances  interrelated?  (d)  Finally,  how  can 
we  account  for  the  change  or  the  perpetual  trans- 
formation of  the  qualities  of  the  substance? 

2.  The  kinds  of  substance,  (a)  Dualism. — ^We  may  hold 
that  the  mental  and  the  physical  are  two  fundamen- 
tally distinct  orders  of  existence  and  so  argue  that  they 
are  the  phenomena  of  two  di£ferent  kinds  of  substance, 
spirit  and  matter. 

(b)  Materialism. — ^Against  dualism  we  may  argue  that 
the  evidence  of  the  dependence  of  our  mental  life  upon 
the  body  and  especially  upon  the  nervous  system  is 
overwhelming,  that  this  dependence  cannot  be  recon- 
ciled with  dualism,  but  only  with  the  hypothesis  that  our 
mental  as  well  as  our  bodily  states  are  the  phenomena 
of  matter. 

(c)  5/>in7t^a/^smf— Thirdly,  against  both  dualism  and 
materialismwe  may  noldthat  spirit  is  the  one  substance 
and  that  both  the  physical  and  the  mental  are  its  phe- 

i8o 


THE  METAPHYSICS  OF  SUBSTANCE  l8l 

nomenaQ  The  grounds  for  spiritualism  are  of  two  dis- 
tinct types.  The  grounds  of  one  type  are  taken  from  the 
idealistic  hypothesis  (to  be  expoimded  in  the  following 
chapter).  The  grounds  of  the  second  type  are  suggested 
by  the  study  of  the  material  phenomena  themselves. 
Matter  with  its  energies  and  with  its  wonderful  fertility  in 
giving  rise  to  the  higher  types  of  physical  existence,  es- 
pecially life,  seems  far  more  analogous  to  spirit  than  to 
matter  as  described  in  our  textbooks  on  mechanics.  If 
matter  is  the  substance  of  the  phenomena  of  gravity, 
heat,  light,  electricity,  chemical  affinity  and  life  and  even 
of  mind,  it  must  have  as  its  properties,  or  essential  na- 
ture, enough  to  account  not  merely  for  such  mechanical 
events  as  the  behavior  of  the  balls  on  a  billiard  table  but 
also  for  such  non-mechanical  events  as  the  vital  processes, 
the  reactions,  the  thoughts,  feelings  and  purposes  of  the 
players  to  whom  the  billiard  balls  owe  their  motion.  It 
is  maintained  that  spirit  alone  has  these  properties  and 
therefore  that  matter  must  be  spiritual. 

(d)  Finally,  against  all  these  three  theories  it  has  been 
urged  that  neither  matter  nor  spirit  is  the  true  substance, 
but  that  the  material  and  the  spiritual  both  arise  from  a 
common  substance,  a  substance  which  itself  therefore 
cannot  be  called  either  matter  or  spirit  or  any  other 
name  borrowed  from  the  phenomena.  Of  the  names 
which  have  been  given  to  this  substance,  probably  the 
most  usual  is  the  Absolute. 

For  further  study  read: 
Smith,  Norman,  Studies  in  the  Cartesian  Philosophy. 

For  the  study  of  Dualism  read: 
Calkins,  Persistent  Problems  of  Philosophy,  Chap.  U. 


l82  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

For  the  study  of  Materialism  read: 
Paulsen,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  53-86; 
Calkins,  loc.  cit.; 
Hibben,  Philosophy  of  the  EnUghtenment,  Chap.  V. 

For  the  study  of  Spiritualism  read: 
Calkins,  Persistent  Problems  of  Philosophy,  Chaps.  IV  and  V; 
Hibben,  Philosophy  of  the  Enlightenment,  Chap.  III. 

5.  Pluralism  and  monism. — To  the  question,  How 
many  substances  are  there?  those  who  hold  the  foregoing 
theories  have  given  different  answers.  The  duaUst,  of 
course,  must  hold  to  a  pluraUty  of  substances.  Those 
who  hold  the  fourth  theory  have  usually  adopted  monism, 
the  doctrine  that  there  is  but  one  substance.  But  the 
materialists  and  the  spiritualists  have  divided  into  the 
two  sub-groups  monists  and  pluraUsts,  thus  giving  rise 
to  the  four  hypotheses,  pluralistic  materialism,  monistic 
materiahsm,  pluralistic  spiritualism  and  monistic  spirit- 
uaUsm.  The  most  famous  type  of  pluralistic  materialism 
is  the  atomic  theory  of  Democritus  and  his  modern 
followers.  An  example  of  monistic  materialism  would  be 
the  doctrine,  the  ether  is  a  substance  and  all  other 
entities  such  as  the  electrons,  chemical  atoms,  molecules, 
and  living  creatures  are  reducible  to  vortices  and  to 
systems  of  vortices  in  the  ether.  The  most  familiar 
examples  of  pluralistic  spiritualism  are  the  theories 
of  Berkeley  and  of  Leibniz.  Of  monistic  spiritualism 
the  most  prominent  examples  are  the  doctrines  of  the 
post-Kantian  philosophers,  Fichte,  Hegel,  Schopenhauer. 

For  further  study  read: 
Calkins,  Persistent  Problems  of  Philosophy.    Chaps.  II-V, 

vni-X; 


THE  METAPHYSICS  OF  SUBSTANCE  183 

Paulsen,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  207-243; 
Hibben,  Philosophy  of  the  Enlightenment,  Chap.  VII. 

For  more  extensive  study  read: 
Lotze,  Metaphysics,  Bk.  I,  Chaps.  V  and  VI. 

4.  The  relation  between  the  substances, — ^Though  the 
monist  claims  to  escape  the  further  problem,  How  are  the 
substances  related?  he  does  so  only  by  surreptitiously 
avoiding  the  problem.  The  pluralist  cannot  avoid  the 
problem,  and  frankly  endeavors  to  solve  it.  Yet  so 
difficult  is  this  problem  that  no  less  than  three  theories 
have  been  held,  and  all  of  these  are  manifestly  inadequate, 
(a)  The  interaction  theory. — ^The  first  and  natural  theory 
is  that  the  substances  interact.  But  more  refined  def- 
initions and  theories  of  substance  make  this  impossible.  A 
substance  must  be  the  sole  subject,  or  ground  of  all  its  phe- 
nomena. If  so,  it  cannot  have  phenomena  partly  caused 
by  other  substances  acting  upon  it.  (b)  Monadism. — 
To  avoid  this  difficulty,  the  pluralist  may  deny  that  there 
is  any  interaction  or  any  interrelation,  asserting  that  all 
seeming  interaction  and  interrelation  are  an  illusion 
of  the  human  mind,  and  that  each  substance  is  really  a 
little  world  by  itself,  completely  isolated  from  all  other 
entities.  But  this  theory  is  met  by  the  overwhelming 
difficulty  that  all  the  facts  we  do  know  point  to  interrela- 
tion and  that  the  theory  is  consistent  with  no  known 
fact  and  is  therefore  purely  gratuitous,  (c)  Occasional- 
ism and  the  pre-established  harmony. — So  serious  is  this 
difficulty  that  even  the  monadist  has  added  to  his  theory 
the  third  theory,  which  asserts  that  the  substances  have 
no  natural,  but  a  supernatural  interrelation.  This 
supernatural  interrelation  may  be  twofold.    Either  God 


1 84  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

in  creating  the  monads  or  the  substances  pre-established 
their  behavior  for  all  eternity  and  thereby  brought  it 
to  pass  that  for  all  time  the  substances  behave  as  though 
they  interacted;  or  God  by  a  perpetual  miracle  or  inter- 
ference regulates  each  substance  upon  each  occasion 
when  we  seem  to  see  it  interact,  so  that  it  behaves  as 
though  it  did  indeed  interact.  The  former  hypothesis 
is  called  the  pre-established  harmony.  Its  most  famous 
advocate  was  the  great  German  philosopher  Leibniz. 
The  latter  is  called  occasionalism.  It  was  held  especially 
by  some  of  the  followers  of  Descartes  who  could  not 
reconcile  his  dualism  with  the  interaction  of  mind  and 
body. 

For  further  study,  consult  references  already  given. 
Consult  also: 
Russell,  Philosophy  of  Leibniz. 

5.  The  problem  of  change. — ^The  substance  hypothesis 
claims  to  account  not  only  for  the  predicates  things  have 
but  also  for  the  changes  that  take  place  in  these  pred- 
icates. A  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  the  substance  will 
reveal  not  only  its  essence  but  will  tell  us  why  its  acci- 
dental properties  keep  changing.  But  no  substance 
hypothesis  ever  solved  this  problem,  nor  could  it,  for 
the  reasons  given  in  earlier  chapters  in  discussing  chance 
and  evolution.  However,  attempts  have  been  made 
leading  to  the  following  rival  theories:  (a)  Change  is 
an  illusion;  the  substance  is  eternally  the  same.  This 
theory  is  called  eleaticism,  from  the  name  of  the  school 
of  Greek  philosophers  by  whom  it  was  first  maintained. 
(b)  It  is  of  the  very  nature  of  the  substance  spontane- 


THE  METAPHYSICS  OF  SUBSTANCE  18$ 

ously  to  produce  new  qualities  and  states.  This  doctrine 
is  called  dynamism,  (c)  The  substance  itself  does  not 
change.  All  that  changes  is  the  relation  between  the 
substances.  These  changes  in  relation  give  rise  in  us,  as 
onlookers,  to  the  illusion  that  the  substance  itself  is 
changing  its  qualities.  This  doctrine  is  mechanism, 
named  after  its  typical  form,  the  world  of  mechanics 
taken  as  the  complete  story  of  reahty.  In  mechanics 
the  material  particles  alter  their  position  relatively  to 
one  another,  or,  as  it  is  usually  expressed,  the  systems  of 
material  particles  alter  their  configuration.  This  altera- 
tion, so  the  mechanist  argues,  is  the  only  real  change,  all 
other  changes  being  discontinuous  and  illusory. 

Each  of  these  theories  is  evidently  insufficient.  Change 
certainly  exists,  for  it  is  revealed  to  us  as  fact  and  is 
never  denied  except  in  the  interest  of  a  theory.  To  say 
that  it  is  the  nature  of  the  substance  to  produce  change 
does  not  explain  change.  It  simply  admits  that  change  is 
inexplicable.  Finally,  to  admit  that  the  relations  be- 
tween the  substances  change,  even  if  all  other  changes  are 
illusion,  leaves  the  believer  in  the  substance  theory  with 
the  problem  of  change  still  on  his  hands,  for  why  do 
these  relations  change?  The  only  answer  he  can  give  is 
that  change  is  ultimate  and  inexplicable.  In  short,  the 
various  substance  hypotheses  do  not  explain  change  hut 
leave  us  precisely  where  we  started,  with  change  ultimate 
and  unexplained. 


CHAPTER  XVI 


IDEALISM 


I.  Introduction. — Idealism,  the  theory  to  be  studied 
in  the  present  chapter,  is  historically  closely  related  to 
the  substance  hypothesis.  The  first  idealists  were  the 
first  destructive  critics  of  the  substance  hypothesis, 
and  their  rejection  of  the  notion  substance  led  them  to 
idealism.  Logically,  idealism  arose  as  a  theory  regarding 
the  nature  of  the  phenomena  which  alone  compose  the 
world,  provided  substance  does  not  exist.  The  various 
commonplace  objects  about  us,  with  their  many  qualities 
and  states,  are  the  phenomena,  let  us  say,  of  matter; 
but  "what  are  they  if  there  is  no  such  substance  as 
matter?"  Even  before  this  question  was  asked,  some 
philosophers  who  held  to  the  substance  theory  began  to 
have  difficulty  in  accounting  for  all  the  familiar  qualities 
of  material  objects  as  genuine  phenomena  of  matter. 
Is  the  sweetness  of  sugar  a  quality  of  sugar?  Is  the  color 
of  a  red  flag  truly  a  quality  of  the  matter  of  which  the 
flag  is  composed?  If  it  be  so,  why  does  the  color  change 
when  we  become  color  blind?  Or  when  we  look  at  the 
object  from  the  side  of  our  eyes?  Is  the  warmth  of 
water  truly  a  quality  of  the  water?  If  so,  why  can  the 
same  "tepid"  water  feel  to  one  hand  hot  and  to  another 
cold?  Similar  questions  were  asked  regarding  odors  and 
soimds.    These  so-called  secondary  qualities  seemed  to 

i86 


IDEALISM  187 

depend  largely  upon  the  perceiving  mind  rather  than 
upon  the  nature  of  the  material  object;  for  to  the  philoso- 
pher of  the  seventeenth  century  reflecting  upon  the 
nature  of  matter,  the  only  way  in  which  to  account  for 
such  phenomena  seemed  to  be  to  assert  that  they  were 
merely  the  ejects  of  the  true  properties  of  matter  acting 
upon  our  minds.  Thus  Descartes  held  that  matter  has 
but  two  genuine  properties,  extension  and  motion,  and 
that  all  the  other  familiar  qualities  of  material  things 
result  from  this  moving  matter  acting  upon  our  sense 
organs  and  giving  rise  in  us  to  sensations  radically 
different  from  it,  their  external  cause.  In  short,  colors, 
tastes,  sounds,  odors,  heat  and  cold,  are  but  mental  states 
in  the  perceiving  mind  and  have  no  existence  outside  that 
mind.  This  beHef  together  with  the  growing  disbeUef  in 
the  existence  of  substance  led  to  the  rise  of  the  idealistic 
hypothesis  in  the  early  eighteenth  century. 

2.  The  idealistic  hypothesis. — The  word  idealism  may 
be  used  in  a  broader  or  a  narrower  sense.  In  the  broader 
sense,  idealism  asserts  the  proposition,  "all  facts  are 
mental,"  that  is  to  say,  "all  things  which  one  perceives 
are  but  the  states  of  the  perceiving  mind  itself."  When 
I  see  colored  objects,  what  I  see  is  only  my  sensory  ex- 
periences of  colors  of  certain  shape  and  arrangement. 
When  I  feel  the  warm  fire,  what  I  feel  is  only  a  sensation 
of  warmth.  It  may  be  caused  by  the  fire,  but  whether 
it  is  or  not,  as  perceived  it  is  only  my  mental  state. 
Again,  when  I  hear  another  man  speaking,  the  sounds 
being  my  sensations,  are  only  my  mental  states.  In 
short,  apart  from  my  own  experiences,  my  own  mental 
states,  I  perceive  nothing.    These  mental  states  may  be 


l88  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

caused  from  without  and  may,  by  their  resemblance  to 
external  objects,  reveal  the  nature  of  those  objects;  but 
never  do  the  objects  reveal  themselves  directly. 

In  the  narrower  sense  idealism  asserts  the  extreme  hy- 
pothesis, "not  only  are  all  facts  mental  but  so  also  is  all 
existence."  To  he  is  to  he  perceived^  or  to  he  experienced 
in  some  other  way,  and  apart  from  experience  there  is  noth- 
ing. Idealism  thus  denies  the  existence  of  the  physical 
world,  that  is,  the  existence  of  a  world  of  material  and 
physical  agents  and  events  apart  from  the  mental  states 
which  we  call  our  experience  of  this  world.  In  our  dreams 
it  is  said,  the  material  objects  perceived  have  no  exist- 
ence apart  from  the  dream  experience;  so  also  have  the 
physical  objects  of  waking  Ufe  no  existence  apart  from 
the  experiences  of  minds. 

For  further  study  read: 
Berkeley,  Dialogues  between  Hylas  and  Philonous. 

5.  The  evidence  offered  in  support  of  idealism. — To 
most  ideahsts  it  seems  self-evident  that  what  we  perceive 
is  only  our  own  mental  states.  Take  any  object  and 
examine  its  sensible  properties.  Is  not  each  quality  as 
perceived  but  so  much  sensory  experience  of  our  minds? 
Take  your  perception  of  an  orange.  Consider  the  color, 
is  this  not  a  visual  sensation  which  you  now  get  and 
which  you  would  lack  if  you  were  blind?  Take  the  weight, 
the  smoothness,  the  softness,  and  the  taste;  is  not  each 
but  the  sensation  which  your  mind  is  now  experiencing 
and  which  an  injury  to  the  special  sense  organs  involved 
would  quite  annihilate? 

As  further  evidence  that  what  we  perceive  is  only  men- 


IDEALISM  189 

tal,or  subjective,  our  attention  is  called  to  the  well-known 
truths  concerning  perception,  illusion  and  hallucination. 
It  will  suffice  to  mention  a  few  of  these;  some  have 
been  already  mentioned.  There  is  the  "distortion"  of 
things  as  seen  in  perspective,  the  meeting  of  parallel  Hnes 
in  the  horizon,  the  smallness  of  distant  objects.  There 
are  the  phenomena  of  refracted  light,  the  straight  stick 
partly  immersed  in  the  water  but  perceived  as  a  bent 
stick.  There  are  the  changed  colors  and  lessened  detail 
of  distant  objects,  the  blueness  of  the  distant  mountain. 
Illusion  and  hallucination  especially  are  regarded  as  un- 
questionable proof.  There  are  the  spatial  and  temporal 
displacements  of  the  perceived.  A  thing  looks  far  away 
when  it  is  near.  A  sound  is  heard  later  than  another 
which  followed  it.  There  are  the  qualitative  illusions,  of 
which  the  example  previously  cited  is  an  instance,  the 
tepid  water  cold  to  one  hand,  hot  to  the  other.  Finally, 
there  are  the  hallucinatory  experiences  of  normal  life, 
of  the  man  dreaming,  of  the  delirious  patient  and  of  the 
insane.  These  cases,  it  is  argued,  form  an  overwhelming 
mass  of  evidence  in  support  of  the  subjectivity  of  all 
that  is  perceived. 

Such  is  the  evidence  for  idealism  in  the  broader  sense. 
For  idealism  in  the  narrow  sense,  further  evidence  is 
oflFered,  evidence  which  is  said  to  prove  that  nothing  ex- 
ists apart  from  the  mind's  experience.  One  argument 
which  appeals  strongly  to  some  idealists  is  based  on  the 
conviction  that  the  mind  cannot  "transcend  itself"  by 
knowing  what  lies  outside  or  beyond  the  mind.  How 
can  the  niind  know  a  distant  world?  Even  if  the  distant 
world  is,  spatially  considered,  only  a  few  yards  from  my 


igo  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

body,  it  is  as  inconceivable  for  the  mind  to  know  the 
world  as  it  is  inconceivable  for  me  to  get  to  London  with- 
out passing  through  the  intervening  space.  What  is  not 
in  the  mind  is  as  such  unknowable;  therefore  to  insist 
upon  the  existence  of  a  world  outside  experience  is  to 
assert  the  existence  of  a  totally  unknowable  world.  Even 
that  such  a  world  exists  about  us  is  more  than  the  mind 
can  know.  In  short,  to  assert  the  existence  of  such  a 
world  is  to  talk  nonsense,  it  is  to  go  beyond  all  possible 
knowledge.  This  argument  sometimes  takes  a  shorter 
form:  what  I  know  to  exist  I  must  have  in  some  way 
experienced;  and  since  I  never  know  of  an  existent 
apart  from  my  experience,  all  existence  must  belong  to 
experience. 

A  more  forceful  argument  is  one  used  especially  by  Eng- 
hsh  idealists.  Analyze  any  existential  proposition  and  it 
will  be  found  to  be  only  an  assertion  of  future  possible 
percepts.  If  I  say  there  is  a  hat  in  this  box,  I  mean  that  if 
I  op)en  the  box  I  shall  see  a  hat  there.  If  I  hear  a  noise 
and  assert  there  is  a  wagon  passing  the  house,  I  mean 
that  if  I  go  to  the  window  and  look  out  I  shall  receive 
such  and  such  visual  sensations.  If  I  believe  that  Charles 
the  Great  lived  in  the  eighth  century,  I  mean  that  such 
and  such  possible  percepts  are  now  to  be  had,  percepts 
which  we  often  refer  to  as  the  evidence  of  his  existence. 
In  short,  "to  exist"  means  "to  be  a  possible  experience." 

Finally  it  is  urged  that  the  world  itself  bears  the  marks 
of  being  the  mind's  experience.  Space  and  time  are 
shown  to  be  forms  of  our  perception,  that  is,  peculiar 
ways  in  which  the  mind  of  man  does  its  perceiving. 
They  are  like  the  blue  spectacles  a  man  may  wear  and 


IDEALISM  191 

thereby  make  the  world  blue,  except  that  these  spectacles, 
space  and  time,  cannot  be  taken  on  and  off.  That  is,  the 
world  is  for  us  a  world  in  space  and  time  solely  because 
from  the  constitution  of  the  mind,  in  order  to  be  per- 
ceived and  thought,  it  must  be  perceived  and  thought 
as  a  spatial  and  temporal  world.  The  same  is  true  of 
the  causal  order  of  the  world.  This  order  is  but  the 
way  in  which  our  minds  have  to  order  their  experience; 
indeed  some  philosophers  reduce  causation  to  the  work- 
ing of  the  familiar  psychological  law,  the  law  of  associ- 
ation. For  example,  I  believe  fire  will  burn  because  I 
have  associated  burning  with  fire.  I  believe  that  thunder 
and  lightning  are  causally  related  because  I  have  as- 
sociated the  two  together.  But  a  full  statement  of  this 
last  argument  leads  us  into  questions  which  must  be 
reserved  for  a  later  chapter.  Suj6&ce  it  to  say  here  that 
for  two  hundred  years  one  or  more  of  the  foregoing 
arguments  have  seemed  to  almost  all  philosophers  suf- 
ficient proof  of  idealism  either  in  the  broader  or  in  the 
narrower  sense.  We  must  now  consider  the  validity  of 
these  arguments. 

4.  The  refutation  of  the  idealistic  hypothesis. — In  gen- 
eral, it  must  be  said  that  though  the  way  to  idealism  is 
easy  and  the  arguments  in  its  behalf  are  wonderfully 
persuasive,  idealism  is  the  most  remarkable  instance  of 
human  seK-deception  which  the  world  has  ever  seen. 
For  two  centuries  it  has  been  believed  without  question 
by  most  philosophers,  including,  indeed,  many  of  the 
ablest  and  profoundest  thinkers  of  all  time.  In  particular 
we  must  consider  each  type  of  argument  and  point  out 
its  error. 


192  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

(a)  //  is  not  self-evident  that  what  we  perceive  is  only  our 
own  mental  states. — Rather  precisely  the  opposite  is 
evident.  What  we  perceive  are  things  and  happenings 
in  a  physical  world.  Such  is  the  verdict  of  common  sense ; 
and  such  also  is  unquestionably  the  verdict  of  perception 
itself  if  we  keep  all  other  matters  out  of  consideration 
except  the  actual  perceived  content.  Only  after  we  have 
become  prejudiced  by  a  study  of  other  problems  and  have 
become  thoroughly  sophisticated  thereby  does  any  such 
feeling  of  self-evidence  as  that  claimed  for  idealism  get 
the  better  of  our  natural  common  sense.  The  sensible 
qualities  of  things,  such  as  their  color,  their  smoothness, 
their  weight,  their  temperature,  are  always  asserted  as 
properties  of  the  things  themselves  by  mankind  at 
large  and  by  the  idealist  himself  when  not  speaking  ex 
cathedra.  Indeed  it  requires  a  high  degree  of  ingenuity 
to  free  perception  from  the  charge  of  universal  false- 
hood in  case  idealism  be  true. 

(b)  Do  the  facts  connected  with  perception,  illusion  and 
hallucination  give  the  evidence  which  perception  itself  cer- 
tainly does  not  give?  The  argument  from  the  familiar 
phenomena  of  perception,  illusion  and  hallucination  is 
also  a  most  astonishing  misinterpretation  of  fact.  It  is 
so  for  the  following  reasons:  First,  the  idealist  assumes 
naively  that  no  other  theory  but  his  own  can  account 
for  the  phenomena  of  perspective,  and  the  phenomena 
of  illusion  and  hallucination.  Secondly,  he  seems  utterly 
blind  to  the  truth  that  his  idealism  does  not  really 
oJ0fer  any  solution  whatsoever  of  the  problems  raised  by 
these  phenomena.  As  to  the  first  matter,  the  phenomena 
of  perspective  are  not  peculiarly  human,  not  to  say,  men- 


IDEALISM  193 

tal.  Every  photograph  reveals  the  same  phenomena.  In 
short,  they  are  thoroughly  physical.  So  also  are  the 
phenomena  of  refraction;  the  bent  stick  seen  in  the  water, 
if  the  idealist's  argument  were  valid,  would  prove  even 
that  the  camera  is  a  mind  and  its  altered  sensitive  plate 
a  mental  state.  Similar  truths  hold  regarding  other 
familiar  cases  of  illusion.  Indeed,  if  the  so-called  sec- 
ondary quahties  were  mental  and  not  physical,  the  sci- 
ence of  physics  would  almost  have  to  be  abandoned,  for 
the  major  part  of  its  subject  matter  would  be  taken  from 
it.  As  to  the  second  matter,  idealism  has  never  given 
the  world  the  slightest  hint,  not  to  say  account,  of  how 
these  phenomena  of  perception,  illusion  and  hallucina- 
tion are  to  be  explained.  The  only  explanations  we 
have,  come  from  physics  and  physiological  psychology, 
where  the  scientist  is  taking  for  granted  that  he  is  ex- 
plaining the  mental  phenomena  by  means  of  physical 
and  biological  phenomena,  and  where  he  certainly  is  not 
taking  it  to  be  true  that  he  is  explaining  one  mental  state 
by  means  of  other  mental  states.  In  other  words,  the 
idealist  uses  the  problems  of  perception  and  illusion  to 
prove  idealism;  and  then,  after  he  feels  that  his  idealism 
is  estabUshed,  he  throws  away  the  problems. 

(c)  The  third  type  of  argument  involves  matters  to  be 
discussed  in  the  following  chapter,  so  only  some  of  its 
special  forms  will  be  now  considered.  Whatever  may  be 
the  meaning  of  the  words  "to  exist,"  usually  when  we 
assert  existence,  we  do  not  mean  to  predict  possible  per- 
cepts. When  I  say  that  there  are  submerged  mountains 
in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  that  there  are  waves  in  the  ether, 
that  Brutus  was  present  at  the  killing  of  Caesar,  that  I 


194  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

had  a  dream  last  night,  I  am  certainly  not  asserting 
directly  any  proposition  about  future  percepts,  or  possible 
percepts.  The  very  talk  about  possible  percepts  and 
future  percepts  is  itself  an  existential  judgment  regarding 
percepts;  for  if  "to  exist"  is  "to  be  a  possible  percept" 
what  do  I  mean  when  I  say  "percepts  exist"?  Existence 
as  a  notion  is  logically  prior  to  perception  and  certainly 
to  the  propositions  which  predict  percepts.  In  short,  the 
notion  "to  exist"  cannot  be  defined  in  terms  of  the  notion 
"to  be  perceived,"  as  has  been  so  widely  held  by  Eng- 
lish ideahsts  since  Berkeley.  A  similar  truth  holds  re- 
garding the  other  fundamental  terms  of  science  such  as 
space,  time  and  causation.  They  certainly  cannot  be 
defined  in  terms  of  the  mental  without  a  vicious  drcle; 
nor  can  they  be  reduced  to  mental  laws  or  forms  of  per- 
ception without  the  most  disgraceful  abandonment  of 
logical  rules.  Moreover,  a  study  of  the  spatial,  temporal 
and  causal  aspects  of  facts  does  not  reveal  anything 
mental.  It  reveals  rather  the  properties  of  space,  time 
and  causation,  and  "mentaHty  "  is  not  one  of  these  prop- 
erties. If  it  were  so,  would  not  those  sciences  which  espe- 
cially study  space  and  time,  for  example,  mathematics, 
be  obliged  to  indicate  this,  which  they  certainly  do  not? 
In  general,  what  we  beheve  or  what  we  must  beheve 
because  of  the  nature  of  our  minds  has  nothing  to  do 
with  the  truth  or  falsity  of  this  or  that  proposition,  nor 
does  it  give  or  withhold  existence  to  the  major  events 
and  aspects  of  the  physical  world.  That  anyone  should 
ever  have  believed  so  is  due  to  erroneous  theories,  to 
be  studied  in  the  next  chapter,  regarding  the  logical  pri- 
ority of  the  science  of  knowledge. 


IDEALISM  195 

For  further  study  read: 

Moore,  The  Refutation  of  Idealism,  Mind,  1903,  XII; 

Montague,  The  New  Realism  and  the  Old,  /.  ofPhilos.,  Psychol., 
etc.,  191 2,  p; 

Alexander,  On  Sensations  and  Images,  Proc.  Aristotd.  Soc, 
1909-10,  10; 

Nunn,  Are  Secondary  Qualities  Independent  of  Perception? 
Proc.  Aristotd.  Soc,  1909-10,  10; 

Wolf,  Natural  Realism  and  the  Present  Tendencies  in  Philoso- 
phy, Proc.  Aristotd.  Soc,  1908-9,  9; 

Moore,  Nature  and  Reality  of  Objects  of  Perception,  Proc 
Aristotd.  Soc,  1905-6,  6; 

McGilvary,  The  Stream  of  Consciousness,  Prolegomena  to  a 
Tentative  ReaKsm,  and  The  Physiological  Argument  against 
Realism,  J.  of  Philos.,  Psychol.,  etc.,  1907,  4; 

McGilvary,  The  Relation  of  Consciousness  and  Object  in  Sense 
Perception,  Philos.  Review,  191 2,  21; 

Smith,  Norman,  Subjectivism  and  Realism  in  Modem  Phi- 
losophy, Philos.  Review,  1908,  17; 

Perry,  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,  Pts.  Ill  and  IV. 

For  more  extensive  study  read: 
Case,  Thomas,  Physical  Realism; 
FxUlerton,  System  of  Metaphysics,  Pts.  I  and  II. 
The  New  Realism,  essays  by  Montague,  Holt  and  Pitkin. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XVI 

IDEALISTIC  HYPOTHESES 

1.  Introduction. — Various  idealistic  hj^otheses  have 
been  held  regarding  the  nature  of  reality;  and  many 
of  these  have  played  an  important  part  in  the  history  of 
modern  European  thought  and  continue  to  do  so.  Chief 
among  these  hypotheses  are  (a)  Representative  Realism, 
(b)  Phenomenalism,  (c)  Subjective  Idealism,  (d)  Ob- 
jective, or  Absolute  Idealism. 

2.  Representative  realism  and  phenomenalism. — Rep- 
resentative realism  is  best  illustrated  by  the  familiar 
doctrine  that  the  physical  world  consists  solely  of  par- 
ticles of  matter  with  their  motion,  and  the  ether  with  its 
undulations,  whereas  all  other  aspects  and  qualities 
of  the  natural  world  consist  solely  of  the  mental  states 
caused  in  our  minds  by  the  action  of  the  ether  and  par- 
ticles of  matter  upon  our  organs  of  sense.  Nature  as 
revealed  to  our  perception  has  colors,  but  these  colors 
are  subjective  or  mental  states  in  us.  What  truly  exists 
without  the  mind  is  the  undulatory  motion  in  the  ether  , 
which  gives  rise  to  color  sensations  by  stimulating  the 
nervous  system.  In  short,  "if  minds  and  their  mental 
states  should  be  annihilated,  there  would  exist  only  the 
ether  and  its  undulations,  the  particles  of  matter  and 
their  motion,  or  whatever  other  entities  turn  out  to  be 
the  'ultimate  physical  objects.' " 

196 


IDEALISTIC  HYPOTHESES  I97 

Phenomenalism  ^  goes  a  step  farther.  Even  the  phys- 
ical world  is  mental.  All  that  we  can  perceive  and  know 
is  but  what  we  experience  through  the  action  of  un- 
knowable entities  upon  our  minds.  That  is,  the  mind  is, 
as  it  were,  at  the  central  station  of  a  telephone  system 
(evidently  our  nervous  system  is  what  is  meant)  through 
which  it  is  receiving  messages  from  an  outside  world. 
From  the  nature  of  the  case  it  has  never,  and  can  never, 
leave  this  central  station  and  can  therefore  never  per- 
ceive those  who  are  sending  in  the  messages,  the  world 
of  which  they  are  members,  or  the  world  of  which  they 
speak.  The  messages  then  alone  are  all  that  we  perceive; 
their  authorship  is  not  only  unknown  to  us,  but  unknow- 
able. As  the  man  blind  from  birth  can  by  no  conceivable 
means  gain  a  picture  of  the  sun  whose  warmth  he  feels,  so 
we  can  never  perceive  or  even  conceive  the  nature  of  that 
world  without  us  by  whose  agency  we  have  the  sensa- 
tions and  percepts  which  we  experience  and  call  the 
world.  Not  only  is  this  true  of  the  world  without  the 
mind  but  it  is  true  even  of  the  mind  upon  which  this 
unknowable  world  is  supposed  to  act.  We  perceive  its 
states,  its  sensations  and  feelings;  but  we  can  never 
perceive  it,  the  subject  of  these  states. 

As  the  real  objective  world  is  believed  to  exist  but  is 
declared  to  be  quite  unknowable,  we  are  left  in  a  situa- 
tion which  cannot  but  provoke  guessing,  no  matter  how 
impossible  it  is  to  verify  the  resulting  guesses.  And  the 
ingenious  philosophers  among  the  phenomenahsts  have 
not  been  idle. 

1  Many  use  this  name  to  denote  also  representative  realism. 


198  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

For  further  study  read: 
Calkins,  Persistent  Problems  of  Philosophy; 
Smith,  Norman,  Studies  in  the  Cartesian  Philosophy; 
Pearson,  Grammar  of  Science,  Chap.  II. 

For  more  extensive  study: 
The  writings  of  Descartes,  Locke,  Kant  and  Schopenhauer. 

J.  Subjective  and  objective  idealism. — Subjective  ideal- 
ism goes  one  step  farther.  Not  only  is  all  that  we 
experience  mental,  not  only  is  the  external  world  un- 
knowable, but  there  is  no  external  world.  There  exist 
mind  and  its  experience  or  minds  and  their  experiences. 
The  existence  of  a  transcendent  world  or  world  of  things 
in  themselves  apart  from  experience  is  a  meaningless 
statement.  To  be  or  to  exist  means,  as  such,  to  be  for 
some  mind. 

The  most  familiar  instance  of  subjective  idealism 
is  the  ideahsm  of  Bishop  Berkeley.  According  to  this 
philosopher  there  exist  God,  the  infinite  spirit,  and  the 
finite  spirits  He  has  created.  The  world  exists  only  as 
the  thoughts  and  percepts  of  God  and  of  the  finite  spirits. 
The  world  differs  from  a  mere  dream  solely  through  its 
law  and  order  which  are  due  to  God,  He  being  on  the 
one  hand  the  source  of  all  the  percepts  which  the  finite 
spirits  experience  and  on  the  other  hand  the  guarantor 
of  the  reign  of  law. 

Whether  or  not  the  world  conception  of  the  German 
philosopher  Fichte  can  rightly  be  called  subjective 
idealism,  his  doctrine  was  at  least  so  interpreted  by  his 
immediate  successors  and  may  be  used  here  to  illustrate 
further  the  doctrine  of  extreme  subjectivism.  There 
exists  only  the  "absolute  ego."    This  ego  creates  the 


IDEALISTIC  HYPOTHESES  I99 

experience  of  an  external  world  of  physical  objects  in 
order  that  the  moral  struggle  of  life  may  take  place. 
The  end  and  purposes  of  Ufe  are  this  moral  victory  of  the 
self  over  a  world,  or  not  self,  of  which  the  self  is  the  ulti- 
mate author;  for  the  existence  and  the  significance  of  the 
physical  world  are  due  solely  to  this  ultimate  act  of  the 
will.  In  short,  the  will  wills  a  world  in  order  to  over- 
come the  world. 

Objective,  or  absolute  idealism  arose  as  a  reaction 
within  idealism  against  this  extreme  subjectivism. 
Though  all  that  exists  is  experience,  still  what  you  and 
I  experience  is  only  a  part  of  the  total  experience  and  may 
be  largely  subjective.  Reality  is  a  complete  or  absolute 
experience,  whereas  a  man's  experience  is  fragmentary, 
relative  and  incoherent.  Perhaps  the  easiest  way  to  pic- 
ture the  absolute  experience  which  coincides  with  reality 
is  this:  You  and  I  mean  by  the  world  not  what  we 
have  experienced  or  do  experience  but  what  we  should 
experience  if  we  knew  everything  and  knew  it  fully  and 
perfectly.  In  other  words,  reality  is  the  absolute  goal 
or  final  stage  in  the  evolution  of  that  knowledge  which 
began  in  our  babyhood  and  which  has  made  some  prog- 
ress along  its  ideal  pathway  in  the  intervening  years. 
From  a  study  of  this,  its  progress,  we  can  infer  the 
nature  of  its  ideal  goal,  its  perfect  consummation.  Real- 
ity is  that  perfect  and  absolutely  coherent  experience 
in  which  all  error  and  incompleteness,  that  is,  subjec- 
tivity, has  passed  away  from  experience  and  in  which 
experience  has  become  absolute  or  objective.  Objective 
idealists  differ  as  to  whether  or  not  this  ideal  experience 
actually  exists  in  an  absolute  mind,  namely  God,  and  so 


200  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

as  to  whether  or  not  it  is  merely  an  ideal  of  the  finite 
minds  toward  which  they  can  progress  but  which  will 
never  be  realized.  In  any  case  the  finite  experiences 
of  men  are  but  parts  of  this  one  all  inclusive  experience. 
Thus  objective  idealism  does  overcome  some  at  least 
of  the  subjectivism  of  other  forms  of  idealism.  The 
world  is  not  a  mere  collection  of  the  mental  states  of 
whatever  minds  happen  to  exist.  It  is  an  absolute  system 
quite  distinct  from  these  experiences  though  most  inti- 
mately related  to  them  by  being  their  ideal  goal.  The 
objects  of  the  world  do  not  then  depend  upon  us  for  their 
existence,  for  they  exist  regardless  of  whether  we  ex- 
perience them  or  not.  Their  existence  depends  solely 
upon  whether  or  not  they  would  be  experienced  were  our 
experience  complete  and  perfect.  StUl,  of  course,  it 
remains  true  that  all  reality  is  nothing  but  experience, 
the  experience  of  the  absolute  mind. 

For  further  study  read: 
Berkeley,  Dialogues  between  Hylas  and  Philonous; 
Berkeley,  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge; 
Fichte,  Vocation  of  Man; 
Haldane,  Pathway  of  Reality; 
Taylor,  Elements  of  Metaphysics,  Bk.  11,  Chaps.  I-III. 

For  more  extensive  study  read: 
Mtinsterberg,  The  Eternal  Values; 
Royce,  The  World  and  the  Individual; 
Ward,  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  Parts  IV  and  V; 
Bradley,  Appearance  and  Reahty; 
Taylor,  Elements  of  Metaphysics. 


CHAPTER  XVn 

DOGMATISM  VS.  CRITICISM 

I.  Introduction. — If  we  look  into  the  mind  of  a  young 
child,  psychology  tells  us,  we  shall  find  that  he  per- 
ceives a  world  about  him  radically  different  from  that 
which  the  adult  man  perceives;  for  our  adult  perceptions 
are  the  result  of  years  of  training  and  experience  in 
reacting  to  and  experimenting  with  the  commonplace 
objects  of  our  environment.  The  infant  does  not  see 
things  at  a  distance  in  any  such  discriminating  way  as 
does  the  adult,  nor  are  the  relative  sizes  of  the  familiar 
objects  apparent  to  him.  To  us  fire  "looks"  hot,  ice 
"looks"  cold,  rocks  "look"  hard  and  heavy,  water 
"looks"  a  fluid,  and  the  wind  "sounds"  cold  and  raging. 
To  us,  familiar  objects  are  quite  complex  as  to  their 
parts,  qualities,  relations  and  other  properties.  A  man 
is  seen  to  have  a  nose  and  a  mouth,  eyes  and  ears,  hair 
and  hands,  to  be  wearing  a  hat  and  coat,  to  be  old  or 
yoimg  and  strong  or  feeble.  Some  of  us  remember  when 
distant  men  and  houses  were  beUeved  to  be  literally  as 
small  as  they  appeared.  How  different,  too,  music 
sounds  after  we  have  been  trained  in  music,  from  what  it 
did  before;  and  how  different  a  machine  looks  to  the 
mechanical  engineer  from  what  it  does  to  the  layman! 
Again,  could  we  but  see  into  the  mind  of  a  dog  or  cat, 
would  it  not  be  similar  to  entering  another  world;  for 

20I 


202  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

their  world  is  a  world  of  far  fewer  objects  and  of  objects 
which  are  far  less  complex  in  their  qualities  and  in  their 
relations?  In  short,  must  not  the  world  which  is  asserted 
as  the  real  world  by  each  human  mind  be  markedly 
peculiar  and  unlike  not  only  the  world  asserted  by  the 
higher  animals  but  even  by  fellow  men? 

Thus  we  may  not  only  infer  that  there  are  as  many 
worlds  as  there  are  minds  capable  of  perceiving  and 
judging,  but  also  go  farther  and  conclude  that  the  con- 
ception of  a  real  world  totally  independent  of  each  man's 
peculiar  world  is  for  him  impossible.  The  so-called  real 
world  which  exists  regardless  of  my  mind  is  for  my 
thought  merely  my  own  world  explored  and  studied  till 
I  feel  that  I  have  done  so  exhaustively.  For  example, 
if  I  am  blind  and  try  to  conceive  the  world  perceived 
by  those  who  see,  I  have  to  build  up  my  notion  of  such 
a  world  entirely  from  my  own  world;  and  therefore  it 
never  becomes  truly  a  world  of  light  and  color  just 
because  my  world  is  totally  lacking  in  these  attributes. 
Further  evidence  supporting  our  general  conclusion  is  to 
be  found  everywhere  we  turn.  Even  the  most  perfect 
and  rigorous  sciences  are  stamped  with  the  human  trade- 
mark. Those  aspects  of  man's  world  which  are  most 
important  for  man  or  most  interesting  to  m^n  or  most 
apparent  to  man  are  the  ones  that  have  received  man's 
study.  Applied  science  is  the  mother  of  pure  science; 
and  the  possible  future  application  of  pure  science  adds 
greatly  to  its  interest  and  pursuit,  for  a  world  revealed 
by  pure  science  and  totally  lacking  elements  of  human 
interest  would  be  ignored  by  man  as  our  scientific  world 
is  ignored  by  the  dog  and  the  horse.    In  short,  even  as 


DOGMATISM  VS.   CRITICISM  20$ 

philosophers,  we  view  the  world  through  human  spec- 
tacles and  we  can  no  more  discard  these  spectacles  in  our 
intellectual  enterprise  than  we  can  totally  discard  the  in- 
stincts and  other  traits  which  govern  and  foreordain  the 
chief  directions  of  human  practical  life.  To  view  the 
world  as  it  is  or  regardless  of  the  human  point  of  view  is 
not  only  an  impossible  undertaking  but  an  absurd  en- 
deavor. 

From  this  it  is  argued  that  we  must  draw  the  following 
conclusion:  In  order  to  know  and  to  understand  the 
world  of  which  we  are  a  part  and  in  which  we  live  and 
move  and  have  our  being  we  must  first  know  and  under- 
stand the  mind  which  is  to  do  the  knowing  and  the  under- 
standing. Not  as  we  once  believed,  first  understand  the 
world  and  then  you  can  understand  man  and  his  mind; 
rather,  understand  first  man  and  his  mind  and  then  you 
can  understand  the  world.  Thus  the  theory  of  the 
mind  and  of  the  knowing  process  is  the  fundamental 
science  and  the  true  basis  of  a  scientific  conception  of 
reality.  It  is  the  fundamental  science  because  the  various 
sciences  take  their  form,  get  their  postulates,  and  have 
their  goal  chosen  for  them  by  the  minds  of  the  individual 
scientists,  and  because  on  this  account  the  study  of  these 
minds  will  reveal  the  foreordained  character  of  the  sciences. 

2.  Criticism. — That  there  should  be  a  science  of  man's 
intellect  and  of  the  nature  of  his  knowledge  (called  the 
theory  of  knowledge,  or  epistemology),  no  one  will  ques- 
tion. But  philosophers  differ  radically  in  their  answer  to 
the  question:  Is  this  science  truly  fundamental,  forming 
the  basis  of  all  other  science?  Idealists  usually  answer 
this  question  afl5rmatively.    Moreover,  they  find  in  the 


204  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

science  of  knowledge  a  powerful  body  of  evidence  in 
support  of  idealism  itself;  and  with  their  idealistic  bias 
they  behold  in  this  science  a  means  to  work  out  a  priori  a 
theory  of  reality  which  will  make  the  mind  the  centre 
and  the  controller  of  reality.  On  the  other  hand,  those 
who  deny  that  the  theory  of  knowledge  is  fundamental 
believe  that  the  idealists  are  here  guilty  of  a  grievous 
logical  treason  whereby,  through  a  coup  d'etat,  a  per- 
fectly legitimate  special  science  has  been  raised  by  them 
from  the  humble  rank  of  a  private  citizen  in  the  world  of 
science  to  be  the  infalHble  and  supreme  autocrat  and 
judge  over  all  the  other  sciences. 

As  a  result  of  this  logical  revolution  we  have  no  longer 
a  special  science  on  our  hands;  for  the  science  now 
studies  the  nature  and  growth  of  man's  knowledge  in 
order  to  learn  the  nature  of  reality,  in  order  to  learn 
whether  or  not  matter  exists,  whether  or  not  space 
and  time  are  real,  whether  or  not  the  world  is  a 
causal  system,  whether  or  not  there  can  be  any  world 
beyond  our  experience,  whether  or  not  religion  and  morals 
are  valid,  whether  or  not  God  exists.  It  has  even  tres- 
passed upon  the  fields  of  the  special  sciences.  It  has 
been  ready  to  dispute  with  mathematics  about  the 
nature  and  validity  of  the  infinite  and  the  continuum. 
It  has  attempted  to  work  out  from  the  nature  of  man's 
intellect  the  fundamental  postulates  of  mechanics  and 
physics.  Indeed  a  careful  search  through  all  the  volumes 
devoted  to  its  teachings  would  probably  find  few  special 
fields  where  it  has  not  trespassed. 

For  the  past  two  hundred  years  the  theory  of  knowl- 
edge  has   been   the  most   prominent   department  of 


DOGMATISM  VS.   CRITICISM  20$ 

philosophy;  and  it  has  been  so  because  philosophers 
have  held  this  remarkable  belief  regarding  its  place 
among  the  sciences.  It  has  supported  idealism  and 
idealism  has  supported  it,  until  the  attempt  to  separate 
the  two  is  very  difl5cult.  Hume  and  Kant,  the  great 
fathers  of  nineteenth  century  philosophical  thought, 
were  its  sponsors  and  they  gave  metaphysics  almost 
entirely  into  its  care  and  keeping.  Indeed,  for  the  past 
one  hundred  and  fifty  years  metaphysics  has  been  virtu- 
ally identified  with  the  theory  of  knowledge,  and  many 
philosophers  to-day  hardly  distinguish  between  them. 
In  general,  I  call  this  transformation  of  epistemology 
into  a  metaphysics  and  a  theory  of  reality.  Criticism. 
Opposed  then  to  criticism  is  the  doctrine  that  episte- 
mology is  but  one  of  the  special  sciences  and  is  neither 
metaphysics  nor  in  any  way  a  fundamental  science. 
This  doctrine,  which  I  now  proceed  to  defend  against 
criticism,  I  call  Dogmatism.  Before  proceeding,  however, 
let  me  make  the  doctrines  of  the  rival  standpoints  ex- 
plicit by  summing  them  up  in  two  sets  of  propositions. 

For  further  study  read: 
Paulsen,  Immanuel  Kant; 
Fischer,  Kuno,  Geschichte  der  neuem  Philosophie,  first  volume 

on  Kant; 
Kant,  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  (Watson's  Selections); 
K^nt,  Prolegomena. 

J.  The  issue  between  criticistn  and  dogmatism. — "Crit- 
icism maintains  one  or  more  of  the  following  propo- 
sitions: first,  that  in  general  the  theory  of  knowledge 
is  logically  fundamental  or  prior  to  all  other  sciences  and 
to  all  other  scientific  procedure;  secondly,  that  the  theory 


2o6  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

of  knowledge  can  ascertain  the  limits  of  the  field  of  pos- 
sible knowledge;  thirdly,  that  it  can  determine  ultimately 
the  validity  of  science  and  of  the  methods  of  science 
and  can  correct  the  results  of  science  with  the  authority 
of  a  court  of  final  resort;  and  finally,  that  it  can  give  us 
of  itself  certain  fundamental,  existential  truths,  a  theory 
of  reality.  In  opposition  to  these  claims,  dogmatism 
maintains:  first,  that  the  theory  of  knowledge  is  not 
logically  fundamental,  that  it  is  simply  one  of  the  special 
sciences  and  logically  presupposes  the  results  of  many 
of  the  other  special  sciences;  secondly,  that  the  theory  of 
knowledge  is  not  able  to  show,  except  inductively  and 
empirically,  either  what  knowledge  is  possible,  or  how 
it  is  possible,  or  again  what  are  the  limits  of  our  knowl- 
edge; and,  finally,  that  it  is  not  able  to  throw  any  light 
upon  the  nature  of  the  existent  world  or  upon  the  funda- 
mental postulates  and  generalizations  of  science,  except 
in  so  far  as  the  knowledge  of  one  natural  event  or  object 
enables  us  at  times  to  make  inferences  regarding  certain 
others;  in  short,  that  the  theory  of  knowledge  does  not 
give  us  a  theory  of  reality,  but,  on  the  contrary,  assumes 
a  theory  of  reality  of  which  it  is  not  the  author. " 

4.  The  refutation  of  criticism. — (a)  Criticism  maintains 
that  the  study  of  knowledge  is  logically  fundamental 
or  prior  to  all  other  sciences.  But  this  is  absurd,  be- 
cause if  it  were  true  then  a  student  knowing  absolutely 
nothing  about  logic,  about  physics,  or  about  biology,  that 
is,  about  man's  life  and  his  environment,  could  discover 
the  nature  of  knowledge,  the  factors  which  determine  the 
growth  of  knowledge  and  the  validity  of  knowledge. 
Evidently  such  an  independent  study  of  the  knowing 


DOGMATISM  VS.   CRITICISM  207 

process  is  impossible.  Whatever  we  know  to-day  re- 
garding the  nature  and  conditions  of  our  knowing  has 
come  through  a  long  study  not  only  of  man  and  his  mind 
but  also  of  the  environment  in  which  that  mind  has  its 
existence,  of  the  world  to  which  that  mind  has  to  react 
and  to  which  it  has  to  adjust  itself.  In  short,  instead 
of  the  theory  of  knowledge  indicating  to  us  what  the 
world  must  be  in  order  to  be  known,  the  truth  is  precisely 
the  opposite.  Learning  what  the  world  is,  has  enabled 
us  to  learn  what  man's  knowledge  is,  what  its  function 
is,  what  its  origin  and  conditions  are.  Thus  the  theory 
of  knowledge,  instead  of  being  a  fundamental  science, 
presupposes  the  results  of  almost  all  the  sciences,  certainly 
the  results  of  logic,  physics,  biology,  psychology,  social 
psychology  and  the  history  of  science. 

(b)  Again,  criticism,  in  maintaining  that  a  study  of 
the  nature  of  knowledge  can  ascertain  the  limits  of  the 
field  of  possible  knowledge,  is  asserting  what  is  untrue. 
By  no  known  means  can  I  learn  from  psychology,  or 
any  other  study  of  the  knowing  process,  what  problems, 
let  me  say,  of  physics  or  physiology,  will  prove  insolvable. 
Of  course,  some  things  may  indeed  be  for  man  quite  un- 
knowable; but  if  we  can  learn  what  these  things  are,  we 
must  do  so  by  first  learning  a  great  deal  about  the  world 
which  we  do  know.  "In  case  after  case  man  has  been 
able  to  discover  what  scholars  in  an  earlier  age  pro- 
nounced unknowable,  or  would  have  pronounced  un- 
knowable if  the  question  had  so  much  as  entered  their 
minds.  This  has  been  true  of  what  man  has  learned 
precisely  as  a  similar  truth  holds  regarding  what  he  has 
proved  himself  able  to  do  in  spite  of  an  earlier  belief 


2o8  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

that  the  deed  was  impossible.  We  have  been  able  to  see 
the  far  distant  and  the  exceeding  small,  where  centuries 
ago  such  vision  would  have  seemed  impossible.  We  have 
been  able  to  study  the  chemistry  and  the  temperature 
of  the  stars,  we  can  weigh  the  planets,  we  can  tell  with 
complete  accuracy  the  area  of  curved  figures  whose 
sides  stretch  out  to  infinity.  In  short,  precisely  as  the 
wireless  telegraph  and  telephone.  X-ray  photographs, 
and  trolley  cars  would  seem  miracles  to  Galileo  could 
we  suddenly  usher  him  from  the  seventeenth  century  into 
the  twentieth;  so  too  what  has  proved  possible  for  man 
to  learn  since  his  day  would  seem  to  him  miraculous." 
(c)  Thirdly,  criticism  maintains  that  by  stud3dng 
the  nature  of  knowledge  we  can  determine  ultimately  the 
validity  of  science  and  of  the  methods  of  science  and 
correct  the  results  of  science  with  the  authority  of  a  court 
of  final  resort.  Evidently  this  cannot  be  so  if  the  science 
of  knowledge  is  logically  indebted  to  the  sciences  which  it 
criticises,  for  such  a  procedure  would  be  a  flagrant 
vicious  circle.  In  the  course  of  its  growth  science  does 
often  find  its  theories  to  be  erroneous  and  its  methods  to 
be  inadequate;  still  the  way  in  which  this  is  discovered 
is  not  by  studying  the  nature  and  faculties  of  the  human 
mind,  but  by  studying  the  things  themselves,  the  facts. 
If  a  theory  is  false,  some  crucial  experiment  reveals  facts 
which  contradict  it.  If  a  method  is  inadequate,  its 
results  show  its  inadequacy,  or  a  more  critical  insight 
reveals  the  fallacy  involved  in  the  logical  presuppositions 
of  the  method.  Our  scientific  methods,  our  precise 
instruments  for  observation,  for  measurement,  and  in 
general  for  experimentation  are  not  the  inventions  of 


DOGMATISM  VS.   CRITICISM  209 

psychologists  and  epistemologists  but  of  the  men  actually 
working  in  the  field  of  the  special  sciences. 

(d)  Finally,  criticism  in  maintaining  that  the  theory 
of  knowledge  can  give  us  a  theory  of  reality  is  again 
guilty  of  an  evident  vicious  drcle.  No  theory  of  knowl- 
edge has  ever  been  formulated  which  upon  careful 
analysis  does  not  betray  that  it  presupposes  logically 
some  theory  of  reality,  usually  the  theory  of  reahty 
current  in  the  day  and  generation  of  its  author.  In 
other  words,  the  epistemologist  has  borrowed  his  theory 
of  reahty  from  the  sciences  and  then  after  reading  it 
into  his  theory  of  knowledge,  has  read  it  out  again. 
Moreover,  such  attempts  to  discover  through  the  nature 
of  knowledge  the  nature  of  the  world  have  been  a  dis- 
mal failure.  Idealism  is  the  chief  result  of  these  attempts, 
but  I  refer  especially  to  those  attempts  which  have  led  to 
doctrines  of  causation,  of  space  and  time,  of  matter,  and 
of  other  things  which  belong  to  the  field  of  the  special 
sciences.  The  history  of  philosophy  from  the  days  of 
Descartes  to  our  own  is  full  of  such  theories  which  have 
sooner  or  later  met  shipwreck.  The  rock  upon  which 
they  have  run,  a  harder  rock  than  any  epistemological 
theory,  is  fact.  Fact  and  fact  alone  can  give,  test,  and 
vaUdate  existential  hypotheses.  Therefore  the  sciences 
most  closely  in  touch  with  any  field  of  fact  are  alone  the 
sciences  which  have  prior  right  to  offer  us  existential 
theories  belonging  to  that  field.  Thus  when  epistemology 
commences  to  be  a  physics  or  any  other  special  existential 
science  outside  its  proper  field,  we  have  a  right  to  expect 
what  we  usually  get,  outworn,  discarded,  and,  in  general, 
erroneous  theories. 


2IO  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

5.  Conclusion. — We  must  conclude  then:  Though  "a 
correct  epistemology  can  be  full  of  valuable  suggestion 
to  the  metaphysician,  this  science  is  in  no  peculiar 
respect  nor  to  any  peculiar  extent  fundamental  to  meta- 
physics. It  is  not  peculiarly  a  part  of  metaphysics  nor 
is  it  in  any  respect  to  be  identified  with  metaphysics. 
On  the  contrary  the  truth  is  that  epistemology  is  not  a 
logically  fundamental  science,  that  the  solution  of  the 
problem  of  the  possibility  and  the  limits  of  knowledge 
is  logically  subsequent  to  some  at  least  of  the  special 
sciences,  that  epistemology  cannot  furnish  us  with  a 
theory  of  reality,  that  metaphysics  owes  logically  neither 
its  problems  nor  their  solution  to  the  theory  of  knowl- 
edge. " 

For  further  study  read: 
Woodbridge,  Field  of  Logic,  Congress  of  Arts  and  Science, 

St.  Louis,  1904,  Vol.  I; 
Marvin,  The  Emancipation  of  Metaphysics  from  Epistemology, 

in  The  New  Realism,  New  York,  1912. 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XVII 

THE  METAPHYSICS  OF  CRITICISM 

1.  Introdtiction. — As  the  subject  of  epistemology  lies 
quite  beyond  the  plan  of  this  book,  only  the  briefest  out- 
line of  the  different  epistemological  theories  will  be  given 
here,  and  this  will  be  done  solely  because  criticism  has 
transformed  these  theories  from  legitimate  inductive 
studies  into  fundamental  metaphysical  hypotheses. 
Considerable  confusion  is  inevitable  because  these  theo- 
ries have  become  closely  associated  with  metaphysics 
and  chiefly  because  current  usage  employs  many  tech- 
nical names  for  radically  distinct  theories.  The  student 
is  especially  warned  not  to  confuse  many  of  these  names 
with  the  same  names  used  in  preceding  chapters  to  denote 
radically  distinct  metaphysical  theories,  especially  the 
names,  romanticism,  rationalism,  empiricism,  realism. 
Of  course,  these  common  names  point  to  a  common  his- 
torical origin  of  the  different  theories  and  to  a  continued 
confusion  of  these  theories  in  the  minds  of  philosophers. 
I  shall  not  argue  for  or  against  any  of  the  different 
epistemological  doctrines,  but  shall  rest  satisfied  that  all 
forms  of  criticism  have  been  refuted,  no  matter  what 
epistemological  standpoint  they  represent,  and  that 
certain  epistemological  theories  are  shut  out  by  the 
metaphysics  of  those  sciences  which  are  logically  prior 
to  epistemology. 

2.  A  classification  of  epistemological  theories. — In  gen- 

221 


212  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

eral,  the  following  problems  arise  when  we  study  the 
knowing  process,  (a)  What  is  the  function  of  knowledge? 
Why  does  it  exist?  (b)  Through  what  mental  faculties 
do  we  get  our  knowledge?  (c)  What  is  the  relation  be- 
tween the  perceiver  or  knower  and  the  object  perceived 
or  known?  (d)  What  degree  of  certainty  is  attainable 
by  human  knowledge,  the  nature  of  man's  mind,  its  origin 
and  its  growth,  being  what  they  are?  This  problem  may  / 
be  called  the  problem  of  the  vahdity  of  knowledge.  \ 
(e)  Finally,  the  mind  and  its  powers  of  knowing  being 
what  they  are,  what  are  the  Hmits  of  human  knowledge? J 

(a)  The  function  of  knowledge. — Regarding  the  function 
of  knowledge  two  prominent  theories  are  entertained. 
According  to  the  first,  knowing  is  an  end  in  itself.  It  is  an 
ultimate  sui  generis  capacity  of  man  and  is  independent 
of  his  biological  history.  This  doctrine  may  be  called 
Absolutism.  Some  call  it  Intellectualism,  but  I  shall  re- 
serve this  name  for  another  doctrine.  'According  to  the 
second  theory,  knowing  is  a  vital  function,  as  are  breath- 
ing, digesting,  moving  the  arms  and  legs.  It  is  a  means  of 
adjusting  the  human  organism  to  its  environment  and,  in 
general,  a  means  of  satisfying  the  instinctive  and  acquired 
needs  of  that  organism.)  Knowledge  for  its  own  sake 
exists  only  in  the  sense  tnat  loving  and  hating,  breathing 
and  walking  exist  for  their  own  sake.  This  doctrine  is 
called  Pragmatism. 

(b)  The  source  of  information. — Regarding  the  source 
of  information  two  radically  di£ferent  theories  obtain. 
By  the  romanticist  it  is  denied  that  the  intellect  is  a  means 
by  which  we  acquire  true  knowledge.  Perception  and 
especially  feeling  alone  reveal  reality.    The  work  of  the 


THE  METAPHYSICS  OF  CRITICISM  213 

intellect  is  not  to  give  us  truth  but  solely  practical  de- 
vices by  means  of  which  conduct  can  be  guided.  For 
example,  such  a  knowledge  as  that  of  the  abstract  laws 
of  mechanics  is  only  a  means  by  which  we  construct 
machines  and  do  other  useful  things.  It  is  not  a  genuine 
knowledge  of  the  nature  of  the  real.  In  general,  science 
is  not  truth  but  a  practical  device. 

By  the  intellectualist  it  is  afl&rmed  that  not  only  the 
perceptual  experience  but  also  the  conceptual  experience 
of  mankind  is  a  genuine  means  of  acquiring  information. 
The  intellechialists  are  divided  among  themselves  into 
two  groups.  ^First,  there  are  iht  empiricists  who  maintain 
that  the  sole  source  of  the  conceptual  experience  is  the 
perceptual.  ^^  That  is,  our  conception  of  space,  of  cause 
and  effect,  of  matter,  of  number  or  of  any  imiversal  has 
arisen  from  our  sensory  experiences  by  processes  which 
the  psychologists  call  analysis  and  association.  Secondly, 
there  are  the  rationalists  who  maintain  that  the  intellect 
or  reason  is  itself  the  direct  source  of  all  or  at  least  of 
some  concepts.  Of  the  extreme  rationalists  Plato  is  the 
most  famous  among  ancient  philosophers.  Among  modem 
rationalists  Kant  is  the  one  most  widely  studied  and  fol- 
lowed. His  theory  is  called  transcendentalism.  It  teaches 
that  the  content  of  our  experience  comes  from  our  outer 
and  inner  perception,  but  that  the  general  form  of  ex- 
perience is  given  by  the  mind.  More  in  detail,  space 
and  rime  are  the  forms  of  perception,  causation  and  cer- 
tain other  laws  are  the  forms  of  the  understanding.  In 
calling  space  and  time  forms  of  perception  Kant  means 
that  it  is  not  due  to  the  content  perceived  but  to  the  mind 
that  the  sensory  world  is  a  world  in  time' and  space;  and 


214  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

in  calling  causation  a  form  of  the  understanding,  he 
means  that  the  mind  does  not  receive  its  experiences 
ordered  causally  or  cosmically  but  that  it  is  due  entirely 
to  an  activity  of  the  mind  that  the  world  appears  to  us 
a  world  and  not  a  chaos  of  sensory  elements. 

(c)  The  relation  between  the  perceiver  and  the  perceived. — 
Here  also  two  major  opinions  obtain.  The  first  theory 
is  that  of  the  epistemological  monists  who  maintain  that 
we  perceive  immediately  the  objects  of  the  world.  The 
second  is  the  theory  of  the  epistemological  dtialists  who 
believe  that  we  perceive  not  the  objects  of  the  world  but 
only  the  mental  states  to  which  these  objects  give  rise 
in  our  minds.  For  example,  the  colors  I  see  are  only 
mental  states  caused  in  me  by  some  external  agent  stim- 
ulating my  sense  organs. 

Each  of  these  groups  is  again  subdivided.  The 
epistemological  monists  are  divided  into  the  natural,  or 
naive  realists,  and  the  subjectivists;  the  dualists  are  divided 
into  the  representative,  or  inferential  realists,  and  the  phe- 
nomenalists.  (i)  The  naive  realists  believe  that  we 
perceive  immediately  the  external,  physical  world. 
(2)  The  subjectivists  believe  that  we  perceive  only 
our  own  mental  states  and  that  these  constitute  the 
external  world.  In  other  words,  they  are  idealists  and 
deny  the  existence  of  anything  but  minds  and  their  ex- 
perience. (3)  The  representative  realists  also  are  ideal- 
ists (in  the  broad  sense)  bu!;"maintain  that  there  is  an 
external  world  whose  nature  can  be  inferred  from  our 
experiences.  (4)  The  phenomenalists  deny  this  last, 
believing  that  the  true  external  world  may  be  totally 
unlike  anything  which  we  experience  or  are  capable  of 


THE  METAPHYSICS   OF  CRITICISM  215 

even  conceiving.  Finally  the  subjectivists  are  themselves 
subdivided,  as  we  already  know,  into  the  two  idealistic 
groups,  the  subjective  and  the  objective  idealists. 

(d)  Regarding  the  validity  or  certainty  of  our  knowledge 
three  beliefs  have  been  entertained,  (i)  The  absolutist^ 
(a  second  meaning  of  the  word)  maintains  that  part  of 
our  existential  knowledge  is  infallible  and  even  that  the 
general  structure  of  the  universe  can  be  known  deduct- 
ively from  infallible  existential  axioms.  (2)  The  empir- 
icist (a  second  meaning  of  the  word)  maintains  that  all 
existential  knowledge  (or  virtually  all)  is  got  inductively 
and  can  be  verified  only  by  the  trial  and  error  method. 
At  best  our  existential  knowledge  reaches  a  high  degree 
of  probability  in  the  mor^  exact  experimental  sciences. 
(3)  The  skeptic  (or  better  the  absolute  skeptic)  denies  that 
our  minds  have  power  of  knowing  reality  at  all  and  there- 
fore asserts  that  we  can  never  reach  any  degree  of  cer- 
titude in  our  existential  knowledge. 

(e)  The  limits  of  knowledge. — It  is  difficult  to  distin- 
guish this  problem  from  the  others  and  especially  from 
the  problem  immediately  preceding.  Still  none  of  these 
divisions  is  logically  rigorous,  for  all  are  matters  of  usage 
and  history  rather  than  of  final  and  rigorous  analysis. 
The  problem  is.  How  mu^h  can  we  know,  our  cognitive 
faculties  being  what  they  are?  (i)  The  gnostic  (if  I  may 
here  adopt  this  name)  believes  that  we  are  able  (as  far 
as  our  faculties  are  concerned)  to  know  everything  that 
there  is  to  know.  Practically,  of  course,  there  are  many 
things  which  we  are  unable  to  find  out  but  that  we  are 
quite  capable  of  ascertaining  were  it  not  for  lack  of 
instruments  or  other  devices.    For  example,  a  thousand 


2l6  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

years  ago  men  had  the  faculties  by  which  to  see  the  mi- 
croscopic, but  lacked  the  instruments.  To-day  we  have 
the  faculties  but  not  the  means  to  see  the  other  side  of 
the  moon  or  the  centre  of  the  earth.  (2)  The  agnostics 
claim  that  there  are  certain  ultimate  problems  which  are 
essentially  unknowable,  man's  faculties  being  what  they 
are.  We  cannot  know  the  ultimate  ground  of  the  world; 
or  as  they  were  fond  of  expressing  it,  we  can  know  only 
the  relative,  not  the  absolute.  |The  phenomenalist  must 
of  necessity  be  an  agnostic. )  (3)  Finally,  we  shall  have 
to  mention  here  too  the  skeptic,  for  he  would  maintain 
that  all  existence  is  beyond  our  powers  of  knowing. 
His  then  is  a  third  position.  All  this  uninteresting  clas- 
sification of  epistemological  theories  can  be  seen  more 
clearly  in  the  diagram  on  page  217. 

J.  The  metaphysics  of  these  theories. — It  would  be 
largely  a  repetition  of  what  has  been  said  in  several 
previous  chapters  to  point  out  the  various  metaphysical 
hypotheses  which  are  presupposed  in,  or  have,  historically 
speaking,  risen  from,  these  many  epistemological  theories. 
Idealism  is  evident,  as  are  also  many  other  issues, 
for  example,  that  between  romanticism  and  its  meta- 
physical opponent,  that  regarding  the  perception  of  uni- 
versal truths,  that  regarding  the  possibility  of  deducing 
reality  from  universal  causal  laws.  In  general,  it  can  be 
said  that  the  epistemological  theories  of  the  past  three 
hundred  years,  from  Descartes  to  our  own  day,  are  inex- 
tricably intertwined  with  metaphysical  and  therefore 
non-epistemological  doctrines.  The  dogmatist  believes 
that  this  is  greatly  to  be  lamented  and  that  it  has  wrought 
much  harm  to  the  progress  of  both  sciences,  even  bring- 


THE  METAPHYSICS  OF  CRITICISM 


217 


2l8  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

ing  both  of  them  into  disgrace  in  the  eyes  of  other 
scientists.  Metaphysics  must  be  freed  from  this  baneful 
alliance  and  so  too  must  epistemology.  Metaphysics 
must  be  purged  from  all  traces  of  criticism,  and  episte- 
mology must  take  its  place  as  one  of  the  special  sciences 
among  the  other  special  sciences.  It  must  return  to  an 
open-minded  and  modest  empirical  and  experimental 
study  of  the  facts  involved  in  knowing.  Metaphysical 
and  dialectical  controversies  have  no  more  place  here 
than  in  any  other  special  science;  and  a  substitution  of 
them  for  study  of  fact  should  have  no  place  whatever. 
When  epistemology  frees  itself  from  this  entanglement 
there  will  no  doubt  be  a  very  different  set  of  epistemo- 
logical  opinions  from  the  foregoing  to  be  classified. 
Many  of  them  will  remain  solely  as  interesting  historic 
relics,  and  the  others  will  cease  to  have  their  present 
metaphysical  connotation. 

For  further  study  read: 
Paulsen,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  Part  II; 
Smith,  Norman,  Studies  in  the  Cartesian  Philosophy,  Chap.  I; 
Dewey,  Influence  of  Darwin  on  Philosophy  and  Other  Essays; 
James,  Pragmatism; 
James,  Meaning  of  Truth; 
Russell,  Philosophical  Essays,  87-149; 
Stein,  Philosophische  Stromungen  der  Gegenwart,  33-75; 
Moore,    Experience    and    Empiricism,    Froc.    Aristotel.   Soc, 

1902-3,  j; 
Liebmann,  Zur  Analysis  der  Wirklichkeit,  ister  Abschnitt; 
Boodin,  Truth  and  Reality; 
Spencer,  First  Principles,  Part  I; 
For  references  to  classical  writings  cf.  Paulsen,  loc.  cit. 
For  further  references  to  recent  books  and  articles,  cf.  refer- 
ences given  in  Chap.  XVI. 


PART  IV 
PROBLEMS  IN  SPECIAL  METAPHYSICS 


Each  of  the  chief  branches  of  science  such  as  logic, 
mathematics,  physics,  biology,  and  pyschology  raises 
metaphysical  problems  peculiar  to  itself.  These  prob- 
lems being  special  to  parts  of  science  are  called  special 
metaphysics  in  distinction  from  the  general  metaphysics 
of  the  preceding  chapters. 

To  be  a  student  of  special  metaphysics  one  must  be 
acquainted  with  the  sciences  whose  metaphysics  is  under 
discussion,  for  one  must  consider  critically  the  detailed 
results  of  the  sciences  and  the  evidence  supporting  their* 
special  metaphysical  hypotheses.  Without  such  knowl- 
edge the  problems  cannot  but  be  obscure  and  in  many 
cases  unintelligible.  Therefore  where  the  student  lacks 
this  knowledge  completely,  he  should  not  fail  to  read 
before  studying  each  chapter  some  popular  book  or  article 
on  the  nature  of  the  science  in  question. 

Unfortunately  special  metaphysics  is  still  little  studied 
in  college  courses;  but  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  students  of 
metaphysics  in  the  years  to  come  will  again  be  what  meta- 
physicians were  in  centuries  gone  by,  masters  of  one  or 
more  of  the  special  sciences,  and  that  in  this  way  the 
workers  in  metaphysics  may  come  in  closer  touch  with 
the  workers  in  these  sciences  and  so  become  of  genuine 
assistance  to  them.  The  following  chapters  are  written 
to  invite  and  to  encourage  the  student  of  philosophy 
to  enter  the  study  of  special  metaphysics.  Each  chapter 
will  deal  with  only  a  few  problems  and  will  serve  only 
as  the  briefest  introduction,  leaving  the  student  to  con- 
tinue his  study  by  reading  some  of  the  writings  recom- 
mended. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

THE  LOGICAL 

1.  Introduction. — In  formal  logic  two  prominent  special 
metaphysical  problems  have  to  do,  (a)  with  the  subject 
matter  of  logical  study,  that  is,  with  the  nature  of  formal 
logic,  and  (b)  with  the  relation  between  the  doctrines  of 
formal  logic  and  the  existent. 

2.  The  subject  matter  of  formal  logic. — In  the  past  one 
hundred  and  fifty  years  logic  and  the  psychology  of  the 
knowing  processes  have  been  confused,  and  many  philoso- 
phers still  neglect  to  distinguish  between  them.  As  a 
result  of  this  confusion,  the  postulates  of  logic  are  often 
called  "laws  of  thought,"  as  though  they  were  mental 
laws  in  the  sense  in  which  the  law  of  association  or  habit, 
or  the  law  of  inborn  connections  is  a  mental  law.  Further, 
logic  has  been  thought  of  as  the  science  of  how  we  reason, 
as  the  science  of  how  our  knowledge  gets  built  up,  as 
the  science  of  how  we  form  general  and  abstract  ideas. 
Whereas  logic  is  nothing  of  the  sort.  The  postulates  of 
logic  are  not  laws  of  thought,  not  more  so  than  is  the 
law  of  gravitation.  Logic  does  not  study  the  mind  nor 
any  of  the  •  thought  processes  nor  has  it  anything  espe- 
cially in  common  with  psychology.  The  two  sciences 
are  absolutely  distinct. 

Logic  is  "the  study  of  the  various  general  types  of 
deduction. "    As  such  it  studies  those  general  properties 

221 


222  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

of  propositions,  of  classes  and  of  relations,  knowledge 
of  which  enables  us  to  infer  the  truth  of  one  proposition 
from  the  truth  of  other  propositions.  Such  a  study  is 
of  entities  and  relations  which  are  quite  non-mental 
and  non-human  in  the  same  sense  as  is  a  multiplication 
table  or  the  value  of  ir.  Moreover,  these  entities  and 
relations  are  discovered  as  truly  as  America  was  dis- 
covered by  Columbus;  for  they  would  be  there  to  be 
discovered  if  man  and  his  mind  had  never  existed, 
precisely  as  would  be  the  functional  relation  between  the 
pressure  and  the  volume  of  a  gas  or  between  the  speed 
of  the  earth  and  its  distance  from  the  sun. 

The  confusion  of  logic  with  the  study  of  man's  reason- 
ing processes  has  probably  arisen  from  the  fact  that  we 
always  use  logical  information  in  our  reasoning.  But 
it  should  have  been  noticed  that  in  our  reasoning  we  use 
also  other  bodies  of  information,  depending  upon  the 
topic  under  study,  and  that  we  use  logic  precisely  in  the 
same  way  in  which  we  use  this  other  information,  that 
is,  we  use  the  truths  of  logic  as  premises.  For  example, 
we  use  logic  in  the  same  way  in  which  we  use  physics. 
"We  make  use  of  the  laws  or  propositions  of  physics  as 
premises  or  as  formulce  for  whose  variables  we  substitute 
constants.  Let  me  illustrate.  I  want  to  know  how  far 
a  projectile  will  go  if  it  leaves  the  ground  at  a  given  angle 
and  at  a  given  velocity.  Physics  gives  me  formulae  which 
if  I  use  as  premises  along  with  the  given  conditions  also 
used  as  premises,  I  can  infer  the  proposition  which  I 
wish  to  know.  Again,  mathematics  tells  me  {a+by  = 
a^+2ab+b^.  I  want  to  know  the  square  of  27.  How 
then  do  I  use  (in  my  reasoning)  this  information?    We 


THE  LOGICAL  223 

substitute,  let  us  say,  for  a  20  and  for  6  7;  that  is,  we 
substitute  constants  for  the  variables  in  the  equation. 
Thus  (20+7)^=400+280+49  =  729.  Hence  to  use 
physics  or  any  other  exact  or  natural  science  in  our 
reasoning  is  to  adopt  its  propositions  as  premises.  The 
same  thing  is  true  when  we  use  logic  in  our  reasoning. 
The  results  or  truths  of  logic  are  assertions,  as  we  have 
said,  regarding  the  relations  of  classes  and  propositions. 
Further,  these  results  of  logic  are  usually  formulae,  that 
is,  propositions  whose  terms  are  variables.  Thus,  if 
any  class  a  is  contained  in  another  class  h,  and  if  this  class 
b,  in  turn  is  contained  in  a  third  class  c,  then  the  first 
class  a  is  contained  in  the  third  class  c;  or  more  precisely 
stated,  [{a<h){h<c)]  implies  {a<c),  where  a,  h,  c,  repre- 
sent any  class.  Here  is  a  logical  formula  taken  from  the 
logic  of  classes.  How  do  we  use  it  in  our  reasoning? 
Assuming  it  as  true,  we  substitute  constants  for  its 
variables.  For  example,  if  this  formula  is  true,  and 
if  the  class  men  is  included  in  the  class  mortals,  and 
if  Socrates  is  a  member  of  the  class  men,  then  Socrates 
is  a  member  of  the  class  mortals.  Every  student  will 
agree  that  logic  is  not  concerned  with  Socrates  or  man 
but  with  something  more  general.  But  notice  what  this 
means:  Logic  is  concerned  with  variables.  It  gives  us 
formulcB.  If  so,  and  if  we  always  use  logic  in  our  reasoning 
we  shall  find,  no  matter  what  instance  of  reasoning  we 
may  take  instead  of  the  trite  example  aforegiven,  that 
some  formula  is  presupposed  by  it.  That  a  formula 
is  presupposed  means  that  it  is  assumed  as  a  premise 
which  we  have  used  by  substituting  constants  in  place 
of  its  variables.    In  short,  to  use  logic  means  to  sub- 


224  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

stitute  in  a  formula  constants  for  the  variables  of  tin 
formula  and  then  to  assert  one  of  the  resulting  proposi- 
tions, namely,  the  one  found  in  that  part  of  the  formula 
called  the  conclusion.  But  this,  we  know,  is  precisely 
what  we  do  when  we  use  physical  formulae  in  our  reason- 
ing. " 

"'Yet,'  you  ask,  'is  not  logic  the  science  or  art  of 
correct  reasoning?  and  is  not  reasoning  a  mental  proc- 
ess?' No,  logic  is  not.  Of  course  there  is  such  a  study 
or  art,  and  of  course  there  is  excellent  authority  for  the 
use  of  the  word  logic  as  the  name  of  this  art.  But  the 
art  called  logic,  when  examined  critically  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  pure  sciences,  is  a  conglomerate  of  many 
sciences  applied  to  solving  one  type  of  practical  problem. 
In  short,  it  is  the  application  of  information  from  many 
scientific  sources.  It  draws  on  pure  logic,  on  psychology, 
on  mathematics;  indeed,  I  should  fear  to  mention  the 
pure  science  upon  which  it  should  not  draw. " 

To  conclude:  the  subject  matter  of  a  science  depends 
upon  the  terms  and  relations  to  be  found  in  the  proposi- 
tions constituting  the  science.  In  the  case  of  logic  these 
are  such  terms  as  propositions,  propositional  functions, 
classes,  t3^es  of  relation;  and  such  terms  are  as  truly 
non-mental  as  are  rocks  and  ocean  currents.  In  other 
words,  logic  is  not  a  science  of  the  knowing  process,  its 
principles  and  formulae  are  not  laws  of  thought,  its  terms 
and  relations  are  as  clearly  distinct  from  those  of  thought 
as  are  the  terms  and  relations  of  physics. 

Formal  logic  has  made  great  progress  in  the  last 
sixty  years  (since  the  work  of  Boole,  "Laws  of  Thought" 
1854),  and  this  progress  has  enabled  us  to  see  far  better 


THE   LOGICAL  225 

the  true  nature  of  the  science.  It  has  done  so  in  two 
respects.  It  has  shown  that  there  are  other  types  of 
deduction  besides  the  syllogism,  opening  up  to  our 
view  especially  the  logic  of  relations;  and  it  has  shown 
the  great  value  of  formalism,  or  symbolism,  for  logical 
research.  In  the  words  of  Mr.  Bertrand  Russell, 
"What  is  now  required  is  to  give  the  greatest  possible 
development  to  mathematical  logic,  to  allow  to  the  full 
the  importance  of  relations,  and  then  to  found  upon 
this  secure  basis  a  new  philosophical  logic,  which  may 
hope  to  borrow  some  of  the  exactitude  and  certainty  of 
its  mathematical  foundation.  If  this  can  be  successfully 
accompUshed,  there  is  every  reason  to  hope  that  the  near 
future  will  be  as  great  an  epoch  in  pure  philosophy  as 
the  immediate  past  has  been  in  the  principles  of  mathe- 
mathics." 

J.  Logic  and  existence. — Thus  interpreted,  logic  reveals 
its  own  narrow  Hmits,  and  these  narrow  limits  cause  us 
to  call  logic  a  non-existential  science.  Though  the 
principles  of  logic  and  the  calculus  founded  upon  these 
principles  give  us,  in  spite  of  the  narrowness  of  the 
science,  a  most  important  and  widely  useful  body  of 
information;  still  this  information  can  be  so  formulated 
that  it  does  not  commit  the  logician  to  asserted  existen- 
tial propositions.  On  this  account  his  science  remains 
non-existential.  That  is,  it  can  be  so  formulated  that 
its  conclusions  merely  assert  the  consequences  of  certain 
postulates  without  regard  to  the  further  question.  Are 
these  postulates  true  and  which  of  them  are  found  veri- 
fied in  the  existent  world?  It  can  demonstrate  that  if 
the  law  of  the  syllogism  and  certain  other  postulates  of 


226  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

logic  are  true,  then  such  and  such  formulae  for  deduction 
are  valid.  But  from  the  nature  of  the  case  it  cannot 
demonstrate  its  own  original  premises;  and  as  it  is 
logically  prior  to  all  other  deduction,  no  other  science 
can  do  so  either.  Of  course,  this  does  not  mean  that  the 
logician  is  in  doubt  about  the  truth  of  his  premises 
or  that  he  doubts  that  his  conclusions  are  verified  by 
existence.  Nor  does  it  mean  that  the  existent  world 
and  perceived  truths  are  not  the  stimulus  to  his  research 
and  the  source  of  his  information.  If  this  were  its 
meaning,  logic  would  be  purely  arbitrary,  a  game  instead 
of  a  science.  In  other  words,  the  statement,  logic  is 
non-existential,  means  that  the  nature  of  existence  is 
not  a  problem  of  logic. 

For  further  study  read: 
Woodbridge,  The  Field  of  Logic,  Congress  of  Arts  and  Science, 
St.  Louis,  1904,  Vol.  I. 

For  more  extenstve  study  read: 
Husserl,  Logische  Untersuchungen. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE  MATHEMATICAL  ^ 

I.  The  nature  of  mathematics. — Nowhere  has  greater 
progress  been  made  in  philosophical  thought  during  the 
past  fifty  years  than  in  mathematics.  Indeed  this  prog- 
ress has  been  so  great  that-  it  inspires  the  hope  that 
''pure  thought  may  achieve"  within  our  century  "such 
results  as  will  place  our  time  in  this  respect  on  a  level 
with  the  greatest  age  of  Greece."  The  world  owes  to  the 
philosophical  mathematicians  of  the  nineteenth  century 
the  important  discovery  of  the  nature  of  mathematical 
truth,  a  discovery  which  helps  to  solve  many  a  vexed 
philosophical  problem.  Briefly,  it  has  been  shown  that 
the  various  divisions  of  mathematics  form  branches  of  one 
science,  that  the  fundamental  notions  and  premises  of 
all  mathematics  belong  to  formal  logic,  in  other  words, 
that  mathematics  follows  from  formal  logic,  and  finally 
that  mathematics  is  a  non-existential  science.  The  dis- 
covery of  the  unity  of  mathematical  science  reveals  that 
the  older  notion  of  it  as  the  science  of  quantity  and  of 
space  is  quite  erroneous.  "Pure  mathematics  consist 
entirely  of  asservations  to  the  effect  that,  if  such  and 
such  a  proposition  is  true  of  anything,  then  such  and  such 

'  If  the  student  is  not  familiar  with  the  subject-matter  of  this  chapter 
he  should  read  before  studying  it :  Whitehead,  An  Introduction  to  Mathe- 
matics (Home  University  Library  of  Modern  Knowledge);  and  Young, 
Lectures  on  Fundamental  Concepts  of  Algebra  and  Geometry. 

237 


228  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

another  proposition  is  true  of  that  thing.  It  is  essential 
not  to  discuss  whether  the  first  proposition  is  really  true, 
and  not  to  mention  what  the  anything  is,  of  which  it  is 
supposed  to  be  true.  Both  these  points  would  belong 
to  appHed  mathematics.  We  start,  in  pure  mathematics, 
from  certain  rules  of  inference,  by  which  we  can  infer 
that  if  one  proposition  is  true,  then  so  is  some  other 
proposition.  These  rules  of  inference  constitute  the 
principles  of  formal  logic.  We  then  take  any  hypothesis 
that  seems  assuring,  and  deduce  its  consequences,  if  our 
hypothesis  is  about  anything,  and  not  about  some  one 
or  more  particular  things,  then  our  deductions  con- 
stitute mathematics."    [Russell] 

2.  Mathematics  deducible  from  formal  logic. — It  is 
familiar  to  all  students  that  elementary  textbooks  on 
geometry  begin  with  a  hst  of  definitions,  axioms  and 
postulates  and  that  the  remainder  of  the  subject  is  pre- 
sented as  a  deduction  from  the  first  assumptions.  Now 
it  has  been  found  that  all  of  mathematics  including 
geometry  as  well  as  arithmetic  and  analysis  is  deducible 
from  a  small  number  of  indemonstrable  propositions 
belonging  to  formal  logic,  such  as  the  principle  of  the 
syllogism.  Moreover,  it  is  found  that  mathematics  uses 
only  a  few  fundamental  notions  and  that  these  too  are 
logical. 

The  identification  of  the  foundations  of  mathematics 
with  logical  postulates  and  notions  causes  considerable 
misunderstanding.  It  does  not  mean  that  mathematics 
was  and  is  discovered  in  this  way;  for  no  doubt  intuition 
and  imagination  play  as  important  a  role  in  the  discovery 
of  mathematical  truth  as  is  usually  claimed  for  them. 


THE  MATHEMATICAL  229 

But  the  means  by  which  a  truth  is  discovered  are  quite 
irrelevant  to  the  philosophical  questions:  Why  is  it  true? 
What  does  it  presuppose?  Again  this  identification  of 
the  foundations  of  mathematics  with  logical  postulates 
and  notions  does  not  mean  that  we  had  to  wait  until 
mathematics  was  explicitly  and  rigorously  deduced  from 
logical  indemonstrables  before  we  could  know  this  or 
that  mathematical  proposition  to  be  true.  For  example, 
we  did  not  have  so  to  demonstrate  that  two  plus  two 
equals  four,  before  we  knew  it  to  be  true.  Still  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  many  a  mathematical  error  and  incon- 
sistency has  come  to  light  through  the  effort  to  make 
mathematical  demonstration  thoroughly  explicit  and 
rigorous.  Finally,  when  it  is  said  that  no  new  terms 
except  those  definable  through  logical  notions  are  in- 
troduced into  the  premises  of  mathematical  demon- 
strations, this  statement  does  not  mean  that  the  act  of 
forming  a  new  definition  is  not  introducing  new  matter, 
is  not  a  foresight  of  the  direction  in  which  our  research 
should  proceed.  Rather  the  statement  means  simply 
what  it  says,  that  in  introducing  the  new  notion  we  can 
define  this  notion  ultimately  in  terms  of  logical  indefin- 
ables. 

J.  Mathematics  as  a  non-existential  science. — What 
was  said  regarding  the  non-existential  character  of  logic 
is  relevant  also  to  mathematics.  Mathematics  does  not 
make  assertions  regarding  particular  things  but  regarding 
anything  that  fulfils  certain  conditions.  In  other  words, 
it  asserts  implications  between  propositions  which  con- 
tain variables.  Whether  or  not  there  exist  objects  which 
fulfil  the  conditions  of  the  premises  is  a  very  important 


230  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

matter,  but  a  matter  that  is  irrelevant  to  mathematics. 
Of  course,  the  mathematician  believes  that  his  premises 
are  true  and  believes  that  his  results  can  be  applied  to 
individual  existing  objects;  and  of  course,  it  was  a  study 
of  things  which  made  man  discover  numbers,  space  and 
some  of  their  notable  properties.  But,  to  repeat,  this 
is  irrelevant  to  mathematics. 

Indeed  one  of  the  most  important  philosophical  les- 
sons which  mathematics  teaches  is  that  we  cannot  argue 
directly  from  mathematics  to  existence  without  bring- 
ing in  additional  information  derivable  only  from  a  study 
of  particular  facts.  For  example,  a  non-euclidian  space, 
finite  in  extent  and  its  shortest  distances  measured  on 
curved  lines,  is  mathematically  as  genuine  a  possibility 
as  is  an  euclidian  space.  Hence  the  question  whether  or 
not  existent  space  is  euclidian,  cannot  be  answered 
by  mathematics,  but  only  by  facts  which  can  give  us  a 
crucial  test  between  the  unlike  consequences  of  the  two 
geometries.  It  even  happens  that  we  lack  such  a  crucial 
test  and  that  we  may  never  find  it.  In  other  words,  one 
of  the  great  strongholds  of  the  older  rationalistic  theories 
of  reality  must  capitulate.  Pure  mathematical  thought 
apart  from  empirical  research  will  not  reveal  the  nature 
of  existent  space  and  time,  will  not  show  whether  our 
world  is  finite  or  infinite,  will  not  tell  us  of  the  ultimate 
nature  of  matter  and  whether  matter  is  continuous  or 
discrete,  monistic  or  atomic.  Thus  though  mathematics 
is  a  great  victory  of  pure  thought  and  so  a  triumph  for 
the  rationalist,  it  is  a  still  greater  victory  for  the 
empiricist. 

4.  Some  mathematical  results  of  great  philosophical  im- 


THE  MATHEMATICAL  23 1 

portance,  (a)  class,  number,  order. — Points  of  great  im- 
portance in  the  philosophy  of  mathematics  are  the  funda- 
mental character  of  the  notions  of  class,  of  membership  in 
a  class,  and  of  order  and  the  dependence  of  mathematics 
upon  the  logic  of  relations.  In  terms  of  the  notion  of 
class  and  of  correspondence  the  notion  of  number  is 
defined.  A  number  is  a  class  of  classes  whose  members 
can  be  put  into  one  to  one  correspondence.  Without 
taking  up  the  subject  of  numbers  which  the  student  must 
get  from  books  dealing  at  some  length  with  the  funda- 
mental concepts  of  mathematics,  I  will  indicate  briefly 
the  importance  of  this  definition  of  number.  It  shows 
that  counting  or  any  other  mental  process  has  nothing 
to  do  with  the  nature  of  number,  that  any  order  of  the 
members  of  a  class,  and  in  particular  the  order  which 
would  be  presupposed  in  counting,  is  quite  irrelevant 
and  that  a  class  with  an  infinite  number  of  members 
has  a  number  as  truly  as  has  a  class  with  a  finite  mem- 
bership. 

The  notion  of  order  is  presupposed  in  the  notion  of 
series  and  this,  in  particular,  is  presupposed  in  geometry. 
That  is,  geometry  is  not  a  science  of  space  but  a  science 
of  series,  a  science  of  series  of  two  or  more  dimensions. 
It  is  even  a  question  if  geometry  and  algebra  are  not 
abstractly  equivalent.  In  any  case  geometry  does  not 
presuppose  space  but  builds  up  the  properties  of  space 
from  a  consideration  of  sets,  or  classes  of  points. 

(b)  Space  and  time. — This  brings  us  to  a  classical  prob- 
lem in  philosophy,  the  nature  of  space  and  of  time.  The 
space  and  time  of  pure  mathematics  are  simply  series  of 
one  or  more  dimensions.    These  series  are  infinite  and 


232  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

continuous  aggregates  respectively  of  points  or  of  in- 
stants. To  what  extent  the  results  of  pure  mathematics 
describe  and  explain  existent  time  and  space  is  strictly  not 
a  question  in  mathematics  at  all.  Rather  we  shall  have 
to  say  that  if  real  space  and  time  have  certain  proper- 
ties (conform  with  certain  mathematical  postulates) 
then  the  mathematical  consequences  of  these  postulates 
are  true  of  space  and  of  time.  How  can  this  be  ascer- 
tained? I  know  no  way  to  do  so  other  than  the  way  we 
have  already  discussed,  that  is,  to  ascertain  whether  or 
not  such  a  theory  explains  the  known  facts  and  leads  to 
predictions  verified  by  observations  and  experiment.  Of 
course,  the  scientist,  and  every  civilized  man,  finds  a 
wonderful  agreement  between  fact  and  mathematical 
prediction  and  is  led  to  beUeve  that  real  space  and  real 
time  have  indeed  the  properties  which  make  such  an 
agreement  possible.  None  the  less  the  natiure  of  real 
space  and  time  remains  an  empirical  problem  and  the 
utmost  degree  of  certainty  regarding  their  nature  war- 
ranted by  our  present  geometrical  knowledge  remains 
high  probability. 

(c)  Matter,  change  and  motion. — ^As  a  notion  of  pure 
mathematics,  or  pure  mechanics,  matter  too  seems 
far  simpler  than  the  physical  object  we  perceive.  A 
material  particle  is  an  entity  which  correlates  points  of 
space  and  instants  of  time,  that  is,  it  is  an  entity  related 
to  the  two  types  of  series.  Its  motion  is  again  but  a  cor- 
relation of  different  points  of  space  mth  different  points 
of  time,  and  its  rest  is  but  a  correlation  of  two  or  more 
instants  of  time  with  the  same  point  of  space.  Strictly 
speaking,  a  moving  particle  is  at  rest  at  each  instant  of 


THE  MATHEMATICAL  233 

time  and  point  of  space  and  its  motion  is  but  the  set  of 
different  positions  which  are  correlated  through  it  with 
different  instants  of  time.  In  short,  change  and  motion 
are  not  fundamental  notions,  for  mathematics  analyzes 
them  into  correlations  between  series  which  have  no 
such  property  as  motion  and  change.  The  world  of 
mathematics  is  static.  It  is  all  there,  infinite  time  as 
truly  as  infinite  space.  It  has  no  change  or  motion  as  we 
perceive  these  but  simply  the  infinitely  many  correla- 
tions between  the  spatial  series  and  the  time  series. 
In  this  way  the  mathematician  solves  the  ancient  para- 
doxes, known  as  the  paradoxes  of  Zeno,  which  arose  from 
the  assumption  that  a  moving  body  must  move  at  each 
point  of  space. 

Are  the  matter,  motion  and  change  of  mathematics 
real?  This  again  is  to  ask  the  question  whether  or  not 
they  explain  fact  and  predict  it?  So  great  have  been  the 
triumphs  of  mechanical  explanation  and  of  the  practical 
appUcation  of  mechanical  knowledge  that  it  is  highly 
probable  that  whatever  other  properties  real  matter  and 
motion  may  have  they  are  in  some  respects  genuinely 
mechanical. 

(d) — The  mathematical  infinite  and  the  continuum. — 
For  nothing  is  the  philosopher  more  indebted  to  the 
mathematican  than  for  clearing  up  the  ancient  and  ob- 
scure notions  of  the  infinite  and  the  continuum,  which 
the  mathematician  has  now  made  both  lucid  and  rigor- 
ous. A  class  has  an  infinite  number  of  members  when  a 
part  of  the  class  can  be  put  into  one  to  one  correspondence 
with  the  whole  class.  For  example,  the  even  integers 
2. 4.  6.  etc.,  can  be  put  into  one  to  one  correspondence 


234  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

with  the  integers,  thus  \  ^;  ^;  g]  ^^  ^^  '[^;[  and  so  form 
an  infinite  class.  Again,  the  points  of  a  line  an  inch 
long  can  be  put  into  one  to  one  correspondence  with  the 
points  of  a  line  a  foot  long  or  a  thousand  miles  long,  and 
so  these  lines  must  be  classes,  or  sets  of  infinite  points. 
To  proceed  to  the  notion  of  the  continuum;  the  con- 
tinuimi  is  a  series  which  has  as  one  of  its  several  properties 
that  between  any  two  members  there  is  a  third  member. 
In  short,  a  line  as  a  continuum  has  no  points  next  to  one 
another,  for  between  any  two  indicated  points  there  is 
by  definition  a  third  point.  ^ 

The  ascertainment  of  the  nature  of  the  infinite  and  of 
the  continuum  is  in  particular  of  importance  to  philos- 
ophy, for  it  enables  the  mathematician  to  clear  up  sev- 
eral ancient  paradoxes  and  so  called  antinomies  regarding 
the  infinite  and  the  continuum.  He  shows  that  these 
notions  are  free  from  contradiction;  and  again  through  the 
non-existential  character  of  his  theories  he  shows  that 
whether  or  not  the  existent  world  contains  infinite  classes 
and  continua  is  an  empirical  question,  and  not  a  question 
of  pure  mathematics.  But  here  again  it  must  be  added: 
That  so  many  existential  problems  can  be  solved  by 
mathematics,  forces  us  to  beheve  that  the  mathematician 
has  been  discovering  fundamental  and  most  important 
parts  of  all  future  theories  of  reality. 

For  further  study  read: 
Russell,  Recent  Work  on  the  Principles  of  Mathematics,  Intef' 
national  Monthly,  1901,  4; 

^  Adequate  knowledge  of  all  these  matters  must  be  obtained  from 
special  books  on  the  principles  of  mathematics. 


THE   MATHEMATICAL  235 

Cohen,  The  Present  Situation  in  the  Philosophy  of  Mathe- 
matics, J.  of  Philos.,  Psychol.,  etc.,  191 1,  8. 

For  more  extensive  study  read: 
Whitehead,  An  Introduction  to  Mathematics; 
Young,  J.  W.,  Lectures  on  Fundamental  Concepts  of  Algebra 

and  Geometry; 
Couturat,  Les  Principes  des  Mathematiques; 
Himtington,  The  Continuum  as  a  Type  of  Order  (Ofifprint  from 

Annals  of  Mathematics,  1905); 
Poincare,  Science  and  Hypothesis; 
Poincar6,  Science  et  Methode,  Paris,  1909. 

For  advanced  study  read: 
Riissell,  Principles  of  Mathematics; 
Whitehead  and  Russell,  Principia  Mathematica; 
Cassirer,  Substanzbegriff  und  Funktionsbegriff,  Berlin,  1910. 


CHAPTER  XX 


THE  PHYSICAL 


I.  Introdtiction. — The  metaphysics  of  the  physical  is 
especially  interesting,  because  in  no  other  field  of  science 
have  we  facts  so  thoroughly  authentic,  and  theories  so 
rigorously  formulated,  and  at  the  same  time  so  little 
agreement  and  certainty  regarding  the  logical  foundations 
of  the  science  itself.  Students  of  physics  have  raised  sev- 
eral of  the  metaphysical  issues  discussed  in  the  preceding 
chapters  but  they  have  raised  in  addition  numerous  and 
important  special  metaphysical  issues.  In  these  special 
metaphysical  issues  it  is  astonishing  how  far  apart  are 
the  differing  sides.  For  example,  some  physicists 
regard  mechanics  as  the  logical  basis  of  all  physics, 
others  maintain  that  mechanics  is  but  a  branch  of  physics. 
Some  physicists  regard  physical  theory  as  genuinely 
existential,  others  believe  it  to  imply  in  no  way  the 
existence  of  anything  but  the  facts  it  explains.  Some 
physicists  are  atomists  and  believe  that  all  facts  are  to  be 
explained  ultimately  in  terms  of  mass  particles  and  their 
motion;  others  believe  that  motion  is  only  one  of  several 
irreducible  forms  of  energy,  such  as  heat,  light,  electricity, 
and  chemical  energy.  Yet  with  all  this  difference  in 
theory,  there  is  almost  complete  agreement  regarding  the 
facts  and  the  experimental  results  of  the  science.    For 

236 


THE  PHYSICAL  237 

example,  two  chemists,  the  one  believing  firmly  in  the 
existence  of  chemical  atoms,  and  the  other  questioning 
their  existence,  may  agree  thoroughly  regarding  all  the 
experimental  data  of  chemistry  and  the  empirical  general- 
izations which  summarize  these  data. 

Another  factor  which  makes  physics  to-day  especially 
interesting  to  the  student  of  metaphysics  is  the  revolu- 
tionary discoveries  in  the  field  of  radioactivity.  These 
discoveries  promise  to  modify  the  foundations  of  physical 
theory  in  two  respects:  they  promise  to  enable  us  to 
unify  chemical-physical  theories  to  a  far  greater  extent 
than  have  the  facts  heretofore  known;  and  they  indicate 
that  the  laws  of  electricity  and  magnetism  may  prove 
to  be  logically  fimdamental  to  the  remainder  of  physical 
theory. 

The  metaphysical  problems  of  physics  which  will  be 
studied  in  this  chapter  are  the  following:  the  definition 
of  the  physical;  the  rival  physical  theories,  mechanics 
and  energetics;  and  the  relation  between  physical  theory 
and  physical  existence.^ 

2.  The  definition  of  the  physical. — One  of  the  most 
obvious  characteristics  of  physical  science  (including 
chemistry)  is  the  large  part  played  in  it  by  exact  measure- 
ment, and  by  mathematical  calculation  and  demonstra- 
tion. The  facts  sought  in  the  laboratory  are  usually,  if 
not  always,  quantitative  relations  between  the  properties 
of  the  objects  studied  as  these  objects  interact,  change 

'  The  student  who  is  not  familiar  with  the  subject-matter  of  this 
chapter  should  read  before  studying  it  some  of  the  books  and  articles 
referred  to  at  the  end  of  the  chapter  under  the  heading  "For  further 
study,"  especially  the  books  or  articles  by  Soddy,  Poincar6,  Ostwald, 
Singer,  Boltzmann  and  More. 


238  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

or  remain  constant.  Again,  the  theories  believed  to 
explain  these  facts  are  usually  mathematical  equations 
or  deductions  from  mathematical  equations  postulated 
as  general  physical  laws.  Finally,  the  terms  and  relations 
to  be  foimd  in  these  theories  are  to  a  large  extent  either 
mathematical  or  definable  by  mathematical  expressions. 
For  example,  if  we  ask  the  physicist:  What  is  electricity? 
we  are  liable  to  be  told  it  is  a  term  which  appears  in 
certain  equations,  such  as  Q  in  the  equations  Q=fldt,  or 
W=QE.  That  is,  electricity  is  a  term  definable  by  an 
equation,  by  a  certain  mathematical  relation  between 
certain  terms.  The  same  truth  holds  of  most  every 
physical  term  one  can  mention.  Even  when  at  first 
thought  this  may  not  seem  to  be  true  of  the  qualitative 
differences  between  things  to  which  we  refer  in  giving 
their  chemical  composition,  further  thought  will  con- 
vince us  that  it  is  true;  for  the  better  known  the  chemical 
elements  have  become  the  more  do  their  properties  turn 
out  to  be  mathematical  relations,  such  as  atomic  weights, 
specific  heats  and  valencies.  In  short,  physical  fact  and 
physical  theory  are  essentially  mathematical  relation- 
ships. 

If  this  be  so,  how  shall  we  define  the  physical?  The 
physical  is  a  system  of  propositions  made  up  on  the  one 
hand  of  facts,  observable  mathematical  relations  be- 
tween terms,  and  on  the  other  hand  of  the  explanations 
of  these  facts.  These  explanations  in  turn  are  proposi- 
tions asserting  mathematical  relations  between  terms,  and 
finally  these  terms  are  either  indefinable  or  definable 
by  mathematical  equations.  In  other  words,  the  physical 
is  a  collection  of  measurements  and  their  explanation. 


THE  PHYSICAL  239 

However,  this  account  of  the  physical  does  not  yet 
define  it  completely;  for  the  science  thus  defined  is  too 
broad,  including  not  only  physics  but  the  entire  field  of 
applied  mathematics.  We  can  narrow  our  definition 
by  pointing  out  that  the  facts  of  physics  are  always 
the  relations  of  motion  or  some  other  type  of  change 
taking  place  in  time  and  space.  Thus  our  definition 
becomes.  The  physical  is  the  mathematical  relations 
found  in  the  changes  taking  place  in  time  and  space  and 
their  mathematical   explanation. 

These  changes,  including  the  static  which  is  the  zero  of 
change,  are  motion,  chemical  reactions,  changes  in  tem- 
perature, changes  in  electro-magnetic  fields,  changes  in 
light  and  so  on  through  the  famihar  list  of  physical  fact, 
which  can  be  summed  up  in  the  words,  the  phenomena 
of  matter  and  energy.  These  terms,  however,  have  been 
avoided  in  our  definition  even  when  it  would  have  been 
easier  to  define  physical  science  as  the  science  of  matter 
and  energy.  They  have  been  avoided  for  the  sake  of 
logical  rigor,  since  we  expect  physical  science  to  define 
them  and  not  to  start  with  them  as  physical  indefin- 
ables,  that  is,  we  expect  physics  to  tell  us  what  matter 
and  energy  are  rather  than  to  presuppose  that  we 
already  know  what  they  are. 

As  our  definition  of  the  physical  was  at  first  too  broad, 
is  it  not  now  too  narrow?  Can  we  limit  physical  science 
to  that  which  can  be  expressed  mathematically?  Of 
course,  the  facts  alone  can  decide.  At  present  at  least, 
physical  science  is  tending  to  become  altogether  a  science 
of  exact  measurement  and  mathematical  explanation. 
In  this  it  is  radically  unlike  the  ancient  physics  in  which 


240  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

substances  and  qualities  are  the  instruments  of  explana- 
tion. Hence  though  our  definition  involves  prophecy 
as  well  as  description,  it  seems  to  be  true  to  the  convic- 
tions of  our  time. 

J.  Mechanics  and  energetics. — There  are  to-day  in 
physical  science  at  least  two  prominent  and  nearly 
fundamental  special  metaphysical  problems.  The  first 
of  these  is  whether  mechanics  is  only  a  branch  of  physical 
science  or  is  fundamental  to  all  physical  science?  If 
mechanics  is  fundamental  then  all  tj^es  of  energy,  such 
as  light,  heat,  electricity,  magnetism,  gravity,  and  chemi- 
cal energy  are  reducible  to  kinetic  energy.  K  on  the 
other  hand  mechanics  is  not  fundamental  then  all  or 
some  of  these  types  of  energy  are  fundamental,  and 
therefore  irreducible.  The  second  prominent  special 
metaphysical  problem  is  that  of  the  relationship  between 
physical  theory  and  physical  existence. 

Before  proceeding  with  the  study  of  the  first  problem 
we  must  understand  precisely  what  we  mean  by  the 
word  "irreducible."  Let  us  take  a  specific  instance: 
The  temperature  of  a  gas  is  said  to  be  reducible  to  the 
kinetic  energy  of  the  molecules  of  the  gas.  Here  the 
word  reducible  means  that  the  properties  correlated 
with  the  temperature  of  a  gas  are  deducible  from  postu- 
lates held  to  be  true  of  the  kinetic  energy  of  its  molecules 
or  that  these  properties  are  correlated  in  a  one  to  one 
correspondence  with  properties  that  can  be  so  deduced. 
For  example,  if  the  pressure  of  a  gas  rises  with  the  temper- 
ature, this  increase  in  pressure  can  be  deduced  from  the 
more  violent  bombardment  of  the  molecules  whose 
kinetic  energy  increases  in  a  one  to  one  correspondence 


THE  PHYSICAL  24I 

with  the  mcrease  in  temperature.  Notice  that  the  word 
"reducible"  is  ambiguous,  for  it  means  that  either  a 
given  property  is  deducible  or  that  it  can  be  put  into  a 
one  to  one  correspondence  with  a  property  that  is  de- 
ducible without  making  explicit  which  of  these  two  prop- 
ositions is  meant. 

This  ambiguity  is  a  matter  of  importance.  When  the 
mechanist  maintains  that  light  is  an  undulation  in  the 
ether  or  that  a  chemical  compound  is  made  up  of  such 
and  such  chemical  atoms  each  with  its  respective  valence, 
he  may  mean  three  different  things.  He  may  mean  that 
light  is  absolutely  identical  with  such  undulations,  or 
that  the  compound  is  identical  with  the  sum  of  its  atoms; 
or  he  may  mean  that  the  properties  of  light  or  of  the 
chemical  compound  are  entirely  deducible  from  the 
respective  hypothesis;  or  again  he  may  mean  only  that 
these  properties  are  in  a  one  to  one  correspondence  with 
properties  that  are  deducible.  In  short,  when  the  word 
reducible  is  used,  the  properties  to  be  explained  may  be 
either  logically  continuous  or  logically  discontinuous 
with  the  propositions  asserted  in  the  mechanistic  hypoth- 
esis. Now  I  believe  that  much  misunderstanding  can 
be  avoided  if  the  physical  theorist  makes  explicit  which 
he  means. 

The  actual  properties  observable  in  the  laboratory 
seem  often  logically  quite  discontinuous  with  the  propo- 
sitions of  the  theory.  Light  as  observed  is  not  an  xmdu- 
lation,  heat  as  observed  is  not  the  kinetic  energy  of 
molecules.  Now  this,  if  I  mistake  not,  is  one  of  the 
difficulties  the  believer  in  energetics  finds  with  the 
mechanistic  hypothesis.     He  believes  the  various  types 


242  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

of  energy  to  be  precisely  what  they  are  observed  to  be, 
light  and  heat  are  not  motion,  they  are  just  light  and 
heat.  But  the  mechanist  should  not,  and  probably  does 
not,  mean  either  identity  or  complete  logical  continuity 
when  he  reduces  these  energies  to  kinetic  energy;  for 
he  should  admit  that  many  such  properties  may  not 
be  identical  with,  but  only  in  a  one  to  one  corre- 
spondence with,  properties  dedudble  from  mechanistic 
theories. 

If  this  is  the  meaning  of  the  mechanist's  hypothesis, 
the  question  at  issue  between  him  and  the  "Energetiker" 
becomes  the  questions:  (i)  Can  all  the  various  observable 
physical  facts  be  explained  by  (reduced  to)  mechanical 
hypotheses,  or  are  some  of  these  mechanically  inexplic- 
able? (2)  Can  they  be  explained  (in  any  case)  in  terms  of 
general  laws  of  energy  rather  than  in  terms  of  the  laws 
of  mechanics?  It  is  evident  that  these  questions  cannot 
be  answered  a  priori,  and  therefore  that  we  must  wait 
until  we  get  sufficient  evidence.  A  few  years  ago  the 
evidence  at  hand  indicated  that  physical  facts  can  be 
explained  both  mechanistically  and  in  terms  of  general 
laws  of  energy.  Hence  it  could  be  inferred  either  that 
both  hj^otheses  were  equally  vaUd,  or  that  the  crucial 
facts  which  would  decide  between  them  still  remained 
undiscovered.  Recently,  however,  there  appears  to  be 
increasing  evidence  in  favor  of  some  of  the  mechanistic 
hypotheses,  such  as  the  atomic  and  molecular  theory 
in  chemistry,  so  that  those  "  Energetiker"  who  have  dis- 
puted the  necessity  of  such  an  hypothesis  seem  to  be 
weakening.  But  at  the  same  time  mechanism  itself 
is  being  called  in  question  by  the  new  discoveries  in  the 


THE  PHYSICAL  243 

field  of  radioactivity.  Is  electricity  to  be  reduced  to 
the  mechanical?  Is  not  rather  the  mechanical  to  be 
reduced  to  the  electrical?  Is  not  mass,  or  inertia,  which 
is  an  ultimate  in  mechanics,  itself  reducible  to  the  prop- 
erties of  electro-magnetic  phenomena  present  when  an 
electric  charge  moves?  The  evidence  indicates  that 
it  is.  In  other  words,  "Is  the  unexplained  inertia  of 
matter  a  different  thing  from  the  elucidated  inertia  of 
electricity,  or  is  it  possible  that  the  inertia  of  matter  is 
due  to  the  same  phenomena  as  that  of  electricity,  and 
that  matter  is  in  some  unknown  way  compounded  en- 
tirely out  of  electrons?"  That  is,  electrical  theory  may  be 
logically  fundamental  to  all  other  physical  theories.  If  this 
is  so,  the  interesting  metaphysical  question  at  once  arises. 
How  many  of  the  older  fundamental  postulates  of 
physical  science  are  to  remain  valid  and  fundamental? 
The  future  alone  can  give  us  the  answer.  At  present, 
the  principle  of  the  conservation  of  energy  appears 
to  be  valid.  So  also  does  the  principle  of  least  action, 
and  the  principle  of  relativity.  But  the  principle  of 
the  equality  of  action  and  reaction  is  questioned;  and  the 
principle  of  the  conservation  of  mass  is  denied.  However, 
if  the  place  of  mechanics  as  the  fundamental  physical 
science  is  to  be  surrendered  to  electro-magnetic  theory, 
this  does  not  mean  a  victory  for  that  type  of  energetics 
which  finds  in  each  energy  a  fundamental  form  of  physical 
existence.  It  indicates  rather  that  most  of  these  types 
of  energy  are  reducible  to  electro-magnetic  energy. 
Further,  it  means  a  victory  for  atomism,  for  electricity 
itself  has  proved  to  be  granular. 
4.  The  relation  between  physical  theory  and  physical 


244  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

existence. — ^Nowhere  in  science  has  the  question  of  the 
relation  between  theory  and  existence  been  raised  more 
prominently  than  in  physical  science.  The  entities 
postulated  by  various  theories,  the  chemical  molecule  and 
atom,  the  electron,  the  ether  and  its  undulations,  are  far 
beyond  our  range  of  perception  and  are  therefore  purely 
hypothetical.  Are  then  the  physical  theories  which 
assume  them,  to  be  regarded  as  seriously  entertained 
existential  hypotheses  or  as  merely  tentative  and  conven- 
ient ways  of  explaining  physical  fact,  but  not  ways  which 
imply  any  other  existence  than  the  physical  fact  itself? 
For  example,  if  we  explain  radiation  by  assuming  an 
ether,  do  we  assume  the  ether  as  an  existent  or  merely  as  a 
convenient  symbol  in  terms  of  which  we  can  formulate 
our  hypothesis  or  by  means  of  which  we  can  secure 
an  imaginary  model  illustrating  our  theory  in  a  concrete 
form?  In  short,  is  physical  theory  merely  a  collection 
of  non-existential  mathematical  postulates,  or  is  physical 
theory  existential?  Each  view  is  held  by  different 
prominent  physicists,  the  mechanist  and  the  majority  of 
physicists  tending  to  believe  that  physical  theory  is 
existential,  and  the  Energetiker  tending  to  believe  that  it 
is  not. 

The  grounds  of  disbelief  in  the  existence  of  the  hypo- 
thetical physical  entities  are  four  in  number: — First, 
there  are  many  possible  rival  theories  explaining  the  same 
physical  fact;  secondly,  physical  theory  has  undergone 
many  and  radical  changes  in  the  past  one  hundred  and 
fifty  years;  thirdly,  physical  theory  can  be  formulated  in 
purely  general  mathematical  terms  which  in  no  way  in- 
volve the  existence  of  particular  hypothetical  entities; 


THE  PHYSICAL  245 

finally,  there  is  no  means  of  verifying  directly  by  per- 
ception the  existence  of  such  entities. 

These  grounds  are  far  from  conclusive.  In  the  first 
place,  existence,  as  we  have  learned,  cannot  be  identified 
with  the  perceivable.  Most  existence  is  theoretical  and 
the  question,  whether  or  not  a  theory  is  existential  is 
the  same  question  as  whether  or  not  it  can  be  verified. 
Though  it  be  true  that  physical  theories  are  extremely 
hypothetical  and  lack  crucial  tests,  this  does  not  make 
them  non-existential.  It  makes  them  only  more  tenta- 
tive and  less  probable.  In  the  second  place,  the  unhke- 
lihood  of  securing  crucial  tests  and  ample  verification  for 
physical  theories  does  not  indicate  that  these  theories 
are  non-existential,  it  indicates  rather  that  our  powers  of 
perception  are  narrowly  Umited.  Moreover,  it  seems 
foolhardy  to  predict  what  in  the  future  will  prove  verifi- 
able and  what  will  not.  Finally,  even  should  the  physical 
theory  of  the  future  become  highly  general,  implying  no 
other  particular  entities  than  those  which  are  observable, 
this  would  not  make  it  any  the  less  existential,  unless  we 
are  to  abandon  Platonic  realism  for  extreme  nominahsm. 
In  short,  the  problem  of  existence  in  physical  science 
does  not  differ  fundamentally  from  what  it  is  elsewhere 
in  science:  although  more  difficult  to  verify,  it  is  the 
same  problem. 

For  further  study  read: 
Nichols,  E.  F.,  Physics  (Lectures  on  Science,  Philosophy  and 

Art),  Columbia  University  Press; 
Soddy,  F.,  Matter  and  Energy.    (Home  University  Library  of 

Modem  Knowledge); 
Pearson,  Grammar  of  Science,  3d  ed,,  Chaps.  VII-X; 


246  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

Poincar6,  The  Principles  of  Mathematical  Physics  (Congress 
of  Arts  and  Science,  St.  Louis,  1904,  Vol.  I)  (also  in  Monist, 

1905*  15)', 
Boltzmann,  The  Recent  Development  of  Method  in  Theoretical 

Physics,  Monist,  1900-1,  Ji; 
Ostwald,  The  Modern  Theory  of  Energetics,  Monist,  1907,  ly; 
Singer,  E.   A.,  Note   on   the  Physical  World  Order,  /.   of 

Philos.,  Psychol.,   etc.,   1904,   z,   623   and  645.     (Also  in 

Fullerton,  System  of  Metaphysics,  609); 
More,  L.  T.,  Atomic  Theories  and  Modern  Physics,  Hibbert 

Journal,  1908-9,  7; 
More,  L.  T.,  The  Metaphysical  Tendencies  of  Modem  Physics, 

Hibbert  Journal,  1909-10,  8; 
Boltzmann,  On  the  Necessity  of  Atomic  Theories  in  Physics, 

Monist,  1901-2, 12. 

For  more  extensive  study  read: 
Rey,  A.,  La  Theorie  de  la  Physique  chez  les  Physiciens  Con- 

temporains,  Paris,  1907; 
Duhem,  Thiorie  physique; 
Ostwald,  Vorlesungen  iiber  Naturphilosophie; 
Helm,  G.,  Die  Energetik  nach  ihrer  geschichtlichen  Entwickel- 

ung; 
Stallo,  Concepts  and  Theories  of  Modem  Physics; 
Mach,  The  Science  of  Mechanics; 
Poincar6,  L.,  La  Physique  Modeme,  son  Evolution,  Paris, 

1909; 
Poincar6,  H.,  Science  et  M^thode,  Paris,  1909; 
Poincar6,  H.,  Science  and  Hypothesis; 
Picard,  £.,  La  Science  Modeme  et  son  fitat  Actuel,  Paris, 

1909; 
Nuim,  Aims  and  Achievement  of  Scientific  Method; 
Tilden,  The  Elements  (Library  of  Living  Thought); 
Lodge,  Electrons; 

Foumier  d'Albe,  The  Electron  Theory; 
Soddy,  The  Interpretation  of  Radium; 
Arrhenius,  Worlds  in  the  Making. 


THE  PHYSICAL  247 

For  advanced  study: 
Russell,  Principles  of  Mathematics,  Part  VII; 
Larmor,  /Ether  and  Matter; 

Lockyer,  Inorganic  Evolution  as  studied  by  Spectrum  Analysis; 
Thompson,  Sir  J.  J.,  The  Corpuscular  Theory  of  Matter; 
Mach,  Die  Principien  der  Warmelehre,  2  Aufl.,  Leipzig,  1900. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

LIFE 

1.  Introdiiction. — In  the  field  of  biology  at  the  present 
time  two  special  metaphysical  subjects  are  prominent. 
The  first  is  the  issue  between  mechanism  and  vitalism; 
the  second  is  the  theory  arising  from  mendelism,  a 
distinctly  atomistic  theory  of  the  forms  of  life  and  of 
their  origin,  a  theory  which  virtually  supersedes  the 
older  doctrine  of  animal  and  plant  evolution.  As  the 
question  of  fact  underlying  each  of  these  subjects  would 
take  us  at  once  from  metaphysics  into  biological  science, 
our  brief  study  of  these  matters  will  be  confined  to  their 
meaning  and  philosophical  importance.^ 

2.  Mechanism  and  vitalism. — In  the  issue  between 
mechanism  and  vitalism  two  questions  appear  to  be 
involved  which  when  rigorously  formulated  define  the 
two  rival  theories.  The  first  question  is  a  special  case 
of  the  problem  now  familiar  to  us,  the  problem  of  logical 
continuity  and  discontinuity.  The  second  question 
arises  from  the  first  and  asks  whether  or  not  each  living 
organism  is  controlled  by  a  miique  factor  whose  office 
is  to  work  out  the  ends  or  appropriate  destiny  of  the 
creature.  Should  this  second  question  be  answered 
affirmatively,  then  life  is  a  fundamentally  different  type 

*  If  the  student  is  quite  unfamiliar  with  the  subject-matter  of  this 
chapter,  he  should  read,  before  studying  it,  the  articles  referred  to  at 
the  end  under  the  heading  "For  further  study." 

248 


LIFE  249 

of  existence  from  the  lifeless.  Let  us  turn  to  the  first 
question. 

That  plants  and  animals  are  markedly  unlike  the  ob- 
jects of  the  inorganic  world  with  which,  however,  they 
share  many  chemical-physical  properties,  is  evident  to 
all  men.  The  mechanist  admits  this  marked  difference 
as  fully  as  does  the  vitalist;  but  he  points  out  that  it  is 
only  a  special  type  of  the  discontinuity  to  be  found  every- 
where, even  in  the  inorganic  world.  For  example,  he 
can  urge  that  chemical  compounds  which  are  aUke  in 
their  elements,  the  isomers,  may  be  extremely  unHke 
in  many  of  their  properties.  What  he  maintains  and 
what  the  vitalist  denies,  is  that  in  vital  phenomena  each  in- 
stance of  discontinuity  and  each  element  of  every  discon- 
tinuous property  is  in  a  one  to  one  correspondence  "with 
some  chemical-physical  configuration.  Mark  the  word  each; 
for  the  vitalist  also  admits  that  many  discontinuous 
properties  are  in  close  correspondence  with  life's  physical 
substructure  and  that  it  is  always  the  business  of  science 
to  try  to  find  such  correspondence.  That  is,  even  he 
admits  that  all  life  has  an  extensive  and  complicated 
chemical-physical  structure  as  the  greater  part  of  its 
logical  basis.  What  the  vitalist  questions,  however,  is 
that  this  structure  forms  the  entire  logical  basis;  for  he  is 
convinced  that  some  properties  of  the  living  organism  are 
so  radically  unlike  any  property  found  in  any  lifeless  ob- 
ject that  these  properties  are  not  in  a  one  to  one  corre- 
spondence with  the  creature's  chemical-physical  structure 
but  are  logically  independent. 

It  is  diflScult  to  see  how  these  rival  theories  can  be 
given  a  crucial  test  and  to  see  wherein  these  theories 


250  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

will  affect  differently  the  methods  and  problems  of  the 
science;  for  the  vitalist,  if  consistent,  will  seek  chemical- 
physical  correspondence  as  zealously  as  will  the  mechan- 
ist. The  only  difference  seems  to  be  that  where  this 
correspondence  is  not  yet  found  the  mechanist  will  al- 
ways hold  out  the  hope  that  it  may  be  found;  whereas 
the  vitalist  will  not.  Still,  the  mechanist's  position  seems 
the  stronger  for  two  reasons,  (a)  because,  as  we  have 
learned,  discontinuity  can  be  shown  to  be  no  argument 
against  mechanism,  and  (b)  because  of  the  great  physio- 
logical triumphs  already  won  in  discovering  the  chemical- 
physical  correlate  or  cause  of  many  vital  processes. 
These  triumphs  rightly  raise  the  hope  that  as  in  the  past 
some  vital  processes  which  once  seemed  quite  unlike 
anything  explicable  by  chemistry  and  physics  have  been 
thus  explained,  so  also  in  the  future  what  now  does  not 
seem  to  be  explicable  in  this  way,  may  prove  to  be  so. 
However,  the  vitalist  claims  not  only  that  there  are 
vital  processes  without  a  chemical-physical  correlate 
but  that  these  processes  can  be  easily  discovered  through 
their  observable  character.  For  example,  a  locomotive 
having  lost  a  wheel  cannot  of  itself  reproduce  a  wheel, 
but  certain  organisms  can  reproduce  lost  members. 
Even  the  most  complicated  of  automatic  machines  can 
react  only  in  definite  fixed  ways  and  is  absolutely  at  the 
mercy  of  whatever  factor  sets  it  working;  whereas  even 
the  lowest  forms  of  life  will  by  a  process  of  trial  and  error 
flee  from  or  adjust  themselves  to  many  unfavorable 
stimuli.  Indeed  all  organisms  reveal  remarkable  adjust- 
ments of  means  to  ends;  and  nothing  strictly  comparable 
to  these  adjustments  is  to  be  found  in  the  world  of  purely 


IIFB  351 

mechanical  things.  In  general,  such  characters  are  tele- 
ological,  and  no  conceivable  mechanism  can  be  their 
cause.  They  must  work,  at  least  in  part,  independently 
of  the  physical  and  be  due  to  a  cause  of  a  fundamentally 
different  order.  This  cause  resembles  the  mind  in  that 
it  works  for  ends  and  adapts  means  to  ends.  It  has  been 
called  by  the  Aristotelian  name,  an  entelechy. 

In  opposition  to  the  doctrine  that  an  entelechy  exists 
in  the  living  organism,  the  mechanist  can  urge  that  once 
we  admit  that  discontinuity  can  be  correlated  with  a 
continuous  system,  we  can  not  limit  a  priori  either  the 
complexity  or  the  properties  of  this  discontinuity,  espe- 
cially when  it  is  correlated  with  what  is  known  to  be  a 
marvelously  complicated  chemical-physical  machine. 
Thus  that  life  is  radically  unlike  the  lifeless  is  paral- 
leled by  the  truth  that  the  chemical-physical  machine 
of  the  living  organism  is  radically  unlike  in  complexity  the 
simpler  mechanisms  usually  thought  of  when  the  word 
machine  is  employed.  How  great  a  change  in  discontin- 
uity may  be  correlated  with  this  increase  in  mechanical 
complexity  only  the  facts  themselves  can  reveal.  Even 
should  the  discontinuous  properties  prove  to  be  irreduc- 
ibly  or  fundamentally  teleological,  as  the  vitalist  claims, 
who  can  tell,  except  the  facts  reveal  it,  what  properties 
machines  can  have?  In  other  words,  the  mechanist  can 
urge  in  defense  of  his  theory  a  broader  vitalism  than  that 
of  the  vitalist.  He  can  assert  that  if  vitalism  is  true 
anywhere  it  is  true  everywhere,  for  everywhere  in  nature 
the  discontinuous  is  correlated  with  the  physical.  He 
can  deny  that  there  is  a  fundamental  difference  in  this 
respect  between  the  living  and  the  lifeless. 


252  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

This  reasoning,  of  course,  does  not  satisfy  the  vitalist, 
for  the  discontinuity  which  he  finds  in  the  living  is  pe- 
culiar to  life  in  being  teleological.  For  myself  I  fail  to 
see  how  logical  analysis  can  settle  this  issue.  Either 
position  is  logically  possible,  though  the  mechanist's 
position  has  the  advantage  of  assvmiing  greater  uniform- 
ity throughout  existence  and  has  proved  a  good  work- 
ing hypothesis.  In  short,  facts  alone  can  reveal  to  us 
whether  or  not  chemical-physical  processes  logically 
underlie  the  remarkable  instances  of  seemingly  pure  tele- 
ology now  urged  in  support  of  vitalism. 

J.  Biological  atomism. — Besides  the  issue  between 
mechanism  and  vitalism,  the  biology  of  to-day  presents 
another  special  metaphysical  subject  of  great  interest. 
This  is  no  less  than  the  question:  Is  not  biology  giving 
up  her  older  doctrine  of  evolution  and  offering  us  an 
atomic  theory  of  life  in  its  place?  Briefly  stated,  the 
new  theory  teaches  as  follows:  Each  living  creature 
is  a  compound  of  certain  unit  characters  and  differs  from 
other  organisms  merely  in  the  presence  or  absence  of 
this  or  that  unit  character.  All  the  unit  characters  of 
each  adult  organism  are  in  turn  merely  the  developed 
form  of  the  unit  characters  in  the  germplasm  from  which 
that  organism  has  sprung.  But  this  germplasm  is  only 
a  part  of  the  total  germplasm  of  the  creature's  parents, 
hence  the  creature's  unit  characters  are  only  a  selection 
out  of  the  total  collection  of  unit  characters  present  in 
the  total  germplasm  in  the  parents.  Of  course,  the  same 
is  true  in  turn  of  the  adult  form  of  each  parent  relatively 
to  this  same  germplasm;  for  though  each  creature  is 
the  carrier  of  half  the  germplasm  to  parts  of  which  each 


UPE  253 

of  its  offspring  will  owe  their  parentage;  still  it  is  itself 
merely  a  selection  from  this  same  germplasm  received 
from  the  preceding  generation.  For  example,  a  hybrid 
sweet  pea  is  the  product  of  the  germplasm  selected  by 
nature  from  the  germplasm  of  two  different  specimens 
of  the  sweet  pea.  That  is,  it  will  not  possess  developed 
all  the  characters  which  that  germplasm  contains;  for 
in  the  total  germplasm  from  which  its  offspring  will  de- 
velop, it  does  possess  many  characters  besides  those 
which  have  reached  maturity  in  its  own  self  and  there- 
fore it  can  be  the  carrier  to  a  new  generation  of  qualities 
lacking  in  its  own  adult  form.  Expressed  in  other  words, 
each  organism  is  a  selection  of  unit  characters  out  of  a 
germplasm  which  is  immortal  and  of  which  it  is  merely 
the  carrier  from  a  preceding  to  a  following  genera- 
tion. 

Further,  the  total  germplasm  throughout  the  world 
possesses  a  finite  number  of  unit  characters  and  each 
living  creature  is  simply  a  compound  of  characters  se- 
lected from  this  total  list.  Hence  many  a  new  variety  of 
organism  may  represent  nothing  new  except  a  new 
selection;  precisely  as  a  hand  at  whist  is  but  a  new  selec- 
tion from  the  fifty  two  cards  of  the  deck,  even  though 
it  be  a  hand  which  we  have  never  held  before,  for  it  con- 
tains no  card  which  we  have  not  previously  held.  To 
repeat,  as  hfe  goes  on  from  generation  to  generation, 
although  there  may  be  creatures  unlike  any  which  have 
ever  before  existed,  yet  they  may  be  no  more  than  a  new 
deal  of  nature's  deck  of  cards,  the  total  imit  characters 
in  the  germplasm  from  which  they  are  descended.  To  all 
outward  appearance  there  has  been  an  evolution,  a  spon- 


254  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

taneous  arising  of  new  types  of  life;  but  in  terms  of  the 
unit  characters  they  are  not  new. 

These  unit  characters  may  persist  through  ages  and 
there  may  be  no  new  characters  arising  but  simply  new 
shuflSings  and  so  new  selections.  Hence  these  unit 
characters  form  atoms,  in  their  way  as  truly  atoms  as 
those  of  chemistry  or  of  mechanics;  for  as  the  various 
material  objects  are  but  new  selections  of  atoms  which 
have  existed  for  untold  ages,  so  each  organism  is  a  com- 
pound of  old,  it  may  be  exceedingly  old,  unit  characters. 

However,  each  of  these  unit  characters  must  have  had 
a  beginning  sometime  in  the  history  of  plant  and  animal 
life.  But  whatever  the  story  of  its  origin,  from  the  pres- 
ent point  of  view  it  was  the  spontaneous  arising  of  a 
new  atom.  It  was  an  addition  to  the  biological  world 
of  the  same  sort  as  the  arising  of  new  chemical  atoms  in 
a  cooling  star.  On  the  other  hand,  of  course,  unit  char- 
acters may  die  out  through  the  extinction  of  all  organisms 
which  happen  to  be  their  carriers.  If  they  do,  they  are 
lost  to  the  world  forever  unless  they  arise  again  sponta- 
neously. 

Now  the  importance  of  this  doctrine  philosophically 
is  that,  according  to  present  biological  theory,  biological 
evolution  is  quite  of  the  same  general  type  of  evolution 
we  find  in  other  realms  of  existence.  Correlated  with 
the  logically  discontinuous  there  is  a  system  of  log- 
ical continuity.  Moreover,  in  biology  this  system  of 
logical  continuity  is  a  thorough  going  atomism,  as 
much  so  in  its  way  as  is  the  atomism  of  chemistry  in 
another  way.  Thus  if  we  mean  by  evolution  the  spon- 
taneous generation  of  the  new,  evolution  takes  place 


LIFE  255 

Within  the  field  of  mendelian  characters  only  when  a 
new  unit  character  arises  spontaneously.  At  other  times 
there  is  no  evolution  in  this  field  but  only  a  thoroughly 
mechanical  reassortment  of  atoms. 

For  further  study  read: 
Schafer,  Inaugural  Address,  Nature,  191 2,  go,  7; 
Jenkinson,  J.  W.,  Vitalism,  Hibbert  Journal,  1910-11,  g; 
Thomson,  J.  A.,  Is  there  one  Science  of  Nature?  Hibbert  Journal, 

1911-12,  10; 
Loeb,  J.,  The  Mechanistic  Conception  of  Life,  Popular  Science 

Monthly,  191 2,  80; 
Jennings,  H.  S.,  Heredity  and  Personality,  Science,  1911, 34, 902; 
Punnett,  MendeUsm. 

For  more  extensive  study  read: 
Driesch,  Hans,  Science  and  Philosophy  of  the  Organism,  2  vols., 

1908; 
Spaulding,  review  of  Driesch's  book,  Philos.  Review,  1909,  18, 

63  and  436; 
Loeb,  J.,  The  Dynamics  of  Living  Matter,  Columbia  University 

Press. 


CHAPTER   XXII 


THE  MENTAL 


/.  Introduction. — ^Among  the  prominent  topics  in  the 
special  metaphysics  of  psychological  science  are  the  fol- 
lowing: The  subject  matter  of  psychology,  or  the  nature 
of  consciousness;  and  the  relation  between  the  mind 
and  the  body,  including  the  problem  of  the  existence 
of  the  sotd. 

2,  The  subject  matter  of  psychology. — Regarding  the 
subject  matter  of  no  other  science  perhaps  is  there  less 
consensus  of  opinion  than  regarding  that  of  psychology. 
One  cause  of  this  obscurity  and  disagreement  is  that  a 
definition  is  sought  not  by  analyzing  logically  the  in- 
formation which  is  acknowledged  to  be  psychological 
but  by  arguing  a  priori  what  the  subject  matter  of 
psychology  ought  to  be.  Starting  thus  with  a  precon- 
ceived notion  of  the  mental,  we  are  prone  to  read  into 
psychology  matter  which  is  quite  foreign  to  it,  and  even 
non-existent. 

Let  us  accordingly  consider  at  once  certain  truths 
regarding  psychological  research  and  doctrine  which 
must  be  taken  into  account  by  anyone  who  defines  its 
subject  matter,  (a)  Psychological  research  is  carried  on 
by  many  men  co-operating.  Psychologists  write  books  for 
other  psychologists.  The  psychological  investigator 
experiments  not  only  on  his  o^^  mind  but  also  on  the 

256 


THE  MENTAL  257 

minds  of  other  people.  In  short,  the  subject  matter  of 
psychology  is  not,  as  many  thinkers  assert,  something 
absolutely  private  to  each  mind,  something  that  cannot  be 
observed  and  experimented  with  by  other  men  than  the 
owner  of  the  mind.^ 

^  The  belief  that  the  mental  is  absolutely  private  and  imobservable 
except  by  "its  owner"  leads  to  some  remarkable  conclusions.  It  leads 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  only  way  in  which  we  can  know  another  mind 
is  by  inference  from  our  own,  assmning  that  when  another  organism 
reacts  as  we  do,  it  imphes  that  the  organism  has  the  same  mental  states. 
But  if  another's  mind  is  quite  unobservable,  it  remains  possible  that 
these  reactions  are  controlled  by  mental  contents  quite  imlike  any 
wh'ch  we  have.  The  diflBculty  of  ascertaining  the  precise  color  sensa- 
tions of  color  blind  patients  suggests  how  this  might  be  the  case.  In 
other  words,  I  cannot  be  sure  as  I  read  the  textbook  of  a  psychologist 
that  when  he  speaks  of  this  or  that  sensory  content,  he  means  what  I 
mean  by  the  words  he  uses.  Hence  the  conclusion,  contrary  to  fact, 
consciousness  cannot  truly  be  studied  in  common  by  two  psychologists. 
All  they  can  do,  is  to  study  reactions  and  to  guess  at  that  which  is  cor- 
related with  these  reactions. 

This  leads  to  the  conclusion,  which  has  been  ably  defended,  that  as 
far  as  psychology  can  show,  a  perfect  himian  automaton  would  in  no 
way  differ  from  what  we  ordinarily  believe  our  fellow  beings  to  be. 
That  is,  since  conduct  is  the  sole  means  by  which  we  can  infer  the  nature 
of  the  absolutely  hidden  conscious  states  of  another  man,  a  perfect 
automaton  would  give  us  all  the  evidence  of  the  existence  of  conscious- 
ness and  of  the  nature  of  consciousness  given  by  the  normal  being.  In 
short,  "I"  may  be  the  only  conscious  being  and  all  other  himnian  beings 
may  be  automata.  All  this  absurdity  comes  from  the  assumption,  to 
which  no  psychologist  really  keeps  faithful,  that  another's  conscious- 
ness is  private  or  unobservable  by  the  psychologist  studying  that  con- 
sciousness. 

But  why  do  some  thinkers  believe  consciousness  is  absolutely  private? 
Because  they  believe  that  when  you  and  I  see  a  table  there  are  three 
tables:  (i)  The  table  of  the  external  physical  world;  (2)  a  table,  a  con- 
scious state  in  yoiu:  mind;  (3)  a  table,  a  conscious  state  in  my  mind. 
Each  of  these  tables  is  believed  to  be  an  absolutely  distinct  existent 
entity.    Of  course,  it  then  follows  that  I  cannot  observe  the  table  of 


258  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

(b)  If  we  examine  carefully  the  data  or  the  information 
either  got  by  the  experimenter  himself  or  acquired  by 
him  from  other  men's  psychological  treatises,  we  find  that 
these  data  or  this  information  is  made  up  of  two  elements, 
first,  reactions  of  some  sort,  secondly,  objects  in  the  world, 
correlated  with  these  reactions,  which  can  be  observed  in 
common  by  all  students.  By  reactions  I  mean  not  only 
motions  of  arms,  legs,  and  in  general  the  muscles,  but 
also  the  written  and  oral  answers  to  questions.  By  ob- 
jects of  conmion  observation  I  mean  such  entities  as 
colors,  sounds,  odors,  things,  motions,  and  differences 
between  one  object  and  another.  We  never  get  as  a 
datum  that  which  by  its  very  definition  is  unattainable, 
the  so  called  private  sensations,  mental  images,  and 
thoughts  of  the  patient.  If  we  get  his  sensations,  we  must 
get  something  we  also  can  observe;  and  if  we  get  his 
thoughts,  the  same  is  true.  In  short,  we  learn  the  objects 
to  which  he  is  reacting  and  the  reactions.  Did  we  remain 
ignorant  of  either,  psychology  as  a  science  would  vanish 
altogether,  (c)  The  psychologist  is  very  much  interested 
in  the  structure  and  the  function  of  the  nervous  system, 
and  in  all  that  affects  the  functioning  of  the  neurons. 
Yet  his  science  is  distinct  from  neural  anatomy  and 
physiology;  for  what  he  is  studying  is  not  the  nervous 
system  but  something  peculiarly  related  to  the  nervous 
system,  and  indeed  to  the  entire  organism. 

your  consciousness,  for  the  only  table  of  which  I  can  be  conscious  is  an 
absolutely  distinct  and  unique  entity,  the  table  of  my  consciousness. 
The  step  from  this  belief  to  idealism  and  general  subjectivism  is  a  short 
one.  Fortunately,  it  is  also  a  belief  that  though  entertained  at  times 
by  many  a  psychologist  is  seldom  actually  followed  in  practice.  If  it 
were  consistently  held  to,  there  would  be  no  psychology. 


THE  MENTAL  259 

If  we  keep  these  three  points  in  mind  what  must  be 
our  answer  to  the  question  before  us?  The  subject 
matter  of  psychology  is  the  nature,  the  complexity,  and  the 
structure  of  that  which  controls  reactions,  and  of  the  way 
it  acquires  this  control.  Not  to  enter  into  the  study  of 
psychology  but  solely  to  illustrate  this  abstruse  defini- 
tion, let  us  see  what  it  implies  in  concrete  examples. 
The  psychologist  might  wish  to  learn  what  controls  a 
rat's  motions  as  the  rat  runs  through  a  maze.  Is  it  color, 
is  it  odor,  or  is  it  some  other  property  of  the  maze? 
Again,  in  examining  the  intelligence  of  a  child,  he  en- 
deavors to  learn  what  qualities,  aspects,  relations  of 
things,  and  what  small  differences  in  all  these  will  affect 
the  child's  reactions.  That  he  can  sometimes  ask  the 
child  and  get  the  child's  own  report,  does  not  alter  the 
object  of  his  search.  Nor  does  it  alter  the  object  of 
his  search  if  he  names  his  investigation,  a  study  of  the 
child's  sensations.  "The  child's  sensations"  means 
the  objects  to  which  the  child  reacts.  Or  he  may  study 
the  child's  ability  to  learn,  that  is  the  alteration  in 
reaction  and  the  alteration  in  the  ability  of  an  object  to 
affect  reaction,  as  that  which  we  call  training  proceeds. 

Again,  he  may  be  studying  memory  and  thought. 
How  far  and  imder  what  conditions  will  the  patient 
react  to  past  objects?  How  far  and  imder  what  condi- 
tions will  the  patient  react  to  the  abstract  relations 
between  abstract  entities?  He  calls  a  child  stupid  be- 
cause it  wiU  not  react  properly  to  the  question :  What  is 
theoppositeof  "out  doors," of  "play, "of  "love"?  Finally, 
in  the  psychologist's  own  introspection,  what  is  he  study- 
ing?   As  we  have  seen,  he  is  studying  something  he  can 


26o  A  FmST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

communicate  to  us.  If  so,  the  objects  studied  must  be  of 
the  same  sort  as  those  he  himself  studies  in  his  patients, 
that  is,  the  qualities  and  relations  which  affect  reaction. 
To  take  a  crucial  case,  let  us  say  he  is  studying  his  own 
mental  imagery.  He  is  examining  perhaps  the  color,  the 
vagueness,  the  instability  of  the  content  to  which  he 
is  reacting  in  a  way  called  "  attending; "  or  again  he  is 
noticing  perhaps  the  absence  of  this  or  that  content  as 
a  controller  of  his  conduct.  In  either  case,  it  is  not  the 
content  just  as  content  which  is  studied,  but  the  nature 
of  the  content  controlling  his  reaction.  He  asks:  What 
is  the  nature  of  this  content,  how  complex  is  it,  what 
role  does  it  play  in  his  reactions,  and  how  did  it  come  to 
play  this  r61e?  All  of  this  he  can  communicate  to  us; 
for  the  only  thing  private  about  it,  is  that  he  had  an 
opportimity  to  observe  it  which  we  did  not  have.  More- 
over, one  cannot  decide  a  priori  that  experimental  con- 
ditions cannot  be  invented  by  means  of  which  all  that 
introspection  reveals,  can  be  discovered  by  the  outside 
observer.  Indeed  in  daily  life  we  often  can  learn  a  man's 
thoughts  or  even  dreams  by  watching  his  behavior. 
To  return  to  the  definition  of  the  subject  matter  of 
psychology,  I  believe  that  a  logical  analysis  of  the  in- 
formation called  psychological  will  show  that  it  has  to  do 
with  two  systems  of  things  which  control  our  reactions: 
first,  the  system  of  things  which  is  ordinarily  described 
as  "that  to  which  we  are  reacting;"  and  second,  the 
system  of  things  called  "the  inborn  and  acquired  con- 
nections," which  make  these  reactions  possible.  If  we 
name  the  subject  of  psychological  study,  the  mental, 
then  the  mental  consists  of  these  two  systems,  that  to 


THE  MENTAL  261 

which  an  organism  reacts,  and  that  which  makes  the 
organism  capable  of  so  reacting.  The  mental  is  not 
something  private  in  an  absolute  sense.  It  is  not  pri- 
vately owned  in  an  absolute  sense.  It  is  not  privately 
observed  in  an  absolute  sense.  The  mental  is  not  a 
stuff,  or  substance,  not  a  new  kind  of  content,  or  quality. 
It  is  a  relationship  between  observable  entities. 

J.  The  nature  of  consciousness.— Consciousness  is 
then  a  relation.  A  content  becomes  consciousness  by 
becoming  related  in  a  certain  way.  In  what  way?  By 
becoming  the  object  to  which  an  organism  reacts.  Thus, 
my  hat  is  part  of  my  consciousness,  or  as  we  ordinarily 
say,  I  perceive  my  hat,  if  its  color,  shape,  and  other 
properties  control  my  reaction,  for  example,  lead  to  my 
picking  it  up  and  placing  it  upon  my  head.  "Two  plus 
two  equals  four"  is  one  of  my  thoughts,  provided  this 
relationship  between  the  number  two  and  itself  controls 
my  conduct  and  leads  me  to  put  two  two  cent  stamps 
on  a  letter  requiring  four  cents  postage.  But  the  hat 
out  of  such  a  relation  is  not  consciousness;  nor  is  the 
proposition  "two  plus  two  equals  four." 

There  are  two  objections  to  this  doctrine,  or  rather 
possible  misunderstandings  of  it,  which  we  must  study 
at  least  briefly.  First,  how  are  we  to  distinguish  between 
conscious  reaction  and  blind  reflexes?  Second,  is  not  this 
definition  of  consciousness  an  out  and  out  materialism? 
In  the  blind  reflex  we  do  react  to  a  stimulus  (the  chemical 
or  physical  effect  an  entity  may  have  upon  the  neural 
afferent  end  organs),  but  not  to  the  object,  its  qualities 
and  its  relations.  True,  it  is  sometimes  very  diffi- 
cult to  ascertain  what  is  the  controller  of  a  reaction. 


262  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

for  sometimes  the  two  types  of  reaction  appear  to  be 
identical.  But  our  only  method  of  ascertaining  is  to 
eliminate  experimentally,  as  in  experimenting  with 
animals,  one  thing  after  another  until  we  do  succeed 
in  ascertaining.  To  repeat,  in  the  case  of  the  blind 
reflex  the  stimulus  and  the  nature  of  the  organism  de- 
termine the  reaction,  not  the  nature  of  the  object. 
Whereas  in  the  conscious  reaction,  things,  their  qualities, 
and  their  relations  determine  the  organism's  reactions. 
Of  course,  the  organism  has  to  have  the  structure  or  the 
ability  to  function  in  response  to  such  objects;  for  it 
is  this  ability  which  makes  us  conscious  beings:  and  of 
course  the  organism  has  to  be  stimulated  to  function. 
In  the  blind  reflexes  it  is  the  chemical-physical  effects 
®f  the  object  actually  acting  upon  our  organs,  together 
with  the  nature  of  the  organism  itself,  which  completely 
accounts  for  the  reaction.  In  the  conscious  reaction  we 
have  to  appeal  in  addition  to  the  many  other  properties 
and  relations  of  the  object  in  order  to  explain  the  reaction; 
and  often  the  object  is  such  that  it  has  no  chemical- 
physical  effect  upon  us,  at  least  at  that  time,  for  ex- 
ample, objects  thought  of  but  not  sensed.  That  is  to  say, 
if  an  animal's  reaction  can  be  accounted  for  wholly  by 
the  chemical-physical  effect  of  an  object  acting  upon 
it  we  should  regard  the  reaction  as  a  mere  tropism  or 
reflex.  But  if  we  could  show  that  color,  as  color,  or 
some  relation  between  a  color  and  things  implied  by 
color  (e.  g.  a  red  flag  as  a  sign  of  danger)  controlled 
the  reaction,  we  should  have  to  call  it  conscious. 

This  definition  is  not  a  materialism.     Materialism 
is,  strictly  speaking,  a  doctrine  regarding  the  nature 


THE  MENTAL  263 

of  substance.  This  definition  does  not  presuppose 
substance,  but  only  terms  and  their  relations.  Moreover, 
this  definition  identifies  in  no  way  consciousness  and  the 
physical.  Rather  what  it  implies  is  that  the  physical 
too  is  only  a  relation.  In  short,  the  same  terms  in  one 
relation  are  physical,  in  another  relation  are  mental. 
The  content  or  terms,  apart  from  their  relations,  are 
neither  mental  nor  physical.  For  example,  a  blue, 
let  us  say,  the  blue  of  a  flag,  is  as  a  mere  quality,  a  blue. 
It  is  not  mental,  nor  is  it  physical.  To  be  physical  it 
must  have  certain  quantitative  relationships  which  cause 
other  quantitative  relationships  in  other  things.  For  ex- 
ample, there  may  be  a  relation  between  its  blueness  and 
chemical  effects  on  a  sensitive  plate  exposed  to  its  light 
by  means  of  a  camera.  To  be  consciousness,  this  blue 
\-,^  as  such  through  its  relations  or  implications,  must 
influence  the  conduct  of  an  organism.  For  example, 
it  may  lead  us  to  articulate  the  words  "Union  Jack." 
Moreover,  materialism  identifies  consciousness  with 
unknown  chemical-physical  events  taking  place  in  the 
nervous  system.  The  relational  theory  does  not.  Con- 
sciousness is  not  usually  in  the  body.  My  consciousness 
of  this  page  is  literally  the  page,  the  page  in  certain  re- 
lations. To  conclude:  Consciousness  has  been  compared 
to  a  search  light  which  illuminates,  or  selects  out  of  a 
world  of  objects,  certain  entities,  but  in  so  illuminating 
or  selecting  it  neither  creates  them  nor  takes  them  out  of 
their  environment.  That  is,  a  field  of  consciousness  is  a 
certain  cross  section,  a  certain  collection,  of  entities,  be- 
longing to  the  universe  of  subsistent  entities  and  definable 
as  a  group  by  its  peculiar  relation  to  our  bodily  reactions. 


264  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

This  definition  thus  eliminates  the  old  dualism  which 
divides  the  world  into  two  t5^s  of  substances  remarkably 
like  one  another,  mental  states  and  material  things. 
To  one  accepting  this  dualism  the  sensation  blue  and  the 
physical  blue  are  so  much  alike  that  it  is  impossible  to 
tell  which  is  which,  and  though  both  are  asserted  to  be 
present  it  is  impossible  to  find  two  blues.  It  is  this 
dualism,  really  a  substance  hypothesis,  which  is  the 
origin  of  idealism.  For  example,  it  was  argued  that, 
since  when  I  perceive  a  blue,  I  can  find  only  one  blue 
thing,  the  blueness  must  be  mental  and  not  physical. 
Materialism  on  the  other  hand  could  retort,  since  there 
is  but  one  blue  here  and  that  is  physical,  there  is  no 
consciousness.  A  correct  definition  of  consciousness 
must  make  it  possible  for  one  and  the  same  blue  to  be 
both  physical  and  mental,  physical  in  one  set  of  relations 
and  mental  in  another. 

4.  The  relation  between  mind  and  body, — ^The  older 
doctrine  regarding  the  nature  of  consciousness  (which 
teaches  that  it  is  a  stuff,  a  stuff  different  in  kind  from 
matter,  another  stuff)  impUed,  as  was  discovered  when 
the  subject  was  thought  through,  that  mind  and  body 
cannot  interact.  Many  contemporary  pyschologists 
and  philosophers  are  still  under  the  spell  of  this  old  doc- 
trine, or  a  modified  form  of  it,  and  teach  parallelism, 
when  nothing  but  a  metaphysical  bias  could  possibly 
lead  them  to  interpret  the  commonplace  facts  of  mental 
and  bodily  life  in  this  way.  The  argument  is  brought 
forward,  that  the  principle  of  the  conversation  of  energy 
implies  that  the  chemical-physical  processes  in  our  nerv- 
ous system  cannot  pass  over  into  a  form  of  existence 


THE  MENTAL  265 

which  is  not  energy.  Conversely,  thoughts  cannot  give 
rise  to  energy,  for  they  themselves  are  not  energy.  This 
argument  is  metaphysically  absurd.  The  same  type 
of  argument  would  prove  that  ether  vmdulations  cannot 
give  rise  to  blue  color  because  blue  is  not  an  energy.  It 
is  our  old  acquaintance  the  problem  of  logical  continuity 
and  logical  discontinuity.  True,  the  mental  is  logically 
discontinuous  with  the  physical,  but  logical  discontinuity 
of  one  sort  or  another  meets  us  everywhere  in  nature. 
Correlated  with  one  mechanical  configuration  we  find 
such  and  such  a  quality.  Change  the  configuration  and 
another  quite  different  quality  has  arisen.  This  is  com- 
monplace natural  history.  It  has  nothing  to  do  with 
the  conservation  of  energy,  for  the  conservation  of  en- 
ergy implies  simply  a  certain  logical  continuity  through- 
out all  physical  processes.  It  does  not  deny  all  spon- 
taneity.   It  denies  spontaneity  only  in  certain  respects. 

The  mental  is  then  logically  discontinuous  with  the 
chemical-physical  system  with  which  it  is  correlated. 
As  such  it  cannot  be  explained  in  terms  of  that  system. 
It  has  to  be  accepted  in  this  relation  simply  as  fact.  If 
such  an  assertion  is  mystery,  so  is  all  discontinuity.  In 
other  words  we  are  thrown  back  to  the  study  of  fact;  and 
if  we  set  aside  metaphysics  and  put  our  question  di- 
rectly to  the  facts,  is  there  any  other  way  to  account  for 
the  facts  of  mental  life  except  the  theory  of  causal  rela- 
tionship between  our  thoughts  and  our  conduct?  Surely 
every  test  in  the  form  of  fact  is  consistent  with  the  inter- 
action hypothesis. 

5.  The  soul. — There  is,  however,  a  genuine  problem 
involved  in  this  relation  between  the  body  and  the  mind. 


266  A  FIRST  BOOK  TO  METAPHYSICS 

Are  all  mental  states  in  a  one  to  one  correspondence 
with  the  chemical-physical  processes  in  the  neurons  of 
our  central  nervous  system?  This  is  the  problem  of  the 
existence  of  the  soul. 

If  all  mental  states  are  indeed  in  a  one  to  one  cor- 
respondence with  the  chemical-physical  processes,  and 
are  therefore  simply  discontinuous  phenomena  arising 
spontaneously  when  certain  as  yet  imknown  chemical- 
physical  configurations  exist  in  our  nervous  system,  then 
mental  states  cannot  appropriately  be  called  the  states 
of  some  further  non-physical  entity,  the  soul.  They 
cannot  be  so  called  any  more  than  the  blue  of  the  rain- 
bow can  be  ascribed  to  a  non-physical  entity.  If  on  the 
other  hand  the  mental  states  are  not  in  such  a  one  to 
one  correspondence  with  the  states  of  the  body,  then 
they  can  be  properly  ascribed  to  a  distinct  entity,  the 
soul.  As  the  states  of  a  soul  they  are  independent  of  the 
body  and  can  possibly  exist  though  the  body  perish. 
Does  the  sovd  exist  or  are  mental  states  in  a  one  to  one 
correspondence  with  states  of  the  nervous  system? 
Metaphysics  cannot  answer,  for  it  is  a  question  of  fact. 
Either  hypothesis  is  metaphysically,  that  is  logically, 
quite  sound.  The  question  must  then  be  left  to  the 
psychologist  to  answer  by  discovering  some  crucial  ex- 
periment. 

Metaphysically,  however,  the  question  is  interesting 
in  two  respects.  First,  it  is  part  of  that  larger  question: 
Has  the  world  one  logically  continuous  system,  forming 
as  it  were  the  great  logical  skeleton  of  the  universe,  with 
whose  members  all  else  which  exists  is  in  a  one  to  one 
correspondence?    There  is  no  doubt  a  tendency  in  mod- 


THE  MENTAL  267 

em  science  to  assume  this  and  to  find  in  mechanics  or 
physics  the  science  which  reveals  to  us  the  nature  of 
this  continuous  system.  Indeed  this  postulate  has  been 
long  a  firm  conviction  among  natural  scientists.  But 
in  our  own  day  we  are  hearing  this  postulate  questioned 
on  many  sides.  Vitalism  in  biology  explicitly  disputes 
it.  A  renewal  of  the  soul  hypothesis  in  pyschology  is 
also  explicitly  denying  its  truth. 

Secondly,  the  soul-problem  is  metaphysically  interest- 
ing because  it  is  inherently  very  difficult  to  solve,  as  is  also 
the  problem  of  vitalism.  Further  and  further  evidence  of 
a  one  to  one  correspondence  in  either  of  these  problems, 
as  this  or  that  physiological  or  psychological  discovery 
is  made,  is  never  a  convincing  proof;  for  our  present  ig- 
norance is  great  and  the  field  of  possible  independence 
on  the  part  of  life  and  of  consciousness  remains  vast. 
One  thing,  however,  all  scientists  are  agreed  upon,  that 
we  should  ever  seek  this  one  to  one  correspondence 
between  the  terms  of  the  logically  continuous  and  the 
terms  of  the  related  logically  discontinuous. 

For  further  study  read: 

Perry,  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,  Chap,  xii; 

James,  Does  Consciousness  Exist?  /.  of  Philos.,  Psychol.^  etc., 
1904,  i; 

James,  The  Place  of  Mectional  Facts  in  a  World  of  Pure  Ex- 
perience, /.  of  Philos.,  Psychol.,  etc.,  1905,  z; 

Woodbridge,  The  Nature  of  Consciousness,  /.  of  Philos., 
Psychol.,  etc.,  1905,  2; 

Woodbridge,  The  Problem  of  Consciousness,  in  "Studies  in 
Philosophy  and  Psychology:  The  Carman  Commemorative 
Volume;" 

Woodbridge,  Consciousness  and  Meaning,  Psychol.  Review,  1$; 


968  A  FIRST  BOOK  IN  METAPHYSICS 

Woodbridge,  Consciousness,  the  Sense  Organs  and  the  Nervous 

System,  J.  of  Philos.,  Psychol.,  etc.,  1909,  6; 
Montague,  The  Relational  Theory  of  Consciousness  and  Its 

Realistic  Implications,  /.  of  Philos.,  Psychol.,  etc.,  1905,  2; 
Bawden,  The  Functional  View  of  the  Relation  between  the 

Psychical  and  the  Physical,  Philos.  Review,  1902, 11; 
Paulsen,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  87-144; 
Thilly,  The  Theory  of  Interaction,  Philos.  Review,  1901,  10; 
Carr,  The  Theory  of  Psycho-physical  Parallelism  as  a  Working 

Hypothesis  in  Psychology,  Proc.  Aristotd.  Soc,  igii,  11; 
The  New  Realism,  essays  by  Montague,  Holt,  and  Pitkin. 

For  more  extensive  study  read: 
McDougal,  Body  and  Mind; 
Strong,  Why  the  Mind  has  a  Body; 
Ward,  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  Part  HI; 
Bergson,  Matter  and  Memory. 


INDEX 


Absolutism,  212,  2IS 

Agnostidsm,  216 

Analysis,  defense  of,  76  f.;  its  na- 
ture, 7S  ff. 

Animism,  265  £f. 

Atheism,  168 

Atomism,  see  Mechanism;  243;  in 
biology,  252  ff. 

Causation,  and  causal  pluralism, 

121  ff.;  its  nature,  116  ff. 
Chance,  123  f. 

Change,  the  problem  of,  184  f. 
Consciousness,  nature  of,  256  ff. 
Continuity,  136  ff. 
Continuum,     the     mathematical, 

233  f- 

Cosmological  argument,  for  God's 
existence,  162  ff. 

Creation,  the  problem  of  the  na- 
ture of,  166 

Criticism,  argimient  against, 
206  ff.;  defined,  203  ff.;  vs.  dog- 
matism, 201  ff. 

Deism,  167 
Discontinuity,  136  ff. 
Dogmatism,  see  Criticism. 
Dualism,  180;  epistemological,  214 

Empiricism,  102  ff.,  213  ff. 
Energetics,  and  mechanics,  240  ff. 
Epistemological  theories,  classifi- 
cation of,  211  ff. 


Etemalism,  128  ff. 

Evolution,  i28ff. 

Existence,  and  subsistence,  106  ff.; 

definition  of  term,  40  f. 
Explanation,  defense  of,  81  ff.;  its 

nature,  36  f.;  objections  raised 

by  romanticism  against,  79  ff. 
Faith,  nature  of,  54;  validity  of, 

55  ff. 

Gnosticism,  215  f. 

Idealism,  186  ff. ;  argxmient  against, 

191  ff.;   argument   for,    188  ff.; 

objective,     198  f.;     subjective, 

198  f. 
Implication,  nature  of,  29  f. 
Infinite,  the  mathematical,  233  f. 
Intellectualism,  7ff.,  212  f.;  issue 

between  romanticism  and,  75  ff. 
Interaction  theory,  183 

Knowledge,  its  nature,  25  ff.,  30  ff. 

Logic,  and  existence,   225  f.;  its 

subject-matter,  221  ff. 
Logical  continuity,  see  Continuity. 
Logical  discontinuity,  see  Chance 

and  Discontinuity. 

Materialism,  180 

Mathematics,  its  relation  to  formal 

logic,  228  f.;  nature  of,  227  ff.; 

non-existential,  229  f. 


269 


270 


INDEX 


Matter,  232  f. 

Mechanics,  and  energetics,  240  ff. 

Mechanism,  185;  and  vitalism, 
248  ff. 

Mendelism,  as  a  biological  atom- 
ism, 252  ff. 

Metaphysics,  defined,  19  f.;  its 
place  in  science,  67  ff.;  the  rela- 
tion of  its  progress  to  that  of 
science,  69  ff. 

Mind,  its  relation  to  the  body, 
2645. 

Monadism,  as  a  theory  of  sub- 
stance, 177  f.,  183  f. 

Monism,  7  f.;  as  a  theory  of  sub- 
stance, 176  f.,  182;  epistemolog- 
ical,  214;  logical,  86  ff. 

Motion,  232  f. 

Naturalism,    the    issue    between 

supernaturalism  and,  154  ff. 
Nominalism,  106  ff. 
Niunber,  231 

Occasionalism,  177  f.,  183  f. 
Ontological  argument,  for  God's 
existence,  160  ff. 

Pantheism,  167 

Perception,  and  analysis,  75  ff.; 
as  a  criterion  of  truth,  39,  96  ff.; 
of  universals,  99,  102  ff.;  pro- 
gress in,  loi  f. 

Phenomenalism,  196  ff.,  214 

Philosophy,  defined,  14  ff.;  differ- 
ent views  regarding  the  nature 
of,  3  ff. 

Physical,  the  nature  of  the,  236  ff. 

Physical  theory,  and  existence, 
243  ff. 


Platonic  realism,  106  ff. 
Pluralism,  7  f.,  182;  logical,  86  ff. 
Pragmatism,  7,  212 
Preestablished    harmony,    177  f., 

183  f. 
Proposition,     nature    of,     28  ff.; 

172  f. 
Psychology,    its    subject-matter, 

256  ff. 

Rationalism,  102  ff.;  213 

Realism,  see  Platonic  Realism 
and  Idealism;  representative, 
196,  214 

Reality,  see  Existence;  and  ap- 
pearance, 48  ff.;  its  logical 
strata,  136  ff. 

Relations,  external  theory  of,  86  ff . 

Romanticism,  5  f.,  212  f.;  defined, 
75  ff.;  issue  between  intellect- 
ualism  and,  75  ff. 

Science,  nature  of,  53  ff.,  60;  what 
constitutes  its  progress,  62  ff. 

Skepticism,  215  f. 

Soul,  265  ff. 

Space,  231  f. 

Spiritualism,  180  f. 

Spontaneity,  123  f. 

Subsistence,  106  ff. 

Substance,  definition  of,  169  ff. 

Substance  hypothesis,  criticism 
of,  174  ff.;  nature  of,  172  ff.; 
origin  of  the,  169  ff. 

Supernaturalism,  150  ff.;  origin  of, 
152  ff.;  the  issue  between  na- 
turalism and, 154  ff. 

Teleological  argvmaent,  for  God's 
existence,  164  f. 


INDEX 


271 


Temporalism,  128  ff. 

Theism,  see  Theology  and  Super- 
naturalism;  167 

Theology,  150  ff.;  as  a  metaphy- 
sics, 160  ff. 

Time,  231  f. 

Transcendentalism,  see  Criticism; 
213 

Truth,  ascertainment  of,  32  ff.; 
consistency  as  a  criterion  of, 
96  ff.;  its  nature,  27  f.;  percep- 
tion as  a  criterion  of,  96  ff. 


Universals,  perception  of,  99, 
102  ff. 

Value,  its  nature,  58  f. 
Vitalism,  248  ff. 

World,  as  conceived  by  common 
sense,  46  ff.;  as  perceived,  43  ff.; 
definition  of  term,  38  f.;  rela- 
tion between  world  as  perceived 
and  as  conceived,  46  ff.;  the 
problem  of  its  relation  to  God, 
167 


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